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Introduction

We have always lived in the shadows like obscure cockroaches,
powerless before the reading of a newspaper, babbling before the
morose enemy who stole our crops, stripped our land, converted
them from wheat into vineyards useless for our hunger. We
receive the natural verdict with relief. It would finally break the
monotony of servitude. And it is the native soil that will shake
the rocks and that now opens, to bury us with our denouncers,
these arrogant masters who know the pain that they inflict.
—“Old Man,” in Henri Kréa, Le séisme: Tragédie

A

lmost four years after the French Algerian city of Orléansville
was devastated by an earthquake in September 1954, the Franco-Algerian playwright Henri Kréa published a play that presented the seismic
disaster as a harbinger of a painful but necessary decolonization. Kréa, a.k.a.
Henri Cochin, son of a French father and Algerian mother, was an advocate
of Algerian independence, and the struggle for decolonization was still underway when Kréa wrote Le séisme: Tragédie.1 The Algerian Revolution, which had
begun just weeks after the earthquake, would not achieve the independence of
Algeria from French rule until 1962. In the intervening years, North Africa and
France would be wracked by a series of disasters: seismic aftershocks and years
of brutal warfare in Algeria, a dam collapse in France, a mass poisoning, and
another catastrophic earthquake in Morocco.
Kréa’s play, begun in 1956 and published in 1958 in both Paris and Tunis, was
explicitly anti-imperialist. The play builds on the synchronicity of the Orléansville earthquake and the nationalist revolution that began a few weeks later. Yet
Kréa’s play purports to render chronology irrelevant: Le séisme opens with a recitation of major earthquakes of the 1900s, from Calabria in 1905 to Orléansville
1
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in 1954, and then juxtaposes these disasters, particularly the Orléansville earthquake, with an ancient narrative of anti-colonial resistance in North Africa: the
second-century BC rebellion of the Numidian king Jugartha against Roman
occupation.2 The geoenvironmental disaster of 1954 was linked to colonial violence through the category of malheur (misfortune, woe); the revolution of
1954 was linked to antiquity through the theme of oppression and anti-colonial
rebellion.
At the outset, the play’s portrayal of natural disasters is intertwined with its
portrayal of Roman/French colonialism in North Africa. The prologue begins
with a voiceover explaining geological theories of earthquake production and
then turns to antiquity, with the Romans invading North Africa like “locusts
that periodically swoop down to bring famine to fertile Numidia.”3 After the
prologue, however, the ancient setting abruptly dissolves, and the focus of the
first act of the play (“Episode 1”) shifts to the 1954 earthquake as the play turns
to the relationship between the seismic and political events in modern Algeria.
Revising a trope that geographer El Djamhouria Slimani Aït Saada has traced
back to the colonial discourses of the nineteenth century, Kréa portrayed a country battered by misfortune. Earthquakes, war, floods, locusts, and the tragedy
of death in childbirth all converge in the suffering of the Algerian people. The
choir chants in the final passage of the play:
This country, crucible of men of all origins of all poetic destinations
Collides
With clatterings of fire
With the deaf rhythm of blood
Flowing in streams
Like a flooding river
Breaking the dikes of the narrow valleys. . . .
The eternal wave of generations . . .
Crushed by the cosmic pestle
Of misfortune.4
However, this grim finale, as well as the play’s subtitle—Tragédie—contradicts
the dominant narrative of the play, which portrays the earthquake as a vehicle
of salvation.5
At first, the earthquake seems to sweep away the injustices of colonialism,
offering death as the only liberation. However, the pessimism of the Old Man’s
interpretation of the disaster is superseded by a vision of hope through catharsis, communicated at the end of “Episode 1” in a voiceover that reinforces the
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relationship between the seismic and political upheavals in Algeria: “Understand that the earth shook at the same time that the people arose from their torpor.”6 Thus the moral righteousness of the struggle for liberation gives meaning
to all other forms of suffering. In Kréa’s play, the earthquake is not just a portent
of the coming revolution, it is also retribution:
All the dead howl and stir in concert, these fields and these villages that
were stolen from them. The trees open to battle the convoy of sacrilege.
Nothing different, the insects, stones, man. Their planes like sharks are
drowned by the welcome invasion of locusts. Their arms are of no use.7
One disaster avenges another, and if the colonized suffer, the colonizer is also
weakened. The earthquake is a disaster not only for the long-suffering Algerians
but also for the French; as such, it is the first strike against empire. The varieties
of catastrophe that afflict humanity blur into one another: sharks and aerial
bombardments; childbirth and epidemics; earthquakes and locusts. Yet there is
order and meaning in this litany of suffering:
The great day has arrived
With its procession of misfortunes
But misfortunes are good for something
For example the general suppression of misery
The resurrection of grand sentiments
Certainly
One must die of hunger . . . to be human8
The earthquake, and the war, serve a purpose: the liberation and redemption of
the Algerian people.
Kréa’s association of French colonialism with natural scourges like sharks or
locusts portrays individual human actors as overwhelmed by a situation they
neither understand nor control. The French occupiers are confused, struggling
to follow an imperial ideology but bewildered by the realities of colonial North
Africa. Believing in the good works brought about by colonialism but pelted
by children throwing potatoes “larded with razor blades,” the soldiers ask why
their beneficence is welcomed with such hostility, even from the earth itself:
“the stones themselves ruminate with menace.”9 Ultimately, the colonial situation leads the occupiers to extremes of evil. A soldier who was a surgeon in
France, saving lives, becomes a torturer in Algeria, disemboweling prisoners. Another soldier speaks with regret of two children he slaughtered “like partridges”;
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another gleefully recounts the story of a humanist professor who spoke of ethics
until he came under fire, at which point he became “as savage as a cannibal,”
getting drunk and “thinking only of raping little girls.” This brutality, the play
suggests, stems from colonial occupation; French intentions and the idea of a
civilizing mission are irrelevant: they cannot mitigate the brutal nature of colonialism any more than they can alter the movement of tectonic plates.10
The dramatic turning point in the play is the radicalization of the older generation of Muslim Algerians. This occurs in the last section of the play, when
the Old Man and the Old Woman break free from their tragic flaw, their resigned accommodation to colonialism, which Kréa portrays as characteristic of
the older generation. Awakened from their “hypnosis”11 by the earthquake, the
old couple becomes politicized, and the Old Man leaves to take up arms for
the nationalist cause. The sound of the rumbling earth fills the theater, and an
image of a mask of Jugartha, symbol of anti-colonial rebellion, is projected onto a
screen. Rather than representing the earthquake as an inexplicable, meaningless
bringer of suffering, Kréa’s characters interpret it as a clarion call to revolution
and as a sacrifice for the cause. In Kréa’s play, the earthquake-inflicted suffering
of the people, like the violence of rebellion, is the price of salvation. In this vision
of human politics and the physical environment, the two become one: the earthquake and the Algerian Revolution form an inseparable cataclysm.12

Decolonization and Disaster
Historians have increasingly recognized the role of environmental disasters in
the expansion of colonial empires and the development of colonial states.13 In
the historiography of decolonization in North Africa, however, environmental
events, no matter how catastrophic in scale or transformative for those involved,
are often relegated to the background.14 For the average historian, “Algeria 1954”
is shorthand for one thing: the beginning of the Algerian Revolution, a war
which finally led to Algerian independence over seven years later. For the survivors of Orléansville, however, “Algeria 1954” invokes not only the revolution
but also the earthquake. For those who experienced environmental disasters in
Morocco, Algeria, and France between 1954 and 1960, the consequent horrors
were major events, not mere footnotes to the military and political upheavals
of those years. However, the experience of empire and decolonization did not
cease when environmental disasters erupted into the social and political lives
of humans. The inseparability of the human and the environmental, of disaster
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and decolonization, was inscribed across a range of historical texts that can be
examined by the historian: in archival documents, in architecture, in fiction,
and in memoir. The interpenetrations of disaster and decolonization in these
texts have often been obscured by the tendency of popular and academic historiography to separate narratives of political and military events and narratives of
human culture and society from the history of the inanimate environment. Yet
the evidence examined here reveals ways in which the environmental is lived and
understood by humans through the experience of the political and the social.
The earthquake portrayed by Kréa was one of several environmental catastrophes that were bound up in the history, literature, and memory of decolonization in the French empire. This book focuses on four major environmental
disasters that afflicted France, Algeria, and Morocco. These disasters occurred in
the period of French Africa’s transition to independence, which came, formally,
to Morocco (and Tunisia) in 1956; to much of sub-Saharan Africa in 1960; and,
finally, to Algeria in 1962. Two of the disasters examined here are earthquakes:
the September 9, 1954 earthquake and its seismic aftershocks in Algeria’s Chélif
Valley, and the February 28, 1960 earthquake in Agadir, Morocco. The other
two are of overtly anthropogenic origins: the flooding of Fréjus, France, due to
the collapse of the Malpasset Dam in 1959, and a mass outbreak of paralysis in
1959 Morocco, caused by the contamination of the food supply with jet engine
lubricant from an American airbase.
These four disasters were interrelated in multiple ways. Refugees from the
Orléansville earthquake found themselves in Fréjus when the Malpasset Dam
collapsed, and Orléansville became a model for state responses to disaster in
both Fréjus and Agadir. The experience of the 1959 poisoning altered the political calculus of both the US State Department and the Moroccan political opposition following the 1960 earthquake. The Fréjus flood was invoked by French,
American, and Moroccan actors in the diplomatic wrangling, domestic politics,
and great-power machinations that followed both the 1959 poisoning and 1960
earthquake. Due to these interconnections, these four events constitute a single
object of study, impacting Algerian struggles for independence, French reckoning with the loss of empire, and Moroccans’ endeavors to extricate themselves,
even after formal independence, from the continuing military and cultural legacy of French occupation.
These four disasters were not the only four horsemen of the French empire’s
apocalypse in North Africa. Indeed, drought, famine, disease, torture, and massacres are all mentioned in the chapters that follow. Elinor Accampo and Jeffrey
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Jackson have defined “disasters” as “extraordinary circumstances that force individuals, governments, and organizations to operate in unusual and stressful
ways.”15 There were many such circumstances amidst the tumult of imperialism
and decolonization. Nevertheless, these four catastrophes were distinct from the
other calamities of the era in their interconnectedness and in that they were
large-scale transformative events produced by “rapid-onset hazards,” the onsets
of which were not intentionally initiated, thus fitting a narrower scholarly definition separating disasters from other infelicitous events.16
No great importance is placed here on the distinction between “natureinduced” and anthropogenic disasters.17 Rousseau said of the 1755 earthquake
that devastated Lisbon and Meknes that, if people did not build homes made of
heavy materials, earthquakes would cause little damage.18 Rousseau’s argument
becomes particularly relevant to the present study when one learns of the injuries
to earthquake-stricken rural Algerians caused by collapsing tile roofs, an innovation that had replaced the mud-and-thatch used in decades past. More than two
centuries after Rousseau, scholars now widely accept that the effects of so-called
“natural disasters” are determined by historical processes and human actions.
As Jonathan Bergman has put it, natural disasters constitute “a meeting ground
or ‘human ecology’ between human and non-human worlds.”19 This is also true
of unintentionally produced disasters such as the Malpasset Dam collapse in
France and the mass chemical poisoning in Morocco, which were triggered by
anthropogenically manufactured hazards.
Ted Steinberg has argued that the modern idea of a “natural” disaster is a
technology of power, allowing elites to obscure the processes that produce disproportionate suffering among the disempowered.20 In all four of the disasters
addressed here, the colonized suffered more than did the colonizers, and the
poor more than the rich, due to the unequal distribution of resources both before and after the disaster. In the case of the two earthquakes, the idea of “natural disasters” helped elites’ efforts to obscure the social determinants of this
suffering. But all four of these disasters revealed the inequities and injustices of
colonialism.
However, while recognizing the revelatory aspect of disasters, we must also
recognize that disasters can also be transformative, creating abrupt changes in
political, social, and cultural landscapes as well as physical ones. The present
volume takes up the challenge posed by environmental historians to consider
seriously the impact of the environment on human history.21 Arguing against
the notion of “natural” (or “accidental”) disasters in favor of the idea that the
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results of disasters are determined by human decisions and social arrangements,
one runs the risk of denying the importance of the environment in history, repeating the notion of modern history as a story of humans shaping their own
destinies using ingredients provided by nature.22
In the mythology of modernity, the environment begins as a problem but becomes a tool. This myth is shadowed by its inverse: the Frankenstein narrative of
human hubris that places (inadequate) human rationality in opposition to (uncontrollable) nature. However, sources close to these events reveal a multivalent
relation between the human history of decolonization and the environmental
history of floods, chemical compounds, and earthquakes. As Timothy Mitchell
has argued, the opposition between inanimate nature and active human rationality is problematic, a discursive tradition which itself ought to be an object
of study, imposed upon a messy web of causality involving both human and
non-human actors. In contrast to this hegemonic discourse, survivors’ memoirs
and literary representations such as Kréa’s represent counter-hegemonic visions
of what Mitchell calls “the ambivalent relation between the nonhuman and the
human.”23 Archival documents reveal how disasters disrupted colonial projects
and undermined the propaganda of imperialist “civilization” that promised
material and moral benefits for the colonized; disasters likewise undercut triumphalist nationalist narratives promising that political independence would
bring salvation to the poor and oppressed. In other instances, however, the new
circumstances created by disasters were mastered by the powerful, who forged
new tools of colonial oppression, international diplomacy, anti-colonial propaganda, or authoritarian nation-building.
In Kréa’s creative vision, humans are not the only actors, and the distinction between the human and inanimate fades. Kréa’s narrator informs us that
“earthquakes are subject to the same causes whether they be human or telluric.”24
Henri Kréa’s portrayal of the 1954 earthquake’s relation to the struggle for independence might be dismissed as “mere” metaphor, a literary device, if it were
not for other types of documentary evidence revealing the effects of these disasters, as “both ecological facts and representational spaces,”25 on the experience
of decolonization, while also revealing the impact of decolonization on the experience of these disasters. This evidence includes French, Algerian, Moroccan,
and American sources ranging from diplomatic cables and political polemics to
memoirs and architectural reviews. These sources demonstrate that the intersections of disaster and decolonization affected not only memoirs and imaginative
writing but also Cold War diplomacy, humanitarian medical missions, and the
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Map 1. The western Maghreb and southwestern Europe. (Erin Greb Cartography.)

architecture and urbanism of post-disaster reconstruction. This archival record
is replete with evidence that the processes of decolonization and disaster were
not just related by a coincidental similarity in their effects on human bodies and
built environments but that disaster and decolonization impacted each other
in multiple ways, as the legacy of colonialism and the politics of decolonization
shaped the distribution of harm and the distribution of aid, while the destruction of cities created new landscapes for the imagination and implementation of
post-imperial visions.

Introduction

9

Calamity, Empire, and Locality
The events described here all took place within a particular trans-Mediterranean
region of the waning French empire, encompassing the western Maghreb and
the Côte d’Azur. This book situates environmental disasters in the context of
the processes of decolonization through which France, Algeria, and Morocco
negotiated new relationships as separate entities rather than as components of
an empire. However, the focus here is on localities rather than nation-states.
To be more precise, the book centers on the study of disaster-afflicted provincial cities and the areas around them: Orléansville and the Chélif Valley, Fréjus
and the Reyran Valley, Agadir and the Sous Valley, and, to a lesser degree, Meknes, the initial epicenter of the 1959 poisoning that afflicted much of Morocco.
Scholars Gregory Mann and Emmanuelle Saada, among others, have urged their
colleagues to integrate the study of particular localities into our understanding
of imperialism in both metropole and colony and to explore the relation of localities to each other and to global and imperial institutions and networks.26
In an article focusing on Fréjus, Mann seeks to push colonial studies to see beyond the colonial cultures and discourses of the imperial administrative centers
(Paris, Dakar) to the varied and specific places that constituted the empire. This
book follows Mann by working to “disaggregate”27 the waning French empire
by focusing on specific provincial localities—but it also explores what might be
illuminated by re-aggregating these localities through the trans-local category
of “disaster” (sinistre, cataclysme, catastrophe, karitha), a category neglected in
academic historiography but dynamic in the popular press of the time, the archival record, and the remembered experience of those involved. Mann writes:
“The town [Fréjus] and places like it offer immense potential for understanding the cultivation and evolution of historically grounded social and political
formations, as well as the emergence of new ones.”28 If we read “places like it”
to mean other locales both transformed by decolonization and afflicted by disaster—i.e. Orléansville, Meknes, Agadir—we can then examine how disasters
catalyzed the “emergence” of new “social and political formations” and how imperialism and decolonization shaped how people in these locales interpreted and
responded to disaster.
The historiographic turn toward locality parallels efforts by Algerian scholars
and memoirists to explore and remember local pasts, a trend which has produced
complex treatments of the colonial era. Mostefa Lacheraf, in his 1999 preface to
Dr. Belgacem Aït Ouyahia’s memoir Pierres et lumières, describes the attempt
by Algerian writers to liberate Algerian history from the dominance of “abstract
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ideologies, ahistorical and without relation to reality past or present” through
the writing of local histories of village life and of cities. Writing during the civil
war of the 1990s, Lacheraf argued that this localist turn could serve to counter
not only “stereotyped ethnography” of Algerians (a legacy of colonialism) but
also visions of Algeria promoted by Islamist radicals.29 This historiography of
the local also offers an alternative to nationalist narratives of heroic resistance
to a uniformly destructive colonizer.30 As Chapter 7 of the present volume will
discuss, Aït Ouyahia’s memoir explicitly seeks to provide such an alternative
through his self-deprecatory representations of his own tentative relation to the
struggle for independence, and, less explicitly, through his ambiguous portrayals
of French colonial education and medicine.
The turn toward local history in Algeria has also brought to light the relationships between local disasters and experiences of colonialism and decolonization.
El Djamhouria Slimani Aït Saada has made the region of the Chélif Valley, including Orléansville (later known as El Asnam and today as Chlef), the focus of
a study which “seeks to unravel the ties between physical and human geography
and space, and economic, social, and cultural life” through an examination of
memoirs, geographical works, and literature written from the time of French
conquest to the late twentieth century.31 Aït Saada’s examination of the Chélif Valley details an enduring discourse about the violence of the environment
in Algeria that has persisted from the time of French conquest through half a
century of Algerian independence. French sources from the nineteenth century
reveal that the Orléansville region was defined, in the minds of many French
writers, by the environmental hardships inflicted on its inhabitants, as “the heat,
the floods, and the earthquakes contributed to the construction of a strongly
deprecatory imagination of the region.”32 Since independence, Algerian writers
have continued to reflect on the brutality of this environment. This discourse
of the violent environment resembles the persistent narrative of human violence
as the defining feature of Algerian history recently deconstructed by James McDougall in both its racist imperialist form (“imagined native ‘savagery’” requiring repressive violence from the colonizer) and its nationalist reincarnation (“inflexible, unreformable, total oppression” requiring revolutionary violence from
the colonized).33 But these discourses about political and environmental violence
are not separate, parallel strands. Aït Saada’s work reveals, with local specificity,
a double helix of connections between discourses about calamity, colonial rule,
and decolonization in the Chélif region.
Aït Saada explains that the association of natural disaster with the uprising of
the Algerian people appeared not only in the work of Henri Kréa but also in that
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of other Algerian writers such as Habib Tengour and Belgacem Aït Ouyahia
(both discussed at length in this book), as well as Jean Millecam and Mohamed
Magani.34 Aït Saada could also have included the leftist dissidents Boualem
Khalfa, Henri Alleg, and Abdelhamid Benzin, who echoed Kréa in their memoir of the dissident newspaper Alger Républicain: “The autumn of 1954 opened
with a cataclysm. As if nature wanted to be the herald of the hurricane that, for
more than seven years, would tear apart and convulse the country.”35 For these
writers, as Aït Saada argues, the “political and telluric tremors” of the period
could not be separated.36
The intersections of colonialism and decolonization with environmental
calamity are equally evident in writings about the disasters in Fréjus, Agadir,
and Meknes. In Morocco, there has been much interest in distinct histories of
localities long neglected in nationalist historiographies—particularly in the
Tashelhit-speaking south, where Agadir is located. This interest is due both to
the widespread perception, discussed in Chapter 6, that the 1960 earthquake
had a deleterious and disorienting effect on Agadir’s relation to Moroccan heritage and identity and to the countervailing narrative of the Berber cultural
movement that posits Agadir as the “capital” of Morocco’s Berber culture.37
In Fréjus, meanwhile, local notions of a particular identity have undergirded
resistance to more inclusive notions of Frenchness from the time of the 1959
Malpasset Dam collapse to the present. The chapters that follow make the argument that, in these localities, the experience of catastrophe was inseparable from
the upheavals of decolonization, and the shape of decolonization was crafted by
catastrophe.

The Long and the Short of It
Decolonization and disasters were often tied together in survivors’ and observers’ interpretations and memories of events—that is to say, in the lived experience of events, for we live in realms of memory and interpretation. Was this
merely an ahistorical psychological or linguistic phenomenon—a tendency to associate suffering with suffering, sometimes including other, more personal traumas? Does Kréa’s metaphor of disaster and decolonization have dramatic force
only by means of a trick of the mind or linguistic sleight of hand through which
the reader accepts the equation of one sort of woe with another? In Kréa’s play,
the casualties of war and earthquake are intermingled with childbirth, death,
and the suffering of famine.38 In other accounts of disaster discussed in this
book, an automobile accident, a geriatric medical crisis and a childhood sexual
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assault mingle with the violence of decolonization and of disasters. Meanwhile,
the equation of environmental disaster with war had become commonplace in
the twentieth century, as new technologies and methods of warfare—bomber
planes and basket bombs— now leveled buildings and created carnage in a way
that resembled the effects of earthquakes and floods.
This book argues that the survivors, novelists, and memoirists who associated
the disasters of the period with decolonization were not merely suffering from
a painful mental illusion or capitalizing on a coincidental resemblance or useful metaphor. They were invoking a literary trope, to be sure, but the power of
that literary trope was based, as good literature is, on astute observation. These
individuals recognized that distinctions between the natural and the social, the
seismic and the political, are illusory. No environmental event is experienced
outside of sociopolitical contexts, and no human story takes place in an environmental vacuum. The archival record reveals that the upheavals in Algeria,
Morocco, and France that were triggered by the disasters of 1954–1960 were inseparable from the upheavals produced by the violence of colonialism and decolonization. The human relation to the environment is not separate from political
history, and one cannot write the history of these disasters without writing the
history of decolonization.
Unlike Mitchell’s Rule of Experts and Gregory Clancey’s Earthquake Nation,
works which have deftly treated intersections of environment and Western imperialism, this book does not focus primarily on “experts,” although experts are
certainly included here. Much of this book examines the disruption caused by
disasters and the efforts to conceptualize and instrumentalize disasters among
those whose claims of expertise lay elsewhere: mayors, legislators, bureaucrats,
diplomats, journalists, novelists, dissidents, a fisherman, an obstetrician, a filmmaker. Some of the sources used here conform to the traditional definition of
“hard” primary sources: written close to the time of the event, for purposes
seemingly other than the representation of events to posterity, but collected
by archivists for later use in the construction of historiography. However, the
present volume also examines, as source evidence, texts written months, years,
or decades later. These texts include not only imaginative writing and personal
memoirs but also local histories. However, while written long after the onset of
the disasters discussed here, such sources are no less “primary” to an examination of the long-term effects of these disasters and the meanings that humans
ascribed to them.
This book examines disasters and decolonization as temporally extensive
phenomena that do not occur in a “catastrophic instant” but that unfold over
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the course of time—not only weeks and years but also decades.39 Cities, once
destroyed, remain transformed evermore, even if rebuilt. Bodies that become
paralyzed remain impaired for decades, even if some recovery occurs. And the
dead remain dead, even if they do not all remain in their original graves. Therefore, sources that would usually be considered “secondary”—produced long after
the initiating “event”—become “primary” in this analysis, revealing the disaster
and decolonization in their temporally extended forms. Conversely, the “primary” sources produced soon after the onset of catastrophic events are no less
representational than texts produced decades later, but they can represent only
a temporally truncated version of the event; other sources must be consulted to
understand catastrophic events as they unfold over a longer duration and are
inscribed into built environments, histories, and memorializations.40
Decolonizations, like disasters, are also extended affairs. The term decolonization includes the formal recognition of national political independence
through a treaty or accord (e.g. Morocco and France in 1956; Algeria and France
in 1962); it can also refer to the mass exodus of colonists and descendants of
colonists from a particular locality (e.g. Agadir in 1960; Orléansville in 1962).
Decolonization also includes the long chronology of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence that helped to bring about formal independence and continued thereafter. Sometimes, decolonization involves the departure not only of
the living but also of the dead. Sometimes, the end of military occupation comes
long after formal independence and after the outmigration of colonists and their
corpses. In certain contexts, decolonization can mean the displacement of European imperialism by Cold War geopolitics and American (or in other cases,
Soviet) neo-imperialism. Decolonization can also mean the end of the hegemony
of Western imperialist cultural values, aesthetics, and epistemologies—a process
that, if not unattainable, is far slower, more fraught, and much less complete
than the others. Consequently, the synchronicity and interpenetration of the
history of decolonization with the four disasters examined here does not consist
solely in the fact that the onset of these disasters began during the years of the
Algerian Revolution or within a few years of Morocco’s emergence as an independent nation. The disasters that began in 1954-1960 were long, and so were the
decolonizations, and their interconnectedness has spanned decades.
The enduring temporality of both disasters and decolonization has been explored within the field of trauma studies. Approached from a psychoanalytic
perspective, traumatic events are identified as such because the individual cannot comprehend them as they occur; consequently, they are experienced only
later, through flashbacks, emotions and sensory experiences that disrupt the

14

chapter 1

normal experiencing of time.41 Scholars of colonialism and decolonization have
applied the concept of trauma to describe the social and psychological effects of
colonial oppression on both the colonized and the colonizer.42 Paralleling the
ideas of Henri Kréa, scholars Kai Erikson and Andy Horowitz have problematized the distinction between sudden traumas and the slow grind and quotidian
violence of social injustice or political repression, while applying this expanded
concept of trauma to the experience of putatively natural disasters. Erikson has
argued that not only sudden events but also “chronic conditions” can produce
the traumatic psychological and social reactions that, in his view, define disasters.43 Horowitz has argued that the trauma of disaster develops within the context of longstanding social injustice and political violence. In such contexts, the
sudden “traumatizing agency” of the short-term event cannot be separated from
the suffering caused by the long history and enduring legacies of oppression and
conflict.44 Human experiences of the earthquakes of Orléansville and Agadir,
the 1959 poisoning in Morocco, and the flooding of Fréjus were indeed inseparable from the “chronic conditions” of injustice and violence brought about by
colonialism and decolonization.
However, the enduring experience of environmental disasters, like that of
decolonization, cannot be wholly subsumed within the category of trauma.45
Disasters and decolonization involve not only traumatized sufferers but also
resilient survivors—and triumphant opportunists. In the weeks, months, and
years following the onset of the disasters studied here, the effects of colonialism,
decolonization, and catastrophe manifested, for some, in the struggle to survive
extraordinarily difficult times; for others, in the struggle for power. For many—
diplomats and political leaders, rulers and dissidents, antagonists and allies in
the era of the Cold War and decolonization—disaster was not trauma but rather
was war by other means: the attempt to make Algeria French; the attempt to
make it clear that Algerians were not French; the attempt to maintain Morocco’s
dependence on France; the attempt to extend American influence in Morocco;
the attempt to demonstrate Morocco’s independence from France. The effects
of disasters were tied to questions ranging from whether French military bases
might remain after independence to what a modern, independent North African
city ought to look like.
In their short and their long manifestations, the disasters discussed here
shaped international relations, urban landscapes, and the attitudes of French,
Moroccan, and Algerian individuals toward the colonial, pre-disaster past and
toward the post-disaster, post-independence future. The breakup of the French
empire shaped how these disasters were conceptualized, how historical actors
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responded to them, and how the suffering was distributed. The ongoing lives
of disasters and decolonizations extended through the decades in the physical
environment of cities and ruins, buildings and cemeteries, and in the culture and
politics surrounding memory and the built environment. Rebuilding the cities
of Orléansville, Fréjus, and Agadir took years, and these urban environments
were forever transformed by their destruction and reconstruction, and by the
political and demographic upheavals of decolonization. Survivors would forever
have to cope with the absence of what had been destroyed, and with the meaning of living in, or in exile from, a city that had been transformed. However,
post-disaster urban landscapes also provided an opportunity for new assertions
about culture, identity, and power. For some, recovery from disaster offered opportunities to break from the past and impose visions of a glorious future; for
others, disaster offered an opportunity to lament how much had already been
lost. The documentary record produced after these catastrophes reveals competing elites, dissidents, and disaster survivors jockeying to advance competing
and protean visions for Algeria, France, and Morocco in spaces fundamentally
altered by political and environmental events.
This book argues that the interconnections between these disasters and the
decolonization of Morocco and Algeria are evident in both the long and the
short term, as evinced by sources produced throughout this temporal scale,
ranging from diplomatic dispatches and radio broadcasts to memoirs, novels,
architectural plans and urban landscapes. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the Chélif
Valley earthquake and the Malpasset Dam collapse in both their short and long
manifestations, through the lenses of archival documents and through works of
long-term memory and representation. Chapter 4 concentrates on the Morocco
oil poisoning in the short term, examining the expanding impact of the United
States and the Cold War on the political and diplomatic environment in the
waning French Empire. Chapters 5 and 6 both examine the Agadir earthquake,
providing an extended case study of the short and long temporality of a particular disaster. Chapter 5 treats the short term, investigating the manifestations
of the political and diplomatic struggles of decolonization and the Cold War
in controversies concerning the treatment of survivors, the burial of the dead,
and the reconstruction of the city. Because the built environment of Agadir’s
post-earthquake urban landscape and the legacy of disaster remained central
to debates about the meaning of Moroccan identity in ways not paralleled in
Fréjus or in Orléansville-Chlef, Chapter 6 extends the treatment of the urban
reconstruction of Agadir into the longer term, examining the politics of decolonization in relation to architecture and urban planning. Chapter 7 returns to
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the topic of memory and literary representation, examining the long process of
making meaning of catastrophe among survivors and observers of disasters and
decolonization in both Morocco and Algeria.
In these chapters, I have sought to demonstrate that the 1954 Algeria earthquake, the 1959 Malpasset Dam collapse, the 1959 Morocco oil poisoning, and
the 1960 Morocco earthquake were not just momentary ruptures in human history, but were enduring phenomena intimately connected with a decolonization
process that continued long after the 1962 Évian Accords brought formal independence to the last of France’s North African holdings. It may not be precisely
true that “earthquakes are subject to the same causes whether they be human or
telluric.”46 But Henri Kréa was right to see human and environmental history,
decolonization and disaster, as interwoven both in the immediate aftermath of
catastrophic events and through the long “eternal wave of generations.”

Ch a pter 2

Algeria, 1954

A

t 1:06 a.m. on September 9, 1954, Algeria’s Chélif Valley was
struck with an earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale. Two
hundred kilometers northeast of the epicenter, the news reached a
young Muslim doctor, Belgacem Aït Ouyahia, sitting in his new Renault 203 in
the town of Haussonvillers (today Naciria). Aït Ouyahia had just left the Chélif
the week before after finishing his surgical internship in Orléansville; he was
on his way to take up a position in the colonial health service as a “médecin de
colonization de la région” in his native Kabylia, while he finished his thesis. It
was eight in the morning, and he had just stopped for gas, coffee, and a beignet.
Aït Ouyahia recounted that moment in his 1999 memoir:
I got back behind the wheel and turned on the radio:
“. . . [sic] has shaken the region of Orléansville. Numerous buildings have
collapsed. Already there are known to be many victims, and the hospital
is inundated with the injured. This is the largest earthquake ever known
in Algeria…”
—My God! My God!
And I surprised myself; I, who was not too observant—even not observant at all—I surprised myself by reciting the shahada in a loud voice:
“There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his prophet.”1

Aït Ouyahia immediately turned the car around and returned to Orléansville to
rejoin the medical team at the hospital there. Aït Ouyahia was fortunate to have
been far from the center of the earthquake when it struck, but upon his return
to Orléansville, a city of thirty thousand people just thirty kilometers from the
epicenter, he would soon be confronted with the horrors that this sudden movement of the inanimate had inflicted on human bodies.
In his 1955 memoir, a French official, René Debia, described the experience of
the city’s inhabitants:
17
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Those who were not crushed immediately were thrown to the ground “like
the fruits of a fig tree bent by a storm,” like sailors in the midst of a storm,
of which the same din arose around them; it was a deafening noise, formed
of an extraordinary rumbling that rose from the subsoil of the earth, of the
crashing of walls, and their cracking, like that of a ship rocked by waves,
of the dull thud of buildings that crashed on their neighbors like water on
a bridge. And the fathers, the mothers who gathered together their children that night, in the darkness, did so instinctively with the idea of awaiting together a death which seemed to them inevitable; but the shaking of
the ground abated, little by little; without realizing it, they tried to grope
their way to an exit or a stairwell, they climbed over the piles of rubble
and twisted iron; surprised to be still alive, they reached a courtyard, a
garden, or a street; and there, breathing, breathed finally an odor of sulfur
that came, they didn’t know from where, and this opaque dust cloud that
enveloped the city, adding to the thickness of the dark.2

When the sun rose, wrote Debia, Orléansville resembled a bombed out city,
a “landscape of death. 3” Debia stated that four thousand homes had been destroyed in the city; in the entire affected region, he counted eighteen thousand
ruined “houses,” plus the destruction of thirty-five thousand gourbis—small,
windowless structures made of earthen bricks, packed earth (pisé), or sticks or
stones cemented with mud, that were home to the vast majority of the rural Muslim population. In Debia’s words, the gourbis were obliterated “as if by an explosion. Often the roof was intact but had collapsed in one piece on top of the rest
of the structure; from this debris one pulled out the cadavers and the injured.”4
Scientists would later attribute the disaster’s onset to the slow collision of
tectonic plates in the Dahra mountains near the Mediterranean coast.5 An aftershock measuring 6.2 on the Richter scale struck farther north near the coastal
city of Ténès the next day, bringing down more buildings. Countless more aftershocks followed, including significant tremors on September 16 and October
19 and 21. The earthquake and its aftershocks killed at least twelve hundred
people throughout the region, injured about fourteen thousand, and left as many
as two hundred thousand homeless. The vast majority of the dead—over 90
percent—were Muslim Algerians, reflecting the overall population of the affected area as well as the quality of housing.6 As in most earthquakes, it was
human construction that did most of the actual killing. The deadly pancaking of gourbis described by René Debia was most likely due to the adoption of
tile roofing material weighed down and held in place by large rocks. In urban
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areas, the widespread use of masonry in building construction proved similarly
lethal.7 Neither metropolitan nor Algerian France had building codes specifically developed for areas of seismic risk, and the general French building code
was only applied to larger buildings constructed after 1946 from steel-reinforced
concrete.8 On the other hand, reinforced concrete was insufficient to save an
almost-completed nine-story, low-income apartment building (habitation à loyer
modéré or HLM) in Orléansville, which “collapsed like a house of cards, crushing the workers who were living on one its floors.”9
Those who died there left no memoirs, of course. If disaster victims are a
particular subcategory of subaltern, then only the survivors speak.10 However,
the voices of the most disempowered survivors are also muted: the destitute, the
illiterate, those too traumatized by disaster or terrorized by war, or too occupied
by the struggle to survive to provide testimony for posterity. René Debia and
Belgacem Aït Ouyahia were in many ways typical of those who were able to
provide such testimony. As the French subprefect for the region of Orléansville
and an educated surgeon and future professor of obstetrics at the Algiers School
of Medicine, respectively, these men were sufficiently privileged to get their own
representations of the disaster published, even if this event, so enormous in scale
and transformative in their own lives, would be pushed to the margins of the
dominant historical narratives of the era.11 Both Debia and Aït Ouyahia saw the
disaster as intimately related to the question of decolonization in Algeria, but
the two men held sharply contrasting views of this relationship. For Debia, the
earthquake both revealed and augmented the commonality of interests between
the French and the Muslim Algerians of the Chélif Valley, demonstrating the
necessity of continued French rule; for Aït Ouyahia, the disaster was a turning
point that decisively demonstrated the oppressive nature of French colonialism.
Their writings demonstrate the fractured experience of these events as well as
the inseparability of the environmental catastrophe from the experience of political turmoil.
Like the memoirs of Debia and Aït Ouyahia, sources written in the days and
weeks following the 1954 earthquake also reveal divergent understandings of
these events as well as the linkages between the earthquake and the possibility
of decolonization. Archival sources demonstrate that the catastrophe became
a tool for the French colonial state to use disaster response to counter nationalist narratives and to defend a vision of benevolent colonialism. Yet, because
the earthquake wreaked enormous destruction on the built environment, especially on the humble edifices housing most of the region’s Muslim population, it
dramatically increased the financial cost, technical difficulty, and bureaucratic
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complexity of the colonial state’s efforts to make plausible its narratives of civilization, development, and solidarity. Consequently, the disaster provided an
opportunity for dissidents to offer counter-narratives decrying the hypocrisy and
futility of the colonial project. The earthquake thus became an important part
of the struggle for and against Algerian independence, and the political struggle
in Algeria shaped human responses to the seismic shocks that rocked the Chélif
Valley in 1954.

A Department of France, A Valley in North Africa
French histories of Algeria’s Chélif Valley typically begin with the founding of
Orléansville in 1843 as a military camp by General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud.
Bugeaud’s occupation of Orléansville, and of the Mediterranean town of Ténès,
forty kilometers to the north, was intended to create a bulwark against the return of the forces of Amir Abd al-Qadir, the Algerian resistance leader whom
French forces had driven out of the Chélif Valley.12 The new French outpost was
near the site of an ancient Roman colony of Castellum Tingitanum, a fact that
proved useful to the narratives of French imperialists seeking to link the French
conquest of Algeria to the heritage of Rome. The local name for the site (which
may have been the location of a weekly souk) was Lasnab or in classical Arabic,
al-Asnam, meaning “idols,” a name possibly derived from the memory of the
Roman presence or of their ruins. El Asnam became the official name of the
city after independence until it was renamed “Chlef ” after another earthquake
devastated the city in 1980.13 In 1848, the northern part of what is today Algeria,
including the Chélif Valley, was declared part of France by the Second Republic.
Orléansville’s location, isolated by the Dahra Mountains to the north and
the Ouarsenis to the south, was perceived as inhospitable by the French due
to its climate and due to the ongoing resistance of the inhabitants of the two
mountain ranges.14 Nevertheless, the European settlement at Orléansville grew
into a thriving town and became the seat of a subprefecture administering a
district, or arrondissement, extending north to Ténès, within the larger French
department of Algiers, département 91 among the departments of France.15 (The
départements are roughly akin to a North American state or province.)
To begin the history of this valley in North Africa with the arrival of Europeans reinforces an obviously Eurocentric historical metanarrative. If the scope
of the narrative is narrowly confined to the city of Orléansville, this approach
might seem, at first, to be satisfactory. Geographer Valentin Pelosse points out
that, unlike Algerian cities such as Algiers, Constantine, and Tlemcen, the
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French post at Orléansville was not grafted onto an Algerian Muslim town, and
there was only a limited presence of Muslim Algerians in Orléansville during the
early years of the settlement’s growth.16 For René Debia, the subprefect and administrative head of the arrondissement in 1954, Orléansville, though inhabited
by migrants “from all shores of the Mediterranean,” grew into a typical “small
bourgeois city” of the Third Republic.17
A transformation was underway, however: the city started to become what
Debia called “a great indigenous city, one of the most significant Arab cities in
all of Algeria.”18 By 1900, the city of Orléansville was already home to approximately three thousand Muslim Algerians, half the total population.19 These
Muslims did not materialize out of thin air. Even if Orléansville was a creation of
the French, the Chélif Valley was not—there was an earlier history of the region.
The Chélif Valley was inhabited, prior to the French arrival, by the Awlad Qasir,
among others. By 1863 the French had driven the Awlad Qasir out of twelve
thousand hectares of the best agricultural land.20 For the next several decades,
Muslims often sought to escape the rural poverty caused by French conquest
of the Chélif by emigrating to Tunisia or other Muslim countries rather than
to European-dominated Algerian cities. Around the turn of the century, however, migratory flows shifted toward the city, and the history of the rural Chélif
merged with the history of French-built Orléansville.21
This growing city, like all of Algeria, was dominated by its European inhabitants, who enjoyed the full rights of French citizenship, while the Muslims were
French subjects ruled according to the indigénat, or native-status, laws.22 Nevertheless, certain leading Muslim families were able to maintain their prominence
by switching their allegiance to the colonial state, which needed collaborators
who could facilitate control of the Muslim population as French-appointed
rural notables, or caïds. The most significant of these families in the Chélif was
the Saïah family.23 The Saïahs became a focus of controversy and criticism after
the Orléansville earthquake: as a propertied elite with close ties to the French
regime, they represented a symbolic fulcrum in the struggle for post-disaster
justice in the region: though members of the Saïah family positioned themselves
as advocates for the Muslim population, they were portrayed by critics as oppressors, criminally implicated in an unjust system.
The Saïahs’ relationship with the French was shaped, over the years, by
French reform measures intended to justify, mitigate, or occlude the arbitrary
and oppressive character of colonial rule. While the most dramatic of these reforms were enacted after the Second World War, historians have argued that
this process stretched back into the nineteenth century and included the 1898
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establishment of the Délégations Financières, an assembly that included a limited number of seats for privileged Muslim Algerians. Reform accelerated after
the First World War, when almost half of adult Algerian men were exempted
from the indigénat and given voting rights in local elections. After World War
II, the French regime affirmed the citizenship of Muslim Algerians and, in 1947,
replaced the Délégations Financières with a 120-seat Algerian Assembly, elected
by voters who were divided into two “colleges,” one composed of Europeans and
a small number of select Muslim Algerians, and one composed solely of Muslim
Algerians.24
These postwar reforms maintained a system of governance firmly under the
control of the French of European origin and their chosen Muslim allies. Although the indigénat was eliminated, and adult male Muslim voters could now
elect some representatives to the French National Assembly and the Algerian
Assembly, in Algeria the influence of the sixty Algerian Assembly delegates chosen by the Muslim “second college” voters was checked by the power of the sixty
chosen by the overwhelmingly European voters of the “first college.” Consequently, as has often been pointed out, delegates representing a European population of less than a million and less than sixty thousand of the most privileged
Muslims (those who had been given “first college” voting status) could block the
will of the delegates who represented a population of almost eight million. The
ability of the settler population to prevent the Muslim majority from expanding
their power was reinforced by the requirement of a two-thirds supermajority for
certain proposed reforms. When an upswell of Muslim political activity led to
nationalist successes in municipal elections in 1947, the authorities further subverted the limited democratic potential of this assembly through intimidation
and election-tampering in favor of approved Muslim candidates.25
This “reformed” political system prevented real democratization in Algeria, but it provided opportunities for a well-positioned few. Closely tied to the
French colonial system, the Saïah rose to top of the reformed political structure. At the time of the earthquake, members of the family held important positions in French Algeria: Saïah Abdelkader was a member and former president
of the Algerian Assembly; Bouali Saïah was a member of the Assembly, and
Saïah Menouar was a representative to the French National Assembly in Paris.
Locally, several members of the family still held posts of caïd in the Chélif region.26 The vast majority of Muslim Algerians were less fortunate, and it was
the poor Muslim population that would suffer the most after their homes were
destroyed by the earthquake, in the growing shantytowns around Orléansville
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housing migrants from the countryside and in the vast rural areas housing an
impoverished and scattered population. The relation of the Saïahs to this population—as oppressors or advocates—would be a matter of controversy when the
earthquake struck.

City and Country on the Eve of Destruction
In sharp contrast to Agadir, destroyed by an earthquake less than six years later,
controversy and political struggle following the 1954 earthquake in the Chélif would center as much on rural as on urban areas, while the destruction of
Orléansville’s architectural legacy, such as it was, would provoke little comment.
Orléansville’s twentieth-century landscape still bore the imprint of its military
origin. A grid of streets was surrounded by a wall and a belt of military land,
with military buildings dominating the western part of the city. Outside of the
walls, the metropolitan area (agglomération) of Orléansville included two suburbs ( faubourgs), La Ferme in the north and La Bocca Sahnoune in the south.
These suburbs became increasingly Muslim as they absorbed migrants from the
countryside. Europeans engaged in “white flight” from the faubourgs into city
proper, while many Muslim Algerians lived in improvised mudbrick and bidonville (shanty) housing without piped water or sanitation infrastructure.27
As Benjamin Stora explains, many Muslims across Algeria had been driven to
cities by French expropriation of land and water, the disruption of pre-colonial
social and economic networks, and population growth. In the nineteenth century, communal tribal lands, properties of religious brotherhoods, and lands of
the defeated Ottoman governor had been partitioned into private plots, leaving
the average Muslim Algerian farmer with only seven acres, barely enough for subsistence. Meanwhile, traditional systems of water management were disrupted,
along with communal landholding and charitable religious foundations. By 1919,
colons, farmers of European descent with French citizenship, possessed a million
acres of land in the département of Algiers alone, although, it should be noted,
there was enormous inequality of wealth within the European population, and
agricultural consolidation in the twentieth century also led to the urbanization
the European population.28 In the Chélif Valley, rural poverty and further economic disruption in the period of the world wars prompted an acceleration of
rural-to-urban migration, and by 1948 the official census in Orléansville counted
13,693 Muslim Algerians, out of a population of 17,223.29 The rate of migration
was such that, by 1954, the majority of the city’s population had been born in the
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countryside. By 1960, when the European population of Orléansville reached its
apex, the Muslim population had grown to almost thirty-eight thousand, and
people classified as “European” constituted only 16 percent of the population.30
These transformations of the city created some unease among the French
elite. A report by the département’s Service of Urbanism described the population growth of the suburbs as “disordered.”31 For Sub-Prefect Debia, an advocate
of colonialism through economic development, the growth of the city’s Muslim
population was, in part, a positive development, insofar as it included Muslim
merchants and functionaries and later some doctors and lawyers, of Kabyle and
Arab backgrounds, who “adopted our way of life, if not in terms of dress then at
least in the realm of habitat,” moving into villas and apartments formerly occupied by Europeans. “Less encouraging,” lamented Debia, “because it was a sign of
poverty and because it often resulted in social uprootedness,” was the much more
numerous settling of Muslims in the faubourgs “where they often lived as if they
were in the douars [rural villages]”32 Debia described the exponential growth of
unregulated housing in these suburbs as a demographic battle that threatened to
overwhelm the legacy of the planned French city, protected by the “solid corset”
of its ramparts.33 Debia’s modernist, imperialist fear of unregulated Muslims was
echoed by another French official who described the faubourgs as “two popular
quartiers constructed in an anarchic fashion, in violation of the most elementary
rules of hygiene and urbanism.”34
Reinforcing this vision of a city divided between realms of European progress
and Muslim disorder, the European sections of Orléansville had by 1954 become
home to dazzling monuments to Europeans’ belief in their own modernity.
Debia described the architectural innovations: “Here, an ultra-modern building; there, a gigantic school, the largest in France [sic]; an administrative hôtel;
a ten-story building under construction; a magnificent subprefecture in the hispano-mauresque style.” It was a city “glittering with light at night,” and a city
of motorcars.35 The city walls were undergoing demolition, and the glittering
modernity of the city extended westward beyond the old city limits, exemplified
by the construction of a “sumptuous” new building to house the administrative
offices of the subprefecture.36
All this was far removed from the lives of most inhabitants of the region,
however. Beyond the immediate environs of the city, the arrondissement administered by the subprefecture of Orléansville, which included most of the zone
affected by the earthquake, was overwhelmingly rural. This area included eight
sizable communities, with a total population of about eighty-five thousand, that
were classified as communes de plein-exercice, endowed with elected municipal
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governments due to their significant European populations. In addition to the
city of Orléansville, these included Ténès, on the coast (population ten thousand); and Oued-Fodda (population twelve thousand), east of Orléansville, and
five smaller towns. Nevertheless, most of the arrondissement’s three hundred
thousand inhabitants lived in rural districts classified as communes mixtes, where
the almost entirely Muslim residents were administered by appointed officials.37
In these rural areas, “extreme dispersion characterized the distribution of the
rural population,” who survived through a combination of pastoralism and agriculture.38 This “extreme dispersion,” over an area of four hundred fifty thousand hectares (more than seventeen hundred square miles), would make disaster
response slow and difficult.

Disaster Response
The effectiveness, earnestness, and equity—or lack thereof—of the French disaster response effort became a central focus of public contestation in Algeria in
the autumn of 1954, as competing voices struggled to frame the shortcomings of
the disaster response as either the fruit of an intrinsically unjust system, or as the
inevitable result of the sheer magnitude of the “natural” disaster amid the putatively primordial backwardness of the Algerian people, or simply as the result
of organizational failures that could be corrected for future disasters through
technocratic adjustments.
Those involved in the disaster response in its early stages testified to the
magnitude of the challenges they faced. On the night of the first earthquake,
“total confusion, in darkness” reigned in Orléansville until sunrise; one early
report described an “atmosphere of war (presence of numerous soldiers) and of
post-bombardment.”39 The seismic shock had destroyed the city’s means of telecommunication with the outside world and had interrupted its electrical supply. A gendarme was dispatched to the town of Oued Fodda, twenty kilometers
away, where he was able to reach Algiers by telephone, forty minutes after the
disaster. 40 The radio transmitter of the French military subdivision in Orléansville had been damaged but was repaired within two hours, enabling Subprefect
Debia to send three messages requesting tents and food as well as civil engineers,
trucks, and bulldozers. As the hours passed, news of destruction in Ténès and
in several towns in the Chélif Valley trickled into Orléansville, and Débia requested helicopters.41
The city was home to a volunteer crew of thirty or so firefighters (sapeurs-pompiers). They were reportedly unable to organize as a team in the early
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hours of the disaster, but were instead drawn individually or in small groups into
rescue efforts in their immediate vicinities; the fire chief and several pompiers
became engaged in efforts to extricate victims buried in the ruins of the Hotel
Baudoin.42 The 200 legionnaires housed at the military garrison, and the 30 or
so police d’État were able to respond in more organized fashion within hours.
By the afternoon, their numbers were augmented by the arrival of an additional
500 troops, with trucks and bulldozers, and several sapeur-pompier units from
Relizane, to the southwest, and Algiers, to the northeast.43
The medical staff at the hospital constituted another indispensable group of
first responders, reinforced by health professionals arriving from other areas.
In a chapter titled “Orléansville 54,” Dr. Aït Ouyahia described the scene in
the hospital just after his arrival the next day, when additional tremors struck.
Patients sustained additional injuries as they were thrown from their beds by the
aftershocks. Beds were moved to the garden as new patients were brought in with
fresh injuries. Amid the fear and chaos that ensued, the medical staff, led by Aït
Ouyahia’s mentor Dr. Kamoun, kept working.44
As crucial to the disaster response as the functioning of the hospital was the
fact that the city possessed not only a railway depot but an airport; both were
damaged but still usable. The morning after the first earthquake, the first relief
shipment, containing medical supplies, arrived by air. 45 The Cold War presence
of the US Air Force in Europe and in neighboring Morocco proved valuable,
as six American C-119s joined ten French army planes in the airlift of goods
from France to Algiers and Algiers to Orléansville.46 By afternoon, flights were
arriving in Orléansville every twenty minutes, bringing supplies and evacuating
the seriously injured: 117 were evacuated the first day. Hunger and thirst were
rampant, but in the afternoon, the arriving army trucks brought bread and two
cisterns of water. 47 Shipments of tents also began to arrive immediately, but
the supply was grossly inadequate. People had no choice but sleep in the open,
although some found refuge in train cars still on the tracks of the train station,
slowing the arrival of shipments by rail.48
On September 11, a national disaster relief committee, the Comité National
de Secours aux Victimes du Séisme de la région d’Orléansville, was created by
the Ministry of the Interior in Paris, and the Government-General of Algeria
established a parallel committee.49 A large role in the post-disaster relief effort
was played by the metropolitan Service National de Protection Civile (SNPC),
which dispatched a team to Orléansville, including seventeen members of the
Paris Sapeurs-Pompiers to supplement the firefighters from Orléansville and
from Algiers. The SNPC team leader, Lieutenant Colonel Curie, arrived in
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Algiers on September 11 at what is today the Houari Boumediènne airport,
along with a shipment of 16 large tents and 245 beds. That night, Curie flew to
Orléansville, where he met with Subprefect Debia and Mr. Freychet, director of
the departmental relief service (Service de Secours). The rest of the metropolitan
SNPC team arrived within the next forty-eight hours, accompanied by an engineer named Marius Hautberg, who had been appointed to serve as an assistant
(adjoint) to Colonel Curie, with a mission to conduct a study of structural damage, methods of clearing debris, and the organization of the disaster response.50
Those engaged in disaster response were not immune to the stress created by
the carnage and destruction that surrounded them. Once assembled in Orléansville, the sapeurs-pompiers slept in tents at the military garrison, where food
supplies were inadequate, while Curie and Hautberg joined Subprefect Debia,
his staff, and his family in tents near the slightly damaged subprefecture building. 51 Hautberg recounted that, within the SNPC team, “overwork, fatigue,
and a kind of necro-psychosis caused an ambiance of nervousness,” and tempers
flared.52 Aït Ouyahia, too, referred to his own shock and emotional distress upon
viewing the carnage.53 As the days passed, response workers undertook the grisly
task of excavating the ruins to recover bodies. Soon, “in the stifling heat of September, the atmosphere was permeated with the odor of decay.”54 In the blazing
heat, workers began to use the stench to help them locate the bodies, which had
to be painstakingly extricated from the rubble and then coated with quicklime
in an attempt to prevent outbreaks of disease.55 DDT was sprayed liberally over
the city by helicopter and from trucks.56 A school was converted into a makeshift
morgue, where the bodies were placed in coffins, which were being shipped in
from throughout the region.57 After another major aftershock on September 16
brought still more damage to the city, eighty four more firefighters arrived from
Paris, bringing the total size of the SNPC team to about one hundred.58 However, the dispatch of these reinforcements from the metropole was rushed after
the new tremor struck. Consequently, they arrived without adequate advance
planning or materials—they lacked sufficient food supplies for themselves and
were not accompanied by the fifty tons of tents they had been expected to bring.
As a result, the SNPC team was, an according to Curie, ill-equipped to respond
to the new wave of disaster.59

Beni Rached
In the weeks and months following the earthquake, much controversy surrounded the dire conditions and scarcity of relief aid in rural areas, where the
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population was overwhelmingly Muslim. For the first few days, however, officials
had initially assumed that the epicenter of the earthquake was in Orléansville60
where initial counts of the dead ranged from 153 (including 23 “Europeans” and
130 “français musulmans”) to 168.61 There were also reports from other towns
describing death and damage throughout an area extending from the Chélif Valley towns of Oued Fodda (163 dead) and Pontéba (“total destruction – numerous
dead”), to Ténès on the coast.62 However, officials were slow to recognize the extent of the disaster in rural areas, and no effort was made in the first 48 hours to
extend disaster aid into the smaller villages, or douars, in hard-to-reach areas not
served by roads, where most of the thousands of casualties had in fact occurred.63
It was not until September 11 that aid workers in Orléansville became aware
of the enormity of the devastation of the village of Beni Rached, 40 kilometers
to the east at the true epicenter of the earthquake, where 300 residents had been
killed.64 Sources provide conflicting accounts of the discovery of the tragedy
there. Official reports neglected the role of Algerian Muslim agency in uncovering and treating the suffering in Beni Rached, emphasizing instead the vigorous
state response that followed. Colonel Curie’s report from September 27, 1954,
stated that the discovery of Beni Rached on September 11 was made “by chance”
by a gendarme.65 According to Colonel Curie’s concise report, the morning after
the discovery of Beni Rached, a US Air Force helicopter then flew reconnaissance missions in the area, returning with one of the injured. More helicopter
evacuations followed, and a systematic effort was undertaken to identify affected
rural communities, with ten medical teams sent out to canvass the region.66 Colonel Curie’s report on the SNPC mission to Orléansville was followed, in December 1954, by a report on the organization of the disaster response written
by Philippe Kessler, a recent graduate of the elite École nationale d’administration who had been conducting an administrative traineeship near the Chélif
Valley in September, and by Marius Hautberg’s report addressing both disaster
response and the structural effects of the earthquake on buildings.
Kessler’s report credited the medical service’s staff as being the first to address
the full extent of the rural disaster. Like Curie and Hautberg, Kessler emphasized the importance of helicopters.67 Kessler was impressed by the heroic drama
of the aerovac: “It is thus that in certain places where, in the memory of man,
no ‘European’ had ever passed, families affected by the disaster could see one of
these providential machines descend from heaven, land at their door, from which
would disembark ‘toubib’ [doctor] or nurse. This medical penetration, provoked
by the event, brought a royal and marvelous path to the unhappy people who
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benefitted from it.”68 This story of miraculous, technological “penetration” (a
term of colonial conquest) by European saviors is redolent of the mythology
of colonialism—the “providential” machines a modern version of Columbus’s
ships, appearing as gods, as Europeans liked to claim, to the inhabitants of a New
World. Frantz Fanon informs us that Algerian Muslims often saw the colonial
doctor as threatening and humiliating rather than “marvelous.”69 While there
is no doubt that the helicopter evacuations saved lives, Kessler’s version of the
narrative emphasizes the importance of the colonizer’s military technology, and
erases the agency of Muslims—both outsiders and residents of Beni Rached—
who responded to the disaster.
Dr. Aït Ouyahia tells a very different story. According to Aït Ouyahia, the
medical staff at the Orléansville hospital, finally taking a dinner break on the
evening of September 10, were joined by local notable Saïah Menouar, a deputy
(representative) from Orléansville to the National Assembly in Paris. According
to Aït Ouyahia, the young doctor turned to his supervisor, Dr. Kamoun, and
said, “I have noticed, sir, that all the injured who have come to us come from the
farms and villages that are along the roads. I wonder, in what condition are the
isolated douars and mechtas [villages and hamlets]?”70 Saïah Menouar offered the
use of his jeep, and, after a few hours of sleep, Menouar and Aït Ouyahia left,
still in the dark of night.
Aït Ouyahia may have downplayed Menouar’s role in initiating the expedition. French records indicate that Saïah Menouar was born in Beni Rached and
that six members of the Saïah family died there during the earthquake. This
suggests that Saïah Menouar played a more active role in initiating the expedition and determining its destination than Aït Ouyahia indicated: Saïah Menouar was very likely the driving force of the expedition, if not the actual driver,
as in the doctor’s memoir.71 Aït Ouyahia’s account, published in 1999, reflects
some ambivalence about Saïah Menouar, mentioning that Menouar had been
“elected” by the Muslim population only after being handpicked “by the administration and colons of the Chélif,” in consultation with the head of the Saïah
family, Saïah Abdelkader.72 Aït Ouyahia’s depiction of Saïah Menouar’s role in
this story may have been influenced by nationalist condemnations of those who,
like the Saïah, collaborated with French rule. Nevertheless, the doctor’s memoirs
granted Saïah Menouar a role, unlike the reports of Curie and Kessler.
According to Aït Ouyahia’s memoir, he and Menouar drove about thirty kilometers on the road, through the town of Oued Fodda. (There, the ten-year-old
Ali Bouzar, who would later write his own memoir of the earthquakes of 1954
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and 1980, had just survived the disaster and was fearing for the life of his father,
a medical worker in Orléansville—likely one of Aït Ouyahia’s colleagues.73) Past
Oued Fodda, they left the road and turned north, following a trail along a dry
riverbed. At dawn, they reached a pair of collapsed dwellings. Under a fig tree
lay, still alive, a woman, seven months pregnant, the skin on her bloody abdomen
torn back as if “scalped,” along with a man and a small child. Around them lay
corpses: their three sons, and the man’s parents. Aït Ouyahia applied sulfa and
bandages to the woman’s wounds and promised the man they would soon return
to take the woman and child with them to the hospital. They then pressed on
for another dozen kilometers to the village of Beni Rached. There, they found
that “not a single house had resisted the earthquake; Beni Rached was nothing
more than a gigantic cluster of earth and stone, planted here and there with torn
up walls.”74 The survivors recognized “Si Menouar” and kissed his hand. They
reported that there were several dead in every household; the mosque had been
converted into a morgue; survivors were still trying to dig out the dead from
the ruins. Dr. Aït Ouyahia worked for several hours treating the injured, until
he ran out of supplies. Aït Ouyahia and Saïah Menouar were forced to return
to Orléansville, to summon more assistance. On the way, they came to the first
family they had encountered by the fig tree. The woman and child were still
there. The man was on his way to bury the dead. His donkey and mule were
laden with corpses; his parents and two of his sons were stuffed into the saddle
bags, his third son lay across the back of the mule.75
The contrast between Aït Ouyahia’s account and those of the French reports
raises certain questions about sources. Aït-Ouyahia’s book’s 1999 publication
date makes it different from Debia’s 1955 memoir and from other sources used
in this chapter such as contemporaneous press reports and archival documents
such as cablegrams and official government reports: it is inflected by a greater
passage of time and by the knowledge that the turmoil of the Algerian rebellion
would lead to independence in 1962 (and then to an imperfect polity in independent Algeria). Can Aït Ouyahia’s memoir of his life and family history published
many decades later, in 1999, be useful in understanding events following the
disaster in 1954? Or can it only be used as evidence of the long-term, retrospective intermingling of understandings of decolonization and the 1954 disaster
in imagination and memory (a purpose to which it will be put in Chapter 7)?
Certainly, Aït Ouyahia’s memoir cannot be considered entirely reliable. Yet the
early genesis of the reports available in French archives does not necessarily make
them more reliable than the memories of Aït Ouyahia or those of writers such
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as Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine, Habib Tengour, and Ali Bouzar, whose work will
be discussed in Chapter 7. Historians of colonialism are accustomed to reading
primary archival sources “against the grain” and with an awareness that authors’
depictions of events may be shaped by the cultures of colonialism; we are equally
aware, in dealing with post-independence memoirs, that depictions of events
may be shaped by cultures of anti-colonial nationalism, by the preoccupations
of later decades, and by the desire to tailor memorialization to the needs of a
specific audience.
However, exclusively privileging early archival documents when examining
the events of 1954 would privilege the French who were in a position to write
official accounts, skewing our historical understanding in ways that would reflect the distribution of power in 1950s Algeria. Though Aït Ouyahia’s account
of “Orléansville, 1954” is separated from events by the passage of more time than
are Curie’s, Hautberg’s, and Kessler’s, it must be recognized that the French accounts, even those written just days after the events, are also works of memory
and representation for a specific audience. The historian must also approach
those accounts skeptically, in recognition of their neglect (both ideologically
conditioned and individually self-serving) of Muslim agency, and in recognition of their echoes of imperialist narratives. Hitherto unexploited archives in
Algeria may eventually reveal additional perspectives on these events, but in any
case, our understanding of history will remain an ongoing work of construction
out of the “disparate and multiple” memories (both long-and short-term) and
representations by those involved.76

The Second Phase
French archival documents provide much detail about the disaster response as
the French state’s efforts shifted from the initial phase of rescuing victims, treating the injured, and retrieving the dead, to “interventions of secondary urgency”:
housing the displaced and beginning the process of reconstruction. However,
contemporaneous descriptions of events by leftist and nationalist journalists
called into question official representations of this second phase of disaster response. Central to the public debate and political struggle in the Chélif Valley in
late 1954 were divisions over not only whether the French state was acting with
equity to assist both the Muslim and the European survivors but also whether the
remoteness and inaccessibility of rural villages such as Beni Rached was part of a
status quo ante that French colonialism had to confront and overcome or if the
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vulnerability of rural Algerians was a product of colonial neglect or exploitative
harm—in other words, whether the French colonial state, as it then existed, was
the solution to the disaster that afflicted Muslim Algerians, or its deepest cause.
The second phase of relief efforts included both direct state intervention
through the work of the SNPC and services such as Ponts et chaussées (Bridges
and Roads), and donations from private individuals and from organizations such
as the Red Cross and Sécours Catholique (Catholic Relief). The Interior Ministry’s Comité National de Secours organized a “solidarity campaign” to solicit donations, beginning with a “National Day of Solidarity” on September 26. These
funds were to be applied toward the purchase and transport of tents, blankets,
and other goods to meet the immediate needs of survivors. Throughout metropolitan and overseas France, as well as Morocco and Tunisia, tens of thousands
of fundraising posters and hundreds of thousands of solidarity badges were distributed. The total amount collected throughout France and its empire eventually rose to more than 1.5 billion francs (over four million dollars).77 However,
raising the money was one thing; getting aid to the people in need was another.
Monetary donations from throughout France and the overseas French departments were turned over to the treasury office (Trésorier Payeur Géneral) of each
department and then consolidated in Paris by the Trésorier Payeur Géneral de la
Seine.78 Donations in kind, however, were sent directly to the Governor-General
of Algeria by each department, resulting in a diverse plethora of goods that had
to be counted and sorted prior to distribution in the affected areas.79 Cultural
and religious differences produced some glitches in the trans-Mediterranean
solidarity effort, most notably an excess of food donations containing pork, and
a shortage of clothing for Muslim women,80 although fifty million francs from
the September fundraising were earmarked for the purchase of cloth for such
clothing.81
It was housing, however, that presented the greatest problem, a fact agreed
upon by all sources. If a major rationale for French rule in Algeria in the twentieth century was the ability of the French to improve the material well-being
of Muslim Algerians, the earthquake had just made this vastly more difficult.82
Sources within the National Service of Civil Protection (SNCP) presented the
difficulties as largely logistical. By September 13, the Ministry of the Interior in
Paris had arranged shipments, with the help of the SNPC, the French Army
of the Air, and the US Air Force, of 316 large tents capable of housing over six
thousand people.83 Radio broadcasts in France urged citizens to donate their
old camping tents, declaring that “the tent that you have been keeping in the
attic and that the grandchildren never use would constitute an undreamed-of
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solution for an affected family.”84 As more tents arrived, the SNPC team led by
Curie and Hautberg took charge of sorting and distribution. However, the tents
were of a variety of sizes and types, and most were ill-suited to housing families.
It became a nightmare to sort and count the component parts to assure that
each recipient obtained a complete kit. Hautberg’s log also indicated that there
were some enormous American military tents, “worthy of a circus,” that neither
the SNPC nor the legionnaires could figure out how to assemble.85 Meanwhile,
displaced residents resisted the efforts of aid workers to move them into large
tent cities, preferring to camp in front of their damaged homes and keep watch
over their goods.86
By September 22, Hautberg reported that 2,371 tents had been received and
2,066 of them distributed, leaving 305 still in reserve, with the arrival of another
930 anxiously anticipated.87 The leaders of the disaster response were well aware
that this was insufficient and requested more. A daily report of the Algerian
emergency committee estimated that only approximately half of the need had
been met.88 Given the enormity of the disaster, with over forty thousand homes
destroyed,89 this was a gross underestimation of need, reflecting the assumption
that the rural gourbi dwellers would not receive tents.
In the long term, more than tents would be needed to rebuild Orléansville
and to save French Algeria from the political and environmental disasters that
threatened. In late September, Hautberg, seeing tents as an unsatisfactory remedy to the housing crisis, traveled to Paris, and communicated “to diverse individuals interested in the events in Orléansville” the urgent need to construct
temporary housing, referred to as “barracks.” Hautberg pointed out that “the
more quickly these are installed, the less need there is for tents.” Hautberg also
warned, ominously and accurately, that “the rains in the Chélif Valley are said
to be torrential.”90 The first step beyond tents was the requisitioning of fourteen
thousand square meters of asbestos-reinforced, fiber-cement sheets—roofing
material for temporary housing.91
With the winter rains coming, temporary housing was an urgent need. However, barracks, like tents, were mainly destined for the cities and towns. Those
who lived in gourbis were expected to quickly rebuild their homes themselves,
supported by grants of materials and cash payments of ten thousand francs (about
thirty US dollars in 1954) to each household, to be followed by an additional
ten thousand later.92 The proponents of this response argued that an illiterate
population in desperate need, many living in areas not served by roads, required
a process that would be simple and, it was hoped, quick—quick enough to obviate
the need for tents or barracks. In practice, however, rebuilding gourbis was not as
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simple as officials had initially hoped. On September 22, Saïah Abdelkader and
the mayor of Orléansville, Ange Bisgambiglia, met with the Governor-General
of Algeria, Roger Léonard, during Léonard’s visit to Orléansville, and both local
officials complained of inadequate efforts to help the inhabitants of gourbis. They
denounced the slow pace of distribution of building supplies (specifically, poles
to provide a lattice for the roofs) and complained of delays in the distribution of
the promised first installment of ten thousand francs for these families without
shelter.93 When the Algerian Assembly convened several days later to address the
crisis, one representative (M. Francis) pointed out that the “gourbi” policy ignored the many rural poor who lived in houses made of stone that could not be
rebuilt with some wooden poles and twenty thousand francs. Similarly, representative Bentaieb objected to the use of the term “traditional” in the budget line for
“improvements for traditional rural habitats,” essentially agreeing with Francis
that aid should not be based on an arbitrary distinction between what was modern and what was traditional in the dwellings of the rural poor. The term “traditional” was duly deleted from the legislation, but the Assembly maintained the
policy that rural populations would be expected to rebuild their own homes with
the assistance of some materials and the fixed payment of twenty thousand francs.
Future long-term improvements were promised, but the advocates of the plan
claimed that the inhabitants of gourbis preferred to rebuild their own homes.94

Solidarity and Division
For the French state, Algeria was France, and the message was one of national
solidarity; flags were flown at half-mast on public buildings throughout France.95
Hautberg believed that this sentiment was sincere and widely shared, referring
to “this Algeria, so dear to all the French.”96 Governor-General Léonard proclaimed, “I say above all that the French government considers the Orléansville catastrophe a national catastrophe, which France takes charge of because
it affects a French department, French citizens.” This statement was meant to
be inclusive of Muslim Algerians, who were technically French citizens, albeit
unequal ones. Léonard declared, “There has never been, and never will be, discrimination of any kind regarding the victims.”97 Given the obvious divisions in
colonial Algerian society amid intermittent nationalist insurgency since 1945,
such assurances were aspirational, and had to be made explicit, if only in hopes of
minimizing political discord. Léonard’s declaration prefigured a more deliberate
policy promoting the idea of Muslim equality after 1958.98
As Valentin Pelosse has pointed out, official public declarations from the
state—in Paris, Algiers, and Orléansville—presented an image of unity across
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ethnic divisions, but this “phraséologie officielle” 99 was undermined both by
the preexisting inequities of colonialism and by the official disaster response,
which treated poor rural Muslims very differently from the rest of the population. Nevertheless, it was frequently claimed that the earthquake had the effect
of unifying the population across class and ethnic lines. Raymond LaQuière,
president of the Algerian Assembly, declared that “All distinctions, all hierarchies, were leveled in single blow: there remained only brothers, animated by
a single and identical desire to help their neighbor with sublime devotion”100
Orléansville mayor Bisgambiglia echoed this sentiment, declaring to the Assembly that “The Chélif contains two ethnic elements: the Muslims, who are
the more unfortunate, and the Europeans. One should not oppose one to other,
because they have shown, after the earthquake, that they consider each other as
brothers.”101 Several months later, René Debia explained the process by which
he believed the earthquake had furthered this inter-ethnic solidarity. From the
limited vantage point of the subprefecture, Débia described the first night after
the disaster: “An empty lot, across from the subprefecture, was transformed into
a city of canvas where, indistinctly, and taking into account only the situation
of the family, were settled Europeans and Muslims . . . it never ceased to bring
together the ethnic strata of the population so that everyone, rich and poor,
and whatever their origins, knew the same hardship and started again together
from zero.”102 In Debia’s account, it was as if the earthquake had resolved the
fundamental contradiction of France’s “Impossible Republic,” reconciling in one
cataclysmic moment the aspirations of French universalism with imperial rule
in Algeria.103 But Debia’s optimistic vision, like the broader hope of reconciling
imperialism with democracy, was a fantasy. The winds were shifting. By late September, diverse voices, both within the state disaster response effort and in the
press, were pointing out the imminent arrival of the rainy season that portended
fresh misery for the many thousands sleeping outdoors or in tents.104

Organized Protest
Sources contemporaneous with the earthquake response reveal that depictions
of the disaster quickly became a field of struggle over the future of Algeria. Even
as official French sources promoted a narrative of solidarity and promises of improvements, alternative narratives were being offered within the framework of
Algerian nationalism, on the one hand, and leftist calls for class struggle, on
the other. Within weeks of the first earthquake, organized opposition groups
began to openly denounce the French colonial authorities in Orléansville, and
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the provision of humanitarian aid became a field of political and ideological
struggle in the Chélif Valley.105 Active post-disaster public relations campaigns
and relief aid operations were carried out by various groups in Algeria: the Algerian Communist Party, the Communist-linked Conféderation Général du
Travail (CGT) labor union—and also by Ferhat Abbas’s moderate nationalist
Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) and the less moderate
Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), the nationalist party originally founded by Messali Hadj. The earthquake created an
opportunity for these groups to challenge the state’s narrative of the disaster
response and to present their own alternatives.106
The UDMA’s newspaper, La République algérienne, denounced the authorities’ efforts at disaster response and the propaganda of “solidarity” that accompanied it. The authorities were accused of “criminal negligence and scandalous discrimination” based on race. The paper also took note of the manner in
which official sources and the mainstream press emphasized the destruction of
the urban centers where most Europeans lived, and how they invariably reported
the number of European dead separately from casualties among français musulmans. La République algérienne portrayed the paucity and tardiness of disaster
aid in rural areas as a product of racial discrimination. The paper rejected official
claims that the lack of roads was to blame for these shortcomings, and argued
that transportation infrastructure never seemed to be a problem when the army
wanted to send “trucks full of troops” to crush rural disturbances, as they had
in the village of Sidi Ali Bounab three years before. Moreover, the paper argued,
the flimsy construction of gourbis and the absence of roads and medical facilities
only demonstrated the emptiness of the imperialist promises associated with the
“civilizing mission.”107
The authorities were denounced in slightly different terms by dissident political groups of the far Left that included both Muslims and Europeans, most
notably the CGT trade union (associated with the French Communist Party)
and the Algerian Communist Party (PCA). Like the nationalist UDMA, these
groups offered material and political support to the victims of the disaster while
portraying the French state as callously indifferent to the needs of the people.
Some of their criticisms seemed to echo the UDMA almost verbatim.108 However, as historian Yaël Fletcher has demonstrated, these non-nationalist groups
promoted a class-based vision of colonial oppression that deemphasized ethnic
divisions.109 A major vehicle for this vision was the daily newspaper Alger républicain, whose Muslim Algerian and European editors and writers, though
predominantly affiliated with the PCA, sought to provide a platform for diverse
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opposition groups and, as they put it, to “unite, as broadly as possible, all those
who—regardless of their political orientations and their origins—want to end
colonial oppression.”110 In their criticisms of the state response and their appeals
for donations from their members, these groups offered their own vision of “solidarity” between the European French and Muslim and non-Muslim Algerians, based on class identity.111 This alternative vision criticized the inequities
of French colonialism and castigated the French authorities but also hoped to
mitigate the “feudal” elements of Algerian nationalism by persuading nationalists to see the French working class as their comrades in the struggle against
colonial tyranny.112
In early October, articles in Alger républicain denounced the empty promises
and slow pace of the state’s response to the disaster, contrasting the generosity
and goodwill of the people who had donated to the solidarity fund with the
anemic official efforts to deliver help to the people. Particularly contemptible,
in this view, was the state’s expectation that the rural population should rebuild
their own dwellings, with no help from the state except the paltry payments of
twenty thousand francs (less than sixty US dollars)—not even tents for temporary shelter. The earthquake had exposed the falseness of officials’ claims about
the material benefits the French state had brought to Algeria. The suffering of
rural people—rarely identified as Muslim or Arab—was the direct consequence
of the failures of the state; villages like Beni Rached had been “abandoned” and
left without access roads or medical facilities.113
Meanwhile, rural and urban people began to register their discontent, sometimes organized by the dissident political groups. On October 2, Alger républicain reported that a hundred “paysans” (peasants or country folk) from the
douar Bouarouys had marched in protest of a local official or caïd who had demanded bribes from families wishing their names to appear on a list of those to
receive the aid allowance for rebuilding—a recurring complaint that the leftist
press used to demonstrate the complicity of Muslim elites with the oppressive
French state.114 A day or two later, women from the douar of Oued Larbi, who
had organized a “Committee of Disaster Victims,” presented themselves at the
subprefecture in Orléansville, accompanied by Baya Allaouchiche, secretary of
the “Union of the Women of Algeria,” and demanded the distribution of tents.115
The CGT’s disaster relief committee organized a delegation of 300 rural “fellahs” who marched to the town hall in Orléansville, where some of them were
able to gain an audience with Saïah Abdelkader’s personal secretary, to whom
they complained of the lack of tents and the practice of providing only one reconstruction allowance in cases of multiple families living in a single dwelling.116
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OnOctober 9, the rain began to fall, and the need for shelter became urgent.
The CGT responded with its own relief efforts and organized a march of 500
“fellahs and rural workers” to the town of Oued Fodda, led by syndicate leaders
Gessoum Dahmane, Mohammed Marouf, and Zaidi. On October 14, Dahmane
led another march—of 700 people, according to Alger républicain—to the subprefecture in Orléansville, where Debia’s reassurances that all would soon be
housed were found unconvincing.117 Yet another march of over 700 women took
place in Orléansville on October 28.118 In Alger républicain, André Ruiz appealed
to international class solidarity: “Brothers and sisters, workers and peasants, of
the regions of Orléansville, Ténès, Duperré, you can count on the support of
the working class of Algeria and of France, and the support of the international
working class. . . .It is incontestable that this catastrophe highlights the misery of
our lands, due in the first place to the regime of colonial exploitation.”119
Critiques of the state response also emerged in the metropole. On October
8, the Catholic Resistance newspaper Témoinage chrétien (Christian Witness),
which would later voice important critiques of French tactics in the Algerian
War, published an article titled “Orléansville: Racism is not dead! Does the
Mayor only want to feed the Europeans?” The paper quoted a September 15
message, allegedly sent by Bisgambiglia, mayor of Orléansville, to the Red Cross:
“Please do not feed Pontéba, the villages Menassis, Maizia, El-Douabed, Gulaftia, Kafafsa, Cheklil and Chouiat, where the men and children did not come to
work this morning.”120 This piece of damning evidence was later reprinted in
Algeria in the CGT’s La Vie ouvrière (The Worker’s Life) and in its local monthly
newsletter, La voix des sinistrés du Chéliff (The Voice of the Disaster Survivors of
the Chélif ).121
Whereas Témoinage chrétien had focused on Bisgambiglia, Alger républicain
and the CGT paired Bisgambiglia’s villainy with that of privileged Muslims.
Alger républicain pointed out that the first cement building to be constructed,
in October 1954, was a shed to house Bisgambiglia’s horses, but it also addressed
continuing demands for bribes from rural Muslim caïds.122 The CGT’s La voix
des sinistrés du Chéliff paired Bisgambiglia with Saïah Abdelkader, describing
the two as “The Profiteers of Misery.” Both Saïah and Bigambiglia, it was implied, were guilty of skimming from donations intended for disaster victims;
Saïah would later be accused of profiting from the disaster through his family’s
stake in a cement company which was contracted as a supplier in the construction of HLM housing.123
The archival record suggests that this demonization of Bisgambiglia and Saïah
Abdelkader was not fully justified; in September 1954 the pair had pressed the
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Algerian government to speed the distribution of materials for the reconstruction of gourbis, and in 1955 Saïah would lobby the government in Paris to expand
construction of permanent HLM apartment housing in Orléansville for homeless
Muslims who had migrated to the city after the earthquake.124 However, in the
Algerian Assembly, it would be the PCA representative René Justrabo who would
speak out for the needs of the rural poor. Bisgambiglia and Saïah Abdelkader, in
contrast, would focus on maximizing indemnifications for property owners.125 For
the CGT, this dastardly duo constituted a perfect foil to demonstrate that ethnicity and religion were irrelevant to the class struggle against capitalist oppression.
The oppressors, it was made clear, had no ethnic identity.
This message was reinforced by a complementary message of worker solidarity across ethnic lines. Parisian syndicalists visited Beni Rached in October
1954,126 and Alger républicain contrasted the empty words of Saïah Abdelkader
and the inaction of the Algerian Assembly with the successful effort of councilman Rachid Dali Bey, a communist, to persuade the Algiers Conseil Général to
allocate one hundred million francs for disaster relief.127 Meanwhile, Ruiz was
organizing local Muslim Algerian elected officials, who formed a “Comité National algérien d’aide aux sinistrés,” which addressed complaints to the Minister
of the Interior about the lack of tents and barracks, and about the extortion of
bribes from disaster survivors by rural caïds.128
The situation seemed to be explosive. Faced with signs of popular agitation,
the authorities assigned gendarmes to Beni Rached and other villages.129 As the
rains intensified, so did the protests. In late October, Alger républicain reported
crowds as large as two thousand.130

Shortcomings and Deep Causes
The force of seismic waves had produced a dramatic intervention in human
history, transforming another environmental factor, the seasonal rains, from a
routine and predictable event into a catastrophe: a humanitarian catastrophe
for the people of the Chélif Valley and a political disaster for the French state.
These catastrophes were also products of late colonialism: a century of impoverishment and neglect left the rural Algerian population exposed to the elements
in the autumn of 1954, while the growing vitality of the anti-colonial opposition
made the suffering of poor Muslim Algerians an urgent political concern for the
colonial regime.
The French state’s response was seen as inadequate not only by the regime’s
opponents but also by those responsible for the disaster response. By early 1955,
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the solidarity campaign had collected over 1.5 billion francs, with donations arriving from across Europe, the Middle East, the United States, and the Soviet
Union. This did not, however, translate into robust action in the Chélif Valley.131
Within the SNPC, the shortcomings of the immediate disaster response were
acknowledged, and the event became a case study in unpreparedness and suboptimal organization. Although the immediate response of the military units,
sapeurs-pompiers, and especially the medical staff seem to have been universally
applauded, the response from the local government and from Algiers and Paris
was inefficient.132 As Colonel Curie’s report on the disaster response effort would
explain, the local staff of the Service de Santé had performed admirably, but the
local authorities, including Debia, Bisgambiglia, and the mayors of the other
affected towns lacked the “means of communication” to organize an effective
local governmental disaster response operation. Only the military troops in the
area had been able to respond immediately. The subprefecture building had itself been damaged, as had the gendarmie, and the local officials had themselves
been traumatized by the disaster. The Service de Protection Civile d’Algerie had
been slow to respond to the disaster; the “designated director of disaster relief ”
arrived in Orléansville on Friday September 11, only to return to Algiers that day,
and when he returned on the 12th, he possessed no more means of communication or response than did the subprefect or the mayor.133
As Kessler noted in his report on the disaster response, the SNPC team that
set up operations on September 20 in the subprefecture fell short of the organization and infrastructure called for in the Plan ORSEC (Organisation de la
réponse de sécurité civile),134 the guidelines for disaster response promulgated by
the French state in 1952. The Plan ORSEC specified that a team of “specialized
functionaries and technicians” needed to be sent to the disaster site with the authority to respond to the variety of urgent problems that might arise. This team
would have both the skills and the “psychological distance” necessary to confront the disaster, but it was to work closely with the local authorities in order
to benefit from local knowledge. The Orléansville response, however, suffered
from poor coordination. Although the Civil Protection workers from outside
of Orléansville shared space in available buildings with the local authorities,
this resulted in the “dispersion of services” of the SNPC staff while producing
confusion, rather than coordination, between the hierarchy of the SNPC and
that of the subprefecture. 135 Marius Hautberg complained that the municipal
government issued vouchers to Orléansville residents for tents and blankets
without regard for the ability of the SNPC to fulfill such commitments, and
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uncoordinated requests were made to the engineering corps by various authorities, including Debia, at the subprefecture; Freychet, representing the prefecture;
and even the medical service, resulting in wasted time and resources. Meanwhile,
although buildings containing corpses were excavated, no official possessed the
legal authority to order the demolition of the countless other buildings that
stood unusable, damaged by the earthquake.136 These critiques were analogous
to concerns emanating from within the Algerian government. In an October
7 encrypted telegram marked “secret,” Governor-General Roger Léonard expressed alarm that “latent conflicts” between the municipal authorities and the
prefecture prevented effective action, as did the lack of a legal structure permitting the Algerian administration to address the need for repairs to existing
buildings and for permits for new construction. These problems rendered the
administration “paralyzed,” according to Leonard, “on the eve of winter.”137
Kessler argued that the impact of the earthquake was much like that of an aerial bombing campaign, and therefore planners of national defense had much to
learn from Orléansville. Kessler noted that there was one important difference
between the earthquake in Orléansville and the experience of cities destroyed
in war: the Orléansville disaster had occurred when France was otherwise at
peace and had affected only a single region. 138 Given the peacetime abundance
of means in September, the inefficiency of the response was worrisome. For Kessler, the “appalling mediocrity” of the service’s own resources and the grossly
“insufficient training” of the local French population would be a wake-up call,
he hoped, for French disaster response. 139 A similar view was made public in
the pages of the newspaper L’est républican, where an editorial titled “Warning” pointed out the growing danger of nuclear destruction of French cities and
cited the inadequacy of the response to the earthquake.140 Hautberg, too, hoped
that improvements in the organization of disaster response would better prepare
the administration to respond in times of war.141 Finishing their reports in December 1954, it was not yet evident to Kessler and Hautberg that history would
record the period of relative peace in North Africa as ending within weeks of
the disaster.
Neither Hautberg, the engineer, Kessler, the administrator-in-training, nor
Debia, the subprefect, made any mention of the political agitation of the survivors. Hautberg and Debia, however, addressed the question of deeper causes
of the suffering occasioned by the disaster, and recognized that the problems
revealed by the earthquake went beyond organizational inefficiency. They recognized that the disaster produced disproportionate suffering among Muslim

42

chapter 2

Algerians living in rural poverty even if they did not accept that this poverty was
rooted in the injustices of colonialism, insisting instead that French rule was a
force for positive change.
In subprefect Debia’s view, the earthquake provoked a “revelation” for outsiders, including “visitors, metropolitan or Algerian [i.e. colons], journalists, functionaries—and even very high functionaries.” This revelation, for Debia, was not
of the iniquities of colonialism but of the harshness of the land, invoking the discourse described by Aït-Saada. For the first time, these outsiders saw beyond the
façade of beautiful beaches, impressive dams, and public works usually shown
to important visitors and tourists. The disaster brought to the fore “the Algerian reality” of an “ungrateful land” where people toiled in an inhospitable climate, as they had for millennia, but where population growth now exacerbated
their poverty. Debia was confident in the French colonizing mission, however:
the solution lay in the “mise en valeur” (improvement) of Algeria through economic development.142 Prior to the earthquake, Debia had dreamed of the Chélif Valley becoming “a new California,” and he remained optimistic, although
he had recognized, even before the outbreak of war, that the poverty of rural
Algerians was “the gravest problem, which risks endangering France’s work of
civilization.”143
For Hautberg, too, the alterity of “this land of Africa . . . brutal and savage”
was the root cause of Algerian underdevelopment. 144 Like Debia, Hautberg believed that the future of French Algeria depended on economic development.
Unlike Debia, however, Hautberg acknowledged the fragility of the ties between
Muslim Algerians and France, pointing out that French “penetration” in North
Africa was a relatively recent phenomenon. Hautberg argued that poverty was
the root cause of unrest in Algeria, inclining Muslim Algerians “to react violently in order to loosen the grip of their misery.”145 For Hautberg, this poverty
exacerbated the suffering brought by the disaster, and was the primary cause of
social disorder. Ignoring the role that the French had played in destroying the
rural livelihoods of Muslim Algerians since the nineteenth century, Hautberg
assumed that the current underdevelopment reflected the historical status quo
ante, perpetuated by a lack of modern agricultural methods and by insufficient
French schooling. Echoing a frequent postwar theme in French colonial theory,
Hautberg argued that the solution lay in a Keynesian program of state investment in Algerian economic development.146
The suffering that followed the earthquake had drawn attention to the inequities of life in Algeria and the need for improvements in the standard of living
of the Muslim population. For Debia, French rule was the cure for Algeria’s
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underdevelopment, not its cause, but “two thousand years of backwardness cannot be regained in a century.”147 Algeria’s situation, he argued, was not unlike
that of America’s rural South, where state-led economic initiatives—the Tennessee Valley Authority—had been initiated in response. In contrast, Alger républican asserted that the root cause of Algerian poverty was the state itself, which
imposed on poor Algerians “a burdened life, with taxes, caïds, informants, and
gendarmes.”148 Nevertheless, there was significant point of agreement between
the views of dissidents like the editors of Alger républican and imperialist analysts like Debia, Kessler, and Hautberg. They recognized that disaster response
was not enough: reconstruction would be insufficient if it merely returned the
Chélif Valley to its pre-earthquake condition. As Alger républican put it,
The problem posed goes beyond reconstruction, or aid, or even solidarity
with the victims of the catastrophe. Because these fundamental problems
will not be resolved when everything is put back “in order.” When we resume “as before” the neck irons of misery and hunger. A “normal” misery
and hunger. A life without school, without doctors, without warmth and
without liberty.149
Yet even restoring the Chélif to its pre-earthquake condition seemed initially
to be beyond the competence of the French authorities; the seismic event had
dramatically exacerbated the contradiction between imperialism’s promises and
the reality of life in Algeria.

Revolution and Reconstruction
On the night of October 31, 1954, a series of attacks were carried out by the FLN
(Front de Libération Nationale), across Algeria, mainly in Algiers, Kabylia, and
the Aures mountains. On November 1, the FLN issued a proclamation that the
“final phase” of the struggle for an independent Algerian state was beginning, a
“true revolutionary struggle” that would use “every means” to force the French
to negotiate.150 This was not, however, the sudden start of a conflagration. The
insurrection of 1954 started small, with fewer than a thousand armed militants
and was part of a history of postwar resistance that included the mass uprisings
of 1945 followed by the militant activities of the FLN’s predecessor, the MTLD’s
Organisation Spéciale.151 In 1954, the new insurrection brought no immediate
transformation of the situation in the Chélif.
Soon, however, the “events” of the incipient revolution started to compete
with the disaster response for headlines in the Algerian press, and voices in the

44

chapter 2

Chélif Valley began to ask how the earthquake was related to the insurrection.
The earthquake, it was assumed, was simply too momentous an event to be irrelevant to the political question. Descriptions of the calm in the Chélif and planning for the reconstruction of Orléansville became elements of the discursive
contest to imagine the future of Algeria.
For seventeen months after the FLN declaration, Orléansville remained untouched, as the FLN struggled to gain traction beyond its strongholds in the
Aurès and Kabylia, in eastern Algeria. The calm in the Chélif, however, was only
relative: peace for the colonizer went hand in hand with oppression and violence
for the colonized. The nationalists’ declaration of war had made all forms of dissidence more dangerous. Survivors’ organizations, by operating in the open, gave
the administration prime targets for repression: the activist, the disgruntled, the
engaged. In November 1954, fourteen people were arrested in Beni Rached, as
well as five CGT members organizing in the village of Chouchoua.152 In January
1955, the CGT’s La voix des sinistrés reported that homes of its disaster committee organizers were raided by French troops or gendarmes, claiming to search
for arms. One local organizer, Ahmed Sameti, was imprisoned on charges that
he had stolen the caïd’s cow. Two others were imprisoned on charges related to
demonstrations. The villages of Yaabouch and Ouled Bendou were also raided.
No arms were found, but nineteen people were arrested.153 The following year,
there were more arrests in Beni Rached, and twelve in the village of Taighaout.
In August 1955, Kaddhar, the secretary of the Fédération des Comités de Défense
des sinistrés was arrested, as was, a few months later, the secretary for the Comité
Intersyndical de solidarité, Dahmane Guessous. In May 1956, the remaining
leadership of these committees were rounded up and sent to detention camps.154
Yäel Fletcher has argued that the earthquakes of September and the rains of
October had given the leftist dissidents writing for Alger républicain and organizing the CGT’s disaster victims’ committees a grand opportunity to promote
their narrative of a class-based divide between the workers and the wealthy. The
FLN insurrection did not trigger a sudden conversion of these activists to the nationalist cause—at least not overtly.155 In 1954, however, voices from the Left denounced the repressive measures taken in response to the outbreak of hostilities,
and argued that the root causes of the insurrection lay in the oppressive nature
of French rule in Algeria. Alger républicain declared “the necessity of seeking
and finding, QUICKLY, democratic solutions to the Algerian problem.”156 The
Fédération des Comités de defense des Sinistrés (Federation of Committees for
the Defense of the Victims) declared that “the deep causes of these events [the
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FLN insurrection] reside in the accumulation of the methods of exploitation
and oppression, in all domains, of misery and arbitrariness, by a colonial regime
which is largely condemned by all humanity.”157 Alger républicain also pointed
out the contradiction between the French state’s inability to supply twenty-five
thousand tents in the aftermath of the earthquake and its ability to use aircraft
to deploy paratroopers across Algeria in response to the FLN.158 The Chélif
earthquake was once again portrayed as revelatory of the follies and hypocrisy
of the colonial regime.
Meanwhile, supporters of French colonialism depicted Orléansville and the
French response to the earthquake as a model for Algeria. In September 1955, an
article in the Journal d’Alger asked, “Do we owe to the [seismic] cataclysm the
total absence of political troubles in the region of Orléanville?”159 Subprefect
Debia began his book-length history and memoir of Orléansville, published that
year, with a foreword titled “Warning.” In the months between his completion of
the manuscript’s chapters and the publication of the book, Debia acknowledged
that “the situation” in Algeria had become more perilous. But Debia remained
hopeful, as his book’s title indicated: Orléansville: Naissance et destruction d’une
ville: Sa résurrection (Birth and Destruction of a City: Its Resurrection).160 Debia
portrayed the region as a harbor of political tranquility amidst an Algeria in crisis, and he attributed this to the leveling effect of the earthquake. His memoir is
notably silent about the discord of October 1954, when, as the rains intensified,
people slept in the open and marched in the streets. Debia elided the entire period of the survivors’ protests and their repression in three words: “the months
passed.” 161 Ignoring these events, Debia focused on the urban housing of Europeans and Muslims of all social classes, first in an improvised “city of wood” and
then in barracks constructed, for temporary housing, beginning in December
and largely completed by March. There, Europeans and Muslims experienced
together the hardships of life after the earthquake. 162 The result was a new solidarity. The final page of Debia’s book was blank, except for a photograph of a
smiling Muslim Algerian boy.
Given the anger and misery expressed in the Chélif Valley in the fall and
winter of 1954, Debia’s optimism was Panglossian. In the Chélif the rains continued, as did the survivors’ demonstrations, culminating in a demonstration of as
many as five thousand people on November 25.163 Their complaints, as conveyed
by Algèr republicain and La voix des sinistrés du Chéliff, continued to focus on
the difficulty of obtaining the twenty thousand francs allotted to rural families
rendered homeless, and above all, the lack of housing. The weather had made
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the need for housing urgent, and, weeks after the disaster, neither the administration nor the survivors saw tents as an adequate solution. On October 11,
the administration had promised temporary housing in barracks constructed
of prefabricated materials. However, the volume of material ordered was grossly
insufficient, having been intended only for the residents of towns and cities.
Meanwhile, there was no sign of progress on plans for permanent reconstruction of Orléansville.164
Nevertheless, the pace of disaster relief did improve in November 1954. This
was partly in response to the political agitation in the Chélif, and to negative
press coverage about the disaster response in Algeria and metropolitan France.
In part it was simply because initiatives begun in late September and October
were finally bearing fruit. In October, a meeting of the Algerian Assembly had
established a legal basis for funding reconstruction; meanwhile, the mess of heterogeneous tents and poles and canvas piling up in the Orléansville train station
was sorted out. By late November, according to official figures, over 6,000 tents
had been distributed, including 500 from the Italian Red Cross, 1,474 from
the SNPC, and 1,030 from the army. Thirty thousand blankets were handed
out: the Red Cross had provided twenty thousand and Sécours Catholique, ten
thousand.165 (No mention was made in official counts of the efforts made by the
CGT, UDMA, or MTLD.) From Kessler’s point of view, the distribution of
tents “represented the vastest French housing effort ever achieved in a time of
peace.”166 Meanwhile, “Operation Gourbi” was declared, to speed the distribution of funds and supplies to permit rural families to rebuild their homes. Debia
claimed that the reconstruction of thirty-eight thousand gourbis was completed
by winter (Interior Minister Mitterrand claimed that it was thirty-five thousand), enabled by the aid payments of twenty thousand francs each.167 Official
claims of successes in the distribution of tents and aid for the construction of
gourbis are corroborated by a shift in the nature of the critiques leveled by the
colonial regime’s critics, including not only the CGT and Alger républican but
also the metropolitan Comité Chrètien d’entente France-Islam, who now increasingly called for the construction of barracks or more permanent “modern”
housing for the rural population.168
The question of housing in the Chélif was not just a matter of overcoming
logistical, financial, or bureaucratic obstacles, however. In the context of the
FLN rebellion, reconstruction took on new urgency. It is important to note that
this urgency predated the 1958 Constantine Plan, which is often portrayed as a
turning point in the French response to anti-colonial revolt. A massive program
of state investment in Algeria intended to undercut the appeal of the FLN by
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fulfilling some of the promises of colonialism, the Constantine Plan aimed to
improve standards of living through investment in infrastructure, industry, education, and particularly the construction of decent housing for swelling urban
populations. However, this 1958 initiative was part of an ongoing shift in postwar colonial thinking emphasizing social reconfiguration and economic development through Keynesian investment. French intentions for reconstruction
in the Chélif Valley prefigured the Constantine Plan as a response to the threat
of nationalism.169
Scholars have demonstrated that violent coercion played a central role in this
attempt to remake Algeria through an imposed economic transformation.170 For
Debia, the earthquake’s violent disruption of traditional patterns of Muslims’
lives already represented a helpful “forced step toward assimilation, of which we
today see the happy effects.”171 Debia argued that these “happy effects” meant
that there was hope that France might “remake the moral, social, economic and
administrative conquest of the country.”172 Debia argued that the regime’s critics
were wrong to focus merely on housing the rural poor without envisioning a
wholesale transformation of Algerian life. He saw the inadequacy of the gourbis
as a mere symptom of the underdevelopment of rural Algeria; replacing collapsed
gourbis with modern housing would not treat the cause of the problem. Roads,
he argued, were the key: “It is by road that civilization penetrates and implants
itself.”173 Debia’s view that the inaccessibility and isolation of remote villages was
a major obstacle to the success of the French project was widely shared; and in
the context of the war this problem would eventually be addressed through the
mass relocation of rural Algerians into dismal centers of régroupement.174 In the
Chélif, however, mass relocation had already begun. The population had swelled
on the outskirts of Orléansville, as desperate earthquake survivors in rural areas
moved closer to the center of aid distribution, many resorting to picking through
garbage dumps to survive.175 The Muslim Algerian population of the city grew
to over twenty thousand by 1955.176
Reconstruction was slow to manifest, however, and its political purpose was
undermined by the inequities of colonial power. In 1955, the Commissariat of
Reconstruction rebuilt low-income (HLM) apartment housing in Orléansville
destroyed by the earthquake and constructed additional HLM housing, but in
some cases European families moved into these buildings. Muslims in the suburbs of Le Ferme and Bocca Sahnoune, including many who had migrated from
the countryside after the disaster, continued to live in tents.177
Owners of European-style buildings in cities and towns were better provided
for. Not only were they provided with temporary “barrack” housing, but they
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had the opportunity to receive substantial compensation for their losses from
the state. In October 1954, the Algerian Assembly had authorized assistance
from state funds for private property owners (excluding the gourbi dwellers)
equal to the value of any property damage valued at more than five thousand
francs. This aid included grants of up to one hundred thousand francs per property owner for repairs, and up to the depreciated value of the building for buildings deemed irreparable. Government-backed low-interest loans were offered to
cover the remainder of repair or reconstruction costs. This assistance, however,
was issued in the form of vouchers, redeemable only when reconstruction was
underway, which required obtaining demolition and building permits from
the newly created Commissaire de la Reconstruction. The process was slow,
and consequently little permanent reconstruction occurred before 1956. When
buildings were reconstructed, provisions intended to ensure that renters would
be able to return to reconstructed buildings proved ineffective, and many tenants remained displaced.178
As one might expect, the well-to-do and the well-connected fared best of all.
As the months passed, critics on the Left pointed out that Bisgambiglia and
Saïah Abdelkader received state funds to reconstruct their own villas, reportedly
costing ten million and sixteen million francs, respectively, while their business
enterprises and those of their family members benefitted from state reconstruction contracts.179 The wealthy also benefitted from the real estate market created
by the process of reconstruction. The rich bought the property and the vouchers of owners left destitute by the earthquake, who could not afford to wait for
the Commissariat of Reconstruction to approve reconstruction plans and issue
payment for their vouchers. This created a profitable market for those with the
means to speculate in a real-estate market propped up by government funds.
Meanwhile, in 1955, the municipal council blocked the urban planners’ efforts to
“construct affordable housing in well-situated locations” such as on the central
thoroughfare, the rue d’Isly, and near the train station. In a move paralleling segregationist strategy in the United States, plans for a public swimming pool were
thwarted in favor of a privately owned swim club exclusively for Europeans.180
In March 1956, 1.3 of the 1.5 billion francs from the national solidarity fund
remained unspent. The CGT’s Committee for the Defense of Disaster Victims
(Comité pour la defense des Sinistrés) argued that these funds should go directly to the survivors of the earthquake.181 However, a member of the Saïah
family had organized a survivors’ group to act as an alternative voice to the
CGT, and this group supported the transfer of money from the solidarity fund
to the reconstruction budget.182 The CGT’s approach would have ensured that
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equal benefits would go, not only to urban property owners, but to urban renters and the rural population in the gourbis, who constituted the majority of
those affected by the disaster. Instead, the funds were transferred to the Algerian Government-General for use by the Commissariat of Reconstruction, in
keeping with the regime’s desire to impose centrally directed transformation.183
Plans laid out in October of 1954 that had languished for many months were
now put into motion. These included provisions to address the needs of the
Muslim poor. Two hundred fifty thousand francs were allocated for “social improvements in the douars.” One hundred nine million francs were allocated for
roads, water supply, and sanitation in Orléansville’s Muslim suburbs of La Ferme
and Bocca Sahnoune. In Ténès, apartment housing was to be constructed for 328
families, along with a school, mosque, and bathhouse (a hammam or “Moorish bath”). Trade schools for construction were to be built in Orléansville and
Ténès, at a cost of thirty-two million francs; eighty million was allocated for a
cultural center in Orléansville; while only forty million was set aside for a rural
vocational training center in El Attaf.184 A small portion of these funds were
used to respond to complaints of discrimination against Muslim Algerians. For
example, a supplemental distribution for war veterans of ten thousand francs
from the solidarity fund, originally only distributed in the city of Orléansville,
was extended to veterans in the outlying areas when Muslim veterans outside of
the city complained that geography was being used as a proxy for race in granting preferential treatment to European veterans.185 Such measures, however, did
little to counteract the rural catastrophe inflicted, first by more than a century of
settler colonialism and then by the new violence of the earthquake and the war.
The FLN’s major operations were largely limited to eastern Algeria in the
first phase of the war, and therefore no clear conclusion can be reached about
the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort as an imperialist countermeasure to
nationalist recruitment. Keynesian effects may have made a contribution to the
relative calm in Orléansville. Certainly, Keynesian stimulus is a more plausible
explanation than Debia’s imagined social leveling and post-disaster assimilation
in the tent cities of Orléansville. Alger républicain had criticized the state for
earmarking funds for reconstruction and compensation of damages that could
have been directed toward the most urgent material needs of the survivors.186
However, after 1954, both the reconstruction of the city and the presence of the
army stimulated the local economy, creating jobs and a demand for goods from
local businesses.187 Before the earthquake, in an economy long dependent on day
laborers, underemployment had been a major problem. Hundreds of the underemployed and unemployed had demonstrated in Orléansville in October 1953,
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and the administration in 1954 counted 1,026 unemployed workers. The direct,
short-term effect of the earthquake was striking: even critics of the colonial state
recognized that, in November 1954, more than two and a half times that number
were employed in the task of clearing the debris; seven months later, 800 were
still working in this capacity. 188 However, this was not a sufficient remedy in the
long term for Algerian economic suffering or political discontent.
In 1956, the war came to the Chélif. The Army of National Liberation (ALN)
gained a foothold in the mountains north and south of the valley (the Dahra
and the Ouarsenis); the Government-General considered the villages in these
areas 20 to 50 percent “contaminated.”189 Although the French maintained control of Orléansville, the city experienced attacks and assassinations; meanwhile,
the ALN expanded their control of the mountains.190 In 1957, the Chélif Valley
itself was the site of significant fighting, not only between the nationalists and
the French and their Muslim allies, but between rival nationalist groups.191 In
some areas affected by the earthquake, disaster reconstruction came to a halt.192
The army began implementing the massive forced “regrouping” of populations,
along with whatever portion of their herds and belongings they could manage to
bring with them, out of the mountains and into regroupement village centers. By
October 1958, in the newly created département of Orléansville, which extended
north to the coast at Ténès and south beyond the Ouarsenis, over 100 thousand people had been forcibly displaced; two years later, over 260 thousand were
housed in 311 regroupement centers, approximately 40 percent of the region’s
Muslim Algerian population. Many thousands more fled to cities to escape this
“regrouping.”193 Although the French organizations Secours Catholique and
the Protestant CIMADE (Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des évacués)
provided aid in these camps and distributed donations of food and clothing
shipped from the United States, press reports of unhygienic living conditions
and malnutrition in the camps scandalized the metropolitan public.194 Across
Algeria, the French state’s belated attempts to provide these refugees with food
and housing, first in tents and then in barracks, paralleled the belated scramble
to provide shelter to earthquake survivors in 1954.
In the Chélif, funds originating in the 1954 fundraising campaign and earmarked for “social improvements in the douars” were now directed toward these
“regroupment” centers. As the Commissariat of Reconstruction put it, disaster
relief in the countryside was now “tightly associated with the work of pacification.”195 Disaster response in Algeria, in other words, had become a tool used by
the colonial state in its efforts to counter the effects of nationalism. Reconstruction efforts were then augmented, beginning in 1958, by the Constantine Plan.
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Valentin Pelosse points out that the total sum paid in salaries to Muslim Algerians by the Commissariat of Reconstruction (750 million old francs between 1955
and 1961) amounted to as much as 40 percent of the annual agricultural payroll
for Algerian workers in the Chélif area.196 In addition to providing employment
directly, reconstruction had a broader effect on the economy. The Muslim middle class in Orléansville, including business owners, teachers, professionals, and
functionaries, grew to perhaps 10 percent of the Muslim population by 1962.197
However, the fact that Muslims in Orléansville benefitted from post-earthquake
reconstruction and the Constantine Plan does not mean that the position of
Muslims improved relative to Europeans or that economic power was redistributed. Europeans, already economically and politically better off, tended to
benefit the most from the economic stimulus. The Constantine Plan aimed to
counteract this by stipulating that contracts for goods and services engage not
only the largest firms but also “diverse small and medium-sized local entrepreneurs.” However, these small businesses, to a greater degree in Orléansville than
in some cities, were often owned by Europeans.198 Moreover, as Pelosse points
out, the combined effects of regroupement and public spending on earthquake
reconstruction exacerbated the long-standing tendency of the French colonizers to privilege urban areas while carrying out the “devastation” of the rural
economy.199 Construction and reconstruction could do little to address the gross
and pervasive inequities of colonialism. Yet it is clear that the response to the
earthquake was part and parcel of the French state’s response to the political
insurrection.

Conclusion
The inseparability of the natural disaster and the war was captured in the interpretation of events presented by the playwright Henri Kréa and in the memoir of Dr. Aït Ouyahia, who each portrayed the earthquake as a harbinger of a
nationalist awakening. In Dr. Aït Ouyahia’s recollections of his own personal
experience, the façade of solidarity in Algeria crumbled within days of the first
earthquake. Aït Ouyahia recalled press reports describing how, “during those
days, the entire world manifested its compassion and generosity.”200 Yet this talk
of universal solidarity did not ring true for him. As a Kabyle-speaking Muslim from a small rural village, Aït Ouyahia had a deep-rooted sympathy for the
predicament of the rural Algerians he found suffering in Beni Rached. However, as a French-educated doctor and the son of a French-educated “indigenous
schoolteacher,” Aït Ouyahia was part of a tiny elite of Muslim professionals who
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had benefitted from French power and from colonial education.201 Frantz Fanon
wrote that, before the war of liberation, “the doctor always appears as a link in
the colonialist network, as a spokesman for the occupying power.”202 Yet, in his
memoirs, Aït Ouyahia dated his passage from the realm of the colonizer to the
realm of the colonized not to the outbreak of war but rather to the aftermath of
the earthquake.
Soon after the disaster, the young doctor observed as crowds of mostly Muslim Algerians gathered to receive aid, and a commotion occurred outside one
of the tents where humanitarian aid was being distributed. Soldiers dragged a
young Algerian man away from the tent, and a French officer ordered the crowd
to disperse, declaring: “All thieves, these Arabs!” This event is not implausible:
Hautberg also described incidents of friction between earthquake survivors and
French aid workers leading to the intervention of gendarmes during the distribution of aid.203 For Aït Ouyahia, the angry words of the French officer were an
outrage, and a transformative moment for the newly minted, French-trained obstetric surgeon. According to his account, he confronted the French officer and,
in front of the crowd, denounced the man’s racism. Aït Ouyahia remembered
the moment as an epiphany:
It was as if this insult was addressed to me alone. I decided then to take on,
alone, the burden for all the Arabs, and in their name, to respond, alone,
to he who had just injured us. I had to do it, me who spoke French. . . .
Forgotten was the Muslim intern, all proud of being called “Monsieur,” just
like his European colleagues in the medical service! Forgotten the young
indigene who had been told, more than once, that he was not “an ordinary
Arab”. . . . To the Devil the privileged Muslim! I was no longer me; I was
those, those poor wretches in rags and dirty feet. I felt suddenly strong, all
grown up.204
At this moment, Aït Ouyahia appears to have experienced a conversion. For
this Kabyle-speaking, French-educated doctor, a new ideology of solidarity, that
of Arab-Algerian nationalism, had replaced the claims of Franco-Algerian unity
and universal brotherhood.205 Aït Ouyahia would later go on to provide active
support to the Algerian revolution against France.
Although Henri Kréa in 1957 and Aït Ouyahia in 1999 portrayed the earthquake as a definitive trigger event in Algerians’ embrace of the FLN cause, this
cannot be taken as evidence of a widespread phenomenon. Even regarding his
own, personal experience, Aït Ouyahia’s story about the French officer seems to
fit uneasily with other chapters in his disjointed memoir that treat his wartime
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support for the FLN without any reference to the earthquake as a formative
experience. Clearly, however, Aït Ouyahia’s memory of the earthquake itself was
strongly tied to his commitment to the nationalist struggle for independence.
The archival record produced in the weeks and months following the earthquake supports the view that disaster and decolonization were linked, as colonizer and colonized interpreted and responded to the seismic disaster in light
of the problems of inequity in Algeria and of Algeria’s relation to France. By
the time the earthquake struck, Algerian nationalism had already been growing
for decades, and North Africa already being rent by nationalist violence from
Morocco to Tunisia, but the Chélif disaster revealed and exacerbated the very
injustices and miseries of colonialism that fueled the nationalist revolution. The
bankruptcy of the social contract implied by French promises of “civilization”
and economic development was already apparent in Algeria, but by destroying
vast amounts of housing, the seismic shocks of 1954 exposed the poorest Algerians to the winter rains and exponentially increased what it would cost the
French state to follow through on its promises—at precisely the moment when
anti-colonial opposition was gathering strength. Indisputably, when the earthquake struck, questions of decolonization were far from the minds of some—
the child Ali Bouzar waking from his bed in Oued Fodda, or those suffocating
workers, crushed in the ruins of a high rise in Orléansville. However, the earthquake and the war of independence are not separable objects of inquiry, at least
not when the scope of inquiry includes the Chélif Valley. Every action of the
French state and of its agents, critics, and rivals in the Chélif was conditioned
by the question of whether Algeria was France, and whether and how it would
remain so. In the Chélif, disaster relief became a field of struggle over decolonization, as it would in Fréjus and in Morocco in the coming years.
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Fréjus 1959, Under Water and at War
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n the night of December 2, 1959, fourteen-year-old Christian
Hughes and his father returned home in Fréjus, on the north shore of
the Mediterranean, at the mouths of the Argens and Reyran Rivers,
in the French département of the Var. They had set out by bicycle in the pouring
rain to pull in their fishing nets, but Christian’s father had changed his mind,
and they returned empty-handed to the house the Hughes family shared with
Christian’s aunt and uncle. They immediately went to bed. All seemed normal
until, as Hughes recalled: “Then, we heard noises, gunshots. My father, my sister
came out of their rooms. We were in the midst of the Algerian War. My brother
was in the djebels [mountains]. We heard rifle shots, the siren, the alarm; it scared
us. My sister said, ‘It is the FLN attacking….’ Everyone shouted, ‘It is a revolution!’” There was a loud knock on the door: Christian’s father demanded that
somebody get him a knife. Then his father and uncle opened the door, and his
uncle, “a colossus, two meters tall,” fainted. It was not a revolution; the Algerian
revolutionaries were not invading the quiet town in the dark of night. It was a
flood: there was “water everywhere.” A neighbor was at the door to warn them.
Christian’s uncle revived and shouted: “A tidal wave, we’re all going to die!”1
The Malpasset Dam north of Fréjus had burst at approximately 9:30 p.m.,
unleashing a wall of water. Waves, reportedly four-to-five meters high, swept
through the Reyran Valley and into Fréjus. Over 400 people were drowned; 155
buildings were destroyed, and almost 800 were damaged. Over thirteen square
kilometers of agricultural land flooded; a thousand sheep drowned, and 471
vehicles were destroyed.2 Christian Hughes remembered seeing the aftermath
the next day: “cadavers, destroyed buildings, hectares of ruined crops, drowned
animals.”3
Hughes’s short memoir of the event, published in 2003, illustrates how the
environmental catastrophe his family experienced in 1959 was intertwined in his
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memory with the political violence of the Algerian War. Hughes was not alone
in connecting the experience of the flood to that of war and decolonization, and
the imbrication of the Fréjus flood with imperialism and the Algerian War was
not limited to an ex post facto reconstruction of events. The town of Fréjus had
long had a particularly strong connection to France’s colonial endeavors, and
this connection was evident in 1959. This chapter will make use of sources from
1959 through the 1960s and beyond to demonstrate how the Malpasset disaster
was shaped by events in North Africa (including both the Algerian Revolution
and the Chélif earthquake), affecting who suffered as a result, how the state
responded, and how the disaster in the Var was remembered.

The War at Home
In the grim context of 1959, the Hughes family’s initial assumption that the violence outside their door was caused by Algerian revolutionaries was not entirely
implausible. The “events” in Algeria, which had begun as a small uprising in November 1954, had metastasized into a major conflict by the time of the Malpasset
Dam collapse. The nationalist revolutionaries of the FLN (Front de libération
nationale) recruited new supporters as their attacks prompted French reprisals
against the Muslim population. By February 1955, the revolt had begun to spread
beyond FLN strongholds in the Aurès Mountains and Kabylia; in response, the
French sent more soldiers to Algeria, including conscripts as well as professional
troops battle-hardened by the failed campaign for French Indochina.4 In 1957 Algiers had been engulfed in urban guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and reprisals, but in
Algiers and across Algeria, French forces were able to reverse FLN gains through
a brutal campaign that included the “widespread and systematic” use of torture.5
The “regrouping” of rural populations and then the 1958 Constantine Plan further escalated this French campaign to transform and “reconquer” Algeria.6
The population of the metropole was keenly aware of these “events.” In the
Var, the then-dominant Socialist party lamented “the sacrifices imposed on
young Frenchmen, who risk paying—and paying dearly—for the faults of colonialism and the deficiencies of rulers.” 7 In Algiers, however, there was no sign
of compromise: in 1958 the formation of a government in Paris under a prime
minister who had advocated negotiation with the nationalists had precipitated
a rebellion of hard-line settlers and French paratroopers in Algeria. This had
brought down the Fourth Republic and prompted the return of Charles de
Gaulle to power. The war continued.8
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In the sixteen months preceding the Malpasset Dam collapse, the FLN had
taken the war to the hexagon, attacking oil refineries and military and police
forces in metropolitan France.9 In 2011, the German historians Matthias Ritzi
and Erich Schmidt-Eenboom uncovered a report by a West German spy, Richard
Christmann, indicating that the FLN had been considering attacks on dams in
France. Through his informants inside the FLN, Christmann had learned that
the revolutionaries were exploring new options for sabotage. They were studying
sewer tunnels and public water supply infrastructure in Paris and Algiers, with
the idea of planting bombs underneath buildings, or using judiciously placed
explosions to destroy the public water supply. In addition, the FLN was contemplating the destruction of dams. After the Malpasset collapse, Christmann
believed that the catastrophe had in fact resulted from such an attack. In a report
for the West German intelligence service, Christmann stated that “After an attack on a small dam in southern France had only a partial success, but took many
lives, all other terrorist measures were stopped by order of the group around Ben
Bella, then still imprisoned.” This was obviously a reference to the collapse of the
Malpasset Dam. Ritzi and Schmidt-Eenboom have accepted Christmann’s view
that the FLN were responsible for the Fréjus disaster.10 This idea has since been
publicized by Schmidt-Eenbaum and by a 2013 Arte television documentary,
reviving, in public discourse, the connection between the violence of decolonization and the flood.11
This interpretation of the evidence has significant flaws, however. It would be
hard to imagine by what standard the destruction of Fréjus would be considered
only a “partial success,” if the goal of the FLN attacks in France was to spread
fear and force France to shift security forces away from Algeria. 12 It is possible
that the indiscriminate killing of Algerian Muslims by the disaster caused FLN
leaders to think twice about turning dams into weapons. However, it seems
likely that Christmann was mistaken or misled about the cause of the disaster,
or was speculating based on his knowledge of prior FLN intentions. He may also
have misinterpreted later FLN discussion about what lessons the revolutionaries
might learn from the Fréjus accident about dam sabotage as a political tactic.
As Benjamin Stora and others have argued, it seems very unlikely that the
Malpasset Dam was in fact destroyed by an FLN attack, since no reference to
such an attack has ever been made by party leaders or combatants (generally
unapologetic about the necessary violence of the war), and no trace of such an
attack has been found in the French or Algerian archives.13 Therefore, Christmann’s claim and the Ritzi/Schmidt-Eeboom hypothesis are best interpreted as
a parallel to Hughes’s recollection of the disaster. Across the decades, some have

Fréjus 1959, Under Water and at War

57

found it difficult to believe that destruction on such a scale was not somehow
connected to the events in Algeria—which it was, even if an FLN attack was
not to blame.

No such thing as an Accidental Disaster
The flooding of Fréjus, the result of a dam failure, would not generally be considered a “natural” disaster. However, the same analytical questions that underlie
environmental historians’ efforts to problematize the notion of a natural disaster
can be applied to this “accidental” event: how did the unintended movements
of the inanimate (earth, concrete, water) interact with historical processes and
human power relations? How was the resulting damage and suffering distributed as a result? How did authorities’ treatment of the event as an accident obscure the deeper causes of this suffering?
The Malpasset Dam’s construction in the 1950s had been a response to
drought in the area—that is, to the discrepancy between the availability of fresh
water and the demands of the human community that had developed in the
region. While the Argens River ran from the west to its mouth at Fréjus, the
lands to the north of the town were watered by the Reyran—but the Reyran
“river” was a seasonal wadi, often dry except for in the winter months. The
population of the coastal region including Fréjus, Saint-Raphaël, Saint-Tropez,
and Sainte-Maxime, within the département of the Var, had been estimated to
be about forty-five thousand in 1945, and departmental officials expected it to
soon reach one hundred fifty thousand during the summer tourist season. The
thirsty summer crowds would require 6.5 million cubic meters of drinking water
annually; the agriculture of the area would use over 13 million cubic meters of
water for irrigation. Planners concluded that meeting such needs necessitated a
reservoir of 22 million cubic meters, to account for evaporative loss. Damming
the Reyran produced the necessary accumulation of water for year-round use.14
From the start, the dam had served both a political and an economic purpose. As Georges Menant wrote in 1960, “Our lands were thirsty for water like
we were thirsty for progress, and progress, that was the dam.”15 Although there
had been discussion of various solutions to the region’s shortage of water for
irrigation, the project that became the Malpasset Dam was proposed in 1946 by
a departmental councilman, communist schoolteacher Antoine Foucard. The
project was then taken up by the Socialists, who had initially shared power with
the Communists and then came to dominate postwar departmental and municipal government for over a decade.16 The dam’s construction began in 1952
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and was completed in 1954, although legal disputes with the owner of one of
the local mines delayed the complete filling of the planned reservoir basin until
1959.17 The dam project served not only as a source of water, but also as a symbol
of hope after the Second World War, and as proof of the ability of the postwar
local leadership, men of the Left and the Resistance, to provide a brighter future
for the people of the region. By the time the basin was filled, however, the wars
of decolonization had eroded the optimism of the post-World War II decade.
In the weeks immediately following the disaster, connections between French
imperialism and the dam collapse were absent in the public discourse. It was
quickly accepted that there was no sign of sabotage or saboteurs, and discussions
regarding the cause focused on the design and placement of the dam. In the
initial absence of details, a failure of state oversight seemed a likely culprit. On
December 6, Nice-Matin published an article with the headline: “Unbelievable
but True! No legislation requires prior geological testing for the construction
of dams, which is indispensable.”18 Those who sought to impute blame for the
disaster were more likely to point to the Socialists than to the FLN. In 1958,
the “events” in Algeria had brought down the Fourth Republic, and the March
1959 municipal elections had brought the French right into power in Fréjus, led
by the new mayor André Léotard, a former Vichy official.19 On December 10,
Louis Eugène Joly, a former colonial engineer and the Vichy-era mayor of Fréjus
(1941–1944), wrote to Léotard and demanded that justice be brought to bear
against those responsible for the dam’s creation. Joly was presumably no friend
to the Socialist and Communist politicians who had initiated the construction
of the dam. Invoking the authority of his experience as an engineer in the colonies, and particularly as head of Public Works for Niger “where had created, in
technical matters, the city of Niamey,” Joly now stated that he had always had
his doubts about the Malpasset project. Joly suggested that those responsible for
geographical studies may have been pressured to produce a favorable conclusion,
and he claimed that there had been sufficient concerns among engineers to have
precluded the decision to construct a “thin” arch dam rather than a traditional
“heavy” dam.” 20
Yet official inquiries concluded that no one was to blame for the disaster. In
1960, a Commission of Inquiry instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture considered and ruled out sabotage, judging that some traces of saboteurs operating
on such a large scale would have been noticeable before or after the flood. The
commission also considered and eliminated as possible causes the use of dynamite in the construction of the nearby highway, an earthquake, or a meteorite
strike (the latter possibility suggested by eyewitness reports that lights in the sky
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preceded the flood). The commission also ruled out human error, finding that
the dam failure “must be exclusively attributed to the ground below the foundations,” which contained hidden faults or underground weak spots that gave
way in November 1959; there were no errors in the design or construction of the
dam itself. The final words of the “survey of possible causes” seem to have been
directed against the idea that the project itself might have been hubris: “As the
result of these investigations, the commission can affirm that the catastrophe of
Malpasset should not diminish the confidence of engineers in dams of the arch
type [i.e. a “thin” curved dam which bulges in the direction of the reservoir], the
safety of which is ensured as long as the entire supporting structure is capable
of permanently carrying the loads transmitted by such a structure.”21 In other
words, there was nothing wrong with the dam; it was the earth that had failed.
Consequently, the French state acknowledged no responsibility for damages.
Laurin, deputy from the Var, objected that the state’s response, based on past
responses to natural disasters, was inappropriate. This was no natural disaster,
argued Laurin: its origins, he argued, should have entitled victims to full restitution from the state for damages which, he estimated, would total 236 million
new francs.22 However, the Senate rejected all such proposals that would have
made the state responsible for damages.23 The state authorized only 40 million
new francs for disaster aid (equivalent to 4 billion old francs following a devaluation in January 1960). Of the 40 million, 39.2 million was to be used to rebuild
civilian and military infrastructure, including roads, rural engineering, and port
repair. Only 800,000 was allocated for urgent, emergency aid to victims.24 The
Department of the Var did provide reconstruction payments for businesses, and
the municipal government of Fréjus successfully pursued legal action against
the Department of the Var, as the party responsible for the dam, to eventually
obtain state compensation for the cost of rebuilding public infrastructure, even
in the absence of any finding of fault. However, indemnifying individual victims
and their heirs would be left to private donors through a “solidarity” campaign
modeled on the one for victims of the Orléansville earthquake.25 As in the case
of Orléansville, an abundance of donations poured in from around metropolitan
France, Algeria, and the world.26
The initial investigation’s finding that no one was to blame for the disaster
was upheld by a separate, court-ordered inquiry in 1967, and finally by the Conseil d’État, (France’s highest court) in 1971.27 Some experts did testify that the
civil engineers had been negligent in failing to conduct adequate testing of the
rock bed, and that therefore ultimate culpability should be attributed to the
chief of the Service of Rural Engineering of the Var, who had been in charge
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of the operation. However, the prevailing argument was that the faults in the
rock were not detectible before the disaster by the means then available but became visible only after the flood waters had swept away concealing layers.28 This
conclusion has been upheld by recent scholarship on the topic. Pierre Duffault
describes how a lack of regulatory oversight and communication among experts,
regulators, and workers meant that there was little awareness of risks and therefore no surveillance for early warning signs. Nevertheless, Duffault argues that
would be anachronistic to expect procedures to have been in place that became
commonplace and required only as a response to studies conducted after the
Malpasset incident.29
However, when viewed in a broader historical context, debates about whether
the disaster was an unforeseeable accident or the result of human malfeasance or
negligence present a false dichotomy. One need not believe that FLN sabotage
was involved in order to view the Fréjus disaster as a product of empire. The technical ability to construct such public works, developed to a great extent in the
colonies, served to demonstrate a putative European modernity that sought to
maintain the distinction between the “modern” metropole and the “backwards”
colonial subject. Moreover, the Malpasset Dam was intended to serve not only
the basic needs of the Var’s population but also the agricultural export market,
contributing to the postwar economic recovery that was necessary for France to
maintain control over its colonial empire. The Malpasset was also designed to
provide for the affluence and leisure of the metropolitan French, who would be
vacationing on the Côte d’Azur, and French military personnel preparing for,
or recovering from, their imperial duties at the local army post and aero-naval
base. These ambitions drove the politicians, engineers, and geographers of the
Var to push beyond the contemporaneous limits of geotechnical foresight and
bureaucratic oversight and beyond their ability to master the inanimate forces
of water, earth, and rock.30
However, understanding this disaster is not just a matter of identifying the
causes of the construction and dissolution of the Malpasset Dam. The dimensions of the disaster—whom it affected, and how—unfolded over weeks and
even years. The cultural and social dynamics of empire shaped how Fréjus’s inhabitants of European and Algerian origin were impacted by the disaster: where
they lived, where they died, and, for those who survived, how they were imagined and treated afterward by French commentators and French government
officials.
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Chélif-on-the-Reyran (Algerians in Fréjus)
The history of the city of Fréjus is intertwined with the history of the French
empire in Africa, a fact which has been recognized by academics as well as by
journalists, amateur historians, and popular writers. The academic historians
Gregory Mann and M. Kathryn Edwards have analyzed the connection to empire found in local representations of Fréjus’s history. As Mann has argued, Fréjus is not merely a generic French town: “Fréjus has a distinct past, one not shared
by the country as a whole... for Fréjus we cannot read ‘France.’”31 Fréjus’s history
and locally-constructed identity is imbued with what Mann refers to as “residues
of empire.”32 Mann notes that the streets and places of Fréjus are named after the
heroes of empire, like Gallieni and Lyautey, and that over ten thousand soldiers
from the colonies are buried in the area, a byproduct of the Great War and the
presence of (segregated) military hospitals that treated the wounded.33 Later, as
local historians and journalists have frequently noted, Fréjus also became the
point of departure for many metropolitan troops leaving for the colonies, and
the town’s population grew by 1959 to include not only over 13,000 civilians but
also 6,331 uniformed soldiers.34 As Edwards explains, Fréjus’s connections with
the imperial project in Indochina made the town an apparently “natural choice”
when, in the 1980s, French associations of veterans and formers settlers sought a
site for a national memorial to the Indochina Wars.35
As Mann has argued, colonial relationships, networks, and flows connect particular localities in the empire, “and it is not always necessary to pass through
Paris.”36 Although Mann has emphasized the movement of troops and Fréjus’s
unique relation to France’s West African empire in the period of the World
Wars, after World War II Fréjus also developed a strong connection to Algeria’s
Chélif valley, and especially to the village of Ouled Fares, near Orléansville.37
Postwar Fréjus, like other parts of metropolitan France, needed laborers for its
mines, factories, and road crews. Fréjus came to depend on immigrant workers, including Spaniards and Italians as well as Algerians, many of whom were
housed in barracks. After 1954, the Algerian proportion of the population increased dramatically.
This demographic shift was not in itself unique to Fréjus or to the Chélif:
between 1954 and 1962, the Algerian Muslim population in France increased
from 211,000 to as many as 436,000, driven largely by migration from rural
areas.38 In the Chélif, however, the geoenvironmental violence of the earthquake
was a unique factor exacerbating the suffering of a rural population already
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impoverished by a century of colonial rule, prompting an additional wave of migration. According to official counts, Fréjus in 1954 was home to “between 300
and 350 souls” from the Chélif; after the earthquake, some immigrant workers
in Fréjus brought over additional family members.39 By 1959, Fréjus was said to
be home to as many as 1,100 Muslim Algerians. According to a 1960 account by
journalist Gaston Bonheur, earthquake refugees constituted the majority of the
North African community there.40 Some of the Chélif refugees arrived destitute, and were assisted by the Red Cross, using funds from the earthquake solidarity fundraising drive, inciting resentment among the European residents.41
In Bonheur’s telling, one set of twins, Zorah and Nadine Mekki, had been born
when their mother went into labor during the terror of the Orléansville disaster;
they drowned in the Fréjus flood.42
In addition to the earthquake and the economic devastation of wartime rural
Algeria, another driver of the migration of Muslim Algerians to France was
the effort of the French state to assist Muslims targeted as collaborators by the
FLN. These political refugees sought safety in metropolitan France. Archival
documents reveal that in 1956 the French government authorized the use of nine
million francs remaining in the budget for the reconstruction of Ténès (near
Orléansville) for the purpose of resettling “North Africans needing residence in
the metropole, with first priority being given, where appropriate, to those from
the disaster region of the Chélif.”43 This decision had been urged both in order
to resettle Orléansville earthquake survivors with relatives already working in
agriculture in several departments, including the Var, and in order to resettle
political refugees. The Var was listed among the regions needing immigrant
labor. Because of the large proportion of families in Fréjus from the Chélif region and the directive given to prioritize the political refugees who came from
the earthquake-stricken zone (a nod to the original authorization of these funds
for use in reconstruction), it is reasonable to conclude that the Algerian population of Fréjus in 1959 included these sorts of political refugees as well as other
war refugees and earthquake refugees.
When the economic inequalities of empire and the violence of decolonization
drove Muslims to migrate from the Chélif Valley to the Reyran Valley, these anthropogenic factors combined with drought in Algeria and “diluvian rainfalls”
in France to set the stage for the Malpasset disaster in December 1959. When the
water level behind the dam rose to unprecedented levels,44 the earth beneath the
dam gave way, and the residents of the valley below paid the price. The Algerian
residents of Fréjus paid a particularly high price.

Fréjus 1959, Under Water and at War

63

Official Policies and Local Officials
As Todd Shepard and Amelia Lyons have shown, the French state’s official response in the late 1950s to the FLN’s nationalist narrative was to proclaim that
Muslim Algerians were fully French, while taking ethnic origins into account
for the purposes of fighting discrimination and providing social welfare assistance. These policies aimed to improve the economic status of Algerians within
France while simultaneously pursuing the goals of the colonial “civilizing mission” among the migrants. Officially, Muslim Algerians were already French citizens, and since the late 1940s the “Muslim French from Algeria” were to possess
political equality while in metropolitan France, even if they lacked such equality
in Algeria. In 1958, in a belated attempt to undermine support for the FLN, the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic had extended this more equal citizenship to
Muslims in Algeria as well. Furthermore, the promotion of equality was now extended beyond political and legal equality. The social advancement of Muslims
became an official goal of the Republic, and provision of welfare benefits to the
“Muslim French” in the metropole became a crucial element of the French effort
to mitigate Muslim grievances against French rule.45
Nevertheless, as Amelia Lyons has pointed out, resistance to this policy existed
both among “well placed government officials” and among the European-born
neighbors of migrants, who continued to believe that “Algerians did not fit into
France.”46 French responses to the Fréjus disaster demonstrate that the official
ideology of integration and equality was not hegemonic in the Var of 1959, as
evinced by French accounts of the disaster and by the actions of the local government revealed by the archival record. The municipal government, conditioned
by the ingrained colonial habits of discrimination, made use of ethnic categorization to block, rather than assist, the social advancement and well-being of
Muslim Algerians in the wake of the Fréjus disaster.
Archival sources reveal the gap between local government actions and the
official, legal position of Muslim Algerians within France. After the Malpasset
disaster, Algerians in Fréjus, citizenship notwithstanding, were subjected to a
discriminatory regime based on suspicion and scrutiny. Payments to “North
Africans” or Algerian “français musulmans” (used as interchangeable terms)
were set at lower levels than those available to French of European origin, and
procedures were put in place to make it difficult for Muslims to obtain disaster
relief at all. On December 5, 1959, the municipal council of Fréjus instituted a
special service to review the claims made by North Africans who sought aid
as victims of the flood. This service would be staffed by the Service of Muslim
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Affairs on the first floor of the town hall (Mairie) and would authorize North
Africans to receive “white cards” entitling disaster survivors to food, clothing,
and aid payments—but only if they could provide a signed attestation to their
residency from an employer, and another from a “metropolitan Frenchman” or
an Algerian accepted as a long-term resident of Fréjus who was also “known to
be honorable.” This had to be accompanied by an official certificate from the
Fréjus police commissariat.47
Even for disaster survivors who managed to assemble these documents, the
initial approval of disaster survivor status for “les français origins des départements de l’Afrique du Nord,” (“the French originating in the departments of
North Africa,” i.e. Muslim Algerians) was merely provisional, entitling them
only to an initial emergency payment of 5,000 francs and a second, “complementary” payment of 10,000 francs per person. Algerians became eligible for the
larger amounts received by “metropolitan Frenchmen” (eventually set at 50,000
per household, plus 20,000 per additional person in the family) only “when the
state of disaster victim is determined in an [unspecified] formal manner, and
unequivocally.”48 The imposition of this special process for Muslim Algerians
belied their official status as equal citizens of France.
The distribution of donations from the Fréjus solidarity fund reveals gross
discrepancies between the aid for Muslim citizens and for citizens of European
descent, despite the official doctrine of the Frenchness of Algeria and the goal
of equality of Algerians as French citizens. According to an unpublished report
from the Mairie, 170 “Muslim” families suffered damages from the disaster,
and 1,680 “autochthones” families. The official number of deaths was given as
396, including 27 unidentified dead and 50 missing persons. The report’s section on “Categorization by Origin” identified 338 of the dead as “nationals”; 10
were “foreign”; 39 were “Muslim” and 9 were “Africans (soldiers).”49 Fatalities in
the Muslim community may in fact have been more numerous: Oliver Donat
has pointed out that the number of dead remained controversial. The official
figure of the total dead eventually rose to 423, but some claimed that the real
number was over 500.50 According to the unpublished Mairie report, “North
Africans” in Fréjus received 360,212 new francs in aid payments, compared with
over 88 million distributed to survivors and victims’ heirs not identified as of
North African origin. This meant that Muslims in Fréjus constituted at least
9.2 percent of the affected families and at least 9.8 percent of the dead (based on
39 out of 396) but received 0.4 percent of the aid.51
The archives offer several clues indicating why Algerian Muslims in Fréjus
received relatively little aid in the aftermath of the disaster. The mayor’s office’s
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unpublished report listed payments to “North Africans” separately from payments to other residents of Fréjus. These payments were included only after a
section listing donations from the city of Fréjus to victims of later disasters elsewhere, including victims of floods in 1960 and a donation of clothing (including transport) to post-earthquake Agadir. The content and organization of this
unpublished report is telling: Muslim deaths were not like other deaths, and aid
to Fréjus residents of Algerian origin was seen by the Mairie not as a duty of the
state to its citizens but as an act of humanitarian generosity to outsiders, who
did not merit the same treatment as “autochthon” French in Fréjus. Moreover,
resistance to the notion of Algerian French citizenship was not limited to officials at the local level: a December 7 telegram from the Interior Ministry’s Service of National Civil Protection to all metropolitan and Algerian departmental
prefects included Algerians in an enumeration of “foreign nationals” who had
perished in the flood.52
This othering of Algeria was also present in Mayor Léotard’s 1959 Christmas
message to survivors: “We have not been abandoned. From all parts of the world
have come evidence of sympathy and solace. A mutilated Algeria has responded
with an admirable élan.”53 Léotard’s phrasing, placing donations from “mutilated” Algeria after those “from all parts of the world,” paralleled the structure
of the unpublished report on aid distribution. Algeria was not France, and Algerians were not French, even if French rule over its Algerian subjects and lands
was to be defended and maintained.
This, however, was not official policy, of course. When the city government
published a brochure on the occasion of the first anniversary of the disaster, the
brochure included much of the information from the unpublished report. However, it did not specify payments to North Africans as opposed to other residents
and did not divide the affected families into “autochthon families” and “Muslim
families.” Moreover, the published brochure no longer divided the dead into the
categories of “nationals,” “foreigners,” and “Muslims” (in that order); instead, it
recognized Algerian Muslims as a subset of French citizens, listing fatalities as:
“Français métropolitains” ……. 338
musulmans……………….39
militaires africains….......9
Étrangers…………………………………..1054
The difference between the published and unpublished reports illustrates
the tension between the status of Algerian Muslims as a category of French citizens and the colonial culture that designated them as “Other,” as indigènes.
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The published brochure served to efface the colonialist thinking, which was still
pervasive, in favor of the official doctrines of equality. The unpublished report,
however, reveals the colonial culture that was driving decision-making at the
local level in Fréjus. Even the published brochure, however, found it necessary
to distinguish between the two categories of French.
Being officially French did not help Algerian Muslims in Fréjus: unlike the
Italians living there, for example, these “North Africans” had no foreign consulate to advocate for their interests or to raise funds abroad specifically on their
behalf.55 Of course, much of the discrepancy in relief payments was due to the
fact that aid distribution was in large part based on property damage, a common
post-disaster practice that privileges the owning classes and prevents disasters
from having leveling effects. However, the lack of wealth among Fréjus’s Muslim
inhabitants of Algerian origin was no accident; it was the result of a long story of
colonialism dating back to the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 as well as the
more recent history of Fréjus and Algeria in the twentieth century.
The relatively meager aid dispensed to North Africans in Fréjus came in the
context of a general abundance of donated funds. In the words of Olivier Donat,
a local historian of Fréjus:
The Malpasset disaster was a global tragedy. From all over the world, food,
clothing, clothes, money and consolation made their way to Fréjus, a town
ravaged by nature. All roads in France were crossed by cars with flags and
the placards of “S.O.S. Fréjus” to collect donations for the victims.56
In the wake of such generosity, waste was almost inevitable, and there was
little oversight of the mayor’s office as it distributed the funds. In 1961, a government auditor concluded that “it is not possible to know whether the funds
collected were regularly and equitably distributed” but noted that in many cases
damage claims seemed to have been inflated. There were, nevertheless, funds left
over for use in other catastrophes, and it was suggested that donations might be
used for general improvements in the area, such as road construction, although
such a diversion of funds, noted the author of the 1961 investigative report, would
be a violation of the normal expectations of donors.57 In the final accounting,
in 1968, a total of 100,001,938 francs had been available, including state funds
and donations. In the end, the books were balanced and excess funds dispersed
by shifting funds to victims of subsequent disasters (over half a million francs)
and to expenditures for “Works in the Public Interest” (almost 3.5 million), and
“diverse” expenditures, mainly repair of roads and public buildings (almost
5 million).58 It is notable that the amount diverted into “Works in the Public
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Interest” and “diverse expenditures” would have been sufficient to bring relief
payments to Muslims in Fréjus in line with that received by the non-Muslim
population.
The special surveillance of France’s Muslim Algerian citizens was by no means
unique to Fréjus but was fundamental to the state’s effort to remake these citizens’ relationship to the Republic on both sides of the Mediterranean. However,
the 1959 flood provided local officials in Fréjus with a particular opportunity,
and a choice. They could implement and extend, on a local level, the national
policy of promoting the social advancement of Algerians in France in hopes of
undermining the case for Algerian independence and bolstering France’s image
as a universal, democratic Republic. Or the local leadership could reassert the
second-class status of Algerians as dangerous, untrustworthy subjects whose
alterity made them less, not more, worthy of public benevolence than the “autochthon” French. In 1959 and 1960, the town government chose the latter, even
if national policy made them reluctant to advertise this choice.

Memoir and Memory
Far removed from these events, Christian Hughes, the fisherman’s son, wrote
his memoir of the Fréjus flood “forty years later” from a hospital bed. A new
crisis, an unspecified medical crisis, had brought his mind back to 1959: “In this
hospital where I have once more had a brush with death, the enormous wave of
the Malpasset has torn my memory, leading me, frozen, to the mouth of the Argens.”59 Thus three painful events became intimately connected in his memoir:
one that was his alone and two that were shared by many. In Hughes’s memoir,
the agonies of decolonization, the flood, and the hospital all live on, together.
Hughes’s juxtaposition of his personal medical crisis with the paired memories of decolonization and environmental disaster resembles a parallel juxtaposition in the memoir of Belgacem Aït Ouyahia, the Kabyle Algerian doctor
who treated the injured in the immediate aftermath of the 1954 Orléansville
earthquake (discussed in Chapter 2). Dr. Aït Ouyahia linked the disaster to the
struggle for independence by describing his sudden shift of identity, days after
the earthquake, from an assimilated “privileged Muslim” to a new identification
with the downtrodden “Arab” poor, portrayed as a key moment in his conversion
to the FLN cause.60 However, Aït Ouyahia, like Hughes, also associated the
environmental and political upheavals that he lived through with his memory
of a personal medical crisis. In Aït Ouyahia’s case, this was an automobile accident in which he had been injured prior to the earthquake. His account of the

68

chapter 3

scene at the hospital after the earthquake is interrupted by a flashback to this
earlier trauma, inserting Aït Ouyahia’s own fear and hysteria after his automobile crash into the middle of his account of the bloody scene at the hospital.61
In Aït Ouyahia’s fractured narrative, this digression serves to convey empathy
for the emotional suffering experienced by the earthquake survivors. The linkage of personal health crises to the experience of environmental disaster in the
memoirs of Hughes and Aït Ouyahia support the idea that suffering, while inseparable from the social or political contexts of history, also functions as a category unto itself; that traumas, however disconnected in origin, tend to become
associated in lived experience, memory, and representation, and, therefore, in
effects.62 However, the association of the Fréjus flood with the war in North
Africa was not idiosyncratic, or purely psychological, and is repeatedly evinced
in historical sources whose dates of origins range from the immediate aftermath
of the disaster into the new millennium.
Portrayals of Algerian Muslims in French writers’ dramatized accounts of
the Fréjus disaster can illuminate the shifting discourses that shaped French
attitudes and actions towards Algerians in the aftermath of the flood. Journalist
Gaston Bonheur, memorializing the flood just months after the event, saw the
history of the Fréjus flood as inseparable from the town’s longstanding relation
to the French empire. Bonheur—an editor of Paris-Match who would later be
accused of sympathizing with the French settler terrorist group, the Organisation armée secrete (OAS)63—dated this connection to 1916, when general Gallieni had established Fréjus as a military town in order to provide a winter base
for “troops of color” from the empire. This event brought the empire to Fréjus
in a way that, for Bonheur, seems to have evoked sentimental exoticism: “Senegalese, Malgaches, Pondicherryians, soldiers from the Pacific: they camped here
in the antiquated décor of a colonial exposition that lacked neither Buddhist
pagoda nor Sudanese mosque.”64 Bonheur’s comparison of Fréjus to a festive
colonial exposition invoked positive images of the unity of the empire, a comparison that had been used to describe Fréjus during the interwar period.65 A
similarly sunny portrayal of the town’s military multiculturalism—concealing
the racism faced by African troops in France—was provided by an anonymous
memoirist many years later, in a collection published for the fiftieth anniversary
of the flood: “The Senegalese riflemen based at Camp de Caïs descended into
town, sometimes barefoot. . . . ‘There are pretty things!’ they said, looking at
the shop windows. They called all the women ‘Mama,’ always smiling; we never
failed to salute their passage to honor their bravery on the field of battle.”66 These

Fréjus 1959, Under Water and at War

69

accounts made it clear that when the Malpasset Dam burst, the flood swept
through a crucial part of a benevolent French Empire.
In 1998, local historian Max Prado echoed this sense of Fréjus’s imperial role
but extended his analysis into the more distant past and combined it with a
sense of grief. For Prado, the south of France had for centuries been the site of a
cycle of colonialism and rebellion that had begun with the colonization of the
Mediterranean coast, first by Cretans, then by Celts, then by Romans. Prado
saw the war in Algeria as a tragic continuation of this long historical process.
Modern Fréjus was a staging point for French conscripts, “young people in the
flower of their life,” being deployed to Algeria for a doomed cause: “The barracks
in Fréjus in the Robert and Lecocq districts, the aeronaval base and hospital in
the military zone, would be the last steps of mobilization on the continent; the
origin of many broken lives.” 67 Prado made clear that Fréjus, flooded or dry, was
bound to the violence of empire.
For many writers, memories and metaphors of war permeated descriptions of
the flood, and references to the Second World War accompanied references to
the African empire. Martial associations were always close at hand in Fréjus, and
the immediate disaster response was led by troops stationed in the area, joined
by the gendarmerie and the Fréjus-Saint Raphaël fire-rescue unit (pompiers). Assistance was also provided by United States navy ships in the Mediterranean.68
In 1968, Régina Wallet imagined the scene at dawn that day as a scene of war:
“Jeeps and bulldozers and military trucks ready to attack. Alas, the battle of
Fréjus was not won.”69
Undoubtedly, each person in Fréjus contextualized the disaster in terms of
their own experience. Wallet imagined the multiplicity of individual reactions
to the deafening roar of the flood wave:
An earthquake, thought the refugees from Orléansville, who, this time,
would not escape their rendezvous with death.—the bombardment of
Leipzig. And also of Dresden, specified a former prisoner in Silesia.—no,
it was the Deluge, murmured a nun at prayer; God wearied of an evil world,
and Fréjus did not repent like Nineva.70
In a different era, the religious explanation of Wallet’s nun would have been the
dominant cultural reaction to a European disaster such as this. But this was the
twentieth century, the century of anthropogenic, martial apocalypses, and every
adult in Fréjus had experiences related to the wars France had been fighting since
1939 in Europe, in Indochina, and in North Africa.
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French accounts of the flood often displayed grim irony in relating the stories of those who survived the horrors of war only to die in the flood. Writing
in 1960, Bonheur described a Madame Legrand, who “during the war, already
had known all the horrors, all the distress, during the terrible bombardments of
Hammanlif (400 dead in a few minutes), as the British 8th Army pushed back
the Afrika Korps in Cap Bon in 1943.” The death toll on that day in Tunisia
was similar to that of Fréjus in 1959; in Fréjus, according to Bonheur, Mrs. Legrand lost her seven-year-old daughter.71 Bonheur’s account of Mrs. Legrand’s
tragedy is paralleled by Wallet’s 1968 portrayal of Sergeant Boul, an Algerian
War veteran:
On that first of December, Sergeant Boul had rejoined the garrison in
Fréjus. Two years in Algeria, what an ordeal. Even for a soldier who had
chosen war. But these guerrillas, these attacks on the sly, these tortures, this
was not real war, in which one is confronted face to face. Sergeant Boule
was weary. He aspired to rest, to calm, with his family. He would rejoin,
that very day, his wife, who was arriving from Thionville with their three
children. 72
That night, Boul was awakened by a sudden noise, and leaped up. Wallet imagined his thoughts in the last moments of his life. He was startled by the noise,
“but he smiled. He was no longer at war. He was in the Côte d’Azur. Already the
wave, like the enemy, pounced.”73 Boul and his children were killed. For both
Bonheur and Wallet, the tragedy of the flood was amplified by the surprising
irony that the apparently peaceful environment of the Reyran Valley could destroy what the brutality of war had not.
Some representations of the Fréjus disaster reflected the official discourse
claiming the unity and solidarity of Algeria with France, in which the conflict
in Algeria was portrayed as an unnecessary and unfortunate political development. Other accounts, however, embodied the habits of imperial contempt for
a subjugated population. Maurice Croizard’s 1960 depiction of Fréjus presented
an image of harmony among the town’s metropolitan and African residents.
Croizard’s account reconstructs (or imagines), in intimate detail, a reunion between two former military comrades just before the collapse of the dam. Croizard portrays a conversation between a Sergeant Léveillé, just arrived from Algeria, and his friend Mohammed Azzi. Léveillé speaks warmly about the North
African territory: “A beautiful country, really, if it were not for this political
ugliness,” and Mohammed Azzi tells his old friend that he has been thriving in
his new home in Fréjus: “I am the happiest man in the North African colony [in
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Fréjus]. Now there are eleven hundred of us here, including families. Almost all
of Orléansville. . . . And you know, there’s no politics here. Just family men. . . .
We have social security, we are paid like the French.” 74 Minutes later, the dam
burst. Azzi survived but had to identify the bodies of many of his friends and
their children, drowned when the floodwaters destroyed the Sabagh factory and
the nearby homes of “North Africans.” Forty-three corpses were found in an
area of a few hundred meters. Nearby, according to Croizard, “an Arab…beat his
chest and repeated: ‘I was the one who brought them here after the Orléansville
catastrophe. I told them, you will have work, you will be happy. I’m the one who
led them to their deaths... it was me, it was me.’” 75 Fréjus’s memoirists’ portrayals
of Muslims in Fréjus took on a sympathetic tone as they conveyed the stories of
Algerians surviving the earthquake only to die in Fréjus, stories which paralleled
narratives about the European French who had lived through war but perished
in the flood.
Some French accounts of North Africans in Fréjus mixed sympathy with the
paternalism and contempt inherited from over a century of imperialist culture.
Régina Wallet repeatedly invoked clichés of Arab fatalism in the aftermath of
the disaster: “It was written, declared the Arabs.”76 Wallet seemed to reserve
her sympathy for North African children. She enumerated twenty-two children who died in three North African families, identified by name, and ended
a chapter with a grisly scene: “A great silence, disturbed by the cawing of crows.
Dreadful silence, silence of death. Between two branches, like a bird with wings
unfurled, rested a dismembered [écartelé] toddler. One of the little Arabs who,
around the barracks, laughed and sang, like the children of the douars.” 77 Later,
Wallet’s book itself ends with the story of an official at the prefecture who received a request from a young French couple from outside Fréjus who hoped to
adopt a child orphaned in the disaster. “We would take the most pitiful, even a
little Arab,” the couple offered, but, according to Wallet, “the little Arabs, they
all disappeared in the flood,” including those saved from the “bombardment
[sic!] of Orléansville.” The official wept, having also lost a child in the flood.78
Although the writing of history is always an interpretive act, Wallet’s “history” of these events, as well as the accounts of the disaster published in Bonheur’s 1960 anthology describing the disaster, must be considered, at least in
part, to be imaginative rather than strictly historical works. Unlike, for example,
the 2003 history of the Malpasset Dam and the Fréjus disaster published by the
Société de l’histoire de Fréjus written by Vito Valenti and Alfred Bertini (the
latter a participant in the municipal response to the disaster), or Max Prado’s
self-published 1998 history, neither Wallet nor Bonheur explicitly grounded
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their description of events in documentary evidence. Nor were Wallet and Bonheur witnesses to the events, as Christian Hughes was. In her preface, Wallet,
a novelist by trade and habit, claimed that there was “neither imagination, nor
invention on the part of the witness, in this atrocious and authentic story.” At
the same time, however, she acknowledged that memories change over time,
and that “a testimony is only sincere at the exact moment of the event.” Consequently, Wallet asked her readers for “indulgence, not for myself, who is relating
this just as it is told to me, but for the witness, who, time passing, translates
his unhappy adventure with an infinite sadness.”79 Nevertheless, Wallet did not
limit her account to what could be verified or supported by written sources or
oral testimony. Her narrative obviously goes beyond what could be supported by
any evidence, documentary or otherwise, in depicting the interior soliloquies of
individuals in the moments before their deaths.
Gaston Bonheur, in contrast, was a professional journalist and editor of news
magazines (and also a poet in his younger years). His volume on Fréjus, cowritten with Maurice Croizard, Géorge Pernoud, and others, was part of the Mappemonde series, directed by Bonheur and Pernoud, which included titles such
as The Nazis since Nuremburg and Anastasia, if it is True?. The back cover of
Bonheur’s Fréjus volume claimed that “the authors published in this collection
do not write. They transcribe. The real author is the march of time, creator
of tragedies, comedies, catastrophes, which will draw out literature and which
History will put in order.” Nevertheless, Bonheur’s and Wallet’s accounts might
be classified as pseudo-histories, claiming creative license in works aimed at a
mass audience.
As Claire Eldridge has argued, memories are “socially-framed, presentorientated, relational, and driven by specific agents.”80 Like the memoirs written
by survivors of disasters, these pseudo-historical works demonstrate how the
constructed narratives of the event intertwined the memory of environmental
disaster with memories of war and empire. These sources also reflect and reveal
how decolonization impacted representations of disasters.
Unlike the accounts by Bonheur and Croizard, Wallet’s 1968 work was
penned after Algerian independence. As Todd Shepard has demonstrated,
after 1962 the Frenchness of Muslim Algerians was erased from French law and
from public memory, consecrated through a mass genuflection to “the tide of
history.”81 Before 1962, there had been a political incentive for French writers
to deny belief in the otherness of Muslim Algerians in hopes of undermining
the nationalists’ narrative and advancing the notion that Algeria was France.
Decolonization brought an end to this incentive. It also brought thousands
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of “repatriated” Europeans from Algeria to the Var, a demographic event that
would arguably play a role in making the area a stronghold of the nationalist,
anti-immigrant Front National, culminating in the FN’s 2014 victory in the
Fréjus municipal elections. Wallet’s portrayal of sympathy for “little Arabs” and
solidarity among the bereaved drew on notions of childhood as a universal category. However, it also reflected post-1962 fears that France would be “overrun”
by the children of an alarmingly fertile Algerian migrant population, an attitude
which contrasted sharply with the natalism of French policy in the 1950s, when
women and children were seen as a moderating (or “civilizing”) element among
Algerian migrants in France.82
The sympathy Wallet expressed toward children was less evident in Wallet’s
portrayals of North African adults. Wallet conveyed the suspicion and contempt, replete with the cultural legacy of imperialism and orientalism, that some
European French held toward the North Africans in Fréjus:
Eleven Arab families were lodged at the Sabac [sic] factory. All were swept
away by the wave. But one could never count the victims, and the Arab
mystery was never resolved. How many Algerians or Moroccans worked at
the factory, or on the nearby farms? Many were employed as casual hires
and their foremen had never declared them. Some, in transit, had no fixed
domicile. They lodged with a comrade, in a ruined shed, or even under
the light of the moon, under an olive tree. At the whim of friends and
acquaintances, they took turns with the employers, who never recognized
them. An Arab greatly resembles another Arab. The same bronzed face, the
same look, evasive or timid, the same childish language. An Ali is always
an Ali. . . . None of them possessed a work permit. Thus, how can they be
counted? Especially those who were lost. Impossible to identify disfigured
faces. And how, in Algeria, to find their families? All their wives were illiterate and incapable of making a claim. . . . At the same time, some crafty
Arabs, who were working very tranquilly outside of Fréjus, attempted to
get indemnities as victims. In the chaos, all regulation became impossible
and there are always some vultures who profit from tragic circumstances.83
Eldridge has shown, in her scholarly examination of the construction of memory and historical self-understandings among the communities of Europeans
who left Algeria for France ca. 1962, that the pieds noirs’ communal construction
of memory denied that racial injustice was the basis of colonial Algerian society
and that these constructions described positive interactions with Muslims in
Algeria (mainly those in servile positions). However, as Eldridge argues, these
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positive portrayals were also accompanied by “a category of unknown or threatening ‘Arabs’ or ‘Muslims,’ who, although mentioned much less frequently, underlined the continuing need for a ‘civilizing’ French presence and the challenges
associated with that endeavor.”84 This pattern is evident in Wallet’s account of
“crafty” and dishonest Arabs in Fréjus.
Wallet’s 1968 portrayal of Arabs exploiting French generosity also resembles
a 2008 description of Orléansville by Jacques Torres, a “repatriated” pied noir.
Torres describes a joke that circulated after the 1954 earthquake: “When you
asked an Arab what his profession was, he responded, laughing: ‘Me? Sinistri ou
labbèss (a disaster victim, and all is well—that is enough)’….The status of ‘sinistré’
[disaster victim] gave the right to significant aid, which was enough for certain
people to live on.”85 When Wallet and Torres wrote their stories of disaster, Algeria was independent, and it was no longer necessary or plausible to affirm the
solidarity of Algerians with France, or vice versa.
However, Wallet’s portrayal of Arabs as “crafty” or “vultures,” unrecognizable
and transient, defying French attempts to name and regulate them, were not
merely a product of decolonization, but was also shaped by old habits of racist,
orientalist colonial discourse. Hostility to Muslim North Africans in Fréjus did
not begin in 1962. Ingrained colonialist habits of thought were evident in Fréjus
in 1959, and such thinking had demonstrable consequences for Muslim Algerians, both immediately after the 1959 disaster and for many decades to come.

Fréjus and Le Pen’s Front National
In 1987, local historian and Var schoolteacher Louis Robion described anxiety over “cultural identity” in Fréjus which prompted people to ask, “Is Fréjus
still Fréjus?” Robion attributed this “millenarian disquiet” to rapid population
growth and urbanization, as well as the transformations brought about by the
expansion of tourism, globalization, and the cultural influences brought by new
migrants. As the tourism industry grew, some residents feared that Fréjus might
be on the verge of becoming a generic beach town: as Robion put it, residents
were “haunted by the image of the American ‘sun-belt [sic, in English].’” Meanwhile, cultural change meant that Provençal was disappearing, and “anchovies
have given way to pizza and méchoui [North African roasted lamb].”86 The cultural anxieties described by Robion resemble those that might be found among
longtime residents of many a European (or American) small town, reflecting
the rapid changes of the twentieth century. Yet, despite the commonalities that
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cultural anxiety in Fréjus shared with the angst of globalization elsewhere, the
anxieties in Fréjus were shaped by the particularities of its history.
Robion argued that the changes Fréjus was experiencing were not to be
condemned because the only “tradition” in Fréjus was one of cultural transformation and successive new influences, from the Romans to the tenth-century
Bourguinons, seventeenth-century Moriscos, and eighteenth-century Germans,
to the “Portuguese and Maghrebians of today.”87 It was no shame and no novelty, argued Robion, that Fréjus had in the twentieth century become home to
a pagoda and a mosque as well as a cathedral. But Robion’s analysis ignored the
particularly strong historical connection that Fréjus had with the French colonial project and omitted the fact that Fréjus’s first mosque and first pagoda
were built by and for colonial soldiers of color forcibly conscripted to serve their
French conquerors.
Many Fréjus residents would not join in Robion’s embrace of cultural fluidity.
Fréjus was one of several French localities where Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigrant
National Front party emerged victorious in the elections of 2014; National Front
mayor David Rachline, elected in 2014 at age 26, had made opposition to a large
new mosque complex central to his campaign. The mosque, approved by the
previous mayor, opened in January 2016, but the Rachline government unsuccessfully sought a court ruling requiring its demolition on the grounds that the
building permits had been illegally obtained.88 The reasons for the rise of the
nationalist, anti-immigrant right in Fréjus, as elsewhere in France, are complex,
and include disenchantment with the established parties as well as the popularity of the National Front’s nativist, anti-European-Union rhetoric. Explanations
often include the influence of the pieds noirs in France after 1962, who formed
an important source of support for the party and for Jean-Marie Le Pen, the
ex-paratrooper and Algerian War veteran who led the party from its founding
in 1972 until 2011. After the 2014 elections, nostalgic support for the French
colonial project in Algeria figured prominently in the Rachline administration’s
construction of nationalist patriotism and was embodied in a new monument
“to all those who died so that France could live in Algeria.”89 Unlike the Indochina war memorial built in Fréjus in the early 1990s, this new monument made
no attempt to balance competing views and experiences of the war and of French
colonialism.90
Despite the immanence of the Algerian question in the distribution of aid
after the 1959 Malpasset Dam collapse and in the work of memoirists and
local historians of the disaster through the turn of the millennium, today the
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Malpasset disaster seems to be absent from the rhetoric of Fréjus’s National
Front and its critics and from the identity anxieties described by Robion. Nevertheless, the history of flood of 1959 offers important insights into a strain of
political culture within this town that has been so receptive to the message of
the National Front, and to the Rachline administration’s support for an Algérie
française that had not existed for fifty years. No town is a monolith, of course,
and there were contradicting voices, both in 1959 and in 2014. But in 1959 and
1960, Fréjus’s first right-of-center municipal government in decades spoke,
wrote, and acted in ways that contravened official French policies and that cast
Algerians—French Muslims from Algeria, citizens of the French Republic—as
foreigners and outsiders and denied these disaster victims and survivors their
fair share of disaster aid donations sent, not only by white Europeans, but by
Muslims in Algeria and by Moroccans and Tunisians. This suggests that the
appeal of the anti-immigrant Front National in Fréjus, insofar as it relates to
nostalgia for the French colonial project and hostility to immigrants of North
African descent, cannot be attributed simply to the post-1962 influence of the
pieds noirs settler-refugees, or to more recent events such as terrorist attacks of
the 1990s and 2000s. The influence of deep-seated colonialist ideas about the
venality and alterity of North Africans was evident in Fréjus after the 1959 flood
and cannot be attributed to the influence of the pieds noirs. If one was to point
to a turning point in the political history of Fréjus, it would not be the arrival
of the “repatriated” refugees of 1962 but rather the end of Socialist hegemony
in early 1959 with the election of André Leotard to the mayor’s office (a local
consequence of the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return of De Gaulle
in 1958). Such a conclusion would be over-simplistic, however. The attitudes of
the local authorities in Fréjus, revealed in the aftermath of the flood, were rooted
in the town’s long and intimate association with the French imperial project.91

Conclusion
The Malpasset disaster may have been “a global tragedy,” as Olivier Donat has
written, but it was also an imperial drama. When the inanimate intervened in
the lives of Fréjus’s residents by behaving in unexpected ways, the gradually unfolding results of the sudden collapse of concrete and the rush of water were
shaped by the history of France and its empire, as the local leadership acted to
reinforce the distinction between colonizer and colonized, regardless of the
strategies and policies that emanated from Paris before being overturned by the
independence of Algeria. The solidarity of Algeria with France celebrated by
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Fréjus’s mayor in 1959 did not extend in return from the mayor’s office to Fréjus’s
most vulnerable population.
“Solidarity” campaigns for local catastrophes such as Orléansville and Fréjus
were meant to function much like the war memorials to colonial troops discussed by Mann and Edwards. These fundraising drives were “simultaneously
‘local’ and ‘national,’” serving to foster a sense of republican unity between the
suffering, sacrificing locale and the benevolent, unifying empire, as Mann has
argued.92 For the Algerians living in Fréjus, however, there was more suffering
than benevolence. In the months following the collapse of the Malpasset Dam,
an optimistic vision of imperial unity in the form of a new brotherhood of equals
was advanced by the official proclamations of the French state, as well as by
chroniclers of the disaster like Bonheur and Croizard. However, the long history of colonial distinctions between citizen and colonial subject could not be
overcome. For the Muslim Algerians of Fréjus and for the municipal government
that had the ability to help them recover from the 1959 disaster, the subordinate
status of Muslim Algerians remained.
The French appeal for donations as a show of imperial solidarity did little to
strengthen the affections of the colonized for the colonizer. Indeed, post-disaster
solidarity could be turned to serve the interests of anticolonialism. Donations
were also sent from Morocco, already independent but still struggling to negotiate its post-independence relationship with France. Three months after the
Fréjus disaster, when earthquake-stricken Agadir was in need, and French aid
seemed to come with neocolonial strings attached, Moroccan nationalists would
angrily recall the unconditional generosity Morocco had offered to Fréjus.93 Although the disaster in Fréjus was a much smaller disaster than those that afflicted Algeria and Morocco during these years, Fréjus thus became part of the
game of “disaster diplomacy” played by great and small powers in 1959 and 1960.
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Poison, Paralysis, and the United States in Morocco, 1959
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n September 10, 1959, three years after Moroccan independence, a
previously healthy twenty-five-year-old man was brought to the Mohammed V hospital in Meknes, unable to walk. He had been suddenly
afflicted with cramps in his calves the day before and had awoken to find he
had lost control of the muscles in his lower legs and feet. He had no fever, but
was subjected a spinal tap, which revealed no signs of polio or other pathogens.
Ten more patients with similar symptoms arrived at the hospital later that day.
Thirty more came the next day. Seven hundred more cases were identified by
the end of the week. The epidemic of partial paralysis continued to spread, and
by November, approximately ten thousand cases had been identified in cities,
towns, and rural areas throughout Morocco.1
The origins of the epidemic remained a mystery for weeks, but investigators
eventually identified contaminated cooking oil as the cause of paralysis. On
April 13, 1959, Mohammed Bennani, an automobile supply wholesaler, had purchased a large quantity of surplus jet engine lubricating oil from the US Air
Force base at Nouasseur, near Casablanca. This oil contained triaryl phosphates
and cresol phosphates. The lot purchased by Bennani was just one lot out of over
fifty lots of various sorts of obsolete or excess oils sold from US airbases in Morocco that year. Bennani then sold portions of the oil, still in its original drums,
to another merchant, Ahmed ben Hadj Abdallah. The oil was then resold to
approximately two dozen cooking oil wholesalers, in Casablanca, Fez, and Meknes. The Meknes wholesaler later explained that he had been seeking a way to
increase his profit margin from fourteen to twenty-four francs per liter. He had
purchased several tons of the engine oil, mixed it with vegetable and olive oil,
and bottled the concoction as cooking oil, labeling the bottles “Le Cerf” and “El
Hilal.” As this oil went to market, he purchased another six tons of the engine
oil, in expectation of increased demand from pilgrims arriving in Meknes for the
coming celebration of Mouloud, the birth of the Prophet.2
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Soon after consuming the adulterated oil, the victims typically suffered a brief
period of gastrointestinal distress. This quickly passed, and all seemed to be
well for just over two weeks. Then, however, the motor neurons of the spinal
cord were damaged by the toxins.3 The victims began to experience fever, accompanied by numbness in the hands and feet. This also passed, but was replaced, within about forty-eight hours, by pain and weakness in the feet and
legs, eventually leading to paralysis of all muscles below the knee, followed by
spasticity and muscle atrophy. Most victims’ hands were also affected, and impotence afflicted the men. For some, paralysis of the pelvic and abdominal muscles rendered them non-ambulatory, but in most cases the paralysis was limited
to the muscles of the extremities, so that the victims could still walk, with the
“ungainly high-stepping gait” that soon became the identifying characteristic of
the “Meknes disease.”4
The 1959 oil poisoning was an event produced neither by freak chance nor by
malevolent intent. This disaster, like the Malpasset Dam collapse, might be understood as the product of what Jane Bennett calls the “distributive agency” of
an “agentic assemblage” consisting of a “confederation of human and non-human
elements.”5 Neither the former French colonizers, nor the US Air Force, nor the
profiteering oil wholesalers intended to poison thousands of people in Morocco.
But declining colonial powers needed superpower allies, and, to be competitive,
twentieth-century superpowers needed overseas bases and jet aircraft. Twentieth-century industrialism produced synthetic cresyl compounds, providing lubrication for those jets and a means for grocery merchants competing in a capitalist economy to cut their production costs. Just as French colonialism and the
neo-imperialism of America’s Cold War influenced human thought and action
to produce certain patterns of behavior and cultures of imperialism, they also
produced particular arrangements of inanimate matter. Together, these arrangements of the animate and inanimate constituted the military bases, schools, hospitals, and embassies that were meant to serve colonial and neo-imperial goals.
However, neither humans nor the inanimate behaved quite as the colonizers
desired—and the behavior of manufactured chemicals could prove as intractable
as those of colonial subjects or tectonic plates.
The very large scale and rather sudden onset of the Morocco oil poisoning
produced effects that were in some ways akin to a seismic disaster or a flood.
Much like the 1954 earthquake in Algeria, the paralysis epidemic overwhelmed
the hospitals, tested the state’s ability to respond to the needs of the people,
and opened the state, for its failures, to criticisms by the political opposition.
However, unlike the earthquake in Algeria’s Chélif valley or the anthropogenic
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flooding of Fréjus, the oil poisoning did not destroy the built environment and
was not confined to a specific region or locality. The silent destruction and
bloodless suffering brought by the oil poisoning did not invite comparisons to
the bombing campaigns of the Second World War, and when the disasters of
Orléansville, Fréjus, and Agadir were discussed as kindred catastrophes, the
oil poisoning was often left out. Nevertheless, the Morocco oil poisoning was
connected to the other disasters, especially the 1960 earthquake in Agadir. The
Moroccan political opposition made use of comparisons between the oil poisoning and the Fréjus flood to critique both the continued French presence in
Morocco and the Moroccan state’s response to the oil poisoning. The Moroccan
monarchy used both the oil poisoning and the 1960 earthquake to enhance royal
authority and prestige, and international responses to these two disasters were
interrelated. For the diplomacy of the United States, in particular, the oil poisoning and the Agadir earthquake were of profound mutual relevance.
The origins of the Morocco oil poisoning were inseparable from the social
and political contexts of imperialism, the Cold War, and the still-incomplete
process of decolonization. So, too, were human responses to this disaster. In
1956, after several years of escalating violence, France had permitted its Moroccan protectorate formal independence. The Alaouite monarch, Mohammed
ben Yusef, was retrieved from a two-year exile and became King Mohammed V.
Morocco owed its independence not only to the courage and ruthlessness of its
freedom fighters, but also to France’s determination to keep Algeria at all costs.
Morocco’s independence meant that France could concentrate its resources on
the fight against the FLN. It remained to be seen whether independence would
lead to the French ending their military presence in Morocco, and whether independence would mean that the French would cede their political and cultural
influence over Morocco to the Americans, or, less plausibly, to the Soviets, or
whether the Moroccan state would be able to assert full sovereignty.
In particular, responses to the oil poisoning by the French, American, and
Moroccan states, and by the Moroccan political opposition, were tied to one
of the legacies of colonialism that had not been undone by formal Moroccan
independence: the presence, on Moroccan soil, of military bases occupied by the
former colonizers and their American allies. Just as the question of whether or
not Algerians were to be French shaped responses to the disasters in the Chélif
and Reyran Valleys, responses to the oil poisoning by the Moroccan, American,
and French states, and by the Moroccan political opposition, revolved around
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the question of whether these remaining plots of foreign-occupied land would
be decolonized.

Epidemiology and Crime
The mass poisoning in Morocco was distinctive in its relation to imperialism
and the Cold War, but there had been cases of mass cresyl phosphate poisoning
before. Tasteless, odorless, and soluble in vegetable oil, triorthocresyl phosphate
has a particular tendency to find its way into the food supply through a variety
of means. In 1930 and 1931, as many as sixteen-thousand people were poisoned in
the American Midwest through the adulteration of Jamaican ginger extract, or
“jake,” an alcoholic patent medicine. In that incident, an unscrupulous entrepreneur had used triorthocresyl phosphate to circumvent government regulations
stipulating the minimum solid content of alcoholic “medicinal” extracts. Another case affected hundreds of women in the 1930s who had consumed a parsley
extract abortifacient that included the toxic chemical. There were also several
cases in Germany in the 1940s in which food shortages had led to the use of
engine oils in cooking as well as the accidental poisoning in 1940 of ninety-two
Swiss soldiers after machine-gun cleaning oil was mistaken for cooking oil. In
1942, forty-one people in Verona, Italy, were afflicted with paralysis, which has
been traced to ground contamination caused by the use of discarded military engine oil containers in the handling of farm compost and manure.6 In its scale, the
Moroccan case was most like the American jake poisoning; in its causes, it also
resembled the German incidents, in which poverty incentivized the substitution
of machine oil for vegetable oil, and the Verona case, in which the outbreak was
caused by improper repurposing of military surplus material.
In 1959 Morocco, it took some time for investigators to determine the chemical and human vectors by which imperialism, industrial capitalism, and the
Cold War had led to mass paralysis in Meknes. Initially, polio or other viral
infection was suspected. The appearance of a few cases between August 31 and
September 2 followed by an explosion of cases between September 18 and 24
suggested a pattern of contagion. Indeed, the delayed onset of paralysis following consumption of the poison mimicked the incubation period of a contagious
disease, making the true origin of the crisis difficult to identify. In addition,
all of the afflicted lived in poor neighborhoods, suggesting disease vectors related to housing patterns and unsanitary living conditions, such as sewage or
insects.7 Fearing the outbreak of some new virus, King Mohammed V ordered
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the cancellations of all festivities for the September 19 celebration of Mouloud,
which had already brought pilgrims to Meknes from the surrounding region.
The King also banned all travel and public meetings; public pools and athletic
facilities were closed.8
Yet the symptoms did not correspond to polio or any other known illness,
and blood and spinal fluid showed no infection.9 By the end of September, the
hospitals in Meknes were overwhelmed, and the sick were being housed in ad
hoc locations. The French military hospital in Meknes opened beds to the afflicted, and French military doctors arrived from Casablanca to help treat the
influx of patients.10
In late September, Dr. Youssef Ben Abbes, the Minister of Public Health, met
with doctors from the Avicenna Hospital in Rabat, and the staff of the National
Institute of Health. The doctors and investigators were puzzled by the odd distribution of the malady. While all of the victims were poor (typically the families
of day laborers), the very poorest members of the society (who had been too poor
to buy oil that month) were spared, as were infants. Furthermore, the “absolute
immunity” of Europeans (with one exception) and of Jewish Moroccans seemed
to defy explanation simply in terms of superior sanitation, and very few of the
fifty thousand people who traveled to Meknes from other regions for the celebration of the Mouloud in mid-September had become afflicted. Of the hundred
Moroccan soldiers stationed in Meknes, only two suffered from paralysis.11
Several patients had pointed to the strange, dark, reddish-colored oil as the
probable cause of their affliction. One family, described by a doctor Baillé, had
noticed that a bottle of cooking oil that they had recently bought was unusually
dark in color—in hindsight, “as dark as old motor oil.”12 After using the oil to
cook a meal, they had been concerned enough to offer a portion to their dog.
After the dog seemed to suffer no ill effects, they went ahead and ate, but remembered the strange oil after they later fell ill.
The experts, however, were not to be convinced by anecdotal evidence alone.
Albert Tuyns, a Belgian epidemiologist working for the World Health Organization (WHO), began to investigate the outbreak, applying the methods of the
“new epidemiology” of the period, which included expanding epidemiological
analysis to include maladies other than infectious disease. Tuyns initiated a survey of 250 patients on September 21 and found that cooking oil was the common
factor in all the responses. This conclusion was also supported by the correlation
of paralysis cases, noticed by the Ministry of Health, with the areas frequented
by street vendors who sold fried pastries and by the suspicions of the patients
themselves.13
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When the cooking oil was identified as the cause of the paralysis, the investigators suspected a neurotoxin was involved and sent a sample of the oil to the
Institute of Hygiene in Rabat. The initial chemical analysis on September 30
indicated the presence of “phosphates, phenols, and cresols.” World Health Organization investigators identified triorthocresyl phosphate as the culprit, although other triaryl phosphates and cresol phosphates also present were later
seen as having a significant role.14 These chemicals were binding with acetylcholinesterase in the neural synapses, causing a buildup of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine and a breakdown in the functioning of the motor neurons.
This diagnosis was not good news; there was no pharmaceutical cure—the only
course of treatment was physical therapy, and in certain cases of severe spasticity,
orthopedic surgery.
Once the chemical cause of the affliction had been determined, the focus of
the investigation shifted from the epidemiologists to the police. By October 9,
the Moroccan government’s Criminal Investigation Division in Meknes tracked
the tainted oil to a warehouse in Meknes, where they discovered a second shipment of “six tons of oil in 31 drums ready for bottling and delivery to consumers.”15 Initially, the investigation focused on Meknes, and warnings to the public
identified only the local brands Le Cerf and El Hilal as potentially dangerous.
Soon, however, it became evident that this was not a localized disaster; nor was
it contained. The number of diagnoses continued to rise sharply around the
country, reaching ten thousand within a few weeks. On October 28, the Moroccan government declared a “national calamity” and provided emergency funds
(one hundred million francs) to the Ministry of Public Health for rehabilitation
and treatment of those afflicted.16 The government also began a public information campaign, warning the public against the purchase of any oil that was not
bottled in a factory, and identifying twenty of the more inexpensive brands of
cooking oil sold throughout the country as potentially dangerous. Orders were
issued that all persons should turn over bottles of the suspected brands to the
police, and the government announced that that house-to-house searches would
be conducted to confiscate any undeclared household stocks. Following the initial arrests of alleged culprits in Meknes, interrogations led the investigators to
other wholesale centers in Fez and Casablanca, from which the toxic oil had
been sold across Morocco, and thirty-one people were arrested. The authorities
seized 190 metric tons of suspected oil, including 600 kilograms of machine oil.17
As in the Chélif region of Algeria in 1954, however, the mountainous territory in
parts of Morocco and the dispersal of the rural population inhibited the disaster
response, and authorities feared that the inhabitants of villages in areas “with
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neither radio nor roads” might continue to possess and consume adulterated
supplies of oil.18
The impact of the disaster extended beyond the individuals afflicted and was
economically devastating to entire families. Minister of Health Youssef Ben
Abbes estimated that “there are at least 30,000 made destitute” by the disaster.19 Abdelmalek Faraj, head of the National Institute of Health, noted that
80 percent of the afflicted were unskilled workers, who lived by means of their
physical labor. Such workers had already been struggling to sell their labor in an
economy characterized by high unemployment; for the newly disabled, finding
work would be impossible. Moreover, as Faraj noted, afflicted families often lost
both wage labor and the unpaid labor of women and children, producing a desperate situation.20 Medically, the long-term prognosis was equally grim. WHO
physicians offered little hope of recovery, stating that “a probable 10,000 cases,
including small children, will be completely paralyzed for the rest of their lives,
and their upkeep will depend on the good will of their neighbors or the State.”21

Treatment and the Habits of Imperialism
In November, the World Health Organization sent Denis Leroy, head of the
anti-polio center at the University of Rennes, to Morocco. Dr. Leroy stressed
that physical therapy needed to begin immediately for the many thousands of
people afflicted, and Leroy developed a plan for a massive, long-term rehabilitation effort, led by the international Red Cross.22 Departing from their usual policy of providing only immediate, urgent disaster relief, the Red Cross launched
an eighteen-month effort that began in January 1960 and that would involve
167 foreign medical professionals (typically in rotations lasting several months)
as well as 150 Moroccan nurse’s aides.23
Five treatment centers were established around the country. In the most severe
cases of spasticity, medical and surgical treatments were attempted, ranging from
alcohol injections and casts to the surgical severing of tendons.24 For the most
part, however, the program was based on physical therapy, while also addressing
the social impact of the catastrophe described by Faraj. In Khemiset, fifty kilometers west of Meknes, a reportedly successful program of occupational therapy
was implemented, thanks to the presence of a Swiss occupational therapist, the
only occupational therapist present at the start of the program. Vocational rehabilitation programs were also later initiated in Meknes in May 1960 and in
early 1961 in Fes, Sidi Slimane, and Sidi Kacem. In Khemiset, the Swiss therapist
developed a program providing groups of sixty patients at a time with practice in
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“weaving, tapestry-work, sewing, leather-work, knitting, production of strings
of perlas, embroidery, cord-knotting, basket-work, mat-plaiting, writing, painting, drawing, type-writing, wood-work and gardening.”25 These activities were
chosen partly for their value as physical therapy: they “favored the rhythmic
change between contractions of agonists and antagonists,” and therefore, it was
claimed, were not fatiguing. 26 Vocationally-oriented tasks were also included
in hopes that they would provide paths to employment for those who could no
longer work in their prior occupation or who needed occupational therapy to
relearn skills. The choice of tasks obviously was influenced by the predominance
of women among the afflicted, although the medical professionals who reported
on the program were almost silent on the role of gender; the significance of the
fact that the Swiss occupational therapist was female went unremarked, despite
the relevance that her gender must have had when treating female patients. No
occupational therapy program was implemented at the treatment center in Alhucemas; it is unclear whether this was related to the predominance of men
among the patients in the northern region.
In addressing the “social aspects” of this disaster in independent Morocco,
the international assistance teams went beyond the treatment of affliction and
assumed a role once played by colonial schoolteachers and doctors. Medicine had
long been an instrument of colonialism in Morocco. As historian Ellen Amster
has written, “Histories of colonial medicine illuminate how native bodies were
invented as objects of scientific knowledge, racisms were naturalized, and health
dictatorships were designed to sanitize, rationalize, and control native bodies.”27
The occupational therapy program operated on the assumption that the patients
needed not only to recover the use of their extremities but also to adopt Western, industrial attitudes toward work and time. Like the French doctors and
educators of the colonial (“protectorate”) era, the international rehabilitation
staff made Moroccans into objects of observation, engaging in what, given the
brief period of time spent in residence, must have been a very superficial study of
“native arts and crafts.”28 However, they also asserted knowledge of their Moroccan patients’ mental characteristics, which they aimed to improve through the
bodily discipline of physical therapy. Doctor W. M. Zinn, of Switzerland, wrote
that “the majority of patients were illiterate, owned no watches, and often had
no concept of time,” traits that complicated the scheduling of outpatient treatment.29 Consequently, the goals of the rehabilitation program came to include
the remediation of these perceived failings. Zinn reported that, in Khemiset,
“the patients were gradually accustomed to working increasingly long hours, in
the end six hours a day, and to turn up for work regularly and punctually.”30
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Amster has argued that the colonized were often successful in resisting such
discipline, refusing to adopt the norms and standards of their Western doctors
and teachers.31 Whether this was the case in the physical therapy centers is difficult to assess. In terms of the more measurable goal of vocational rehabilitation leading to employment, only the Khemiset treatment center had success
in finding jobs for its patients upon completion of treatment. In part, this was
attributed to the delayed start of occupational therapy in other locations, leading
to less successful recovery of patients’ hands; in Khemiset, the early presence of
an occupational therapist and the use of therapeutic hand splits prevented irreversible hand deformities from developing. Largely, however, the success of the
Khemiset program in the economic reintegration of victims was attributed to
the area’s relatively low unemployment rate; elsewhere, finding jobs for patients
with impaired mobility was virtually impossible in an economy in which, as in
Meknes, 80 percent of the adult male population lacked permanent employment.32 The state of the local economy was the determining factor rather than
the content of the curriculum or the transformation of the Moroccans’ mindsets—a reality experienced by colonial schoolteachers in earlier decades.33
Latent colonialist habits notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the international physical therapy effort made a positive difference in rehabilitating
the bodies of the patients. In January 1961, half of the ten thousand victims of
the oil poisoning were still receiving physical therapy, but five thousand had
been judged fit to discontinue the treatment; of these, three thousand were kept
under supervision, and two thousand were considered “cured to all extents and
purposes, and able to resume their former occupation.”34 In June 1961, a Red
Cross “follow-up” review judged 6,695 to be functionally rehabilitated; another
732 were still using orthopedic devices such as splints, but were no longer in
need of physical therapy. Only 399 were still receiving treatment. This does not
mean that the “recovered” patients suffered no permanent loss of motor function
(and the persistence of impotence was not addressed by the review). Furthermore, over three thousand patients, probably in rural areas, were not included
in the 1961 review, and the closure of most of the treatment centers meant that
outpatient care only remained available in Meknes, creating an incentive to
classify patients elsewhere as sufficiently recovered. Some initial gains would be
reversed over time, as mobility impairments exacerbated the effects of aging, and
vice versa. Nevertheless, the outcome for the victims was better than had been
feared, and the physical therapy program was believed to have played a significant role in this outcome, although patients’ recoveries were also attributed to
reinnervation.35
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The Opposition, Fréjus, and the King
For the Moroccan political opposition, the salient connection between neocolonialism and the oil poisoning lay not in the paternalism of the occupational
therapists but in the toxic oil’s origins on one of the many foreign military
bases—French, American, and Spanish—that remained on Moroccan soil three
years after independence. Most American forces had been evacuated from North
Africa soon after the end of the Second World War, including those at a wartime
base at Agadir, although the United States had maintained a naval presence at
Port Lyautey (Kenitra) since 1942 (albeit under a French flag since 1948).36 However, a 1950 agreement with France—made without consulting the Sultan—had
permitted the United States to once again expand its military presence in Morocco with the construction of three Strategic Air Command bases, as well as
naval and Air Force communications and radar installations, making Morocco
an important part of the American nuclear deterrent against a Soviet assault
on Western Europe.37 Moroccan independence had thrown the status of these
bases into doubt, as Moroccan nationalists of various political parties challenged
the validity of previous US agreements with France, the former protectorate
power. The ongoing Algerian revolution undermined America’s relationships
with nationalists across North Africa, as the United States played what Matthew Connelly has described as a “double game,” providing food aid and refugee
relief to Algerians while providing France with arms to fight the FLN, including the retaliatory bombing of Algerian refugees by American-made planes at
the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Yousseff on February 17, 1958.38 Initially, the
nationalists’ demands had focused on the evacuation of the bases of France, the
former colonial power. However, according to I. William Zartman, the nationalist press’s discourse on the bases had begun to shift in 1957 from “regularizing”
the American presence, in light of Moroccan sovereignty, to demanding evacuation—a goal that was adopted by the Moroccan government and monarchy in
1958. The American intervention in Lebanon in July 1958 further associated the
American military with Western imperialism in Arab lands, and demands for
the evacuation of bases intensified.39
In this context, it was inevitable that the oil poisoning would have implications for the question of bases and Morocco’s relationship with foreign powers.
The government desperately needed US medical, economic, and military aid,
and refrained from openly pointing fingers. The press, however, was quick to
raise the issue, demonstrating the growing divergence between the nationalist
movement that had led the independence struggle and the newly independent
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state. Avant Garde, the newspaper of the newly-created Union Nationale des
Forces Populaire (UNFP), the party of the royally appointed prime minister,
printed an article on November 15, 1959, suggesting that “foreign military authorities…may have been negligent,” in the sale of the oil.40 This did not mean
that Prime Minister Abdallah Ibrahim agreed. The party was fractured, and
Ibrahim served at the pleasure of the monarch: a few weeks later Ibrahim would
ban his party’s paper and have the editor arrested (for questioning the authority
of the king to appoint the government).41 But Avant Garde was not alone in
pointing out the causal role of the American military presence in the oil poisoning. In early December, the photo magazine Al Machahid (described as a Moroccan version of Life magazine) had run the headline “American Military Surplus
are at the Root of This Disaster: Those who Exploit the Weakness and Poverty
of the People: 10,000 Moroccans, one Frenchman, zero Jews Poisoned.”42 While
the text of the article was more nuanced, the inflammatory headline reflected
the role of the disaster in exacerbating nationalist concerns about the American
bases in Morocco.
The dominant nationalist party throughout the postwar period had been
Istiqlal (“Independence”), but the main Istiqlal leadership had been forced out
of the cabinet by King Mohammed V in December 1958 in favor of the Ibrahim
government, and the left wing of Istiqlal, including Ibrahim, split off to form the
UNFP in 1959.43 The remaining conservative body of the Istiqlal party found
itself the party of opposition and was subjected to a ban on its publications in
early October 1959. On November 29, the party’s National Council passed a
resolution denouncing the “negligence” of the authorities with regard to the oil
poisoning and demanded aid and compensation for the victims; a separate resolution demanded the evacuation of all foreign troops, “considered an assault
on the sovereignty of Morocco, a humiliation, and a permanent provocation.”44
When the weekly newspaper Al-Istiqlal resumed publication in December,
it addressed the crisis of the oil poisoning in an article titled: “From Meknes to
Fréjus: The Responsibilities in the Oil Affair.” Al-Istiqlal accused the government of failing to fulfill its responsibilities on two fronts: it had failed to protect
the health of the people and had failed to bring an end to the colonial legacy
of foreign “enclaves” on Moroccan soil. The Americans, the author asserted,
knew full well that the oil being sold was toxic. Although the article stopped
short of stating that the Americans knew the engine lubricant would be added
to cooking oil, the author faulted them for their willful ignorance of Moroccan
laws and regulations. The article then went on to implicitly connect the American presence not only to the paralysis epidemic but also to food shortages and
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famine by comparing this contamination of the Moroccan food supply to the
recent introduction of crop parasites from foreign sources. Yet the Americans
were not the only target of Al-Istiqlal’s wrath. The author asked, “Could they
[the unscrupulous merchants] have done it if the minister of Agriculture had
exercised vigilant control over foodstuffs, as is his responsibility? Could they
have continued their deadly traffic if the minister of Health had not, through his
delayed declarations, failed to sound the alarm?” Once the epidemic had begun,
the authorities had compounded the crisis through incompetence and indifference—they had been too slow to identify the cause of the paralysis and too slow
to realize that the problem extended beyond Meknes and beyond the two brands
of oil initially identified as contaminated. According to the article, the ultimate
blame lay with the Moroccan government for its lack of “vigilance.” Al-Istiqlal
contrasted this portrayal of Moroccan state incompetence to a rosy view of the
national solidarity shown by the French state and people for the victims of the
Fréjus flood. While the Moroccan authorities responded with an “indifference”
which stemmed from a “convenient fatalism” and an overreliance on foreign aid,
French authorities had immediately begun to investigate the causes of the Fréjus
dam collapse and to search for those responsible.45
In fact, the French inquiries into the dam collapse would, in the end, identify
no wrongdoing (as discussed in Chapter 3), while Moroccan government had
not only conducted inquiries but made arrests. King Mohammed V had issued
an edict, or dahir, on October 29, retroactively legislating the death penalty and
creating a special court for “those who have consciously manufactured, stored
with intent to sell, distributed, put up for sale or sold products or foodstuffs destined for human consumption, which are a danger to public health.”46 Far from
demonstrating passivity or indifference, the king’s response was sufficiently decisive to alarm American officials, who correctly sensed a portent of the monarchy’s tendency toward authoritarianism; the French ambassador called the edict
“very severe.”47 The Moroccan state cast a wide net in identifying those responsible and erred on the side of arresting marginal suspects, including grocers who
sold the bottled oil directly to customers and three men who were unconnected
to the adulterated cooking oil but were using the American machine oil as an
ingredient in “brilliantine,” or hair oil. When defense lawyers argued that the
king’s edict specified only those who sold harmful substances for the purpose of
consumption, judges ruled that one could consume a substance through the hair
follicles as well as by mouth.48 In pretrial hearings, defense attorneys also challenged the arbitrariness of the king’s ex post facto decree, but without success.
Al-Istiqlal, however, though quick to point fingers at the Ibrahim government
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and the bureaucracy, would not go so far as to challenge the king. Bowing to
royal authority in a time of crisis, the paper would later present the king’s edict
as an exception to normal rules justified by the gravity of the disaster.49 Catastrophe thus bolstered the king’s authority.

Disaster Diplomacy
An examination of the Morocco oil poisoning offers insight into the public
health consequences of Cold War militarism, the culture of international humanitarian activities, and the politics of Moroccan nationalism soon after independence. In addition, the diplomatic archives concerning the epidemic also permit a historical case study in what has become known as “disaster diplomacy.”
Most such studies have focused on very recent disasters, related to weather and
volcanic or seismic activity. The 1959 oil poisoning provides an opportunity to
extend such investigations to the diplomacy of the Cold War and decolonization
and to an overtly anthropogenic disaster.50
As Gaillard, Kelman, and Orillos have written, “scholars across the disciplines have recently shown an increasing interest in ‘disaster diplomacy,’ which
focuses on how and why disaster-related activities do and do not yield diplomatic gains, looking mainly at disaster-related activities affecting diplomacy
rather than the reverse.”51 This literature has aimed to illuminate the potentially
positive effects of disaster response on relations between otherwise antagonistic
states.52 The Morocco oil poisoning, however, suggests that a broader approach
to the study of diplomacy and disaster is warranted. The oil poisoning involved
semi-adversarial relations between allies and potential allies (the United States,
France, and Morocco), and also involved non-state actors, including the Red
Cross and the Istiqlal party. Furthermore, this case involves a complex reciprocity between the effects of diplomatic strategies on disaster relief and the effects
of disaster relief on diplomatic activities. In post-independence Morocco, diplomatic concerns not only incentivized but also distorted and inhibited disaster
response, as American fears of acknowledging culpability overshadowed the
desire to make a show of American generosity to an emerging Cold War ally.
Furthermore, the examination of this tragedy also allows the historian to explore how responses to one disaster can be intertwined with the experience and
diplomacy of other disasters—in this case, the earthquake of 1960.
In 1959 and 1960, Moroccan, French, and American diplomats, as well as
the Moroccan political opposition, were keenly aware of the potential impact
of disaster responses on diplomacy, for good or for ill. For the Moroccan state,
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the goal was to maximize aid from both the United States and France without
offering concessions that would undermine the government’s nationalist credentials or add credibility to the arguments of its domestic critics, most notably
the Istiqlal party. For the United States, the explicit goals of disaster diplomacy
were to promote the tenure of the American airbases in Morocco and to promote
a positive image of the United States in comparison to the Soviet Union, its
Cold War rival.53 French diplomats were likewise concerned about the future of
French military bases and about international communism but also had broader
goals of maintaining France’s influence in Morocco and preventing the United
States from usurping this role. The Moroccan state proved adept at exploiting
the anxieties and rivalries of its international benefactors.
American disaster assistance, like other forms of US humanitarian aid, constituted part of what Kenneth Osgood has called Eisenhower’s policy of “Total
Cold War,” a means by which the “United States would wage the Cold War assertively through nonmilitary means in the political and psychological arenas.”54
Since 1958, when US military personnel had responded to floods and fires in Morocco with search and rescue teams, the State Department had self-consciously
sought to use disaster relief as a form of diplomacy to promote a positive image of
the United States in Morocco. In June 1958, US airmen from Nousasser had responded to a major fire in the Derb J’did bidonville (shantytown) in Casablanca.
In December 1958, US Navy and Air Force squadrons had provided emergency
relief when floods struck the Gharb plain north of Rabat, distributing food and
airlifting people to safety, feats the Americans would reprise when the Gharb
was inundated again in January 1960. Among American officials, however, views
were mixed as to whether such efforts produced satisfactory coverage of American heroism in the Moroccan press.55
If the positive publicity generated by disaster response was sometimes underwhelming, the oil poisoning presented American officials with a looming public
relations catastrophe: the specter of ten thousand disabled Moroccans living out
their lives as permanent, visible symbols of American imperial harm. Would the
Moroccan public, or the Moroccan political leadership, blame the Americans
for that damage? By November 5, 1959, the American embassy received word
that the US airbase was suspected to be the original source of the adulterating
substance. This suspicion was soon confirmed after the Moroccan authorities
requested samples of machine oils from the airbase, which the Americans provided.56 At the request of Moroccan ambassador Ben Aboud in Washington, the
State Department called upon the US Surgeon General to consult with American experts on rehabilitation.57 As the weeks passed, the Moroccan government

92

chapter 4

made no official complaint but anxiously requested American assistance in responding to the disaster.58
The Belgian WHO epidemiologist Alfred Tuyns told American diplomats
that the Moroccan government was plagued by fatalism, a complaint also expressed by the writers of Al-Istiqlal. According to Tuyns, the government shared
the attitude of the victims that the affliction was an “Act of God”: “‘They are
waiting to die,’ said Tuyns, ‘and one gets the feeling that the authorities share
this attitude.’” Tuyns complained that, in the early weeks of the epidemic, the
Moroccan government, although active enough in pursuing the perpetrators
and confiscating bottled oil, was guilty of “criminal” sluggishness in requesting aid from international agencies. This orientalist description of Moroccan
passivity and fatalism was potentially reassuring to the Americans, who feared
accusations of culpability but also suggested, to Embassy counselor David Nes,
grave failings of the Moroccan state: “this account well illustrates the Moroccan
Government’s deficiencies in any decision-making process.”59 Tuyns’s description of Moroccan government passivity was contradicted, however, by Red Cross
officials who stated that Moroccan officials were not blaming the United States
for the incident but were “desperately anxious to hear what the US might be
able to contribute” and were frustrated by the unwillingness of American organizations to do more than send survey teams.60 Moroccan hopes for American
unilateral assistance might explain the delay in requesting international aid that
had frustrated Tuyns.61
The magnitude of Moroccan need for US assistance limited the adverse diplomatic impact of the tragedy for the United States. In addition to needing aid
for the victims of the disaster, Morocco was heavily dependent on American
economic aid, which totaled approximately $50 million in 1959, and the US had
just begun to supply military assistance, valued at $30 million that year.62 The
Moroccan government was also concerned that fears of adulterated oil in Morocco would harm the country’s canned fish exports, and Moroccan officials
hoped that the State Department would help to reassure “all interested agencies” (presumably the US Food and Drug Administration and the Department
of Agriculture) that Moroccan canneries had not been affected.63 Hostility to
the American presence in Morocco was a public force to which the Moroccan
government had to be sensitive, but the government had no interest in inflaming anti-Americanism. As one US diplomatic dispatch stated, “Whether or not
there was any exploitation of the situation from hostile sources, the Moroccan
authorities would certainly do nothing to foster unfriendly feelings. As far as
the US was concerned, they were entirely preoccupied with the hope that they
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would be receiving some favorable notification regarding the prospects of equipment and personnel contributions very soon, in view of the desperate problem
which the government faces.”64
The Moroccan government’s attitude was a relief for the American officials,
who were also relieved that radio appeals for donations for the victims made by
President Bourguiba of Tunisia made no mention of America’s role in supplying
the adulterated oil. The Americans, however, never felt confident of Morocco’s
loyalty to the United States or of Moroccan dependence on American aid. The
fear that Morocco might turn to the Soviets as an alternative source of aid, including military aid, prevented US officials from taking Moroccan dependence
for granted. Normally, this insecurity would have led to a generous American
aid response.65
However, for American diplomats, the origin of the toxic oil in an American airbase made the oil poisoning unlike other humanitarian crises in North
Africa. The American response to the poisoning was restrained by the fear that
American assistance might encourage the Moroccan public to associate the
tragedy with the US military presence. The Nouasseur airbase willingly provided oil samples to the Moroccan authorities for chemical analysis and donated
twenty-five thousand dollars’ worth of surplus food supplies to the Red Crescent
to assist with relief efforts, but otherwise, the US Air Force undertook to “respond only to specific Moroccan requests for assistance with a view to avoiding
additional publicity and appearance of culpability.”66 The American Embassy
did not declare an official disaster, and hoped that the WHO and the Red Cross
would be able to respond adequately to the crisis.
American disaster diplomacy was also shaped by tensions between funding
rules, which emphasized visibility, and publicity guidelines, which stressed subtlety. Ham-handed publicity about aid provided by the US might seem transparently political and calculated, drawing attention to the bases while undermining
the goodwill generated by the relief efforts themselves. Since the work of Edward
Bernays in the 1920s, “public relations” had emerged as an endeavor which, to
be successful, had to conceal its own deliberate efforts, and its authors.67 Eisenhower had adopted this approach wholeheartedly: in the realm of Cold War psychological warfare, “the hand of government must be carefully concealed, and, in
some cases I should say, wholly eliminated.”68 This approach was not universally
accepted. For example, Leon Borden Blair, the Navy political liaison, ardently favored more explicit publicity about the actions of US servicemen in relief efforts.
Looking back in his 1970 history/memoir of postwar Morocco, Blair scorned the
civilian diplomats’ approach; Blair believed that the key to American relations
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with Morocco had been the open presence of American servicemen (especially
the Navy men at Port Lyautey Naval Air Station in Kenitra), not only in disaster
relief but also in day-to-day interactions with Moroccans.69
Nevertheless, the policy of public relations subtlety and restraint, enunciated
in Washington, had been reinforced in Morocco during the summer of 1959,
when an American payment of $15 million dollars to the Moroccan government
was attacked as a bribe in the Istiqlal press: “Does this mean that this amount
is the price paid for the American bases in Morocco? . . . American dollars have
sealed the lips and appeased the Moroccan Government, may God forgive it.” 70
The lesson learned from this blowback was reflected in the instructions that
USIS reporting on disaster aid in Morocco stress “mutual cooperation” rather
than the heroism of Americans.71 American reluctance to draw attention to the
US role in the oil crisis through overt generosity was clearly rooted in concerns
about culpability, but such concerns were reinforced by the public relations principle that publicity (and disaster aid was in itself a kind of publicity) should not
be obviously related to its political purpose. US policymakers believed that the
provision of supplies or personnel directly from the US bases would seem like
too transparent a diplomatic ploy in the aftermath of the oil poisoning.

The French Position
The French situation was different. The politics of decolonization gave the
French state every reason to respond vigorously to this disaster. On November
5, 1959, the French ambassador in Rabat, Alexandre Parodi, learned from Dr.
Leroy that the American airbases had been identified as the origin of the epidemic. Parodi’s initial response was that this should be kept quiet, presumably
either out of concern for France’s American ally or for fear that French bases
might be maligned with guilt by association. However, the Foreign Ministry in
Paris noted that Leroy had credited two French doctors, Hugonot and Geoffroy,
and a French social worker, Ms. Barbet, as playing a crucial role in uncovering
the cause of the epidemic. This offered an opportunity to create positive press
for France at a time when France was subject to much criticism by official news
outlets in Morocco. In addition, France had recently announced plans to test
atomic bombs in the Algerian Sahara, tests which would take place on February
13 and April 1, 1960. The foreign ministry feared that if the true cause of the paralysis was not widely publicized by the time the tests took place, rumors might
spread that fallout from the atomic explosions was the cause of the paralysis.72
Consequently, Parodi asked Mohammed Taïbi Benhima, then the Secretary
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General for the Moroccan health minister (later the governor of Agadir), to
publicly credit the French doctors for their work; by November 12, the names of
the French doctors and their contributions had been mentioned by Radio Marocaine.73 Moreover, the French state had rivals in its pursuit of publicity. When
an FLN chapter of the Red Crescent donated 500,000 francs to its Moroccan
counterpart in December 1959, and another million francs in March 1960, a new
front opened up in the struggle for public opinion in Morocco.74 Faced with this
competition, the French state, unlike the Americans, had every reason to take
vigorous action.
The problem for French disaster diplomacy was a lack of budgetary resources.
The French Red Cross was already overwhelmed by the needs of a massive program in Morocco and Tunisia to address the needs of more than two hundred
fifty thousand refugees from the Algerian War.75 French diplomacy suffered a
setback in late November when Dr. Leroy mistakenly told Moroccan officials
that the French government would supply the buildings (“caserns”) needed to
house the physical therapy program. When the French embassy informed the
Moroccan government that this had not in fact been approved, Ibrahim and
officials at the Palace were furious. The French consulate in Meknes expressed
alarm at “paradoxical” statements made by Moroccan officials comparing the
generosity of the Americans and the WHO to the “ill will of the French.” It
was hoped, however, that this unfortunate turn of events would be smoothed
over by a decision to offer 200 beds at the French hospital in Meknes to victims
of the poisoning, and that any ill will would be mitigated by the “good sense”
and influence of Dr. Benhima of the Moroccan health service.76 Within days,
the French government announced its plans to send a medical team consisting
of two doctors and 8 to 10 physical therapists to participate in the international
effort for a period of 4 to 6 months, and granted the Moroccan government
the use of a casern in Fes, recently evacuated by French troops.77 Nevertheless,
officials at the French foreign ministry expressed concern that French aid would
fall short of expectations. The French Red Cross could not respond adequately
to Moroccan aid requests, and its contribution to the international response
was smaller than that of other countries’ Red Cross contributions. Meanwhile,
the Moroccan government had pledged fifteen million francs to aid the victims
of the Fréjus disaster, and French officials feared that “this gesture may be quite
adroitly exploited by it [the Moroccan government] to prove that, in proportion, Morocco is more generous than France.” 78 This was a prescient concern:
Al-Istiqlal would make a very similar argument about Fréjus after the earthquake struck Agadir several weeks later. 79
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Charlie Yost’s Cold War
In contrast to the French, who sought to maximize publicity so that their response to the disaster would be both “important and known,”80 American officials endeavored to keep a low profile, hoping to minimize public associations
of the United States with the toxic oil. Soon, however, US Ambassador Charles
Yost began to press the State Department to commit to a more robust American
response. Yost’s position on this matter may have been due to his regular contact
with Moroccan officials, who pleaded for additional aid. It may also have been
due to Yost’s view of Morocco’s strategic role in the Cold War.
At the strategic level, the American government was divided as to whether
the priority in Morocco ought to be to preserve the bases, in order to fight the
Soviets in World War III, or to mitigate anti-Americanism, in order to fight
communist propaganda. The Truman administration had recognized that, in
Europe, “the primary threat was not that the Soviet Union would seize territory
through direct military intervention but that it would capitalize on economic
and social unrest, expanding its power through subversion and manipulation.”81
For North Africa in the Eisenhower years, however, this remained a point of
contention. The construction of new bases in Spain and plans for long-range
nuclear bomber routes from the US diminished the need for the North African
bases,82 but the resulting policy change was gradual and fraught. Base tenure officially remained the top priority for US policy in Morocco into the early 1960s,
although friction developed over this question both in Washington, between
State and Defense, and in Rabat, between the Navy and the Embassy. Yost was
an early advocate of the view that preserving the bases was less important than
preserving a positive image of America among Moroccans.83 Yost’s prioritization
of public opinion rather than base tenure seems to have affected his approach to
the oil poisoning. Yost saw base tenure as expendable in the larger, “total” Cold
War. From this perspective, a vigorous American contribution to relief efforts
might draw attention to the origin of the toxic oil at Nouasser, but if it promoted
favorable views toward Americans in general, then that might do more to thwart
Soviet ambitions in North Africa than the Strategic Air Command’s bombers
ever would.
Yost requested that the State Department approve the release of “Cold War”
(Mutual Security Act) contingency funds, or, failing that, a smaller $50,000
emergency fund, to assist with relief efforts. The Moroccan government, having
learned of the jake poisoning epidemic in the 1930s, hoped that American expertise could offer something beyond the grim prognosis provided by the European
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doctors. 84 Indeed, experts at the Bellevue Medical Center suggested that successful treatment was possible and recommended that the United States send
an “expedition team” comprised of six specialists representing various branches
of medicine and therapy.85 Yost argued that the United States would not make
itself conspicuous by providing such aid: the International Red Cross had issued
a global call for assistance, which had been publicized in the Moroccan press.
He noted that the Austrian government had already pledged to provide a one
hundred-bed hospital,86 and Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and Switzerland were sending physiotherapists.87 When, on December 3, 1959, Moroccan
health minister Ben Abbes announced the details of the Leroy plan for the rehabilitation of the victims, the enormity of the Moroccan need for assistance
became more evident.88
In this light, the American response started to seem stingy. The Institute of
Physical medicine and the American Red Cross were willing to send a medical
survey team for two weeks, and the United States agreed to pay for transportation, but the World Health Organization had proceeded beyond mere evaluation and needed a “semi-permanent treatment team,” which the American organizations were unable or unwilling to provide.89 US Air Force C-124s airlifted
the twelve-ton Austrian field hospital to Morocco, and American Red Cross
did provide a donation of $5,000, but in the critical area of medical personnel,
the Americans came up short.90 The State Department took care, in its contacts with the international Red Cross, to stress American reluctance to provide
further aid and “to avoid any impression that the United States is prepared to
contribute.”91 The Moroccan government complied with the American desire to
keep a low profile, and no public or official request for aid was made to the Embassy or the State Department. However, the international League of Red Cross
Societies appealed to the American Red Cross for two complete field hospitals,
which American Red Cross president Alfred Gruenther urged the State Department to provide, pointing out that thus far, the Europeans and Canadians had
been providing all the personnel. The international Red Cross suggested that
President Eisenhower’s upcoming visit to Morocco on December 22 might be
the perfect occasion to announce such an American donation.92
Ambassador Yost repeatedly made the case for a more generous American
response, pointing to the more generous responses of European countries and to
the threat that the Soviet Union might seek to gain an advantage from the crisis.93 Yost also argued that, while the Moroccan government had been silent on
the issue of American culpability, the Moroccan press had not, and he nervously
anticipated the return of Al-Istiqlal to the news shops: Mohamed Lyazidi, editor
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of Al-Istiqlal, had indicated that his paper would demand an investigation into
American responsibility when it resumed publication.94
Yost’s appeal for additional aid was complicated, however, by Eisenhower’s
scheduled visit. Eisenhower was coming to Morocco as part of an “eleven-nation
goodwill tour” intended to counter the publicity impact of Khrushchev’s visit to
the US in September. The point of the tour was to counter Soviet propaganda
and generate a positive image of the United States, and in Morocco, the US
Information Agency had plans to make the most of Eisenhower’s visit using
film, radio, pamphlets, photographs, and window displays.95 The oil poisoning
issue threatened to subvert the narrative that Eisenhower wanted to create: if
Eisenhower announced the donation of American field hospitals for Meknes,
then the oil poisoning would dominate the headlines. The expected coincidence
of the resumption of A-Istiqlal and the president’s tour was also unfortunate, for
it assured that the focus would be on American culpability and not just American generosity. For these reasons, Yost recommended a “short postponement”
of major American aid.96
Yost continued to be troubled, however, by the urgency of the human crisis
and the inadequacy of the American response. Winter was setting in in Meknes,
and on December 17, representatives of the health ministry contacted the American embassy and described the suffering of the paralysis patients being housed
and treated in tents. Yost urged the State Department to arrange to meet the
Moroccan request for ten thousand each of long underwear, sweaters, wool blankets, pajamas, and wool socks, ideally through the Red Cross.97 The American
Red Cross soon arranged a shipment of sweatshirts and union suits from stores
in Switzerland, but only a fraction of the number requested.98
What the international Red Cross rehabilitation program most desperately
needed was personnel. However, the Americans were participating in the rehabilitation program only minimally. The American Red Cross did arrange
to send two nurses to Morocco but the fact that the Americans were sending
no doctors or physiotherapists was noticeable, since the Red Cross societies of
other Western countries had provided altogether a dozen doctors and thirty
physiotherapists, as well as ten nurses. In the early months of the rehabilitation
program, the American staffing contribution was on par with that of Austria,
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Norway, but was outstripped by the
efforts of Canada, France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Iraq.99 The American Red Cross cash donation of
$6000 was more impressive, making up over half the total cash donations at the
time, but it was less conspicuous, by design.100
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The return of Al-Istiqlal to publication on December 19 increased the political pressure on the Americans, as expected, explicitly linking the oil poisoning
to the American bases and to a general American disregard for Moroccan rights
and sovereignty. Al-Istiqlal’s December 19 article on the oil poisoning exemplified the nationalist view that the American bases were colonial “enclaves” (implicitly comparable to the Spanish enclaves at Septa, Melilla, and Ifni) although
the article placed equal blame on the Moroccan state, as befitted Istiqlal’s role as
the political opposition.101

The Tide Turns
Four events soon transformed the landscape of American disaster diplomacy
in Morocco: a treaty, a debarkation, an earthquake, and a trial. Together, these
events brought an end to American reluctance to participate in the international
medical response to the oil poisoning. First, at the end of December 1959, the
Ibrahim government achieved a major success, reaching an agreement with
America’s president Eisenhower for the evacuation of the US bases by 1963.
This facilitated Moroccan relations with the United States and also solidified
the nationalist credentials of both the monarchy and the Ibrahim government.
The agreement did not end the need for US disaster diplomacy in Morocco,
however, because the Americans still desired to negotiate a continuing military
presence in Morocco under a different guise and needed to insure against possible demands for an earlier evacuation. 102 Nevertheless, the agreement meant
that the nationalist opposition would largely shift its focus to the French bases
and away from the role of the US. The editors of Al-Istiqlal announced the advent of a “new phase” of relations between Morocco and the United States and
hoped that the example of the Americans would push the French and Spanish
to make similar agreements.103 Protests in February 1960 focused on demands
for French base evacuation, objections to the French atomic bomb tests, and
Moroccan claims to the Algerian Sahara; the Americans were no longer in the
crosshairs of nationalist politics.104 The US-Morocco agreement maintained the
incentive for the United States to provide disaster assistance, while lessening the
chance that the nationalist press or the government would attack the American
military presence by invoking the origin of the toxic oil.
The second major event that altered American calculations was the materialization of responses to the disaster from the West’s Cold War enemies. Whereas
Istiqlal had been pointing out the link between the health crisis and American
bases, the international communist response had been muted. On January 4,
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1960, David Nes at the American embassy expressed relief at the “puzzling” silence of Soviet and Chinese officials in Morocco, who seemed to be passing up a
grand propaganda opportunity. Nevertheless, Nes argued that the potential remained that the oil poisoning incident “could be used to channel the resentment
and desperation of the great number of Moroccans affected—either directly as
victims of paralysis or indirectly as indigents deprived of the support of breadwinners—against the American military forces and installations in Morocco.”105
That same day, a Soviet ship, the Volkhovgen, sailed into the port of Casablanca with nine tons of blankets, milk, and sugar for donation to the relief
effort. The Soviets had entered the fray of disaster diplomacy in Morocco, giving credence to Yost’s warnings. The ship’s arrival provided an occasion for the
Soviet captain and the Soviet ambassador to meet with Moroccan representatives of the local Red Crescent chapter.106 The danger to American interests was
compounded on January 5, 1960, when the minister of health in Qasim’s Iraq
announced that Iraq was sending a “medical mission” to express the “solidarity
of the Republic of Iraq…with the Arab peoples.”107 NATO had already lost their
friends on the thrones of Egypt and Iraq, and American fears of Qasim’s ties to
the Soviet Union were at their peak. Although neither the Soviets nor the Iraqis
seemed to be publicly emphasizing America’s causal role in the tragedy, the combination of Soviet and Iraqi activity and American inactivity concerned Yost.
However, it also presented him with an opportunity: Yost now had significant
new evidence to bolster his argument for increased disaster assistance.108
However, although the US-Morocco agreement on base evacuation and the
arrival of Soviet and Iraqi aid incentivized and facilitated a more generous US
response to the oil poisoning, US policy directives continued to inhibit that
response. Disaster assistance funds from the State Department’s Cold War “Mutual Assistance” program account were only authorized for “meeting immediate needs.” This short-term assistance was meant to “obtain maximum political
and psychological impact in meeting the immediate disaster situation and to
forestall possible need for greater expenditures for other, slower forms of assistance.”109 Long-term assistance to the Red Cross physiotherapy program for
paralysis victims was a poor fit for this State Department policy of concentrating
aid where it was most noticeable and most temporary. When, in January 1960,
the International Red Cross rehabilitation program faced a critical shortage of
vehicles to transport therapists and outpatients in rural areas, Yost hoped that
this might be an opportunity for the United States to more actively curry the
favor of the Moroccan public. The embassy once again pled with the State Department for a generous response, proposing that the State Department arrange
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for the Department of Defense to not only provide vehicles but also maintenance for them as well. Yost reminded the State Department that the oil poisoning was still being covered in the Moroccan press.110
Yost was informed, however that the “Cold War” fund was “currently being
reviewed,” and hence “unavailable,” and that disaster relief funds could not be
authorized for uses other than “immediate and temporary relief.”111 Although
this decision was influenced by the looming threat of Congressional budget cuts,
it was also part of an overall strategy of concentrating aid where it would be most
visible, to the press as well as the public. Moreover, the principle that publicity
should not be obviously related to its political purpose made the provision of
vehicles directly from the US bases particularly problematic.
On the afternoon of February 29, 1960, Yost once again sent a telegram to
the State Department, reporting that the Moroccan cabinet director for Public
Health, Abdel Hamid Ben Yaklef, had again reached out to the Embassy, stressing the “urgent need” for vehicles, and Yost lamented the view of Moroccan
officials that “the US is uncharacteristically at the tail end of the procession
providing help for the oil victims.”112 That night, Agadir collapsed.

Agadir’s Loss, Meknes’ Gain
The earthquake struck Agadir shortly before midnight. News of the disaster
reached Rabat, Paris, and Washington within hours, based on reports issued by
radio from the French military base on the outskirts of the city. It was immediately clear that the devastation to the city and the surrounding area was enormous: estimates of the death toll soon rose to twelve thousand and continued
to climb. When the quake hit, French airmen from the naval base a few miles
away arrived quickly. On March 2, a French fleet arrived, as a well as a Dutch
naval cruiser, along with American sailors from Port Lyautey, and airmen from
the Strategic Air Command bases. Late at night on March 3, the USS Newport
News arrived from Italy. The Americans brought with them heavy machinery
for excavation.113 In sharp contrast to the oil disaster, the American response to
the earthquake was immediate and vigorous.
Even more than the US-Morocco base agreement or the arrival of the Soviet
and Iraqi aid, the Agadir earthquake transformed the politics of disaster relief in
Morocco. The Agadir disaster, similar in scale to the oil poisoning but fresh and
with greater lethality, created competition for aid resources, and the Red Cross
immediately diverted personnel, equipment, and supplies from the paralysis rehabilitation project to Agadir.114 However, the earthquake provided US officials
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in Morocco an opportunity to overcome any ill will created by the American
sale of toxic oil as well as any perceptions of stinginess in the American response.
The earthquake, unlike the oil poisoning, allowed the Americans an opportunity to be innocent, helpful, and brave. It also altered the culture, habits, and
budget of American aid in Morocco, changing the American response to the oil
tragedy.
Analysts have been divided on the role that American disaster relief efforts
played in the diplomacy of the time. In 1964, political scientist I. William Zartman argued that American disaster aid had been ineffective as diplomacy aimed
at preserving base tenure because aid benefitted the masses, but decisions were
made by an isolated elite. Yet the diplomatic archives now available to historians reveal that Moroccan government ministers were putting pressure on Yost
with their repeated requests for American aid. This suggests that the ministerial
class was not as indifferent to the well-being of the disaster victims as Zartman
believed. However, there is little to contradict Zartman’s assertion that good
relations with ministers with portfolios such as Public Health and Public Works
had little impact on the Moroccan Foreign Ministry.115 As Zartman noted, the
nationalist attack on the bases was ideological, in that it was conceived within
the context of anti-imperialism and based on questions of sovereignty and legality. The American bases had to be evacuated as part of the logic of decolonization: they were Moroccan territory that had to be reclaimed. Consequently, accidental harm or humanitarian benefit were largely beside the point. This made
the oil incident less damaging to the Americans than they might have feared, but
it also made humanitarian aid less effective in winning over either the relevant
government ministers or the political opposition.
However, as Leon Borden Blair has argued, there was a parallel channel of
diplomacy between the Navy and Crown Prince Hassan, not least Blair’s own
personal diplomacy. Blair’s prominent position in the earthquake response as the
embassy’s representative in Agadir, “with instructions to coordinate and direct
the American effort,”116 combined with his close relationship with Hassan, suggests that American earthquake relief was not entirely disconnected from the
American diplomatic successes concerning the bases. These successes consisted
not only of securing a continued role for the Navy at Port Lyautey, under the
cover of a “Training Command,”117 but also the ability of the Air Force to remain
at the bases until the agreed-upon deadline in 1963, which was by no means certain at the beginning of 1960.
Yet base tenure may not be an appropriate rubric for measuring the success of
American disaster diplomacy in Cold War Morocco. Even if the United States
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had won over the hearts and minds of the Moroccan government ministers (or,
as Blair believed he had, the Palace), American disaster response efforts were insufficient to deflate public criticism of the American military presence. As early
as March 10, Istiqlal was once again protesting “sequels of colonialism,” arguing
that American relief efforts, however welcome, were undermined by American
unwillingness to evacuate the bases before the agreed deadline of 1963.118 The
Embassy was uninterested in pushing for the preservation of the Air Force bases
in the face of public hostility, and saw base tenure as secondary to the goals
of rescuing America’s image in Morocco and bolstering the legitimacy of the
pro-American monarchy.119

Of Fish and Angels
Whether the earthquake served as a “tipping point” in the diplomacy surrounding the American bases is debatable, but the earthquake certainly served as a
critical juncture or tipping point in the American politics regarding aid for the
toxic oil victims. 120 Unlike the poisoning incident, the needs of the earthquake
victims were for immediate, short-term aid, and the images that earthquake relief offered were purely positive: American soldiers bravely performing rescue
work, in contrast to the feared images of Moroccans crippled by American poisons undergoing painful physical rehabilitation.
The Agadir disaster also differed from the oil poisoning in that it was suitable for that other aspect of the American “total Cold War”—the cultivation
of US domestic public opinion and congressional support. Although, unlike
France, the United States was not (yet) bogged down in a war of decolonization,
funding for foreign aid (both military and non-military) through the Mutual
Security program was under attack by a group of congressmen led by Louisiana
representative Otto Passman, whose fierce opposition to foreign aid since 1953
was approaching fruition. The Eisenhower administration feared that Congress
would impose disastrous budget cuts.121 The earthquake struck just as Congress
was about to begin hearings on the Mutual Security program.
At the hearings, both supporters and critics of the program noted their constituents’ distaste for foreign aid spending. But the Agadir earthquake provided
an opportunity for supporters of the program to argue that more aid was needed.
The ongoing rescue efforts in Agadir were brought up during the testimony of
Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon on March 3. Rep. James Fulton of
Pennsylvania suggested that the $260,000 released by the State Department to
fund rescue efforts was inadequate for a disaster of such magnitude and also
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suggested that more publicity was needed for such efforts in the US, to create
public support for foreign aid. Fulton also argued that the US would win more
loyal friendship abroad in situations where it provided visible aid directly to the
people. In Fulton’s words, “If an angel hands you some food you are certainly
surprised and gratified and you thank heaven. But if you are walking along the
seashore and you pick up a fish, it is you who has found it, because there is no particular source of it and you don’t thank anyone.” On the subject of US domestic
publicity, Fulton suggested that more needed to be done: the “top angels” needed
to get involved.122 These concerns were echoed in the Senate hearings, where
supporters of the program stated that there was a need to inform the public of
the magnitude of need in the developing countries, and also that aid might be
better channeled directly to the people rather than through often distasteful regimes.123 The Agadir catastrophe was perfect for both Moroccan and American
consumption: an opportunity for dramatic, short-term aid provided directly by
the Americans to the people of Morocco, with plenty of opportunities to involve
the domestic American public as well. After Dillon’s exchange with Fulton at
the House hearings, the State Department immediately doubled the earthquake
relief funds to $500,000, to reimburse Defense for goods and services, in order
to assure that military relief efforts could continue.124 In March, $1.5 million
was designated for Agadir in a “Foreign Disaster Emergency Relief Account.”125
Meanwhile, charity drives were organized by private and public agencies across
America (including a Navy clothing drive named “Angels for Agadir.”) Within
days, donations of basic relief goods such as tents and blankets (from Europe and
Tunisia as well as from the US) were in excess of what was needed.
As supplies and funds flowed into Morocco, Yost saw an opportunity to reverse the American reticence in supporting the rehabilitation of toxic oil victims.
Yost complained to the Secretary of State that American inaction on the Red
Cross request for vehicles was becoming “more and more embarrassing.”126 Although the State Department was unwilling to approve additional funds for the
oil poisoning response, the Air Force expected that its earthquake relief expenses
would fall short of the $1.5 million account designated for the purpose. Consequently, $16,000 was authorized on April 6 for use for the toxic oil response.
This was a small sum, but its impact was magnified by the USAF’s cooperation
in designating vehicles and hospital supplies as surplus, allowing the US International Cooperation Agency to obtain them at 10 percent of their normal value.127
On March 8 the US International Cooperation Administration office agreed to
fund the transportation cost of a team of American therapists out of its “technical support” budget.128 The gates of US aid were starting to open.
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The Trial
The trial of twenty-four men accused in the oil poisoning case began on April
11, 1960, and constituted another major turning point in the international diplomacy surrounding the disaster. In its coverage of the trial, Al-Istiqlal again
targeted the failures of the Moroccan state, arguing that, whatever penalty the
accused might receive, real justice would demand that the government officials
who had failed to prevent the disaster should also be held responsible. In contrast
to its earlier reporting, however, Al-Istiqlal now shifted blame away from the
American airbases. Al-Istiqlal’s article on the trial stated that the oil, when originally sold, had been clearly labeled as jet engine lubricant: “in white letters, on a
green background, one could read: ‘Lubricating Oil Ancraf Gaz Turbine Engine’
[sic, in English], huile lubrifiant d’avion à la reaction. There was, therefore, no
ambiguity about its purpose.”129 This provided context and corroboration for
the testimony of Mohammed Bennani, the original purchaser of the American
oil and a dealer in automobile parts and engine oil. Bennani, quoted at length in
Al-Istiqlal, stated that the sign on his warehouse proclaimed, in words a meter
high, “oil and grease for automobiles.” Bennani argued that Ahmed ben Hadj
Abdallah, the customer who had repurposed the toxic oil as a comestible, was
“only one of hundreds” of customers who bought oil from him, that no merchant
could be expected to verify the uses to which his customers put his wares. Furthermore, Bennani argued that he had sold the oil
in its original packaging: U.S. Army. I bought this oil by lots, according to
the rules of sale by auction by submitting a bid to the seller, in this case the
USAF. I paid customs on this merchandise. If by having sold this oil that
I had bought, which I sold in complete ignorance of what my customers
might do with it, is a crime or infraction, then I think that the commander
of the American base who sold it to me is in the same position as I am, and
logically speaking he should be at my side on the bench of the accused. 130
The court was not interested in pursuing the defense’s rhetorical attempt to
put the US Air Force on trial, as Bennani undoubtedly knew. Not only had the
Americans agreed to evacuate the bases, they had also become an important
supplier of various forms of aid to Morocco, lessening Morocco’s dependence
on France. When a defense attorney asked, “by virtue of what convention did
the Americans have the right to sell in our country dangerous materials such as
the oil that has caused this great catastrophe?” the advocate general intervened,
saying, “address this question to the Foreign ministry. This question is outside of
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the authority of this tribunal.”131 The court agreed. The court also dismissed the
defense’s objections to irregularities in the trial procedure (“It is not the oil that
is adulterated, it is the trial!” one defense attorney reportedly protested), and
refused to allow the defense to call expert witnesses or to present as witnesses
victims of the oil poisoning who had recovered from its effects.132
Five of the accused, wholesalers in Meknes, Casablanca, and Fes, were sentenced to death; they were held responsible for using the jet engine oil bought
from Bennani to adulterate vegetable oil in large quantities for sale to grocers.
Three others were sentenced to life in prison. Judgment on the sellers of hair
oil was deferred pending further inquiry. Bennani, however, was acquitted of
all charges.133 For the victims, the Affaire des Huiles was far from over. For the
Americans, however, the outcome of the trial was a tremendous source of relief,
removing lingering concerns about culpability.134
By the time of the verdict, the Red Cross had grown impatient with the US
and purchased from private sources a number of three-ton trucks to transport
patients; the French had also donated ambulances. However, there was still a
shortage of medical supplies, since the US had, at that point, declined to donate
field hospitals and the idea of supplying goods à la carte from base surpluses
had not come to fruition. After the trial, however, the procurement of USAF
medical supplies by the International Cooperation Association Mission was
soon approved, and 75 tons of hospital equipment were donated and delivered
on June 13. American officials were pleased to note that the event was covered
in the press.135

Conclusion
The conundrums of American disaster diplomacy in Morocco revolved around
American and Moroccan attempts to assess the political implications of the 1959
oil poisoning’s complex origins. This disaster could not be easily attributed to
the culpability of a single human agent, but was rather the consequence of Bennett’s “distributive agency” or what epidemiologists call a “web of causation.”136
American responses to the disaster were shaped by American uncertainties
about how Moroccans would interpret this murky causality. The acquittal of
Mohamed Bennani helped to alleviate this uncertainty, producing an authoritative Moroccan rejection of the chain of events that could be traced back to
American culpability. Even before the trial, however, the earthquake at Agadir
had transformed the calculus and the culture of American disaster assistance in
Morocco, liberating American officials to respond more effectively to the needs
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of the toxic oil victims. It was not just the budget for disaster relief that was
liberated: after February 29, 1960, there were no more expressions of concern
that American aid might invite thought of American culpability. In the minds
of American policymakers, American aid no longer needed to be explained or
excused: the images of American soldiers rescuing earthquake victims (displayed
prominently in US publicity in Morocco)137 had changed expectations.
French and American disaster aid in Morocco was both motivated and distorted by disaster diplomacy concerns, as decisions were made based on publicity value rather than on the needs of the victims. In the end, thanks to the
transformation brought about by the US-Morocco base agreement, the arrival
of Soviet and Iraqi aid, the Agadir earthquake, and the outcome of the trial, the
Americans made a respectable contribution to the international rehabilitation
effort for oil victims. By the end of the rehabilitation program, which lasted until
June 1961, the US had contributed not only a substantial amount of critically
needed equipment but also the expertise of two American nurses, five doctors,
twelve physiotherapists, and one secretary, typically for six months, or more, for
the non-doctors.
France, in contrast, contributed only two doctors, four therapists, and a nurse
to the Red Cross effort, who were in residence only one or two months at a
time.138 Although French staff at the military hospital in Meknes also treated
patients, the Moroccan government was billed for a portion of the costs.139 Although the Eisenhower administration’s agreement to evacuate US bases by 1963
placed France at a public relations disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States and
created an additional incentive for French aid, the war in Algeria was consuming French resources, making it difficult for France to compete with the United
States in the realm of disaster diplomacy.
As with the Algerian earthquakes of September 1954 and the Malpasset Dam
collapse of 1959, responses to the Morocco oil poisoning were inseparable from
the politics of decolonization. Just as the political struggles over Algeria’s relation to France shaped responses to the Chélif and Fréjus catastrophes, responses
to the oil poisoning by the Moroccan, American, and French states, and by the
Moroccan political opposition, revolved around the question of whether Morocco was truly sovereign over the land occupied by foreign military bases, the
most obvious vestige of colonial rule. The disaster politics surrounding the aftermath of the Agadir earthquake and the reconstruction of Agadir were, meanwhile, opening new fields of political contestation in Morocco and in France.

Ch a pter 5

Death, Diplomacy, and Reconstruction in Agadir, 1960

T

he earthquake that struck Agadir late at night on February 28,
1960, led to the deaths of twelve thousand to twenty thousand people.
The densely populated Kasbah, high on a hill overlooking the south-facing bay and known to the Tashelhit-speaking population as Agadir Oufella was
almost totally obliterated. The Founti quarter adjacent to the beach below also
sustained very heavy damage, as did the Talborj, an ethnically-mixed commercial and residential district situated on a plateau to the east of the Kasbah, as
well as Ihchach, a village on the northern outskirts of the city. The Anza district
to the west and the Ville Nouvelle to the east were damaged to a lesser degree;
farther east, the industrial district and the French aero-naval base were largely
unscathed. To many observers, however, there was an impression of almost total
destruction. Mohamed Taïba Benhima, who would soon be appointed governor
of Agadir, later described the scene: “At first sight, everything in Agadir built
of reinforced concrete, buildings, mighty super-structure, was on the ground. I
will go further: everything that was on the ground was twisted, tormented; from
the pier of the port, however well-anchored, to the road network that the seismic
shock had literally twisted.”1
The impact of this seismic event on human history was shaped by the legacy
of French imperialism. In February 1960, Agadir, like the rest of Morocco, was
still in the midst of decolonization, four years after formal independence. The
demographics of the city had been shifting as French colonists “repatriated” to
metropolitan France and to Algeria, but the French presence remained unmistakable. The 1960 earthquake was a cataclysmic environmental intervention in
the decolonization process. The disaster precipitated a fresh exodus of the French
population and offered a test of the French state’s commitment to its overseas
citizens. Simultaneously, the earthquake challenged the Moroccan state’s ability
to provide for the needs of the people. The increasingly authoritarian Moroccan
monarchy took this opportunity to increase its power and prestige within the
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Moroccan political field. The monarchy also made use of American aid to lessen
the Moroccan state’s dependence on the French, another example of “disaster diplomacy” that does not fit the paradigm of hostile states growing closer through
disaster response.2 Because of the prominent role of the United States in the
disaster response and in planning for the reconstruction of the city, the Agadir
disaster seemed to strengthen American relations with Morocco while weakening French influence. Consequently, the disaster became a focus of anxiety
for French officials and politicians worried about France’s declining role in the
former protectorate, the future of French colonists in post-imperial spaces, and
the post-disaster reconstruction of those spaces. The political contestation that
followed the earthquake did not just concern the future of those who survived,
however: the enormous numbers of the dead posed particular problems. After
the earthquake, the treatment and disposal of the festering dead was intimately
tied to controversies over power and boundaries in the postcolonial city. Even
after the immediate disposal of corpses, French attempts to seek the repatriation
of remains created new points of friction as the meanings of these burials and
exhumations were created and negotiated. In both the disposal of the dead and
the reconstruction of a new city for the living, the disaster became connected to
the struggle to work out the meaning of decolonization.
In the hours of chaos and grief immediately following the disaster, survivors
struggled to free their family members and neighbors from the ruins and to
treat the injured as best they could. French and American sources (diplomatic
correspondence, memoirs, and journalism) emphasize the role of French and
American troops in the disaster response and tended to portray Moroccans as
passive and helpless. However, Moroccan memoirs describe survivors engaging
in organized rescue efforts. According to Tariq Kabbage, who was twelve years
old in 1960, his father, local landowner Abbès Kabbage, organized nearby farmers to bring workers and tractors to assist in the immediate rescue efforts; in
the Kasbah, survivors reportedly organized themselves and began rescue efforts
during the night of the disaster.3 As in Orléansville, however, the local authorities seem to have been unable to respond effectively. The gendarmerie and police
barracks had collapsed in the earthquake, killing many; other would-be first
responders had died in their homes with their families or were searching for
family members. The Royal Moroccan Army troops in the city had taken heavy
losses. The Moroccan governor, Bouamrani, had lost several family members. In
contrast, the French aero-naval base on the eastern edge of the city was largely
untouched, and the commander immediately initiated operations for the rescue
of the living, and the disposal of the dead.4
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Soon, however, the Moroccan state took charge. In the morning, King Mohammed V and Crown Prince Hassan arrived by plane from Rabat, along with
Colonel Mohammed Oufkir. The king put Hassan in command of rescue operations as Moroccan troops began to arrive from throughout the kingdom,
followed by American, Dutch, and Spanish soldiers and sailors, and French
reinforcements. Oufkir was responsible for the refugee camps; he would later,
as minister of the Interior, command the Moroccan state’s repressive security
apparatus during Hassan’s reign as king.5
In a statement to the nation, the king presented the royal family as leaders of
the disaster response:
A great and terrible catastrophe has struck our country. A horrible cataclysm has destroyed the city of Agadir, made its inhabitants victims, and left
it in ruins. Language is incapable of describing this calamity. It is not the
hour for words, for those whom God has saved await your acts of solidarity,
not your tears and words. We have charged our crown prince Hassan with
directing the rescue and emergency operations. Likewise, we have charged
Princess Aïcha with organizing a campaign of solidarity throughout the
entire kingdom and to collect donations for the victims. We have also allocated the funds necessary for the immediate response. Human, religious,
and national duty demands of each person to come to the aid of our brothers, survivors of the martyred city, and bring them all forms of assistance,
cash and otherwise, thus manifesting his solidarity and accomplishing at
the same time his obligations, both religious and national.6
Patriotic, moral, and religious duties were thus to be united in service of the
king. During the years of the struggle for independence, the monarchy and the
nationalist political parties, particularly Istiqlal, had depended on each other.
In contrast, the years of disaster, 1959 to 1960, were pivotal in the development
of the authoritarian monarchy, and both the oil poisoning and the earthquake
facilitated this development, as Ibrahim’s ministerial government was sidelined.7
Less than three months later, the king would take charge of the government
directly, appointing himself prime minister, with Hassan as deputy-premier and
minister of defense.8
For three days after the earthquake, under the direction of Hassan, Moroccan
soldiers worked alongside foreign troops to rescue the survivors, and the troops
commanded by Colonel Oufkir established refugee tent cities for at least fourteen
thousand Moroccans outside the of city limits.9 European survivors had different
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options: the French military base became a makeshift refugee camp for over three
thousand Europeans. The base also provided medical treatment to injured Moroccans, but the guards turned away uninjured Moroccan refugees.10 Conditions
in the Moroccan camps was less than ideal: despite the distribution of aid by
the Red Cross, Ahmed Bouskous, who survived the disaster as a teenager, would
recall the “inhumane conditions” of these camps.11 Later, temporary prefabricated housing for the displaced Moroccan population was established in the areas
around the existing workforce housing of the two industrial zones in Agadir.12
Meanwhile, thousands lay dead, buried in the rubble. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the handling of the dead was inseparable from the
rescue of survivors, as bodies were dug out of the ruins. There was an effort
to segregate bodies by nationality and religion, but the difficulty of identifying
many corpses sometimes made this impossible, with the result that some mass
graves included both Muslims and non-Muslims, Moroccans and French. Most
bodies identified as French, or of unidentified European origin, were initially
brought to the French military base. A tent was erected to shelter hundreds
of arriving cadavers, which were then buried in communal graves in what had
been the athletic field, wrapped in sheets or placed in crates or armoires scavenged from ruined homes.13 Moroccan dead were brought primarily to Ihchach,
where French marines dug a large mass grave; soon hundreds of Moroccan bodies awaited burial there.14 Thousands more were never recovered. Seventy-eight
Moroccan Muslims were buried at the French base, most likely after arriving
there alive, brought for medical treatment that proved to be in vain.15
Soon, the bodies of the dead began to be seen as a threat to public health.
Crown Prince Hassan feared that the putrefying dead would soon produce epidemics of cholera and typhoid, and the authorities cordoned off the disaster
area, evacuating survivors from what became known as the “dead city,” which
was blanketed with quicklime. (The possibility of dropping napalm on the ruins
was reportedly discussed, provoking some alarm, but came to nothing.) The fear
of pestilence meant that the treatment of the dead was as great a priority as the
rescue of survivors. Hassan ordered a halt to rescue operations after three days,
a decision which outraged both Moroccan and foreign residents and observers,
and which was soon reversed, allowing for the rescue of a few more victims over
the course of the following seven days.16 After that, thoughts turned toward assisting the survivors, recovering the remaining bodies of the dead, and rebuilding the city. None of these tasks could be accomplished without grappling with
the meaning of decolonization.
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Diplomacy’s Discontents
The fears, frustrations, and resentments of decolonization and the Cold War
permeated international public responses to the disaster. For advocates of the
French empire, the earthquake unleashed resentments and fears related to growing American influence and the decline of French hegemony in Morocco. Meanwhile, critics of French imperialism suspected malfeasance by the French state. A
month after the disaster, the president of Liberia, William Tubman, accused the
French of causing the earthquake by conducting a nuclear arms test at Reggane
in the Algerian Sahara on February 13.17 This idea was also reflected in a memoir
by a French officer at the base outside Agadir, who described the arrival of Moroccans at the base immediately after the earthquake who had come to express
anger at the French, which the officer attributed to a Moroccan belief that the
atomic tests had caused the earthquake.18
Both French and American diplomats hoped that disaster aid would bring
“political benefit,”19 particularly regarding the issue of base tenure. The international character of the disaster response was shaped not only by the legacy
of French colonialism but also by the consequence of the Cold War geopolitical situation: the American military presence at Port Lyautey and three Strategic Air Command airbases meant that American as well as French forces had
played a prominent role in the immediate response, alongside Royal Moroccan
Army troops. As in the case of the floods of December 1958 and January 1960,
those French and American officials who hoped to use disaster response to foster goodwill were disappointed when the resulting publicity fell short of expectations. Competing to gain public relations capital in the Moroccan political
market, both French and American diplomats complained that their NATO
ally was suppressing information. The French embassy in Rabat complained that
the Moroccan press gave full treatment only to American earthquake relief, a
fact which officials attributed to the more accommodating policy of the United
States regarding base evacuation.20 In addition, a daily paper in Tangiers, España, had run photographs of military rescue efforts provided by the US Consul General there; one of these photos depicted French sailors and airmen, but
they were not identified, and the credit caption “U.S. Navy” seemed misleading.
An American diplomat meanwhile accused the Agence France-Presse and the
French-language papers of Casablanca of giving short shrift to American contributions.21 The French also hoped that their efforts in Agadir would earn good
publicity elsewhere in Africa, but expressed disappointment when the press in
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Accra, forged in the anti-colonial struggle, failed to mention French disaster
assistance when covering Agadir.22
Both the Moroccan opposition press and the Palace were quick to capitalize
on the apparent crassness of French hopes that gratitude for disaster aid would
translate into the extension of French base tenure. Information Minister Ahmed
el Alaoui stated that “Aid from a foreign country in such a catastrophe does not
mean the foreign country has a right to bases there.”23 The Istiqlal opposition
party’s Arabic-language daily, Al Alam, was more acerbic, stating that, if disaster
aid were to result in permission to maintain bases, then it was the Americans and
Spanish who should keep their bases, since, according to the paper, these countries had played the largest role in rescue efforts. Moreover, the paper asserted
sarcastically that Moroccans might as well invite Italy and West Germany to
establish bases, since they, too, had provided aid.24 The weekly Al-Istiqlal called
upon Moroccans to remain focused on nationalist priorities despite the earthquake, citing the importance of not only base evacuation but also Moroccan
support for the cause of Algerian independence and the pursuit of Moroccan
control of the Sahara—the latter cause made more urgent by the French atomic
testing “in our territory.”25
To the dismay of would-be disaster diplomats, voices of discord soon emerged
among the French. In Orléansville and Fréjus in the 1950s, advocates of empire
had stressed solidarity between the European French and the Algerians, who
had recently been declared fully equal citizens of France. Journalists and commentators such as Gaston Bonheur had often added their voices to the official
chorus of solidarity. Because Morocco was independent, there was less French
motivation to present a public face of solidarity, resulting in hostile polemics in
the press.
Tangier, the most international of Moroccan cities, became a focal point of
French anxieties. Far from the carnage, resentments about France’s new relationship with Morocco erupted, resentments which centered on the apparent lack
of a sense of dependence on the part of the Moroccan leadership, and on fears of
France’s declining influence vis-à-vis other foreign powers in the kingdom. On
March 3, Pierre Bouffanais, the French minister plenipotentiary at the Tangier
consulate, accused Radiodiffusion Marocaine of “disloyalty,” for “systematically
minimizing the contributions of the French armed forces in organizing relief.”26
Bouffanais also resented the lack of coverage given by the Agence-France Press,
which, in his view, should have devoted less front-page space to Sekou Toure’s
visit with Mohammed V, and more to the Catholic mass for the dead celebrated
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at the French church in Tangier. Bouffanais blamed this on the “Moroccanization” of the agency’s staff.27
Bouffanais’s complaints went beyond the frustrations of underpublicized disaster diplomacy, however. A speech by Crown Prince Hassan declared that a
new Agadir would be inaugurated on March 2, 1961, and connected this inauguration with the five-year anniversary of Morocco’s independence. Bouffanais
alleged that French colonists interpreted this as a continuation of Moroccan
“anti-French excitation campaigns.” 28 According to Bouffanais, the French of
Tangier had “reacted forcefully” against this alleged ingratitude, with the result
that their “initial grand élan of solidarity with all the victims” became more “nuanced,” and the French community very quickly shifted their generosity toward
the goal of assisting only the French disaster victims, making it difficult to coordinate relief collection efforts with the Moroccan authorities. Bouffanais linked
the purportedly new “cleavage” between Moroccans and foreigners to anxieties
about the new French relationship with the whole Arab world, “where Islam
reigns, where the forces of pan-Arabism are unleashed.” Bouffanais also stated
that suspicions about religious discrimination in the distribution of donations
had been expressed by Moroccan Jews and were shared by the French as well.29
French colonists, according to Bouffanais, deplored what they saw as the hostility and incompetence of the Moroccan state, characterized by “panic and inefficiency” as well as by publicity-seeking egotism. (How colonists in Tangier were
well-placed to judge the emergency response in the Moroccan south remains
unclear.) The French minister concluded that the root of the problem was “the
power of the word in Arab countries,” and the “illusion” that words could substitute for effective government.30 The ideas expressed by Bouffanais were not
new: they echoed old colonial discourses about threats to French dominance.
Accusations of “verbalism” had been a common disparagement of dissidents who
challenged French power in the colonies.31
By March 12 the uproar in Tangier had reached Paris. Senator Bernard Lafay
of the center-left Gauche démocratique formally asked whether the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs might request that the Red Cross conduct an inquiry into the
“hesitations” and “counter-orders” that had resulted in the deaths of individuals,
buried in the ruins, who might have been saved by quick and resolute action.32
Going beyond Bouffanais’s vague assertions of state “incompetence,” and Lafay’s thinly veiled implication, Paris Jour explicitly accused Prince Hassan of
misconduct for his decision to halt rescue operations on the third day after the
earthquake.33 Al-Istiqlal responded by accusing Lafay and the French press not
only of insensitivity toward Moroccan suffering but also of violating Moroccan
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sovereignty by questioning the handling of internal affairs. When catastrophe
had struck Fréjus, the paper noted, Moroccans had sent donations without meddling in French domestic matters.34
On March 30, Europe-Magazine in Brussels put forward still more acerbic
accusations of Moroccan incompetence, alleging that Moroccan troops had arrived tardily on the scene and had “accomplished practically nothing except issue
lamentations and implore Allah” while French, American, and Dutch troops
engaged in rescue efforts. The article went on to mock Moroccan ambitions for
base evacuation, despite the role played by the bases in rescue efforts, and ridiculed plans for the reconstruction of Agadir (“With what money? Undoubtedly
with ours, and that of the other European powers, and America.”) Hassan was
accused of self-aggrandizement in pursuit of personal popularity in a country
where he was “unanimously detested.”35 Similar arguments were expressed in
still stronger terms in Le Figaro by André Figueres, who stated that more lives
would have been saved “if the rescue work had been directed by someone serious.” Figueres singled out the thirty-year-old Hassan, stating that the “panic
and nonchalance of a ridiculous adolescent had condemned people to death,
undoubtedly including French families.”36 Figueres blamed the French left for
handing over power to such incompetents: the problem, for him, was inherent
in decolonization, which spelled doom for the accomplishments of the colonial
period. For French diplomats, however, the anti-Moroccan sentiment exhibited
in the wake of the disaster threatened French interests. The minister-counsellor
at the French embassy, Le Roy, pointed out that Crown Prince Hassan was one
of France’s most important allies within the Moroccan government, and that
by attacking him, the French press was playing into the hands of the Palace’s
opponents, presumably meaning the Istiqlal party that was demanding the immediate evacuation of the French military bases. Moreover, Le Roy feared that
these attacks might undermine any possibility that the positive role played by
the French base in Agadir would lessen the king’s support for their evacuation.37

French Survivors and the Decline of Empire
Soon, criticisms emanating from French politicians and journalists shifted their
targets from the Moroccan monarchy to the French state, and from unnecessary
deaths to the alleged neglect of the living. Two years before the independence
of Algeria in 1962, when the stream of repatriated colonists would become a
flood, hostility toward an independent North Africa was already linked to the
concerns of repatriated French refugees, as it would be in the politics of the far
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right in France for the next four decades. Lafay became a supporter of victims’
organizations in Agadir,38 and an article by General Bethouart titled “Le scandale d’Agadir” appeared in Le Figaro, contrasting the “magnificent” French rescue effort immediately after the earthquake to inadequate aid for survivors who
hoped to reestablish their lives and livelihoods. Bethouart acknowledged that
funds had been dispersed by the embassy, but the general pointed out that these
met only the most immediate needs. Existing procedures for the disbursement
of unsecured loans were being accelerated, but Bethouart argued that these existing programs failed to meet the unique needs of Agadir survivors. The general supported proposals providing indemnities for “reconstitution de foyer,” the
reestablishment of residences, but so far the government had failed to approve
such measures.39
Bethouart’s editorial drew attention to three key distinctions. First, by comparing the “magnificent” immediate response with the inadequate post-disaster
aid, the general was implicitly drawing a contrast between the heroism of the
military and the ineffectiveness of the civilian government. Second, Bethouart
noted that “there are two sorts of victims: those who desire to remain in Morocco
and those returning to France.” For the former group, Bethouart allowed that it
might be necessary to wait until the Moroccan government had announced its
policies before France could act. But for the latter, the decolonized, such delay
constituted neglect.40
Third, Bethouart accused the French government of a double standard with
regard to French citizens. According to Bethouart, the French state privileged
the survivors of the Orléansville and Fréjus catastrophes while neglecting French
citizens in Agadir: “For the administration, the French victims of cataclysm occurring abroad have rights to nothing . . . . There are thus two categories of
French, treated differently: those of the metropole or overseas departments and
those in foreign lands [de l’ étranger].” After 1962, the politics of decolonization
and repatriation centered around the fate of Algeria’s pieds noirs, who migrated
to France by the hundreds of thousands at the end of the Algerian War of Independence.41 Since the mid-1950s, however, increasing numbers of French colonists had been repatriating from Morocco and Tunisia. Bethouart felt that these
colonists were being betrayed: “It was they [the French abroad] who, spread out
across all the continents, who made our country a world power. It was they who
created the markets supplied by French factories. It was they who taught and
propagated our language. But, in exchange, they have rights to nothing, and the
survivors of Agadir, who, in other times would have been indemnified, no longer
interest the administration.”42 Bethouart’s anxieties about the commitment of
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the French state to Agadir’s French refugees were intertwined with concerns
that, with the end of empire, the government was turning its back on colonists.
Notably, however, Bethouart, like many French in 1960, still believed that the
Fifth Republic would win its fight to keep Algeria.43 Hence, Bethouart still
counted the French survivors of Orléansville among the privileged, French on
French soil, though two years later they would become refugees and migrants
themselves.
As the press continued to draw attention to the hardships of the French survivors of Agadir,44 the French government maintained that, since the disaster
had occurred on foreign soil, in an independent country, “the indemnification
of the victims of the Agadir earthquake is incumbent on the Moroccan government.”45 (The French state would take a similar position toward the recovery of
bodies and the reconstruction of the city.) The Moroccan government offered
1,000 dirhams, or 975 new francs (about $200 in 1960), to each family that remained in Agadir, whether Moroccan or foreign, for the purchase of household
goods and would later offer a combination of grants and subsidized loans to
cover the cost of reconstruction.46 As in Orléansville, Fréjus, and most other
disasters, this meant that the vast majority of public aid would go to property
owners, with minimal provision for the renting poor. The majority of the French
property owners, however, were relocating to Casablanca, Algeria, or France,
and were therefore ineligible for reconstruction assistance from the Moroccan
government. The combination of political independence, exodus, and natural
disaster left many French survivors, accustomed to being part of a privileged elite
in Morocco, in an unusually weak position.
However, French officials pointed out that French aid was already being given,
and more had been approved. Each French survivor remaining in Morocco was
eligible for an emergency payment of 300 new francs (100 for children) from
embassy funds. 47 In order to allow survivors the opportunity to return to Agadir
to retrieve belongings, a daily stipend was available until May 31st.48 Initially, for
those who chose to resettle in France or Algeria, it was proposed that heads of
household would receive 500 new French francs (equivalent to 102 US dollars in
1960), and 300 new francs per dependent, renewable once, in addition to transport and temporary lodging. However, apparently in response to pressure from
senators Lafay and Tomsamini, larger subsidies were soon approved to assist in
the reestablishment of households. Beginning May 7, both repatriates and those
remaining in Morocco would receive compensation based on damages, capped
at 2,500 new francs per head of household plus 500 new francs per additional
surviving resident, although the French consul in Agadir argued that this was
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not terribly generous.49 By the end of 1960, 1.9 million new francs had been distributed by the French government for this purpose.50 In addition, a solidarity
campaign for French victims of the disaster, collected in Morocco and France,
eventually raised over 700,000 new francs.51 Most of this solidarity fund was
distributed by the French embassy to “survivors whose situation merited particular interest.”52 The remaining 70,000 was later spent on the Agadir cemetery
for Europeans and on the exhumation, transport, and reburial of French corpses,
both within Morocco and to France.53
In striking contrast to Orléansville, there was no expectation in any quarter
that the French state should provide equal assistance to European and North
African Muslim victims of the disaster. This was not just because of formal Moroccan independence in 1956. Moroccans, unlike Algerian Muslims, had never
been depicted as French citizens, or even as future French citizens. The protectorate arrangement had meant that, after 1912, Moroccans had remained subjects of the sultan, producing a politics of “two weights and two measures,” with
overtly separate systems of justice, education, and rights applying to the French
and Moroccan populations. Nationalists during the protectorate period had
denounced this “politics of racial privilege.”54 Independence, however, meant
that the French state no longer faced criticism for its preferential treatment of
French citizens in Morocco. French expatriates in Agadir had what Algerians
in Fréjus had lacked: an embassy to look after their interests. However, the Moroccan state—in many respects a continuation of the colonial state—now had
to take care not to perpetuate the protectorate practice of special treatment for
Europeans. In Agadir, this was as much an issue regarding the dead as regarding
the living.

The Decolonization of the Dead
As French politicians, journalists, and diplomats in Tangier, Paris, and Rabat
wrangled over the purported failings of the rescue efforts and the compensation
of French survivors, another drama unfolded in Agadir concerning the bodies of
the dead. As the chaotic initial phase of disaster response passed, a new question
confronted both the Moroccan and French states. How much effort and expense
would be devoted to extricating the thousands of bodies that lay buried deep
under tons of rubble? In a modern state, the management of the dead is a critical function and demonstration of state authority. Since the 1930s, the colonial
state—which in Morocco meant the sultan’s “Makhzen” state in Fez operating
under the control of the French Residency in Rabat—had provided the land
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necessary to accommodate the funereal needs of Agadir’s growing population,
both Muslim and non-Muslim.55
The families of French colonists had not always wanted their loved ones to
be buried where they perished, however, and it had been the French state that
had regulated the transport of colonists’ bodies within Morocco and to France.
Although the authorization of the French secretary general of the protectorate
had been required for transfer of bodies out of Morocco, such requests seem
to have been routinely granted. Some rather malodorous problems developed,
however, involving the inevitable results of transporting bodies in hot weather.
In the summer of 1950, there were unspecified “incidents,” in which bodies arriving at their destination seem to have been rejected and returned to Morocco.
This led, in May 1951, to a moratorium on such international transfers from June
until the end of September each year.56 This moratorium remained in effect after
Moroccan independence, exemplifying the often-noted continuity between the
French and Moroccan regulatory state. In this case, the continuity is unsurprising— the management of the dead is a required duty of the state, and burials had
not been at issue during the struggle leading up to Moroccan independence.57
New implications of the political independence of Morocco surfaced, however,
following the Agadir earthquake.
Shana Minkin has recently explored the role that bodies and burials played in
the implantation of European power in North Africa.58 In the era of decolonization, mass migration of European colonists also produced burials and reburials
that were fraught with cultural and political tension. In 1960, excavations and
burials became central to the negotiation of boundaries between the French
state and the newly independent Moroccan state and hence the very meaning of
the political independence of Morocco that had been recognized in 1956.
The Agadir earthquake temporarily produced a transnational space where
the boundaries of sovereignty and even citizenship were unclear, as the French
and Moroccan states were overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster. For several
days, French troops moved freely through a Moroccan city once again, while
Moroccan police made irrevocable, crucial decisions about the fate of European bodies. Nameless French and Moroccan corpses were buried together in
mass graves, an irreversible mingling of the dead. Of the French population, a
total of 404 bodies were eventually identified. Another 131 were missing and
presumed dead.59 Immediately following the disaster, after the burial of several
hundred bodies at the French base,60 the base commander had declared that
further burials posed a health risk. European bodies were then sent to Ihchach,
on the northern outskirts of the city, where the Muslim dead were already being
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buried. In the European cemetery there, Moroccan police oversaw the burial of
Europeans in mass graves, generally without coffins; a French municipal engineer reportedly assisted.61 For the French dead, death certificates were filled out
by military first-responders and later ratified by the French consular authorities.
About thirty victims, either dead or dying, made the journey to other cities in
Morocco.62
Once the initial phase of emergency response had passed, French authorities
showed no desire to shoulder the staggering financial and moral burden of responsibility for the retrieval of corpses that remained buried under the ruins.
The official French policy was “that the search for bodies is incontestably incumbent upon the Moroccan authorities, and that the French state is not to
substitute itself for the Moroccan state in this matter.”63 Nevertheless, Moroccan authorities granted the French base commander access to the burial sites
of French military dead and involved the consulates of various countries in the
process of identifying bodies. Many French survivors, however, expected their
government to do more for French citizens.
The first organized attempt at the excavation of ruins in order to retrieve
corpses began at the Hotel Saada, an upscale establishment that had suffered
a catastrophic collapse. The first four bodies were retrieved on March 12, 1960,
and were identified as a Frenchman from Casablanca and a Frenchwoman from
Paris, a German tourist, and a young Austrian woman. Although during the first
few days after the disaster, the French base commander had made unilateral decisions about the disposal of bodies, the Moroccan authorities were now firmly in
charge. The Moroccan state delivered coffins from the French base to the hotel,
which were numbered to correspond with new graves that the Royal Moroccan
Army, under Colonel Driss, had dug at the Ihchach cemetery.64
But the excavation of the Hotel Saada was an exceptional effort, led by the
Moroccan army, an effort that was no doubt motivated by the diplomatic importance of retrieving the elite and foreign clientele entombed there. Otherwise,
however, the retrieval of bodies came more or less to a halt. Thousands of unretrieved corpses remained, buried deep within treacherous ruins. International
donations poured in, but the Moroccan state had thousands of refugees to feed
and house, and resources were finite. In the two months after the earthquake,
the excavation of the Hotel Saada, which had cost approximately twenty million
francs (the dirham was not yet in use), was the “only [such] operation that had
been methodically carried out and completed.”65
By early May, a transnational “Association of Disaster Victims” (L’Association
des sinistrés d’Agadir) had been formed, led by landowner Abbès Kabbage, who
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was a local leader of the UNFP (Union nationale des forces populaires), joined by
representatives from the Red Cross and from French companies such as the Compagnie du Souss. This association planned to present a variety of complaints, including the need for action on the retrieval of bodies, directly to King Mohammed
V.66 By this time, however, some French survivors (some of whom had just returned
to the city to claim their moveable property), had also begun to pressure the French
consulate and the French Red Cross to step in and take action to retrieve the buried bodies; these French survivors were frustrated by what they perceived as the
“prolonged inaction” of the Moroccan state, “which they saw as incapable, due to
lack of means and money, of carrying out the clearing of ruins.”67 The frustration
of these survivors was sufficient to worry the French ambassador that this issue
might cause further scandal in the press. Far more alarming for the new French
consul in Agadir, Jestin, were indications that some of the French survivors were
prepared to take matters into their own hands and enter the cordoned-off area to
excavate their own dead. Jestin feared that, with armed Moroccan soldiers guarding the perimeter, under orders to shoot looters, new tragedies with international
implications might result.68 The Moroccan government had agreed to study the
possibility of a massive excavation project, but in the meantime, Jestin urged the
governor of Agadir, Mohamed Benhima, to approve the excavation of one or two
of the most suitable buildings, in hopes that this “first swing of the pickaxe” would
calm the nerves of the disgruntled French survivors.69
While awaiting Benhima’s response, French tempers smoldered. Rumors
spread that in one building seven bodies lay on the surface, easily retrieved but
for the inertia of the French and Moroccan authorities. An inspection of the site
in question by embassy personnel revealed, however, that the bodies were visible
but inaccessible, blocked by “enormous masses of concrete.” One French official had heard mutterings from his own disgruntled colleagues that some might
storm the ruins of the old consulate building, where their fallen coworkers still
lay. He added that the horrific, nauseating odors emerging from the ruins did little to calm the nerves of the bereaved. The French Embassy hoped that the Red
Cross might serve to fill the vacuum between the French and Moroccan states
and take the lead in the retrieval of bodies. However, the Red Cross indicated to
French officials that “’the Red Cross’ mission is to offer relief to the living; they
were not in the habit of intervening for the dead.” 70
The case of the Hotel Saada as a successful example of excavation became a
liability, rather than a model, for foreigners seeking more aggressive Moroccan
action. The Saada excavation had been extremely expensive, and it had clearly
been a case of special treatment for foreigners. This made excavation a sensitive
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issue for the Moroccan authorities. Governor Benhima accompanied the French
consul, Jestin, on a trip to meet with survivors outside of Agadir proper, and
Benhima reportedly explained, both in public and in private, “the impossibility,
for him, of undertaking systematic excavations of the modern city to recover
the bodies of 300–400 Europeans, when, at the same time, nothing was being
done in the quartiers where Moroccans were the majority.” 71 The French Embassy recognized that “it would be hardly imaginable to envisage that only the
Ville Nouvelle (where most of the French resided) should be excavated, while
classifying the Talborj, Founti, and Yachech [Ihchach] as zones destined to be
necropolises in their current state.”72
To placate the French survivors, Benhima authorized individual excavations, at private expense, reportedly to allow the public to see how difficult it
was. Technicians employed by the Moroccan government (many of whom were
French) estimated that excavating the collapsed consulate building, a project
comparable to the effort made for the Saada, would cost eighteen million francs;
to excavate the whole city would cost 1.2 billion. This, in their view, was “materially impossible.”73 Several private excavations did follow, (one large building,
“Immeuble Le Nord,” and some small homes in the Talborj). Jestin argued that,
rather than prove the unfeasibility of such efforts, as Benhima had predicted,
they demonstrated the contrary, and, moreover, they had been better organized
and consequently much less expensive than the excavation of the Saada. Jestin
concluded that the Moroccan government would have to give in and engage in
a costly and time-consuming excavation before beginning the planned reconstruction of the city.74
Mass excavations did indeed begin on July 5, 1960,75 in both the Ville Nouvelle and the Talborj but not in the Kasbah.76 In May, Benhima had subtly introduced the formula which would determine the fate of Agadir’s fallen. Preferential treatment for Europeans was unacceptable to the Moroccan government and
the Moroccan public, but a functional distinction approximated the national
one: the site where the new city would be constructed would be excavated for the
purpose of recovering bodies. The areas where seismologists had proscribed construction—most notably the Kasbah, with its exclusively Moroccan population
and its towering elevation—could be left to lie in their present state. By October,
it was reported that 1,400 bodies had been recovered from the Ville Nouvelle
and the Talborj. The latter, with its ethnically mixed and disproportionately
bourgeois population, was just outside the area zoned for reconstruction but was
excavated nonetheless. This suggests that Benhima’s formula provided political
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Map 2. Agadir before the 1960 earthquake. The densely populated, Saadian-built
Kasbah, atop Agadir Oufella (Agadir Heights), at an elevation of over 230 meters,
towered high above the city’s other districts. (Erin Greb Cartography.)

cover for the excavation of areas housing Europeans and more privileged Moroccans, while leaving the Kasbah untouched.77
Benhima remained sensitive to charges that the French were getting preferential treatment. When the French base commander asked that a representative
from the base be present whenever excavations occurred involving the bodies of
French military personnel or their family members, Benhima reportedly protested that the French were asking him for the “creation of a system of exception in favor of a category, the French, upon whom all the Moroccans had their
eyes fixed.”78 Although Benhima ultimately accommodated this French request,
his concerns demonstrated the new politics surrounding the French presence
in Morocco.
French expectations about the retrieval of loved ones were often accompanied by a desire to repatriate the bodies for burial in France. The expense of
shipping bodies out of Agadir to Europe, estimated to cost 4,000 new francs,79
remained prohibitive for many European families. Even burial in Morocco was

124

chapter 5

a burdensome expense for those left homeless by the disaster. Survivors were
outraged in June 1960 when they learned that the missing and fallen were to
be excluded in the calculation of the stipend authorized for the reconstitution
of residences (“aide à la reconstitution des foyers”) for survivors. Many families
had been counting on the extra 500 per deceased family member “either for a
tomb or for reducing the cost of repatriating the bodies.”80 For those French
survivors whose loved ones were buried at the French airbase, their burial in
the soil of a French military cemetery may have been of some comfort. Some,
however, hoped for a mass transfer of French corpses to the metropole. The first
suggestion that the French state undertake (and fund) the repatriation of the
corpses of French earthquake victims came in April 1960, proposed by the former French consul in Agadir, who had been reassigned soon after the death of
his son in the earthquake. The French foreign ministry’s Direction for Morocco
and Tunisia was supportive, and noted that a collective repatriation would be
more cost-efficient than individual shipments.81 Nevertheless, it would not be
until the evacuation of the base that such a mass expatriation of the dead would
occur, organized and paid for by the French state.

Four Decolonizations of Agadir
The destruction of Agadir in 1960 produced a far more dramatic demographic
transformation than had occurred with the decolonization that accompanied
Moroccan independence in 1956. In the 1950s, amidst the violent struggle for
independence, the city’s French population shrank from 15,000 to 5,200. An
estimated 535 French citizens lost their lives in the earthquake, but beyond this,
the disaster precipitated sudden new exodus. After the earthquake, Agadir’s
French civilian population dropped precipitously, to 200, by June 1960, with
another 300 or 400 displaced to the nearby towns.82 The departure of many
French survivors after the earthquake constituted a second decolonization of
Agadir, a demographic revolution comparable to that of Algeria, two years later,
at the end of the Algerian War.83
After years of polemics and negotiations, a third decolonization—the evacuation of French military bases—would bring formal resolution to the nationalist struggle to restore Moroccan sovereignty over what nationalists considered
Moroccan soil (at least insofar as Franco-Moroccan relations were concerned;
the Spanish and the FLN were another matter entirely). An agreement between
France and Morocco was finally reached on September 1, 1960, providing for
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the “progressive evacuation of operational bases by the fifth anniversary of independence [i.e., by 1961] and of training bases by the end of 1963.”84 Disaster
diplomacy had failed to save the bases, but the evacuation agreement saved disaster diplomacy, removing a major political grievance against France that had
frustrated French efforts to use disaster aid to win goodwill.
For Agadir, the base evacuation agreement meant that plans had to be made
immediately, not only for the withdrawal of French troops but also for the future of the bodies, French, Moroccan, and others, that lay buried in the base
cemetery. For French families seeking the repatriation of loved ones buried at
the French military base, the September 1 agreement was a boon, for the evacuation of the base included the exhumation and repatriation of those buried
at the base cemetery: beginning a fourth decolonization of Agadir. A French
naval vessel was used to bring bodies to Marseille, where they were shipped on
to their final destinations at private expense. Bodies that were unidentified or
whose shipment to France was not requested by their families were exhumed
and reburied at the European cemetery in Ihchach. Meanwhile, the families
of some victims already buried at Ihchach seized the opportunity of the base
evacuation and requested the exhumation from Ihchach of their loved ones and
their transfer to France. This was accommodated, but only in the case of bodies
buried in individual graves; the exhumation of communal graves was interdicted
by the Moroccan government. In February of 1961, the French navy transported
191 bodies of French citizens to Marseille.85

Grimm’s Tale
The evacuation of the French base in Agadir did not close the book on the decolonization of the French dead, however. Following the evacuation, a survivors’
organization was founded in Paris (“l’Association française des sinistrés et rescapés
d’Agadir”), and politicians and private individuals lobbied for more exhumations.
Some families also sought the repatriation of bodies that had been buried outside
of the Agadir area and thus had not been eligible for the group expatriation in 1961.
Others sought loved ones whose bodies had never been identified.86
In August 1962, the director of the Morocco office of the mortgage bank
Crédit Foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie, Mr. V. A. Munier, wrote the French
authorities about a particularly complex case of missing bodies. The remains
in question were those of a Mr. Jacques Bordeaux, also an administrator at
the Crédit Foncier, and his wife, Monique. Mr. and Mrs. Bordeaux had died
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in the earthquake when the roof of their apartment building caved in, crushing them.87
The bodies of Jacques and Monique Bordeaux were missing, and thus they
were presumed to be among the thousands of victims of this earthquake who
were buried anonymously immediately after the disaster or the following summer as the terrain was prepared for the construction of a new city. It was also
possible that their unretrieved remains had been ploughed under with bulldozers, along with the wreckage of their homes. Although most bodies from the
Ville Nouvelle had been recovered and identified, Mr. and Mrs. Bordeaux were
not among them.
However, Mr. Munier, the author of the 1962 memo, believed that he knew
where the Bordeauxes had been buried, and he wanted their bodies to be exhumed and repatriated to France. The evacuation of the base cemetery had inspired a flurry of French requests for exhumation and transport of the deceased
from other burial sites in Agadir. Munier’s request for the exhumation of the
Bordeauxes was problematic, however, not because the whereabouts of the bodies was in question but rather because Munier traced their postmortem itinerary
to a grave shared with other disaster victims, some of them unidentified—and
therefore of unknown nationality and religion. Even more problematic was Mr.
Munier’s request that this grave be opened to retrieve the bodies of French citizens when many hundreds of Moroccans remained interred in communal graves.
Munier’s petition again raised this basic question of decolonization: would Europeans still be treated as a privileged class in independent Morocco?
Central to Mr. Munier’s petition was the story of a certain Ms. Grimm,
who lived across the landing from the Bordeauxes with her sister and her
brother-in-law, the Macans. Both Mr. and Mrs. Macan died in the disaster. Ms.
Grimm survived (“woke up on top of the body of her sister”), managed to extricate herself from the ruins, and then left the building.
When Ms. Grimm returned to her home (reportedly after “a few moments”
but probably at least an hour later), she discovered that the Macans’ bodies were
gone. In order to find them, she ran to the French base on the outskirts of the
city, where many of the dead were being buried. Not finding the remains of her
loved ones at the French military base, however, Mrs. Grimm hurried to the
civilian cemetery for Europeans in Ihchach, north of the city, where burials were
also underway. She arrived in Ihchach in time to witness the burial of her sister.
Her sister’s husband Mr. Macan was not there, however.
Mr. and Mrs. Macan, who had died in the same bed, ended up buried miles
apart. Apparently, the deceased couple had become separated from each other after
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a truck had delivered them to the base, just as the base commander was ordering a
halt to the burials there, declaring that the cemetery was over capacity. Some of the
bodies from that truck were among the last buried at the base, but others, including Mrs. Macan’s, were again placed on trucks and sent to the Ihchach cemetery.
Mr. Macan’s body had remained at the military base and had been identified only
later, during the 1961 exhumations that accompanied the base evacuation.
Where, then, were the remains of the Bordeauxes, those neighbors of the Macans’ sought by Mr. Munier of the Crédit Foncier? Munier believed he knew:
they had been transported by truck, along with the Macans, to the French military base. Another surviving neighbor, the one who had rescued their daughter,
had reported that he had identified both bodies there. There was no record of
Jacques Bordeaux’s burial there, but the base’s burial records listed a grave containing a Mrs. Bordeaux and a second where a woman was semi-identified as
possibly a Mrs. Bordeaux. However, the exhumations that took place in 1961
during the evacuation had revealed that neither of these two graves contained
Monique Bordeaux—one turned out to be an unidentified man, and another
was identified positively as a different woman. No other bodies exhumed there
seemed to match the Bordeauxes. So where were they? Munier concluded that,
like the Macans, their bodies must have been unloaded at the base, but then,
with Mrs. Macan, they were shipped to the European cemetery at Ihchach.
At the Ihchach cemetery, five communal graves were known to contain European victims of the earthquake, but only two contained unidentified corpses, including one in which the Bordeauxes’s neighbor, Mrs. Macan, had been buried.
So, Munier argued, the French authorities needed to arrange the exhumation of
these two communal graves.88
Munier, however, was stonewalled by the French government, which emphasized the technical impossibility of exhuming and identifying entangled bodies
in communal graves. He responded by citing expert opinion to the contrary.
But the situation was not quite as simple as Munier claimed. After conducting
an investigation, the French Embassy concluded that, after the transfer of bodies
to Ihchach from the French military base in 1961, up to 156 French bodies were
interred at Ihchach, including 14 unidentified corpses. Any of these, officials
argued, could have belonged to the Bordeauxes. The Embassy also estimated
that 158 of their compatriots had been buried in unknown locations, without a
“decent burial,” presumably in the large mass graves near the French base and in
the razed Talborj quartier.89
Nevertheless, Munier was right to sense that the French authorities were offering him flimsy or phony excuses. It would have been a relatively small task to
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give it a try and excavate the two small communal graves requested by Munier,
and in 1963 the French consul in Agadir conceded that the Bourdeauxes were
“presumably” in grave number two. 90 Ultimately, however, the real issue was not
technical or budgetary, but political, and concerned the Moroccan state.
As then-governor Benhima had explained, the Moroccan state was obliged
to treat European bodies and Moroccan bodies in an egalitarian fashion. It was
politically impossible to permit the exhumation even of small communal graves
in the European cemetery while denying a proper burial to thousands of Moroccan Muslims.
Although there was obviously a concern about offending religious sensibilities
by handling Muslim remains in reopened graves, the denial of Munier’s petition
for exhumation, and others like it, was based on the distinction between communal graves and individual graves and not between identified or unidentified
corpses or even between Muslim and non-Muslim graves. One of the two graves
identified by Munier (number five) was determined to include only European
bodies: but opening even this grave, it was feared, would open, in the memories
and politics of a traumatized Agadir, undesirable repercussions. In the words
of Consul René Cader, “The question of opening the communal graves at the
Yachech [Ihchach] cemetery cannot be raised without evoking the memory of
the thousands of dead who rest in the immense communal grave in the Talborj
quartier (population very mixed) and in the no less immense communal grave
located across from the military base.”91
Although in many respects the more significant decolonizations of Agadir
were those of 1960 and 1961, the decision to leave French dead in the communal
graves at Agadir and not to decolonize them was predicated on the political
and legal decolonization of 1956. The Moroccan state was sovereign over the Ihchach cemetery for Europeans, and Moroccan public opinion would not tolerate
a protectorate-style system of “two weights and two measures” when it came to
exhumation. In this matter, the French and Moroccan authorities were in agreement, despite the objections of some French citizens. In matters concerning the
retrieval and exhumation of bodies, we see here a case where—as in the decolonization of Algeria in 1962—the desires of the French residents of North Africa
conflicted with what French officials saw as state interest, the French state being
much more willing to prioritize relations with the post-colony.
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Reconstruction
Another field of contested decolonization concerned planning for the permanent
reconstruction of Agadir. Urbanism and architecture became fields of struggle
for the final horizon of decolonization—ending the hegemony of French culture
in Morocco—and would be fought out for many decades. In the short term, reconstruction was a desperate necessity for the Moroccan population of Agadir,
who did not have the option of “repatriating” to France. For elites in Rabat,
Paris, and Washington, however, other issues were at stake. Reconstruction became a test for the ability of the Moroccan sovereign to respond to the needs of
the nation, for the French to maintain their influence, and for the Americans to
demonstrate their resolve as Morocco’s new benefactors.
As rescue efforts wound down, Crown Prince Hassan declared that a new city
would be constructed in a year’s time, and an Al-Istiqlal editorial called upon
Moroccans to rebuild “not only a new Agadir, but also, and above all, a new
Morocco.”92 French critics of decolonization responded with hostility. André
Figueres proclaimed in Figaro that “Lyautey [Morocco’s first French Resident
General] had conjured Agadir out of the marvelous but deserted sands of the
Moroccan south.” Now that the French had handed the country over to an archaic “feudal regime,” Lyautey’s legacy would be squandered. The reconstruction of Agadir, which the king had set for the 1961 anniversary of independence,
would be a test to see whether “Morocco did not still need Lyautey.”93
While eager to show its ability to fulfill its obligations as an independent
state, the Moroccan leadership recognized that Morocco could not rise to this
challenge unilaterally. But while French and American officials in Morocco were
quick to recognize the possible benefits of disaster diplomacy, neither the French
nor the American government wished to accrue major financial obligations for
the reconstruction of the city. The French repeatedly stressed their need to prioritize relief for the French survivors of the disaster.94 Both nations stated that,
in their massive contributions to the rescue effort and in providing immediate
relief to survivors, they had done enough. Enthusiasm for disaster diplomacy was
diminished by concern over the lack of initial publicity for the foreign role in the
emergency response phase and by a recognition that the Moroccan government
had in the past been resistant to publicizing foreign aid and to projects with an
obviously foreign origin.95
Yet international power politics provided considerable motivation. French
reluctance was mitigated by the fear of losing, to the Americans, its role as the
primary provider of technical assistance, while American budgetary concerns

130

chapter 5

were offset by the fear, voiced also by the British, that the Soviet Union might
step in with “a spectacular offer of aid which Morocco would be unable to refuse.”96 The US State Department hoped that an appeal to a United Nations
agency such as the UN Technical Assistance Board might reduce pressure for
Franco-American support, while diluting the impact of possible Soviet aid. This
approach, however, also entailed risks that donations might be expected from
member nations and “the risk that Afro-Asian enthusiasm could lead to a proposal of unmanageable proportions.”97
For the French, anxieties about growing American influence in Morocco
dated back to the early years of the Second World War. Even before the landing of a North American army on the shores of northwest Africa, the war had
prompted a new intensity of transatlantic contacts. After the Fall of France in
June 1940, French authorities in Rabat had sought American aid and trade to
alleviate the economic hardships caused by the collapse of the French metropole.
The British had grudgingly consented, and a modest American aid program
operated, with some interruptions, until November 1942. 98 As rumors of the
impending American invasion spread, French prestige faltered, and there were
reports of Moroccan troops “refusing to obey their French officers because they
knew the Americans were coming.”99 In November 1942, they came, and by
the end of the month there were sixty-five thousand US soldiers in Morocco.100
Along with these troops came American lend-lease and an end to the partial
British blockade: Morocco was “now open again to the markets of the world.”101
After the war, American imports increased, including cars and durable goods
for the benefit of the more well-to-do colons and the Moroccan elite.102 French
anxiety about the growth of American influence—political, economic, and cultural—became a tool that the Moroccan state could use for diplomatic leverage.
Within days of the 1960 disaster, the Moroccan government approached
the Republic of France to request assistance. The boundaries of the two states
were still porous and blurred, four years after independence. Morocco’s Ministry of Public Works and its Service of Urbanism were still dependent, even at
the highest levels, on French coopérants, thirteen thousand French professionals
who worked for the government of Morocco under the terms of a convention
signed between the two countries. The presence of these coopérants could serve
as a backdoor diplomatic channel. It was two such high-level coopérants, the
secretary-general to the minister of Public Works and the engineer-in-chief of
the Service of Urbanism, who were dispatched to Paris on March 7 to request
reconstruction aid from the former colonizer.103
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These two Frenchmen requested that France send a team of urbanists to develop a plan for the new Agadir, reinforce the staff of the Ministry of Public
Works with an additional ten technicians, and commission three companies
that had worked on the reconstruction of Orléansville to analyze and inventory
damage to standing buildings and roads, and to define anti-seismic building
standards for reconstruction. The total cost was estimated at 1.6 million new
francs, but there was a clear French interest in maintaining their influence in
the realm of culture and technical advising and thus in taking part in urban
planning for the new Agadir. The extent of the proposed assistance went beyond city planning and represented more than the French wanted to spend, but,
as one French official noted, if France did not rise to the occasion, other states
would.104
The assessment that independent Morocco would not rely on France alone
was correct. On March 4, Hassan had already outlined a plan to the American
ambassador, Charles Yost, in which the US, France, and one other unnamed
country would each contribute to the design and reconstruction of a different
part of the city. Hassan requested that an “imaginative, modern” American
planner be dispatched to Morocco as soon as possible.105 Over the next several
days, it became increasingly clear that Hassan sought as much American support
as possible. A formal request was made for an American city planner, preferably
(Spanish-born) Josep Lluis Sert, dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design. The minister of Public Works, Abderrahmane ben Abdelâli, also requested
the services of an American housing expert as well as a geologist, a seismologist,
and an architect.106 This was a clear statement about distancing Morocco from
its former colonial “protector” and signaled a Moroccan strategy of provoking
competition between the two NATO allies.
From the beginning, French and American officials were skeptical of Moroccan ambitions about the future of Agadir. On March 12, Le Roy had voiced
his suspicion that Hassan’s decision to halt rescue operations on March 4 was
motivated, not only by epidemiological fears, but also by excess “haste to pass
from the phase of disaster to that of reconstruction.”107 Americans officials felt
that Hassan’s ambitions for reconstruction were “grandiose.”108 The Americans
pressed the Moroccan government to include the French in a joint planning
commission,109 and initially expressed reluctance to displace France in the realm
of civil technical assistance. Neither foreign government, however, wanted to
be left out of the project altogether. As events developed and the Moroccans
presented United States diplomats with opportunities to play a prominent role
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in the “rebirth” of Agadir, the Americans felt obliged to be responsive to Moroccan needs.
Alarmed by the growing American involvement, the French government also
tried to accommodate Moroccan requests. France agreed to a Moroccan request
to send a “grand urbanist” to Morocco and suggested several names.110 Abdelâli,
minister of Public Works, wanted a bigger name, however, and requested the
great planner Le Corbusier.111 For the French ambassador in Rabat, this was
an important opportunity, “at a moment when international interventions are
multiplying regarding Agadir.”112
Le Corbusier, however, did not turn out to be the solution for the French in
Agadir, although his visit to Morocco seemed to go well. When Le Corbusier
arrived in Casablanca on March 25, he made a brief statement to the press indicating that his experience working in Japan had prepared him well for the
challenges in Agadir.113 In Rabat, he met with Abdelâli and the professionals of
the Public Works ministry’s Service of Urbanism, and with Crown Prince Hassan. However, bad weather prevented him from traveling to Agadir prior to his
return to France on the 27th. This may have been an influential environmental
turn of events; perhaps scenes of disaster might have given Le Corbusier more
motivation. Although by all accounts Le Corbusier made a fine impression, he
did not reach an agreement with his hosts and seems to have declined to participate in the project. According to one account, Le Corbusier chafed at certain
requirements set forth by Crown Prince Hassan, who stated “I do not see Agadir
without a mosque, and I do not see a mosque without green tiles.”114 French Ambassador Parodi noted that Corbusier “constantly expressed, with great frankness, and did not conceal that he could not accept responsibility for the reconstruction of Agadir unless he was given the liberty and the means necessary.”115
Although Le Corbusier’s visit ultimately failed to produce an agreement, his
trip to Morocco provided leverage for Abdelâli to press the United States to send
an “expert of similar caliber.”116 The State Department had approved the Moroccan request for a housing expert to advise Public Works, but the Moroccans
clearly wanted someone more prestigious for the urban plan. For US ambassador
Yost in Rabat, the disaster diplomacy possibilities were clear: “American association with the rebirth of Agadir is so obviously desirable that special efforts
appear more than warranted.” Yost argued that this would not imply additional
commitments to the actual reconstruction, but added, however, that a prompt
“no” would be better than an “embarrassing” delay.117 The implied priority
was that the US be seen as a reliable partner. However, Yost stressed, as he had
throughout the oil poisoning crisis, that American stinginess might provide the

Death, Diplomacy, and Reconstruction in Agadir, 1960

133

Soviets with an opportunity. Yost also noted that communist China’s ambassador had already made a substantial cash donation to the king.118 The next day, in
Moscow, Morocco’s ambassador reassured his American counterpart that American aid had in fact been much more forthcoming than Soviet aid and “showed
Moroccans who their true friends were.”119 Despite the anti-Soviet character of
the remark, the Moroccan diplomat nevertheless reinforced the connection between disaster aid and Morocco’s position in the Cold War.
The US State Department, however, preferred to “let the French take the
lead, as they are doing,” and suggested sending, rather than a “top planner,” a
“working-level planner,” who would participate in planning during a year-long assignment, but take no leadership role.120 Abdelâli, however, insisted that a top-level
planner was necessary to build a city that would fulfill the king’s desire to create an
“expression of modern Morocco”; he noted that the Ministry of Public Works was
already well-staffed with rank-and-file planners quite capable of “following up and
executing plans.”121 The State Department relented.122 Josep Lluis Sert was apparently unavailable, uninterested or deemed unsuitable, and so the State Department
selected the prominent American planner Harland Bartholomew, chairman of the
Washington, DC, National Capitol Planning Commission.
The United States authorized $50,000 to pay Bartholomew for the planning.
As American officials put it, “although the project has materialized somewhat
differently than originally envisioned, withdrawal of US assistance at this time
would not be easy to explain without embarrassment.”123 The Americans still
wished to avoid paying for actual reconstruction, although a contingency policy
was outlined in the event that political pressures required it. This would entail
American involvement in the reconstruction of a single “model” residential area;
“necessary safeguards would have to be taken to assure proper recognition of
US sponsorship.” In this case, the “project would specifically emphasize simple
construction technique to permit maximum use of locally available labor.”124
This backup policy never came into play but demonstrates the gap between the
expectations of Washington and Rabat. The king and crown prince wanted an
impressive, modern city that would be a flagship for the new Morocco; American officials expressed anxiety about these “grandiose” ideas.125 In Agadir, however, a different dynamic would develop, in which Governor Benhima’s desire for
a practical, swift reconstruction plan conflicted with the more ambitious scheme
proposed by Bartholomew and endorsed by Rabat.
In Rabat, Moroccan expectations were high. Abdelâli hoped that preliminary
plans could be produced by late April.126 Bartholomew arrived in Rabat on April
9. However, the American planner produced only a basic report, recommending
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that the city be rebuilt on much of its current site (a major question among the
seismologists in the preceding weeks), but that construction be prohibited in
the Kasbah, Talborj, Founti, and Ihchach districts. Bartholomew stated that
a first draft of the comprehensive city plan would take two months, followed
by meetings with Moroccan authorities and the staff of the Ministry of Public
Works and then would require three months for revisions.127 The Moroccan
state accepted Bartholomew’s terms.
InMay 1960, the king dismissed the government headed by Abdallah Ibrahim, and appointed himself head of government, with Crown Prince Hassan as
deputy-premier and defense minister. This was a momentous event in Moroccan
politics, but because the monarchy had always been the main representative of
the Moroccan state in the response to the earthquake, the impact of the change
in government on the question of reconstruction was minimal.128 In a speech in
Agadir on June 30, Mohammed V declared:
Here we see today Agadir at the hour of its resurrection, through the execution of the plan, the preparation of which we have ensured: this plan,
the essential objective of which is to reconstruct the city on a secure location, chosen by the architects, Moroccan and foreign, after a detailed
scientific study, and by modern methods which are applied in cities affected
by earthquakes.
This program will make of Agadir a modern and active city, endowed
with all the equipment necessary for life today: broad avenues, pleasant
gardens, abundant light, mosque, schools, administration, etc. . . . Forward
for the reconstruction of Agadir! Forward for the renaissance of the Sous!
Forward for the new Morocco!129
The king thus associated the monarchy and future of Agadir with the “modern methods” of a transnational community of seismologists, engineers, and
architects. It appeared that the United States would play a prominent role in
this new Morocco. In contrast, French influence seemed to be at a low point
in the summer of 1960, eroded by the unpopularity of France’s ongoing war in
Algeria, atomic testing in the Sahara, and France’s apparent intransigence (prior
to the September agreement) on base tenure in Morocco. The United States,
in contrast, was enjoying the benefits of Eisenhower’s base evacuation treaty.130
Bartholomew’s contract for Agadir seemed to indicate a trend. French fears were
compounded by the appointment of another American, George Schobinger, to
serve as an advisor to Abdelâli, the Minister of Public Works. French officials
worried that they were losing “the traditional influence of France in the domain
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of public works.” This did not please American officials, however. According to
Marcus Gordon, the State Department’s director for Europe and Africa, “the
worst eventuality would be that US assistance caused the French to become so
angered as to make a complete withdrawal, leaving us with a void we could not
possibly fill.”131 The State Department did not wish to be stuck with the bill for
developing Morocco.
France’s role in civil engineering had not vanished: private French companies were contracted for the clearing of debris. However, the French consul
in Agadir became concerned that even this role might be lost, due to the high
prices charged.132 Moreover, in addition to the new role played by Americans
in high-level technical assistance at Public Works, the ministry was engaging
in a “Moroccanization” of its staff. The leadership of the ministry’s Service of
Urbanism had already been Moroccanized. In June, the Public Works engineer-in-chief in Agadir, a Frenchman, was replaced with a Moroccan engineer,
Mohammed Faris. The consul recognized that, for the Moroccan state, “The
reconstruction of Agadir constitutes, in effect, a political act; this gesture will
only have full effect if the Moroccan authorities place technicians of Moroccan
nationality as sector chiefs.”133 If the reconstruction of Agadir was going to be a
national and royal act, an act of decolonization, it had to be done by Moroccans.
French hopes for a leading role in the redesign of the city were revived, however, when serious concerns emerged about Bartholomew’s commitment to the
project. The Moroccan leadership expressed dissatisfaction with the American
planner’s long absence through the summer of 1960; Bartholomew’s dispatch
of a junior employee to Morocco in late July failed to assuage these concerns.
Bartholomew’s representative presented plans which the high commissioner for
the reconstruction described as “childishly superficial.” Even American officials
recognized that Bartholomew’s company representative was “obviously not of a
caliber to deal as an equal with Ministry technicians.”134
For the US embassy, this was no longer just about Agadir. Minister of Public
Works Abdelâli had survived the change of government, but he and the Americans had invested much political capital in each other, and they would stand
or fall together, it appeared. As Ambassador Yost put it, “if Abdelâli fails on
Agadir due to our promised support and is made to suffer for it as he doubtless would, the future of our entire technical assistance program will be jeopardized.”135 Yost’s alarmism was apparently influenced by Abdelâli, who described
the shortcomings of American assistance in the project as “shocking” and who
emphasized the strength of internal opposition to the government’s increasing
turn toward American aid.136 Bartholomew’s lackadaisical efforts had provided
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an opportunity for those opposed to American leadership in the reconstruction,
including “jealous” French coopérants within the Moroccan Ministry of Public Works. Soon, Abdelâli’s frustration was compounded by the failure of the
Americans to provide an advisor to Public Works in Rabat to replace George
Schobinger, who departed in August.137
Thus began what became known as the “Battle of the Plans.” This was both
a competition between France and the United States for influence and prestige, and between Minister of Public Works Abdelâli, who reportedly aspired
to become the Moroccan Ambassador to the United States, and Benhima, the
governor of Agadir, who had good relations with the French in Agadir and who
was skeptical about the Bartholomew plan, finding it overly ambitious. Benhima
wanted a plan that could be implemented more readily to house the displaced
population of the city. Benhima and Abdelâli also differed in their attitudes
toward Crown Prince Hassan: Benhima was seen as loyal to Hassan, while Abdelâli was critical, and reportedly disparaged Hassan’s leadership in the immediate aftermath of the disaster as well as his continuing accrual of power.138
For the French coopérants at the Service of Urbanism, the desire for a leading
French role in designing the new city was less about disaster diplomacy than
about professional prestige. Their collaboration with Moroccan colleagues, like
that of most coopérants, was, as described in American diplomatic assessments
of the situation, “almost entirely insulated from the ups and downs which affect French relations . . . on the political or economic level.”139 Already chafing
at Abdelâli’s decision bring Schobinger to Rabat to oversee projects in Public
Works, the hiring of Bartholomew had been a great affront. According to historian Thierry Nadau, who interviewed many of those involved, Bartholomew
was “little esteemed” 140 by the French and Moroccan urban planners alike, “who
would have gladly deferred to the master [Le Corbusier]” but who “protested this
urbanisme primaire.”141
The French and Moroccan planners had a key factor on their side: the winds
of nationalism and decolonization were with them. However many Frenchmen
were involved, their plan would be produced by an agency of the newly independent Moroccan state. Ironically, the Moroccanization of the Ministry of Public
Works turned out to be an asset to French influence. The Service of Urbanism
was now directed by Abdesalem Faraoui,142 There, however, as in many parts of
the Moroccan government, the French and Moroccan professionals had much
in common. While subtler tensions no doubt lurked beneath the surface, outside observers of Franco-Moroccan technical cooperation noted that “it was
frequently next to impossible to know whether the person one was dealing with
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was a native or a Frenchman because of this similarity of speech and style.”143
The replacement of the French engineer-in-chief at Agadir with Mohammed
Faris proved to be no loss to the French cause. Faris, who consulted regularly
with the French consul in Agadir, considered the American plan too extravagant
and impractical, and he was suspicious of American motives.144 Likewise, the
French-educated modernists in the Service of Urbanism were an asset for the
preservation of French influence. Architect Mourad Ben Embarek, who would
soon succeed Faraoui as head of the service, would present the reconstruction of
Agadir as an opportunity, by proxy, for Le Corbusier to make his mark on Africa, through the impact he had made on the younger generation.145 Yet despite
the fact that it was sometimes referred to by diplomats and officials as the “Plan
Français,” the Public Works plan could be portrayed as an assertion of independence. Several years later, the editors of Morocco’s premier architectural journal,
A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme, would portray the reconstruction of Agadir as an example for developing nations of the utility of avoiding dependence on foreign institutions.146 This was a bit of a stretch, considering
the central role played by French nationals in the Service of Urbanism. However,
both the French and Moroccan governments had, since independence, avoided
publicizing the role of French coopérants in Morocco, each fearing domestic
criticism of the ongoing Franco-Moroccan cooperation.147 The public face of the
Ministry of Public Works’ urban planning service was Moroccan. This arrangement served the interests of both France and Morocco—to the detriment of the
Americans. As in the question of responsibility for the retrieval of the dead, the
formal arrangements of decolonization served the interests of the French state.
Nevertheless, American influence remained an obstacle to French hopes for cultural hegemony: the “Plan américain” seemed to be on the path to realization.

The Fall of Bartholomew
American attention to disaster diplomacy in Agadir was intensified by the
Palace’s decision in November 1960 to purchase Soviet MiG jet aircraft. This
deal shocked the State Department and demonstrated that Yost’s alarmism had
been well-founded. The Soviet deal increased Moroccan leverage in extracting
aid from the United States by demonstrating that, in the era of the global cold
war, the Americans were not the only alternative to dependence on France. The
purchase of the MiGs also increased Abdelâli’s importance to the Americans,
and thus the importance of Agadir’s reconstruction, since Abdelâli was seen as
“not only the most pro-American among the present ministers but is also the
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strongest opponent in the cabinet of the Soviet arms deal.”148 Abdelâli made
use of this leverage, stressing that the Agadir project was a “life and death question for US-Moroccan relations” and insisting that the Americans extend Bartholomew’s contract, which had ended with the completion of the master plan
in late November, to supervise and manage the organization of reconstruction.149
The US had little choice but to approve $49,000 in additional funds, but made
clear that this would not imply any further commitment to fund the actual construction.150 It seemed that this was enough and that the Americans had sealed
the deal. By December 26, the Palace had officially approved the Bartholomew
plan, and arrangements were made for Yost to attend an inauguration ceremony
presided over by Crown Prince Hassan on January 17, 1961.151
Soon, however, the Agadir reconstruction project became engulfed in scandal, leading to a decisive shift in the Battle of the Plans. It began slowly. A West
German newspaper, Die Welt, ran a story accusing the Moroccan government
of diverting two billion francs of international earthquake relief donations to
“cover the chronic deficit of the Moroccan budget.”152 The French press picked
up the story. France Observateur connected the alleged mishandling of funds to
the suffering of the displaced survivors, portrayed as freezing in tents in the middle of winter. This, in turn, linked the issue to the earlier discourse in Tangiers
and in Le Figaro about a negligent French government abandoning its colonists
to the incompetence of the independent Moroccan state.153
The Moroccan minister of information, Alaoui, denied these charges, and
stated that all foreign donations had been placed in a dedicated account, separate
from Treasury funds. The government’s own funds from the 1960 budget had
been applied toward the 4 billion francs already spent on reconstruction and
demolition; foreign aid for reconstruction totaled less than 1.5 billion francs.
Complete reconstruction of the city and compensation payments to victims
(necessary to spur private reconstruction) was estimated at 24 billion francs. A
special tax would raise 12 billion francs, supplemented by 2 billion from the 1961
general budget.154
Nevertheless, the obvious gap between the estimated expense and the available revenue left unanswered questions about the project’s solvency. The press
scandal increased scrutiny of both the finances and pace of Agadir’s reconstruction. Hassan had set an impossibly high standard with his hasty assertion amid
the rubble in March 1960 when he declared that a new city would be inaugurated in a year’s time. Alaoui had apparently exacerbated this problem by indicating to the foreign press that the city was already largely reconstructed, when
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the clearing of debris was not even completed, and the only new structures were
prefabricated.155
The government’s cost estimates also raised questions about the future of the
Bartholomew Plan. Already, in December 1960, Governor Benhima had hinted
to the French that the Bartholomew plan might be discarded, and that what
French diplomats viewed as the Plan Français might be adopted after all.156 At
the end of January 1961, Chief Engineer Mohammed Faris told the French consul that the Bartholomew plan was expected to cost 200 billion francs, while
the Public Works plan would cost only 25 billion.157 In early February, High
Commissioner for Reconstruction Mohamed Imani began to hold a series of
meetings in Rabat; the plan for Agadir was once more up for debate.158 This
was, apparently, a hotly contested question; in mid-March, after the unexpected
death of King Mohammed V and the accession of Hassan II, Faris dejectedly
predicted that the pro-American factions in the government and the Palace
would prevail.159 Faris was wrong.
On June 2, Governor Benhima was suddenly appointed to the post of minister of Public Works, replacing Abdelâli. Abdelâli had been accused of embezzling from the Agadir reconstruction fund generated by the “solidarity tax,”
and smuggling the proceeds to the United States and Switzerland. Benhima
was considered an able technocrat and a dependable supporter of the Palace,
and Benhima had been openly critical of both Abdelâli and the Bartholomew
plan. As Mohammed Faris saw it, this was a major reason the new king chose
him for Public Works: his appointment served to indicate a clean break from
both Abdelâli’s corruption and his policies.160 Of course, this scandal could have
been merely a cover; Abdelâli’s hostility to Hassan may well have been the real
reason for his dismissal, or the high cost of the American plan, in the face of
public criticism about the financing of the project, may have pushed Hassan to
make a change.
In any case, Abdelâli’s fall spelled the demise of the American-designed “New
Agadir,” although this would not be announced for several months. Benhima
charged the French and Moroccan planners and architects at Public Works with
the task of synthesizing elements of the two competing plans into a final plan
ready for immediate implementation by the end of September.161 The Service
d’Urbanisme would also set forth the guidelines imposed on private builders;
and the Service would call upon a dream team of European and Moroccan architects to design state-owned buildings in brutalist, modernist style.162
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Conclusion and Foreshadowing
Decolonization was not coterminous with political independence, at least not
everywhere and in all respects. After independence in 1956, thousands of French
continued to live, die, and be buried in Agadir. The seismic intervention of February 1960 transformed this situation, however, prompting a mass exodus of the
colonists. Then, in 1961, the French military base was evacuated, and the dead
rose from their graves to return to France, although not without some assistance,
to join the living who had fled after the earthquake.
The disaster created opportunities for the increasingly authoritarian Moroccan state to use American assistance to lessen Moroccan dependence on France.
However, both the graves of the dead and the new city built for the living would
continue to be centers of contestation in Agadir. The excavation of the Ville
Nouvelle and the Talborj and the end of the “Battle of the Plans” did not mean
the end of controversy regarding the reconstruction of the city or the treatment
of the dead. For the generation of city residents who survived the earthquake, the
ruins of the Kasbah have remained a festering wound, where the resting places
of the unrecovered dead are despoiled by urinating tourists, beer-drinking Moroccan youth, and most recently, cellphone towers.163 Meanwhile, to many Moroccans longing for the cultural and architectural decolonization of Morocco,
the new Agadir that rose from the ruins became a symbol of enduring French
cultural hegemony.
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s Pierre Mas, one of the principal designers of post-earthquake Agadir, described it: “Few cities occupy a geographic position as remarkable as Agadir. After passing Cap Ghir, where the foothills of the High
Atlas plunge into the Atlantic, the voyager coming from the north travels along
a narrow shore of Mediterranean character for forty-some kilometers, before
discovering the large bay of Agadir open to the south-west. The last foothill,
adorned with ancient Portuguese fortifications, the Kasbah, dominates the city
and the plain of the South from its height of 230 meters.”1 Despite these picturesque natural endowments, a peculiar idea about the reconstructed city of
Agadir began to be expressed in the mid-1960s, one that would be frequently
repeated through the 1990s and into the new millennium. Rebuilt Agadir, with
its modernist architecture centered around a Mediterranean-style beach resort,
became a pervasive symbol of disorientation and rootlessness. In 1967, a French
writer, Péré, reported that it was already commonplace to hear people lament of
Agadir that “it is a city without a soul.”2 By the 1990s, when the present author
was living in Casablanca, the description of Agadir as lacking a soul had become
commonplace in popular discourse in Morocco, accompanied by the assertion
that Agadir was not really Moroccan. Descriptions of Agadir as a “dead city,
without a soul and without a center” appeared repeatedly in the work of students
graduating from the National School of Architecture in Rabat. However, this
cliché has been contested by the inhabitants of Agadir, the Gadiris.
Do cities have souls? Recently, scholars Daniel A. Bell and Avner de-Shalit
published The Spirit of Cities: Why the Identity of a City Matters in a Global
Age, arguing that some cities, but not all, have what the authors alternately refer
to as “spirit,” “ethos,” or “identity.” Prescriptively, Bell and de-Shalit argue that
this spirit, as a focus of civic pride and activity, is a desirable bulwark against
the negative effects of both nationalism and globalism. Descriptively, they apply
what Frederick Cooper has called a “hard” definition of identity as a collective
141
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phenomenon, “something deep, basic, abiding, and foundational.”3 The hazard
of such notions of identity is that they impose theoretical unity on what is in
fact a heterogeneous and plural subject: communities of many thousands of people. As Bell and de-Shalit themselves acknowledge, the life of people in a city is
shaped by many factors; they mention, in particular, economics, street signs, traffic, density, segregation, hospitals, taxi drivers, and “great city planners.”4 Such
diverse forces cannot create a singular entity that one can call an identity, spirit,
or ethos—or “soul”—for an entire city. However, although cities may not have
spirits or ethea or identities or souls, ideas about particular cities do exist, and
some of these ideas circulate widely and are influential.5
It is clear that, in Morocco, many people, both Moroccans and foreigners,
have believed that cities should have souls but that post-earthquake Agadir does
not. This is due both to the particular ways in which the seismic event of 1960
reshaped the built environment in Agadir and to the cultural history of colonialism in Morocco. In neither Orléansville nor Fréjus did the destruction wrought
by the catastrophes of the decolonization era become so directly associated with
an imagined annihilation of cultural heritage and identity. The enduring contours of disaster extend into many aspects of human history, but disasters (and
decolonizations) do not all take the same shape. It was in Agadir that disaster
most dramatically transformed the cultural and architectural shape of decolonization and of local and national debates about identity and the legacy of colonialism. In part, this was because the earthquake in Agadir destroyed the old,
precolonial Saadian Kasbah (misidentified by Mas as Portuguese). Following
the disaster, the Kasbah district, Agadir Oufella, would be left in ruins, while
urban planners rebuilt the city according to the precepts of the mid-century
modernism of Le Corbusier. However, the anxiety brought about by this dramatic change in the built environment was a product of the particularities of
French colonial policy and ideology in Morocco and of the post-independence
monarchy’s shifting approach to discourses of modernity and tradition.
In contrast to Agadir, Fréjus’s disaster and the architecture and urban design
of the town’s reconstruction have not been central to debates about the town’s
cultural identity. Today, Fréjus’s museums and histories mourn the disaster,
while celebrating the city’s heritage of Roman and French military and colonial
history. But the Malpasset disaster did not seem to separate Fréjus from its past:
the floodwaters bypassed the old medieval city center, thanks to the slight elevation of the hill on which it stood. Though the ancient Roman arena was not
spared, it was reconstructed, and remains a major site both for tourism and civic
events. Anxiety about ethnic boundaries shaped the immediate response to the
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disaster, and the history of the 1959 dam collapse provides important clues to
the deeper roots of Fréjus’s later political turmoil (as discussed in Chapter 3).
However, the causes of civic anxiety in Fréjus in later decades have not been
associated with the flood of 1959.
Nor did the 1954 earthquake in Algeria generate the sort of discourse of cultural anomie that developed concerning Agadir. The Chélif Valley disaster did
not bring about so dramatic and distinctive a transformation of urban space in
Orléansville, renamed El Asnam in 1962 and Chlef in 1980. In contrast to Agadir, the rebuilt Orléansville did not become a symbol of independent Algeria: it
had been the French who had built Orléansville, and the French who rebuilt it,
for the city’s reconstruction was largely complete by the advent of independence
in 1962.6 As was the case elsewhere in Algeria, Orléansville’s pre-earthquake
architecture was already influenced by the “structural classicism” of Auguste
Perret and to a lesser extent, Le Corbusier’s functional modernism.7 As Aleth
Picard has explained, post-earthquake urban planners transformed the city less
than they would have liked: the narrowness of the city’s streets contrasted with
the desire, among planners and architects, for more light and space, but in much
of the city the existing street grid was partially maintained, largely because numerous buildings remained usable. Chief architect Jean Bossu envisioned an
architecturally cohesive “red city,” distinctive among Algerian cities, but due to
the very rapid pace of reconstruction and the existence of neighborhood associations of property owners who hired their own architects, guidelines for reconstruction were not consistently followed. With the exception of individual
districts and buildings designed by Bossu (the Saint-Réparatus Quarter) and
by Jean de Maisonseul, an admirer of Le Corbusier, the city that resulted was
unremarkable from an architectural standpoint.8 In this respect, Orléansville
was quite typical among Algerian cities: the Constantine Plan’s emphasis on a
massive expansion of affordable housing and heavy industry had made aesthetics
a low priority, and reconstruction was dominated by the directives of administrators and engineers, a pattern that would continue under the Algerian state
after independence.9 Tragically, however, in the frenzy of construction the new
seismic building codes enacted in 1954 were inconsistently applied, leading to
the new catastrophe of 1980.10 After the 1980 earthquake, there were recriminations about the state’s failure to implement the anti-seismic building code
developed in response to the 1954 quake, but not about the city’s urban plan
or architectural style. Although in the 1990s, architects in Algeria, like those
in Morocco, sought to connect architecture with Arab and national identity,
Orléansville did not become a focal point of such concerns.11 Like cities, streets,
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and other places across Algeria, Orléansville got a new name after independence,
but as an architectural representation of Algerian national identity, El Asnam
after 1962 had neither more nor less to offer than did Orléansville before 1954.
The inhabitants of the city mourned the loss of spaces in which they had lived,
but Orléansville’s built environment had contained little that would allow its
destruction to be portrayed as a loss of Muslim Algerian national heritage.
In Morocco, it was not just the historical accident of the seismic destruction
of Agadir’s Kasbah that made the 1960 earthquake central to discourses about
decolonization and Moroccan identity. Morocco had a particular colonial history of the idea of an âme, or soul, as a desirable characteristic of Moroccans, tied
to culture and implying “something deep, basic, abiding, and foundational.”12
French administrators in protectorate Morocco, terrified that colonial subjects
might demand the rights of Frenchmen, as Ferhat Abbas had initially done in
Algeria or as Blaise Diagne had done in Senegal, despised earlier colonial policies promoting assimilationism. Consequently, French cultural policy in Morocco sought to define what Moroccan culture was, and to control and preserve
that culture, lest dangerous French notions of individualism and democracy
corrupt the Moroccan population and subvert the protectorate arrangement,
under which the population was ruled by “traditional” Moroccan elites who had
become vassals to the French. Moroccan culture, although studied by French
colonial scholars in minute, pluralistic detail, was reduced by administrators to
a unitary and homogenous Moroccan “soul” or “psyche.” In the French schools
of protectorate Morocco, the curriculum was intended to ensure that students
understood the value of preserving their Moroccanness.13 Meanwhile, as will be
discussed below, French urban planners of the early protectorate era attempted
to ensure that the growing French presence in Morocco did not corrupt the
Moroccan character of the kingdom’s cities. More recent discourses asserting
that post-earthquake Agadir was “a city without a soul” must be understood in
relation to this protectorate-era fetishization of precolonial Moroccan culture.
The persistence of the idea that Agadir has no soul reflects the enduring legacy
of French colonial policies and discourses linking culture, urban planning, and
tradition.
The post-earthquake transformation of Agadir’s built environment and the
legacy of cultural policy in Morocco interacted to shape the local implications
of international debates about urban planning, infusing technical discussions
of urban development with political and cultural meaning. Criticisms of modernist urban planning and architecture are not unique to Morocco, of course.
Worldwide, such criticisms have been widespread and intense. One popular
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British writer, Theodore Dalrymple, has recently compared Le Corbusier, who
was greatly admired by Agadir’s urban planners, to Pol Pot, arguing, “Le Corbusier was to architecture what Pol Pot was to social reform. . . . Like Pol Pot,
he wanted to start from Year Zero: before me, nothing; after me, everything.”14
With less hyperbole, the Belgian architect Jean Dethier argued in 1973 that the
division of reconstructed Agadir into functional quarters “atomized” the urban
environment, separating it into disconnected sections, with the result that the
post-quake city was too spread out and insufficiently dense. According to Dethier, “this fragmentation [éclatement] of the modern city, established in all
good faith in the name of hygiene, space, and circulation, annihilates in large
measure the sentiment of the city, of community and animation.” 15 Modernist
urban planning principles emphasizing the importance of open spaces and the
functional differentiation of city sections had created “a series of yawning, solemn spaces, and abstract and imperative zones.”16 In Dethier’s view, these open
spaces and functionally-defined zones (“imperative” in the sense that they commandingly ordered city life) interfered with the activities of city residents. Such

146

chapter 6

critiques were not unique to the realm of francophone urban planning. Both
Dalrymple’s denunciation of Le Corbusier and Dethier’s more measured critique
of the new Agadir resemble twentieth-century critiques of Robert Moses’s urbanism in New York. Jane Jacobs, in opposition to Moses, argued that successful
city life requires not dogmatic planning but a “jumping, joyous urban jumble”
of mixed-use neighborhoods and spontaneous, organic growth, rooted in local
history.17 Dethier and Jacobs’s visions of urban life contrasted sharply not only
with Moses’s work but also with the dominant principles in postwar French
urban planning, which, as historian Paul Rabinow has noted, were based on “a
total rejection of the organic city, which was composed, it was held, of unhealthy,
inefficient, and uncontrollable accidents of history.”18 In Agadir, however, much
of the “organic” city had been destroyed by another accident of history, setting
the scene for a collision between the modernist desire to reshape urban life and a
colonial legacy emphasizing architectural tradition as central to the preservation
of Moroccan identity.
Like other developing cities, reconstructed Agadir presented many challenges
to be addressed by urban planners and policymakers. Investment in tourism
in later years, funded by Moroccans from outside of Agadir, focused on the
speculative construction of hotels, not on the “animation” needed to appease
the tourist’s nagging hunger for Moroccan authenticity. As Thierry Nadau has
argued, such animation was also rendered difficult by the fragmented, functionally divided layout of the city, which failed to provide a central street to draw
Gadiris and tourists together for events.19 Students at the National School of
Architecture identified problems such as a lack of urban density, economic vitality, and activities for tourists, problems they hoped would be solved by a new
generation of urban planners through technical means such as improvements in
transportation. However, these students consistently framed such problems in
terms of Agadir’s alleged soullessness.20
Like so much else related to the disasters of the mid-twentieth century, criticisms of post-disaster Agadir were closely related to the process of decolonization. Moroccan independence in 1956 did not mean that the legacy of French
colonialism had vanished, or that French cultural or economic hegemony had
evaporated overnight. The city’s role as a vacation destination for European
tourists grew, and for decades Agadir lost, to the nearby towns of Inezgane and
Aït Melloul, much of the city’s former role as a trade junction and depot for
agricultural goods arriving from the interior.21 The city remained economically
dependent on Europe, and the most desirable spaces in Agadir became dominated by European visitors. Even commentators sympathetic to the new Agadir
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acknowledged that zoning according to the principle of functional division
meant that a disproportionate share of the city’s natural assets—access to the
beach, views of the mountains—were “monopolized” by the tourist district and
tended to produce a “fragmentation” that was not even unambiguously good for
the tourism industry, since it tended to keep tourists “parked in their hotels,”
gazing at the sea rather than frequenting the town.22
More fundamentally, Agadir’s landscape became a field of struggle over
what a truly decolonized Moroccan city might be. Criticism of the new Agadir became intertwined with “an increasing search for national identity,” and
the reconstructed city’s modernist architecture was frequently portrayed as European rather than Moroccan in character.23 For Dethier, Agadir’s urban plan
constituted a form of cultural imperialism masquerading as the application of
universal norms. At a conference in Agadir in 1994, scholar Mohammed Charef
expanded on Dethier’s denunciation of neo-imperialism in Agadir. For Charef,
Agadir was “a city orphaned of its past and its memory, reconstructed by adopting the image of the Occident, in style as in organization.” Charef argued that
the consequences of a disregard for tradition and heritage produced not only a
lack of urban vitality but psychological suffering, a direct consequence of the
imposition of the vision of Agadir’s urban planners, whom Charef depicted as
alien: “The inhabitants find themselves with difficulty within this mechanistic
conception; they feel lost, crushed, and would have certainly imagined a different city conforming to their culture, if one had asked their opinion.”24 Like Dethier, Charef connected Agadir’s soullessness to its modernist use of space and
to the crushing cultural violence of a neo-imperialist universalism. This was by
no means a dissident perspective in the 1990s. Echoing Charef ’s metaphor, the
director of the kingdom’s state architectural service, Saïd Mouline, argued that
neglect of architecture’s connection to patrimony would “condemn citizens to
become orphans, amnesiacs, excluded and under-developed.”25
If we rephrase Bell and de-Shalit’s terms simply as “the idea of a city,” then
clearly a strong idea about Agadir developed in the decades after the earthquake.
If Paris, as they state, is defined as the “City of Romance,” Jerusalem as the “City
of Religion,” and Montreal as the “City of Language(s),” then Agadir became
known as the “City without a Soul.” Bell and de-Shalit note that ideas about
cities often develop in contrast to other cities (Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, Montreal
to Toronto.)26 As historian Moshe Gershovich has pointed out, the critique of
Agadir as soulless is predicated on a contrast with other Moroccan cities, such as
Marrakech and Fes, where the old city, or medina, has been preserved as a folkloric embodiment of Morocco’s cultural heritage.27 In comparison, one might
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note that Fréjus is no Paris—but no one expects it to be. Agadir, on the other
hand, is implicitly faulted for not being Marrakech, or at least Essaouira.
In Agadir, the discourse of “city without a soul” has not been universally
accepted, but it has been impossible to ignore. Professor Mohamed Ben Attou, a
geographer at the University Ibn Zohr in Agadir, has found it necessary to argue
that today’s Agadir is neither a straightforward manifestation of the vision of
the city planners, “nor a city without a soul,” but is developing, as all cities do,
as a response to economics, demography, and the dynamic interactions between
actors in the urban environment.28 In an interview published in 2011 in the Moroccan newspaper Libération, M’bark Chbani asked the following of Agadir
city councilman Mohammed Bajalat: “Some say that Agadir is a city without a
history, without a soul: do you agree?” Bajalat, president and founding member
of Forum Izorane, an organization devoted to promoting civic memory and civic
pride in Agadir, responded unequivocally. Bajalat answered that the “without
a soul” trope
is revolting . . . above all, in the obstinate desire to transpose the model of
the imperial cities [Rabat, Marrakech, Fes] to Agadir. Finally, by what logic
can we reduce a collective past to buildings? Certainly, the earthquake destroyed many of the buildings and their occupants, but not the memory of
the city.29
For both Bajalat and Ben Attou, the idea of Agadir’s soullessness is a misleading myth that needs to be countered. For Ben Attou, this is to be accomplished
not only by means of academic rigor in the study of the actual city but through
“the memory of each of its citizens” and through “a considerable effort to be
deployed in order to share this collective memory.”30 Toward this end, Bajalat
has taken a leading role in organizing his fellow Gadiris to preserve the memories of pre-earthquake Agadir through commemoration, while also celebrating
Agadir’s modernity. This approach has been endorsed by Ahmed Bouskous, an
earthquake survivor who had become the rector of the Royal Institute of Amazigh [Berber] Culture. For Bouskous, the “soul of a city” was a work in progress: “to give a city a soul is the responsibility of local decision makers, and of
the Gadiri population.” At the same time, however, the task, for Bouskous, was
to preserve the memory and heritage of Agadir through “culture, song, poetry,
cinema, theater, visual arts” and especially through Amazigh culture.31 Bouskous’s approach to the question was not unlike the argument made against the
“without out a soul” trope by Péré in 1967: Agadir’s soul, “whatever the shape
of its walls” is rooted in “its location in the far south of Morocco, in its climate,
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and its people, essentially Chleuh [Tashelhit-speaking Amazigh].”32 Bouskous
and Péré would perhaps agree with Amazigh activists for whom the statement
that Agadir has no soul is tantamount to a denial that Berbers have culture. For
advocates of Amazigh culture, there is an alternate idea of Agadir: “Capital of
the Berber South.”33
Tariq Kabbage (introduced in Chapter 5), who became the mayor of Agadir,
has taken a different approach. “What is this soul of a city?” asks Kabbage; “We
could philosophize about this until tomorrow morning.” The more pertinent
questions, for Kabbage, were whether the inhabitants of the city felt comfortable in relation to the place where they live, and “whether this brings them a
certain amount of pleasure, of joy.” “You know,” argues Kabbage, “when you
lead a life of suffering, soul or no soul, that is not the question.” 34 Kabbage had
little interest in the question of whether his city had a soul; his city had people,
and it was their well-being that he cared about. Yet, as Bajalat and Bouskous
recognize, a sense of civic memory and attachment to a positive idea of a city
(Bell and de-Shalit’s “civicism”) helps to promote the sense of well-being desired
by Kabbage. Conversely, the widespread claim that Agadir is a “city without a
soul,” if not demonstrably deleterious to urban life, has at least been a source of
anxiety for some inhabitants of the city.

Agadir Before 1960
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Agadir had been a strategic fortress
and trading post of importance to the Portuguese, Saadians, and Dutch and an
outlet for the caravan trade from the Sahara and the sugar production of the
Souss Valley. The Portuguese had built an outpost, the fortress of Santa Cruz,
near the beach in an area later called Founti. After defeating the Portuguese and
destroying Santa Cruz in 1451, the Saadians constructed a larger fortress on Agadir Oufella, the mountain overlooking the bay. The Saadians also constructed a
port, and Agadir became a vital link in the sugar trade of southern Morocco.35
By the eighteenth century, however, the city’s fortunes had declined. Agadir was
struck by a severe earthquake in 1731, with reportedly total destruction, but soon
recovered. As in the Saadian period, Agadir remained a key connection point
between the southern caravan routes, the imperial capital at Marrakesh, and
the European trade—and for this reason, was fought over in local power struggles. This changed, however, when Alaouite Sultan Mohammed ibn Abd-Allah opened a new southern port at Mogador (Essaouira) in 1774. Finding the
Souss Valley’s elites rebellious and Agadir dangerously far from Marrakesh, the
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sultan closed the port of Agadir. According to some accounts, the punishment
of the rebellious Souss was a major reason for the construction of Mogador in
the first place.36
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Agadir was little more than a fishing village.37 Then, however, Western interests began to extend southward into
the Souss Valley. The revelation that the Souss region contained iron ore made
Agadir a place of interest to Europeans for the first time since 1774. While the
struggle for the Sultan’s throne in Fes was at the center of international conflict
over Morocco in 1911, competition among French and German prospectors in
the south provided the pretext for the arrival of the German gunboat Panther.
After German objections to a French takeover of Morocco were alleviated by the
cession of a sliver of French Equatorial Africa to Germany, the French arrived
in Agadir in force.38
French-ruled Agadir, unlike Moroccan cities such as Rabat, Casablanca, or
Fez, exhibited only a superficial imprint of the French colonial philosophy of the
1910s and 1920s promoted by Morocco’s first French resident-general, Hubert
Lyautey, and his chief urban planner, Henri Prost. As a young officer stationed in
Algeria, Lyautey had fetishized Arab culture, and disdained the French impact
on Algerian society. He was disgusted by the French-built cities and towns he
encountered there, with their rationalist regularity and lack of any noticeably
Arab or African character, beyond “shoddy goods and pastiche.”39 To this rootlessness, Lyautey contrasted the harmony of Mediterranean cities such as Rome
and Naples, with architecture “well adapted to the local climate and mentality.”40
As resident-general of Morocco, Lyautey hoped that urban planning would be a
remedy to the two things he hated most: French republican universalism on the
one hand, and cultural hybridization on the other.41 The result was the creation
of new European districts separated from the Moroccan city centers, or medinas, by greenspaces, or cordons sanitaires, to minimize cultural contamination.
Lyautey instructed his underlings to “Touch the indigenous cities as little as
possible. . . . Instead, improve their surroundings where, on the vast terrain that
is still free, the European city rises, following a plan that realizes the most modern conceptions of large boulevards, water and electrical supplies, squares and
gardens, buses and tramways, and also foresees future extensions.”42 For Janet
Abu-Lughod, Lyautist urbanism amounted to a system of “cultural and religious
apartheid” based on “minimum alteration in the Moroccan quarters. . . . the
creation of a cordon sanitaire around these native reservations with a greenbelt
of open land; and the design and construction of the most modern, efficient,
elegant cities that Europe could produce.”43 Although his effort to prevent the
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mingling of people and cultures was unsuccessful, Lyautey’s vision had a profound impact on the development of Moroccan cities such as Rabat, Marrakech,
and Fes.44
Far to the south, however, Agadir’s growth into a medium-sized city did not
begin until the late 1920s. By this time, the influence of Lyautey and Prost was
waning in a new, settler-dominated Morocco. As commerce grew at the new
French-built port, the mainly Tashlehit-speaking Moroccan population almost
tripled, from an estimated 700 to approximately 2,000 in 1930, while the European population grew to 1,650.45 Rampant land speculation led to the declaration of an official urban development plan in 1932.46 The 1932 plan, in Lyautist
fashion, called for a new European “Ville Nouvelle,” separated spatially from
the two historic Moroccan quarters: the towering heights of the Kasbah, and
the fishing hamlet Founti adjacent to the beach below. The slopes of the Kasbah
provided a sort of natural cordon sanitaire, as did two riverbeds east of the Kasbah: the Wadi Tildi, which separated the Talborj and administrative plateaus
from the Ville Nouvelle, and the Wadi Tanaout, separating the Ville Nouvelle
from the industrial quarter.47
On the Talborj plateau, however, geography and events were already producing a spatially separated commercial-residential center which attracted both
Europeans and Moroccans. This district, not the Ville Nouvelle, became the
heart of the city. As the Moroccan population had grown in the overcrowded
Kasbah and Founti, which could not expand due to the steepness of the slope
abutting the Kasbah, a new district was constructed, the Talborj. As this became
the center of commerce for the city, the Moroccan inhabitants—Berber-and
Arabic-speaking Muslims and Jews—were soon joined by Europeans. In cities
such as Rabat and Casablanca residential segregation eventually broke down as
affluent Moroccans moved into the Ville Nouvelle, while drought and colonial
land policy emptied the rural areas into new peripheral neighborhoods beyond
the initial dyad of old medina and Ville Nouvelle. In Agadir, in contrast, it was
the Ville Nouvelle that became peripheral, while the ethnically mixed Talborj
became the center of urban life.48
After 1945, a new commercial boom occurred, based on the export of citrus,
canned fish, and minerals. During the postwar economic recovery, construction blossomed in both the Talbordj and the Ville Nouvelle. By the early 1950s,
the total population grew to around forty thousand, including close to fifteen
thousand Europeans. The tourist industry also began to develop, as new hotels
were constructed and the International Federation of Travel Agencies promoted
Agadir as the “Moroccan Nice,” “Pearl of the South,” and “city of three hundred
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days of sunshine.”49 Boom, however, was followed by bust. Crises in agriculture
and in the cannery business between 1955 and 1958 converged with political crisis, as Moroccan independence provoked an exodus of Europeans. In Agadir, the
European population dropped to 4,700 by 1959. Only the small tourist industry
seemed to be thriving: the city’s 200 first-class rooms and 60 second-class rooms
were, reportedly, fully booked when the earthquake struck.50 Over-construction
of both buildings and roads gave observers the sense of a half-empty city: “one
sees there a network of roads, often unnecessary, delimiting numerous vacant
lots, interspersed with a small number of buildings.”51 To Pierre Mas, planner
of the new Agadir, pre-earthquake Agadir was “inorganic, dissolute, a city with
neither a center nor coherence.”52 This critique would have discursive staying
power, and would be echoed in the critiques of the new, post-earthquake Agadir as well.
The postwar years had seen the rise of new approach to the use of urban
planning to shape society. After Prost had departed Morocco in 1923, and Lyautey in 1925, the interests of speculators and settlers had weakened the role of
statist urban planning throughout Morocco. However, it was the rise and fall
of Vichy that thoroughly discredited Lyautey’s culturalism. In urban planning
as in colonial education, French colonial policy returned to the universalism
that Lyautey had rejected. In 1944, the Office of European Habitat took on the
task of housing the Moroccan population and dropped the word “European”
from its name. Two years later, in 1946, Michel Ecochard was appointed to head
urban planning in Morocco; Ecochard created the Service of Urbanism in 1949,
which was placed within the department of Public Works. Ecochard’s modernism, modeled on the principles of Le Corbusier, signaled a sharp break from
Lyautey’s approach. 53 Urban planning thus became divorced from the study
of particular cultures. Rabinow describes Ecochard’s approach as the “neglect,
which bordered on contempt, of economic and political considerations” and as
a “refusal to acknowledge local practices.” Under Ecochard, the protectorate
undertook a massive but belated effort to cope with the demographic growth of
Morocco’s urban populations, striving to offer the trâme Ecochard to the masses:
a sixteen-by-eight-meter living space endowed with access to light, air, and space.
“Culture” was no longer part of the equation.54

The Impact of the Earthquake
It has often been said that there is no such thing as a natural disaster. Despite the
extent of the destruction in Agadir, the earthquake had an estimated magnitude
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of only 5.75 on the Richter scale, as measured on seismographs in Casablanca
and in Europe. Seismologists blamed the high death toll on the location of the
epicenter near the earth’s surface and near population centers. Engineers blamed
the prevalence of unreinforced masonry and the use of improper techniques in
constructing buildings of steel-reinforced concrete.55
However, the growth of Agadir since the 1930s and especially during the postwar economic boom also amplified the destruction and lethality of the earthquake, as the Kasbah population grew and, in the postwar Talborj, buildings were
hastily expanded upward with additions of second and third stories made of unreinforced concrete.56 The lethality was not evenly distributed; the much higher
survival rate of the European population was directly related to their economic
domination in modern Morocco, which allowed many to live in the more expensive Ville Nouvelle, where a third of the buildings withstood the quake in reparable condition, while the Kasbah and Talborj were almost entirely destroyed. It
should be noted, however, that Europeans residing in the devastated Talborj (adjacent to the “administrative plateau”), fared worse than Moroccan workers living
in the eastern industrial quarter, which avoided much damage, due to greater
distance from the epicenter, less multistory housing, and many corrugated-metal
buildings.57 Had the Lyautist model prevailed in Agadir, the discrepancy between
European and Moroccan survival rates would have been greater.
After the earthquake, there was a powerful modernist consensus about the
goals for reconstruction among those elites who were able to give public voice
to their visions. Foreign seismologists and engineers advised that a new, better Agadir should be built of steel-reinforced concrete in the area occupied by
the Ville Nouvelle and the eastern industrial district. As Daniel Williford has
pointed out, this meant closing the book on traditional Moroccan architecture,
on affordable, low-cost construction methods, and on the entire sections of the
old city where the Kasbah, Talborj, and Founti had once housed the majority
of the Moroccan population.58 King Mohammed V endorsed this vision and
sought an ambitious urban plan to create a new city that would be an “expression of modern Morocco.”59 Al-Istiqlal called for the construction of “not only
a new Agadir, but also, and above all, a new Morocco.”60 Rebuilding Agadir was
not just about housing the survivors, mitigating risk, or restoring the port as an
outlet for the agricultural produce of the Moroccan south: the city’s recovery was
to be a model for the future of the nation as a whole. One of the earliest enunciations of the idea that the Agadir disaster had created a unique opportunity
(a common response to modern earthquakes) was found in a report by a West
German technical assistance team, which concluded with the declaration that
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the unique possibility offered by the reconstruction of the new Agadir
should be fully utilized. . . . Decisions concerning the reconstruction of
the city, and the plans, should of course be governed by the general welfare
of the city, without any consideration for certain private interests. This is
the only way to build a new modern Agadir. Certain mistakes made in the
past could be avoided, and the city could become an example of a modern
progressive Morocco.61
The disregard for private interests embodied in this transnational modernist
response provided an opportunity for a Moroccan monarchy interested in consolidating its power over the country. This was not at all unprecedented: ambitious urban planning had long been linked to authoritarian rule, and disasters
have often provided opportunities for authoritarian modernism. The destruction and reconstruction of Lisbon in the eighteenth century had provided the
opportunity for the rise of Carvalho’s absolutism in Portugal. In 1830s France,
cholera epidemics had spurred some intellectuals to advocate “the equivalent of
a technician’s coup d’état, arguing that only a planned and hierarchically coordinated effort was adequate to the crisis. Engineers could save France, but only if
far-reaching changes in private property were undertaken.”62 In contrast, grand
urban schemes after the London Fire of 1666 and the San Francisco earthquake
of 1906 had been stymied by the assertions of property rights by the bourgeoisie.63 Hassan would not allow this to happen in Agadir, and initiated a vast project of property expropriation and state regulation of reconstruction.
For Hassan, the architecture and urban design of Agadir was “the expression,
in stone and in space, of the aspirations of the national macrocosm” 64 Just as
Mohammed V in 1960 had made the monarchy the center of Moroccan humanitarian responses to the earthquake, in 1966, King Hassan II linked the
modernist reconstruction of Agadir to the unity of the Moroccan nation and
the nation’s embodiment in the person of the king. As Hassan declared, the goal
of reconstruction was
Not to simply restore the old, the replaceable, but to make a new work,
alive, essentially opening on the future; to give men back reasons to live
and to hope, it is necessary that these reasons merit the confidence of the
dispossessed and that they are thus guaranties, sanctioned by the King and
by the People as a whole, in short, that the reconstruction of Agadir be
conceived as a work [that is] above all, national.
And in fact Agadir was constantly for the entire country the site of a
magnificent élan of solidarity, of abnegation, of union. All the nation felt
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involved, challenged, all the nation, under the firm and lucid guidance, the
example of our regretted father, His Majesty Mohammed V, then with We
Ourselves, mobilized its means, its intelligence, its heart.65
The young king’s embrace of modern planners’ ability to build a new future
without regard for the past seemed to be absolute, as he described the new Agadir as “a total city, virtually a dream city, rethought in entirety, remade by man
for man, by the Moroccan for the Moroccans and Morocco.” This vision of the
new city was tied to a forward-looking vision for the nation as a whole: “The
reconstruction of Agadir becomes as the symbol and the concrete projection of
what the country wants to be, faced with any problem in the national life: the
deliberate and total union of all for a better life for all and for each.” 66 In this
vision, the choices of individuals counted for little; the unity of the whole, under
the authority of the king, counted for everything.
This approach was enthusiastically endorsed by planners such as Mourad
Ben Embarek at the Moroccan Service of Urbanism. Morocco’s urbanists thus
joined a long line of planners, from Carvalho’s chief engineer Manuel de Maia to
Lyautey’s Henri Prost, who found their work made easier by an autocratic state
that removed the obstacle of local community resistance to a central vision.67
This symbiosis was evident in Agadir. The link between state power and city
planning was made explicit by the editors of the Moroccan architectural journal
A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme who declared, reflecting
on the reconstruction of Agadir, that “more and more, urbanism should affirm
itself as a means of governing.”68 For Mourad Ben Embarek, urban design and
state control went hand-in-hand in a tourist city: “user comfort” was paramount,
views of the sky and the sea had to be preserved, and “commercial and speculative considerations cannot and should not affect this concept.” Unregulated
building would lead to overly dense construction, ruining the city’s aesthetic
potential and creating “regrettable chaos.”69 For Ben Embarek, one only needed
to look north across the Mediterranean to Spain to see a coastline that had been
“ravaged” by a lack of regulation.70 For the monarchy, Agadir was important
because of its historic role as a crucial outpost for the assertion of northern Moroccan power over the south, a role it would reprise in the 1975 Green March.
After the earthquake, however, it also served as an opportune laboratory for the
assertion of royal power.
And autocracy could be efficient. Even Jean Dethier, who condemned the authoritarianism of the planning process, was compelled to acknowledge that in its
efficiency, Agadir was “an extraordinary success. . . . Regarding the financial level . . .
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it was a tour de force. On the technical level also: 5 years after the earthquake, the
new city was more than 75% constructed.”71 In lieu of a voluntary fundraising
drive like those that had funded disaster relief in Orléansville and Fréjus, the
state imposed a mandatory National Solidarity tax. To prevent uncontrolled
reconstruction both inside and outside of the zone determined to be safe for reconstruction (mostly the area of the old Ville Nouvelle and industrial zone), the
state expropriated as many as one thousand parcels of private property, covering
400 hectares. In compensation, property owners were allowed to choose lots of
equivalent size defined in the new urban plan. While the government provided
grants (up to 50 percent) and loans subsidizing reconstruction costs, property
owners had to submit detailed plans to the office of the High Commissariat
for Reconstruction. Once an edifice was completed, the High Commissariat
for Reconstruction also had to give approval before the new building could be
inhabited. These measures aimed to ensure that both seismic and architectural
standards were met.72 Daniel Williford notes that the losers in the expropriation
process included poorer Gadiris who lacked legal title to their homes.73 However,
the process also excluded the land speculators who had purchased land in the
Ville Nouvelle during the postwar period and who had not built on their property. These absentee owners of empty lots, largely French, were ineligible for
State subsidies for reconstruction, and properties considered abandoned were
confiscated. The French consulate protested initially, but then relented.74 The
earthquake thus permitted another significant step in the process of decolonization, with the redistribution of French-owned land to Moroccans, under the
firm control of the Moroccan state.
The centralized power of the Moroccan state in 1960 was, however, a legacy
of colonial authoritarianism. Laws enacted in 1914 under French direction had
precisely regulated not only the “the width of streets, the alignment of buildings,
the height and construction of buildings,” but also architectural style.75 Titles to
land dispensed by the state in Meknes, Fes, and Marrakesh came with the condition that construction ensue according to the urban plan. As in post-earthquake
Agadir, there were to be no lots left vacant by speculators. The new protectorate
in 1914 had also pioneered legislation “permitting expropriation by zones,” rather
than by specific lot or building, with zoning based on function.76 Like the colonial state under Lyautey, under which all proposals for new construction in the
Moroccan medinas were regulated by the Service des Antiquités, Beaux-Arts, et
Monuments Historiques, and in the European districts by the Service d’Architecture et des Plans des Villes, the Moroccan state ensured that private as well as
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public construction would accord with the official vision of the state’s urban planners and architects.77 Now, however, that vision was something quite different.

Designing the New Agadir
Due to efforts to “Moroccanize” the newly independent Moroccan state, the
Service of Urbanism was directed by Abdesalem Faraoui until 1961, and then
by Mourad Ben Embarek.78 According to historian Thierry Nadau, who interviewed the principal planners and architects, however, there was no discernible
dichotomy between the service’s French and Moroccan professionals in terms
of their approach to urbanism. Faroui and Ben Embarek were “little influenced
by traditional architecture, [and were] even hostile to the medinas in which
they had grown up.”79 Having received their professional training in postwar
France,80 they had imbibed little of the Lyautist anti-assimilationism that had
been promoted in the pre-1945 schools of the protectorate and that had been
embraced by much nationalist discourse. Under the leadership of Faraoui and
Ben Embarek, the core of the team consisted of the urban planner Pierre Mas
and the landscape architect Jean Challet, who would become the primary designers of the new Agadir; together, they would lead a group of European and
Moroccan architects to design state-owned buildings in modernist style, and to
set the guidelines imposed on private builders.81
The new Agadir, as designed by these French and Moroccan urbanists, reflected the prevailing modernist ideas of the postwar era, ideas which diverged
from the principles of cultural preservation and segregation that had dominated
urbanism and architecture in Morocco under Lyautey and Prost, in favor of the
functionalist, universalist modernism of Ecochard and Le Corbusier.82 Mas and
Challet aimed to preserve the city’s natural assets—most notably sunlight and
the bay— but had little interest in preserving the Agadir of the past.83 They
focused on adapting their designs to the natural environment rather than to
Moroccan culture; architecture and urbanism were viewed in reference to the
relation between universal man (an idea Lyautey had despised) and nature.84 Architects designing individual buildings such as the new modernist city hall drew
loose inspiration from the architectural traditions of southern Morocco, but this
Moroccan-inspired modernism was a far cry from Lyautey’s efforts to preserve
the traditional medina. Moreover, the urban planners, according to Mas, aimed
to “link the quarters by means of constructed elements, creating a sense of urban
unity and avoiding all social segregation.”85 This was the antithesis of Lyautism.
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The new shape of the city was conditioned by tectonic as well as ideological
shifts. The earthquake had destroyed the “traditional” Kasbah. It would not
be rebuilt, both because seismologists had advised against rebuilding northwest
of the Wadi Tildi, and because Lyautey’s fetishization of Moroccan tradition
was no longer in vogue among Francophone urbanists. It could be argued that,
by 1960, Lyautism had been rendered irrelevant by structural and demographic
changes in Moroccan cities in general and earthquake-ravaged Agadir in particular. The disaster had greatly accelerated the shrinking of the European population, a process begun by political independence and economic crisis. Tectonics
had destroyed the old city; demography meant that the new city was intended for
Moroccans. What place was there for the Lyautey legacy of cultural separation
and modernism-for-Europeans if the old medina was gone and the Europeans
were leaving? Yet demography and tectonics did not in themselves determine
Agadir’s fate: as Rabinow has noted, it was the culture of postwar urbanism that
led the new city’s designers to treat Agadir’s residents as cultureless universal
inhabitants of a theoretical modern world.86
Seismic considerations tempered the ambitions of the modernists: unlike much of housing development in Morocco since 1947, there would be no
high-rises.87 In other respects, however, the planners undertook to reshape the
natural environment. A new urban unity, hitherto made impossible by geography, was to be achieved by eliminating the division created by the ravine of the
Wadi Tanaout: the ravine was filled in with debris from collapsed buildings, and
an aqueduct was constructed with reinforced concrete to handle the water flow.
According to Mas, “This operation permitted the unification of the site of the
new city, making disappear a geological accident troublesome for its development.”88 The Wadi Tildi became the new western boundary of the reconstructed
city; beyond, lay the bulldozed wasteland of the old Talborj and the ruins of the
Kasbah. As in Bartholomew’s American plan (discussed in Chapter 5), a tourist
district east of the port directly abutted the beach. This tourist area’s hotels
would largely house Europeans, but no cordon sanitaire would divide it from the
Moroccan city. Instead, as Bartholomew had proposed, it would be immediately
adjacent to the city center’s commercial-administrative district, just inland to
the north; a pedestrian walkway over the filled-in Tanaout ravine was to facilitate movement between the functionally distinct zones.89
Another aspect of the Service de l’Urbanisme’s final plan was the idea of creating a “new Talborj,” which, according to Mas, “posed the most delicate problems.”90 The forty-five hectare quarter was to house ten thousand to twelve thousand people, and to be the site of “traditional commerce.” It would be served by
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two schools, a market, parks, sports fields, and a cinema. Here, in Mas’s words,
he and his fellow planners attempted “to recreate, within islands, by means of a
network of narrow pedestrian paths, the ambiance and scale of traditional medinas.”91 Each lot had access to a road for motor vehicles as well as medina-style
footpaths.92 The idea of a modernist medina provided a solution to a practical
problem. Because of the high population density of the old Talborj, each household could claim only a small indemnity from the state for their property loss, although a minimum compensation level was set at 6,000 dirhams per household,
to allow minimum standards to be met. Consequently, reconstruction for these
families had to be extremely modest. The New Talborj was designed to bring the
population of this vital commercial district back together, on a scale they could
afford and which would fit the designers’ conceptions of urban order.93 But there
would be no cordon sanitaire here, either: the Talborj was immediately adjacent
to the “modern” commercial and administrative sector.
This was not Lyautey’s vision of the Moroccan city. In the New Talborj, there
was a faint echo of the “neo-traditional” design that characterized the new Habous neighborhoods constructed in Casablanca, which had attempted to replicate the “organic image of the traditional media” but with automobile access and
electrical and water infrastructure. In the Lyautist Habous, however, “all symmetry and geometricism were banned.”94 Agadir’s medina-islands, in contrast,
were separated from each other by a regular pattern of main roads, and bore
greater resemblance to the postwar construction projects in Casablanca’s Aïn
Chock and Mohammedia’s new medina, with their “much less literal interpretation” of the traditional medina, and the obvious “modernist influence of cubism
and Bauhaus.”95 The designers of the new Talborj and of public buildings such
as the new town hall may have drawn on Moroccan precedents for ideas, but
this was not Lyautey’s cultural preservationism; it was Corbuserian modernist
planning with some local inspiration. 96
Over time, the tourist district grew beyond its intended boundaries, driven by
European demand and Moroccan investment. As Thierry Nadau has argued, the
growth of the tourist sector engulfed what the planners had envisioned as the
commercial center of the city, which became an area of hotels, restaurants, and
shops for tourists. Moroccans shopped elsewhere, and increasing lived elsewhere,
too. State control of construction prevented an increase in population density
in the planned city, and the new seismic codes made officially sanctioned housing more expensive. Consequently, non-tourist commerce shifted to the southeast, pulled by the growth of residential construction beyond what had been
originally conceived as the industrial zone.97 Consequently, there was no true
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city center, and the New Talborj became just one neighborhood among many,
never attaining the central role in city life played by its predecessor, west of the
Wadi Tildi.98

A Return to Lyautey
Lyautism was not dead, however. In many respects, segments of Moroccan nationalism had long embraced and adapted the Lyautey legacy. The authors of the
1934 Plan de Reforms, arguably the first public articulation of protectorate-era
Moroccan nationalism, had called for a renaissance of Lyautey’s principles, explicitly favoring cultural dualism in education, while denouncing French policies of “two weights and two measures” in the allocation of resources.99 Yet the
nationalist embrace of Lyautey’s culturalism in their denunciations of assimilation had no immediate impact on the policies or urban plans of the Moroccan
and French architects and planners at the Service d’urbanisme, who “continued to follow the principles of Ecochard.”100 The resulting contrast between
Lyautist-nationalist culturalism and the modernist universalism of Morocco’s
city planners lay at the root of emerging critiques of the new Agadir as a “city
without a soul.”
Beginning in the 1970s, the desire to affirm a culturally Moroccan approach
to architecture and to reject Europeanization was expressed by European commentators as well as Moroccans and crossed political boundaries of the Left and
Right. Dethier’s 1973 critique of Agadir went beyond the notion that functionalist divisions of city districts disrupted “community and animation”101 and defined the more fundamental problem as one of neocolonialism. Dethier argued
that urban planners had imposed a Western vision of cities, and he argued for a
new urbanism that would “permit the abolition of systems of mental, economic,
and technical dependence on the rich countries, and favor the development of
new authentic cultures in the Third World.”102 For Dethier, modernist urban
planners, however well-intentioned, practiced “a new paternalism, oppressive
and constraining.”103 Dethier’s argument was paralleled by Abderrafih Lahbabi,
writing in the Moroccan journal Lamalif. Citing Dethier and recognizing that
decolonization was only partial, Lahbabi applied a Gramscian analysis to the
problem. Lahbabi’s hope was that “a new language should gradually replace the
deterioration of the dominant symbolic hierarchy.” This, in his view, should be
the goal of architecture in Morocco. Believing that the working class needed
to ally with other anti-imperialist groups, Lahbabi argued that liberation required not only social and economic emancipation, but “cultural identification.”

The Soul of a City

161

Consequently, Lahbabi denounced the abstract humanism of the Corbusier
school. Moroccan architects needed to engage in “the search for a national architectural identity” as a necessary step in the class struggle.104
On the opposite end of the Moroccan political spectrum, King Hassan II
gave a speech in Marrakech in 1986 addressed to architects that also called for
a connection between architecture and national identity. This speech signaled
an abrupt departure from the modernist ideas of architecture and city planning that Hassan had supported during the reconstruction of Agadir. The 1986
speech had two main elements: the first promoted the notion that architecture
in Morocco should be tied to the maintenance of tradition and Moroccan cultural identity; the second established the monarchy as the guardian of cultural
authenticity in the kingdom. Hassan, who had been a driving force behind the
reconstruction of Agadir, now denounced Moroccan cities that were not recognizably Moroccan. Agadir, its ancient kasbah now nothing more than a field
of ruins atop a hill, clearly no longer fit Hassan’s vision of what a Moroccan
city should be. Without mentioning Agadir, the king lamented that there were
cities in Morocco that, if one viewed them from a helicopter, would not even be
identifiable as Moroccan. Hassan contrasted such cities (‘McCities’ one might
call them) with cities, such as Azzemour, whose historical ramparts and kasbahs
identified them as unmistakably Moroccan. The king declared that new architecture in the kingdom should also “reaffirm our authenticity” and “preserve the
characteristics of our country. . . . We must not renounce our mother, the land
where we were born and where we live.”105 Architects, to prepare for this task,
were advised to visit the kasbahs of the Moroccan south and the Atlas Mountains. To ensure that his new vision of Moroccan architecture should become a
reality, Hassan proposed regulatory oversight of architectural plans for all new
construction in the kingdom. Thus, Hassan extended to the entire kingdom
the royal influence over architectural culture that he had exerted during the
reconstruction of Agadir—but this royal influence was now directed toward
very different ends.
Jennifer Roberson has argued that Hassan II’s transition from his support of
Corbusierian modernism to this emphasis on national cultural authenticity can
be traced to his traditionalist choices in the design of his father’s mausoleum
in 1961, which grew into an effort to promote the “revival” of Moroccan traditional crafts skills in the 1970s. Roberson notes that by attempting to define and
preserve selected aspects of Moroccan tradition, Hassan was following in the
footsteps of Lyautey.106 However, promoting tradition was also part of a broader
project of justifying authoritarian rule: the Alaouite monarch’s authority had to
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be rooted in respect for the past, as a hedge against revolutionary demands for
democracy. The monarchy’s change of position on architecture can be seen as
part of its broader promotion of Islamic and traditionalist notions of Moroccan
identity in response to political threats from the Left embodied in the 1965 student riots in Casablanca.107 In the field of architecture, however, Hassan’s new
approach harmonized with the anti-colonial Left’s call to challenge imperialist
hegemony through an architecture of cultural identity. A new consensus was
emerging that would reinforce the discourse of Agadir’s soullessness.
Calls from leftist intellectuals and the Moroccan king urging architects to
embrace a connection with the past and with national identity were accompanied by a trend in the architectural choices of wealthy Moroccans, who increasingly incorporated traditionalist elements, or “green tile” architecture, in new
construction. The results received mixed reviews. Like Lyautey in prewar Algiers, Lahdabi and others found the results to be inauthentic “pastiche” rather
than a true expression of Moroccan culture.108 As Thierry Nadau put it in 1992,
“The new buildings have nothing to do with the Moroccan. They are the palaces of a Thousand and One Nights.”109 It was not only in Agadir, apparently,
where architecture failed to fulfill the dreams of those who hoped to capture the
essence of the Moroccan “soul.”
In the early 1990s, in the last years of his life, Hassan II sought a solution to
this problem through monumental architecture. The construction of a towering new traditionalist mosque now meant that even Casablanca could pass his
“helicopter test”: the city’s skyline became unmistakably Moroccan. Marrakech
had the Koutoubia Mosque and Fes had the Kairaouine; now Casablanca had
the Hassan II Mosque. The giant new mosque in Casablanca was, however, juxtaposed in the skyline to a pair of monolithic, modernist commercial skyscrapers
in the commercial district of the Maârif. Lyautey’s cultural dualism lived on in
the policies of the monarchy. Morocco could be both modern and traditional,
but the two remained stylistically and spatially distinct; “pastiche” and hybridization were avoided.110
Agadir thus became an anomaly, at least among Morocco’s larger and
better-known cities. The planners and architects of the new Agadir, with their
focus on functionalism, had rejected monumentalism.111 There were no towering buildings to dominate the urban space: no clock tower, no royal palace, no
grand mosque. Only Agadir Oufella, a vacant, vast sepulcher, stood to memorialize the past. Were it not for the inscription “God, Country, King” emblazoned
on the side of the mountain to fill the need for imperial grandeur, Agadir could
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not pass the king’s helicopter test. Consequently, the “without a soul” trope that
had originated in the 1960s continued to circulate.
While this trope was distressing to some residents of the city, it did not
deter Agadir’s economic or demographic growth. The population of the city
rebounded, rising from less than seventeen thousand after the earthquake to
over sixty-one thousand in 1971.112 By 2004 it had more than quintupled, to over
three hundred forty-six thousand. Architecture aside, this was an unquestionably Moroccan city, including just 1,925 foreigners, barely half of one percent.
Soul or no soul, in strictly demographic terms Agadir has been more thoroughly
decolonized than a number of other Moroccan cities, largely due to the effects
of the earthquake.113

Conclusion
Unquestionably, the discourse of Agadir as a “city without a soul” would not
exist if the earthquake had not destroyed the Kasbah, if tourists from Europe
and vacationers from Casablanca were able to combine their beach holidays with
shopping trips in a densely populated and “authentic” Moroccan fortress. In
neither Fréjus nor Orléansville did disaster so greatly transform the symbolism
of the architectural landscape as the 1960 earthquake did in Agadir. In Morocco,
however, the lament for Agadir’s soul was not just a product of the destruction
of precolonial edifices; it was also the product of a colonial idea that emphasized
the importance of preserving precolonial cityscapes. While Algeria’s national
identity was connected to the idea of a revolution, breaking from the past, the
Moroccan monarchy of Hassan II, like Lyautey’s colonial state, emphasized the
preservation of tradition.
In Agadir, the disaster prompted an exodus of the European population and
provided an opportunity for the Moroccan monarchy to assert its authority and
to use American aid to lessen Moroccan dependence on France. As the victor in
the “Battle of the Plans,” however, France salvaged its role as Morocco’s provider
of technical assistance in the field of urbanism. Consequently, the destruction
of Agadir permitted Morocco’s French and French-educated urban planners to
apply their Corbusierian ideas of universalist modernism on the scale of an entire city, untainted by the legacy of Lyautey’s effort to ensure that Moroccan cities preserve an essentialist conception of Moroccan culture. For some, this new
urbanism came to represent a neo-colonial continuation of French hegemony.
Consequently, although the earthquake facilitated a break with traditionalist
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urban design in Agadir, this break fed anxiety and anomie concerning Moroccan cultural identity, and contributed to a backlash against the putatively
universalist ideas of the city’s planners. This backlash served the interest of the
monarchy, which portrayed itself as the defender of Moroccan identity.
In Agadir, questions about the meaning of decolonization and the impact of
the earthquake were intertwined and contested in the realm of architecture and
urban planning over the course of decades because of Morocco’s particular history and because of the specific pattern of physical damage in Agadir. However,
the long impact of environmental disaster and the long struggles of decolonization also unfolded in the realms of memory, memoir, and literature.
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he Tashelhit poet Ibn Ighil memorialized the 1960 Agadir disaster in an oral poem that framed lamentations of loss in religious terms.
In the poem, Ighil grapples with the fact that people and places had suddenly ceased to exist. “Where is that place of the righteous men, of the carpets
and of the trays and tea?” he asks, and the poem answers: “There is nothing in
it but wind.”1 Ibn Ighil’s poem offered no comment on the relation between the
environmental and political events of his time. As Kenneth Brown and Ahmed
Lakhsassi have pointed out, the prevailing metaphor of Ighil’s poem is that of
the Day of Judgement, in which all is destroyed as if by a “flooding wadi,” and
reduced to “powder, powder.” 2 In this poem, there is no nation: “Morocco” is
not mentioned; nor is the city’s history of French colonialism. The destroyed districts of the city are listed, and the inhabitants are identified by religion, gender,
wealth, and “righteousness.” The city exists in the space between God, the poet,
and the dead, not “God, Country, King.”3
Unlike Ibn Ighil, other memoirists and creative writers have memorialized
the disasters of 1954 to 1960 by explicitly exploring the relation between environmental disaster and the political contexts of decolonization. These writers
grappled with the realization that their loved ones had lived in colonial spaces,
and that the end of colonialism had coincided with the destruction of the lives
they had lived and the cities they had known. The physical places they remembered were gone, unrecognizably transformed by catastrophic movements of
matter. But other transformations were also sweeping away the pre-disaster,
pre-decolonization contexts of their lives.
Fiction and memoir about the disasters of 1954 to 1960 provides insight into
how survivors and observers conceptualized the long aftermath of those events
in later decades. Historians can make some cautious use of memoirs as sources
to examine long-past events, such as the disaster response in Beni Rached, discussed in Chapter 2 in light of both Belgacem Aït Ouyahia’s 1999 memoir and
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archival documents written soon after the earthquake. But memoirs such as Aït
Ouyahia’s can also be used as contemporaneous primary sources, contemporaneous with the experience of surviving decade after decade with the memory of
the disaster, and its effects. All the sources discussed in this chapter, whether presented as fiction or memoir, differ from the archival sources relied upon in earlier
chapters not in their greater or lesser veracity but rather in that they emerge from
their author’s reflection on an “event” that begins with the sudden onset of environmental catastrophe but that includes a long aftermath of months and years.
Their object of study, in other words, is almost coterminous with the object of
the present study. In contrast, archival documents such as diplomatic cables also
present an author’s perception, memory, and representation of an event, but the
event of primary concern is often one of much smaller scope—the arrival of a
shipment, or a significant conversation—in which any portrayal of the disaster
as a whole is usually relegated to the background, and always truncated in time.
Even for reports that purport to analyze the “whole” event, like those of Marius
Hautberg’s account of the successes and failures of the French response to the
1954 earthquake or Alger Républicain’s journalistic chronicle of occurrences following the disaster, the “event” they describe is one with a short duration, since
they were written only weeks or months after the onset of the disaster. Unlike
the archival sources produced in response to the “short” events, the memoirs
and literary representations of disasters considered in this chapter offer the historian additional insight into the effects of time and memory on disasters and
decolonizations, and on the perceived relations among these “long” events. The
task undertaken in the present volume is to use these accounts—representations
of both “short” and “long” events—to construct a critical representation of the
“long” event that is transparent in its use of evidence and which reveals, from a
differently informed perspective, what the individual sources cannot offer when
read in isolation. The result demonstrates the ways in which, from the 1950s
to the new millennium, humans experienced the events of environmental disasters through their experiences of the political, social, and cultural events of
decolonization.

Nationalist Ruptures, Survivors’ Nostalgia
The two earthquakes and the flood discussed in the present volume differed
from the 1959 mass poisoning in Morocco and from other disasters such as
droughts, famines, and epidemics, in that they destroyed the remembered
spaces of the built environment. Consequently, writers and survivors have had
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to grapple, not only with grief for the human losses but also with the memory
of lost places, a memory often shaped by nostalgic longing. “Colonial nostalgia”
has most often been examined by scholars with a focus on colonizers’ nostalgia
for an imagined or lost past relationship between the colonizer and the imagined
colonized subject, and on colonizers’ nostalgia for a home they have left and may
no longer have access to.4 However, when disasters destroy cities, the disaster
survivor also experiences the disruption of relationships and the loss of home.
In this respect, the experience of the disaster survivor has something in common with that of the “repatriated” colonial settlers who, after decolonization,
could no longer return to the physical spaces they remember. When, as in the
cases considered here, the disaster occurred just before, during, or just after the
process of decolonization, memories of the two were intertwined. The French
of Orléansville lost the city they knew twice: once in September 1954, and once
in 1962, when the violence of decolonization drove them north to France. For
the French of Fréjus, the loss of Algeria was a more distant event, but because the
war, like the flood, took so many lives in those years, the shock of Algeria’s revolution remained connected to the memory of the flood in the work of French
memoirists like Max Prado and Christian Hughes, discussed in chapter three.
For the colonized, however, the loss of Orléansville in 1954 or Agadir in 1960
exists in a different relationship to decolonization. Because of the near synchronicity of these disasters with national independence, the memorialization of the
lost places and people of the pre-disaster environment implicates the representation of life under colonial rule. Nostalgia for the pre-earthquake, colonial-era
city sits uneasily with the triumphalism demanded by the discourses of newly
hegemonic nationalism. Yet this tension, and the desire of disaster survivors and
observers to give voice to grief, inspired complex representations of the pre-disaster, pre-independence past, and of the fraught relationship between the victory
of national independence and the tragedy of environmental disaster.5
One response to this tension between the survivor’s grief and the patriot’s
celebration has been to celebrate the rupture brought by the disaster and to
reject all nostalgia for the pre-disaster, colonial city. This was the response of
Henri Kréa, discussed in the introduction to this volume, who celebrated the
1954 earthquake in Algeria as part of the rupture with the colonial past, even
while acknowledging the horror of the earthquake. Kréa’s treatment of the 1954
earthquake left no room for nostalgia for the city it destroyed, and one might
accuse Kréa of callous indifference to the actual ties that residents of the actual
Orléansville may have had to the city before independence. For Kréa, writing
in 1956 and 1957, Algeria’s hope lay in the future; the past held only oppression.
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Orléansville as a city hardly exists in his play, which concerns the relationship
between an abstract people and the imperial France/Rome.
In Kréa’s play, the earthquake was a “mystical sign”6 that awakens the people from their acquiescence. In Aït Ouyahia’s personal memoir, the earthquake
reveals the oppressive violence of imperialism and gives nationalist focus and
meaning to the life of a young man hitherto ambivalent about his position in
the colonial society. Both highlight the inequities and racial discrimination of
French rule as the fundamental injustice of colonialism. The racist words of
the French officer at the aid tent precipitated Aït Ouyahia’s conversion from a
member of the collaborationist elite to a committed representative of the “Arab”
people, ready to confront the oppressor. The archival record produced in the
years from 1954 to 1962 does not permit the historian to accept, as a generalized
truth, Henri Kréa’s and Aït Ouyahia’s portrayal of the earthquake as playing
a strong causal role in the Algerian people’s nationalist awakening (although
future research, particularly in Algerian archives, might provide additional evidence). Regardless, however, it is clear that the archival record does reveal a
complex web of interactions between responses to the earthquake and responses
to decolonization in those years. Works such as those by Aït Ouyahia and the
other writers considered below demonstrate that this web of interconnections
extends further, into the years and decades after the disaster.

Rupture in Rocks and Lights
Like Kréa’s play, Belgacem Aït Ouyahia’s chapter on the Chélif Valley earthquake, “Orléansville 54,” eschews nostalgia for what the earthquake destroyed
and portrays the event as triggering a positive rupture in the doctor’s political
itinerary from the position of a privileged and proud collaborator to that of an
active, though not heroic, nationalist. However, the “Orléansville 54” chapter
stands apart from the rest of the memoir. The geographical and emotional center
of his memoir, Pierres et Lumières, lies in Kabylia, where Aït Ouyahia grew up
and where he returned to practice medicine. His account of the Orléansville
earthquake (introduced in Chapter 2 of the present volume) thus takes the form
of an excursion, a brief interlude during which he is called away from his first
post in Kabylia to return to the stricken city where he had done his surgical
internship. While the geography of the disaster relief expedition from Orléansville to Beni Rached is described in considerable detail, the city of Orléansville
is not: beyond the walls of the hospital, the reader sees little of the colonial-era
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city before or after the disaster. In a nostalgic memoir full of detailed description
of the places and ways of life of the narrator’s personal history, the Orléansville
chapter is an exception, devoid of nostalgia: the focus is on a positive rupture
from the colonial past.
Aït Ouyahia’s account of his Arab nationalist awakening in Orléansville is
foreshadowed by his account of his work in Beni Rached, in the same chapter.
Aït Ouyahia’s account of Beni Rached highlights the linguistic element in the
young doctor’s break from his French-privileged past. When Aït Ouyahia encountered the bloodied survivors of Beni Rached, he found himself, uncharacteristically, addressing them in fluent Arabic: “I was surprised to hear myself speak,
not because I felt that my words would comfort these unfortunates, but because,
for the first time, I pronounced six or seven sentences in a row, in Arabic, without a single word of French among them, as was my necessary habit, because of
ignorance of the language.”7 Writing decades after independence, Aït Ouyahia
contrasted his unexpected use of Arabic only with his more customary use of
French. His native Kabyle is unmentioned in this passage, although his Kabyle
roots figure prominently in his autobiography as a whole. The official nationalist
ideology of the victorious Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) counted all Muslim Algerians as Arabs (as popular French colonial usage sometimes had), and
Aït Ouyahia’s Orléansville chapter presents a dichotomous linguistic world of
Arabic and French. This is consistent with his account of his confrontation with
the French officer, in which he steps forward to speak on behalf of all “Arabs.” His
remembered identification with Arabs was a rejection of the sense of distinction
derived from his status as an évolué—as a French-educated medical student and
the son of a French-educated schoolteacher. His Kabyle background—elsewhere
a central, nostalgia-infused theme in his memoir—is left out of the story. In both
accounts of his personal heroism during the earthquake, the disaster creates a
bond of solidarity among Algerians, presented as Arabs. On the question of Kabyle political identity, Aït Ouyahia is silent. His nostalgia for a lost Kabylia never
appears when themes of nationalist politics are present. His separation of these
two themes reflects the dominant ideology under FLN rule, and the political
realities of independent Algeria in 1999, where a politicized Berberism would not
be tolerated. Aït Ouyahia mentions his youthful fondness for Ferhat Abbas, the
most moderate of the Arab-francophone nationalist leaders to join the FLN and
to survive the revolution’s various purges; if the young doctor had been equally
fond of the Kabyle nationalist thinkers Si Amar Boulifa and Hocine HesnayLahmek, the old memoirist would not, could not, have said so.8

170

chapter 7

Aït Ouyahia’s story of his encounter with the French officer is unique among
the portions of his memoir that deal with the movement for independence in
that it emphasizes the young doctor’s nationalist clarity and strength of personal
commitment. In other chapters, Aït Ouyahia seems interested in distinguishing
his memoir from self-aggrandizing tales of nationalist heroics. The book opens
with a quotation from fellow doctor Jean Bernard on the subject of writing the
history of French resistance to the Nazi occupation: “Histories of the resistance
seem to me to written in the form of a triptych. On the middle page, the truth;
on the left-side page, the story told to the Germans after one’s arrest; on the
right, the description told to one’s friends after the Liberation. I’m going to try to
write on the page in the middle.”9 This epigraph situates Aït Ouyahia’s book as a
memoir of resistance, in this case resistance to French colonialism, but also foreshadows the author’s skepticism about the ideological certainties of nationalist
discourse. The Bernard quotation is immediately followed by a quotation from
Baudelaire and by a Kabyle proverb; together, these epigraphs frame the text’s
cultural landscape, shaped by the parataxis of Kabyle and French that pervades
most of the memoir, though not the Orléansville chapter.
Aït Ouyahia seems to be supporting his claim to adhere to the “page in the
middle” when he reveals the imperfections of his nationalist credentials through
his treatment of several key events related to the nationalist struggle. In May
1945, when Muslim Algerians were protesting and rioting, and the French were
committing massacres in Sétif, Aït Ouyahia was in Algiers celebrating V-E Day
alongside European settlers. Later, when a friend denounced the atrocities committed by the French, the young Aït Ouyahia expressed his faith in the French
mission civilisatrice, repeating “sempiternal clichés about schools, roads, and hospitals.”10 Eventually, Aït Ouyahia revises his position: in an anecdote set in 1955,
his friend asks him to assist the nationalist cause by providing medical help to
resistance fighters. Aït Ouyahia agrees, but he is distinctly nervous about keeping potentially incriminating medical supplies in his office. Soon after, when
put on trial by the French for his suspected actions, he equivocates, stating, “I
have never been part of a political organization” and is set free.11 The memoirist
makes no claim to be a paradigmatic nationalist hero; he explicitly seeks to move
beyond such clichés.
Aït Ouyahia’s accounts of his involvement with the nationalist cause outside
of the Orléansville chapter do not mention the earthquake as a turning point.
The Orléansville chapter also differs from those sections of his memoir in its
emphasis on the strength of his newfound ideological clarity and commitment.
However, Aït Ouyahia’s refusal to portray himself as a hero does also appear at
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the end of his earthquake narrative. The militancy of his confrontation with
the French officer is interrupted by the salutary intervention of a French nurse,
who fabricates an emergency in the hospital in order to rescue the young doctor
from an altercation that he could not win. As in his account of his trial, set
many months later, Aït Ouyahia avails himself of the opportunity to escape.12
Here, too, the author’s actions are portrayed as less than heroic. Nevertheless,
the earthquake chapter clearly presents a narrative in which his experience of
the disaster constitutes a turning point, a nationalist epiphany.

Rupture in Khaïr-Eddine’s Agadir
Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine’s 1967 novel Agadir also presents seismic disaster as a
point of rupture from the past, but without the embrace of nationalism conveyed
by Kréa and Aït Ouyahia. Like Aït Ouyahia, Khaïr-Eddine was not a resident
of the stricken city at the time of the earthquake but was part of the disaster
response. Khaïr-Eddine had been born in Morocco’s Tashelhit-speaking south,
not far from Agadir, and as a government functionary he lived and worked in
Agadir immediately following the disaster, reviewing survivors’ eligibility for
government assistance. His novel reveals a detailed interest in the actual impact
of the earthquake on the city and the survivors. Whereas for Kréa, the symbolic
meaning of the Orléansville earthquake was clear, Khaïr-Eddine confronted the
meaninglessness of the disaster, portraying an incomprehensible ruined landscape where, as literary scholar Ahmed Raqbi has put it, “existence has no meaning and where silence becomes king.”13 For Khaïr-Eddine, the rupture from the
past is disorienting, but it is also fraught with longing, and the pull of nostalgia
is powerful. Yet, for Khaïr-Eddine, nostalgia is a wound, “voracious nostalgia”
from which his characters seek to be cured.14
Unlike Kréa, and unlike Aït Ouyahia’s representation of his younger self,
Khaïr-Eddine placed no faith in decolonization as a cure for the ills of the past
and certainly no faith in anti-colonial political revolution. Like other writers
discussed here, Khaïr-Eddine portrays the violence of the earthquake and the
violence of decolonization as inseparable; Khaïr-Eddine, however, does not distinguish the violence of decolonization from the violence perpetrated by the independent Moroccan state.15 Writing several years after political independence,
an exile from an increasingly authoritarian Moroccan monarchy, Khaïr-Eddine
saw the 1960 earthquake in Agadir not as the harbinger of a new order but as
a horrific disruption of an oppressive totalitarianism that extended from the
mythic past to the post-independence present. This disruption revealed the
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fundamentally unmoored situation of the human individual, but Khaïr-Eddine
offers no new narrative. His novel, a bricolage of “stream-of-consciousness, splintered persona, multiple perspectives and other techniques of discontinuity”16
prevents the privileging of a unifying interpretation of the disaster or of Moroccan history. As Larbi Touaf puts it, “As a postcolonial novel, Agadir leaves
no place for ‘fixity’ or ‘purity’ when it comes to questions of individual or collective identity.”17 Alternating between prose and dramatic dialog, realism and
hallucinogenic fantasy, past and present, Khaïr-Eddine’s novel offers no simple
blueprint for understanding the catastrophe of the earthquake or the future of
the individual after decolonization.
Originally from the town of Tafraout, 150 kilometers from Agadir, KhaïrEddine grew up in Casablanca. Discussing Khaïr-Eddine’s ancestral roots is
problematic as a means of understanding his perspective, however. Hédi AbdelJaouad observes that “Khaïr-Eddine refuses to privilege the figure of the ancestor
as a potential redeemer of precolonial identity. On the contrary, he is obsessed
with the present in all its complexity.”18 Yet Touaf argues that Khaïr-Eddine’s
rejection of grand narratives was conditioned by his Berber background, a cultural heritage which ill-fit the dominant narratives of Moroccan nationalism
centered on monarchy and on Arab and Islamic identity.19 In Agadir, a character
called “The Corruptor” speaks to the head of the Armée de Libération Nationale: “Our tribe is historically a people . . . lord, Berber since the placenta, before
the drop of sperm.”20 Yet neither Berberism nor the military struggle against
colonialism offered any solution. In the novel, the seventh-century Berber queen
Kahina appears as one of a succession of tyrants including a caliph, a caïd, the
dynasts of the Berber Almoravides and the Arab Saadians, as well as the modern minister of the Interior. The Romans called Kahina the “Serpent Queen of
Barbary” she says, but she references Marx and calls herself a communist. Unlike
Kréa’s Jugartha, Kahina provides no salvation. Whether she represents heritage
or a vision of the future, the narrator says he does not know her and rejects her.21
On the opening page, the narrator’s unnamed traveling companion experiences the disaster as liberating: although he has lost his house, wife, and two
daughters, he had already wanted to repudiate them. The narrator confronts the
futility of his own mission to aid the people of the city, for he can recognize no
city: “They lied to me. There is not the least hint of a city here. . . . Little chance
that I have of returning life to the people here. They are traumatized men. I am
not the Good Lord.” According to the narrator, the attempt to find meaning
by looking to the past, the lost city, is hopeless. The city of the past is a city of
corpses: “But I sense clearly the subterranean presence of the cadaver of a city. . . .
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Disturbing odors: exhalations of crushed rats, of human limbs in decomposition, the stench of disemboweled sewers.” The survivors’ desire to recover the
traces of identity in the ruins of the past is presented as pathological, exemplified
by the man who carries with him the severed finger of his dead wife. The narrator states, “The population does not want to leave the city which is, it is believed,
the cradle of civilization and the matrix in which History is formed. They don’t
know that their history is already done. But what will and what faith they apply
to get from the rubble that which is no longer usable.”22
The novel Agadir demonstrates a much more intimate experience of the
earthquake than does Kréa’s play Le Seisme. Like his narrator, Khaïr-Eddine
was sent to Agadir after the earthquake by the Moroccan state to process survivors’ applications for state aid and had direct contact with the aftermath of the
disaster there. The opening section situates the narrative, such as it is, firmly in
the real space of post-disaster Agadir: in a prefab trailer, eight meters long, three
and a half meters wide, and three meters high, equipped with a table and chair, a
typewriter and a calculator, and adorned with portraits “of the dead king and the
living king”23—portraits which frame the novel in the aftermath of the earthquake, after the death of Mohammed V in 1961 and the ascension of Hassan II.
This realism does not pervade the entire novel. In one section, the city is
dominated by talking animals, most notably a powerful parrot and a cobra.
Khaïr-Eddine’s feverishly depicted “ville zoologique” is defended by “brigades
of monkeys” and inhabited by “alligators dozing in the infected water of rectangular pools,” as well as by cigarette-smoking dogs, makeup-wearing hyenas,
and “gorillas with eyeglasses.”24 Khaïr-Eddine was likely referencing accounts
describing pre-Islamic Berber reverence for sacred animals, ideas later incorporated into North African Muslim beliefs that animals might testify on Judgement Day.25 Yet Khaïr-Eddine’s vision of a city of hyenas and infected pools
prowled by scavengers also echoes archival accounts of the cordoned-off disaster
zone, carpeted with quicklime due of fears of epidemics of cholera and typhoid,
guarded by soldiers and prowled by scavenging animals. And when Khaïr-Eddine writes of corpses, he references a massive epidemiological, cultural, and political problem that occupied the Gadiri public, as well as French and Moroccan
diplomats, for months after the disaster, as discussed in Chapter 5 of this volume.
The questions asked by Khaïr-Eddine’s narrator were the great political questions of 1960 and 1961: What would happen to the bodies of the dead, buried
under the ruins? Would reconstruction take place over the bodies of the victims?
Khaïr-Eddine considers two options for building a meaningful future without an oppressive attachment to the past: the construction of a new, modern
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city, and emigration. Both scenarios are rooted in the historical experience of
the city in the months and years after the earthquake; neither offers a satisfying
solution to the problems of disorientation faced by his narrator. Khaïr-Eddine
mocks the Moroccan state’s plans to build a new city, guided by the architectural principles of modernist rationalism. The bulldozers and soldiers of the
newly independent state, as much as the earthquake itself, have produced the
disorientation felt by his narrator.26 Khaïr-Eddine juxtaposes the urban planners’ vision, written in capital letters and focused on creating an orderly and
comprehensible future, to the vain search of a survivor obsessed with finding
his lost home (and pet gazelle). For Khaïr-Eddine, both are equally absurd, or
demented: “I have not yet grasped what I am looking for, and I never find my
City. ONE MUST PERHAPS BEGIN BY BUILDING HOUSES WELLALIGNED SIDE BY SIDE leaving a large enough space between them AND
DISTANCING THEM FOLLOWING A METICULOUS GEOMETRY
(but the problem that is posed in the first place is to know whether it is permitted
to build on the debris of a dead city.)”27 In the political and physical realm, the
solution in fact arrived at had been to excavate the bodies from the areas where
rebuilding would take place—while leaving the fallen Kasbah in ruins as a mass
grave of unretrieved corpses. For Khaïr-Eddine, however, this exemplified the
larger issue: whether one could find one’s place in the present through reference
to the past. Although he rejected all attempts to tie the future to nostalgically
imagined pasts, Khaïr-Eddine was equally critical of the modernist urban planners’ hopes that mere architecture could solve the problems faced by the city’s inhabitants simply by ensuring an environment of light and space. He mocked the
utopianism of those who felt they could improve the human condition through
architecture: “THE HOUSES CONSEQUENTLY WILL HAVE FORTY
WINDOWS AND THE MONTHS FORTY DAYS in order to bring all into
equilibrium and we will have parrots and birds.” Here, Khaïr-Eddine immediately repeats the central question: “Must one build on the site of the dead city?”28
Khaïr-Eddine also explores the possibility of an escape from the oppressive legacy of the past through the option of emigration to France. However,
Khaïr-Eddine, who in fact moved to France in 1965, presents this as a delusionary hope. The Shepard declares “make me a passport I want to go to France /
be a simple miner / in the rectum of the black soil.” His sheep (Le Troupeau),
however, advise him to stay (“Don’t go, France, it is terrible”), as does the Goat
(“What the devil will you do in France The cold the snow the daily duties your
flute will you throw it away you will be a beggar oh do not go.”) The Billy-Goat,
however, speaks of the fleshly pleasures available in France—“the whores come in
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abundance calling / who wants a whore who wants one five francs the vagina”—a
perspective for which the Billy-Goat is promptly lynched by the mob.29 At the
end of the novel, the narrator’s uncle tries to persuade him to leave the city, but
Europe is portrayed as a negation rather than a solution: “In Europe where I lived
in the slums of rain in the voices of our brothers, incomprehensible We have no
brothers I am your uncle and your father but the relations only exist because we
wanted them One invents them ceaselessly.” Yet Khaïr-Eddine’s novel finishes
on a hopeful note: “One must build on the void, voilà. Keep nothing from the
past… past… bad [ellipses sic]; if not, if a memory is possible, but a reinvented
past, in the colors of a new vision, and leaving healthy (sain), new [….] I am going
to a land of joy, young and gleaming, far from the cadavers. So behold me naked,
simple, elsewhere.” For Khaïr-Eddine, his concluding optimism (if not ironic)
rests solely on the writer’s ability to break down identities, ideologies, and grand
narratives: “I will leave with a poem in my pocket; that suffices.”30
Scholarly discussions of Khaïr-Eddine’s Agadir—the most discussed of all
the representations of disaster treated here—have tended to neglect the author’s
encounter with the historical earthquake, instead portraying his exploration of
the disaster in metaphorical terms, as a symbol for the rupture of conventions.
The earthquake is thus reduced to a mere instrument of the author’s desire to
break from literary and linguistic conventions and produce “a writing in rupture with conformism.”31 There is no doubt that Khaïr-Eddine’s culturally and
politically transgressive work emerged in the context of “an interdisciplinary
and transnational movement” and from the sociocultural matrix of avant-garde
thinkers in Morocco that in 1966 became centered around the journal Souffles.32
Nevertheless, I would argue that we should approach Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, like
the other memoirs and representations considered here, from the point of view
of its environmental as well as literary context, acknowledging the historical
earthquake as a force of change. Ted Steinberg has argued that environmental
history is not just the story of human thought and action inscribed on a passive
environment; it is also the “less anthropocentric and less arrogant” story of nature’s impact on human thought and action.33 Touaf writes of Khaïr-Eddine’s
novel that “The earthquake in Agadir introduced a world of great instability,
violence, and disruption. It aimed at shaking people’s blind faith and sapping the
foundations of archaic social and aesthetic order, an aim that reverberated in the
literary and political discourse.”34 This, minus the intentionality, is true not only
of the earthquake in Agadir the novel but also the earthquake in Agadir the city.
To see Khaïr-Eddine’s portrayal of the earthquake as a product of his desire
to depict a world of “instability, violence, and disruption” is to ignore the effect
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of the earthquake itself. His desire to enact textual violence against literary convention may have been a product of his literary milieu, but his very notion of
violence itself was in no small part a product of the earthquake. Khaïr-Eddine’s
portrayal of a city of rotting corpses, ruined buildings, scavenging animals, and
severed limbs engaged with the tectonic, social, and political forces that shaped
the process of burying, excavation, reburying, and reconstruction in the months
and years following February 29, 1960, processes discussed in Chapter 5. The
earthquake helped shape Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, a major work applying new
approaches to Moroccan literature and to the remembering of disaster. Literature, like memory, is “socially-framed, present-orientated, relational and driven
by specific agents,”35 but it does not exist independently of the past, that is, of
the environmental, political, and social forces that shaped the history that is
remembered or represented. While post-modernist and post-colonial deconstructions of narrativity were part of francophone literary culture in the early
1960s, Khaïr-Eddine’s groundbreaking use of non-linearity to represent the disorientation of modernity cannot be separated from the historical experience of
the disaster he both witnessed and experienced, working in the aftermath of the
earthquake.36
In Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, the earthquake eclipses any historical rupture produced by decolonization, but the two are nevertheless portrayed as overlapping
events, part of the alienation of the modern individual from the past, intertwined in Khaïr-Eddine’s non-narrative. Khaïr-Eddine’s novel rejected nationalist and monarchist narratives that portrayed decolonization as the transformational event which was to connect the Moroccan nation both to a modern future
and to a celebrated heritage. Instead, he depicted a future of uncertain meaning,
and the present’s violent separation from an inscrutable past.

Nostalgia in Rocks and Lights
Like Khaïr-Eddine’s Agadir, Aït Ouyahia’s memoir is narratively disjointed.
Criticized by reviewer Dehbia Aït Mansour in the newspaper Liberté for the lack
of a unifying structure or theme, Aït Ouyahia defended his approach in an interview in Algérie-Littérature-Action, stating that “The digressions came on their
own; they were not calculated. When writing, I even sometimes had the impression that they had neither head nor tail. . . . I realize that one might lose one’s
footing sometimes. I did not want to write to be easy. And if the reader must
search a bit, I can say that I chose this difficulty.”37 The tone of Aït Ouyahia’s
response is in keeping with the tone of his memoir, which is peppered with the
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aging medical professor’s critiques of the ignorance of the younger generation.
The chaotic structure of his narrative might also be ascribed to the fact that Aït
Ouyahia in 1999 was not a professional writer but an obstetrician who had hitherto published no other work aside from medical articles, even if he did later go
on to write several novels. However, Aït Ouyahia in 1999 was a highly educated
member of the francophone elite, and his assertion that his fragmented narrative structure was a product of uncalculated stream-of-consciousness must be
viewed with skepticism, for his book may reflect the influence of Khaïr-Eddine’s
work or that of other francophone and North African post-modernists, or the
doctor’s engagement with medical or literary scholarship on trauma. Regardless,
the memoir’s lack of an overall narrative structure is a boon, for it allows space
for many strands of thought and experience, undeterred by the hobgoblins of
consistency or the tyranny of thematic focus.
The Orléansville chapter is disconnected from other themes in the larger
memoir of Aït Ouyahia’s life, in which his involvement with the struggle for
national independence constitutes a significant recurring theme, but that is
nevertheless overshadowed by his treatment of his relationship with his father
and grandfather and by his itinerary negotiating his Kabyle village background
and his relationship with his French education. These themes are alluded to in
the book’s subtitle: “Memories and digressions of an Algerian doctor, son of
a schoolteacher ‘of indigenous origin.’” While the dominant narrative of Aït
Ouyahia’s short account of the Orléansville disaster celebrates a nationalist rupture, the book as a whole repeatedly returns to a nostalgic theme lamenting the
destruction of the past and the loss of memory, while at the same time approvingly narrating the transformation of Aït Ouyahia’s family from Kabyle villagers
to French-educated elites.
The book begins with the destruction of Aït Ouyahia’s natal village in Kabylia, and his grandmother’s home, by the guns of the French Operation Jumelles
in 1959, a destruction that would be made complete after independence when,
long after the war, the bulldozers of the new regime arrived to pave the way for
a reconstruction that disregarded the past and rendered the village unrecognizable. Like Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, this narrative does not portray national independence as salvation. In James McDougall’s terms, nationalist modernity
imposed its own “disciplinary order” on this society, no less destructive than
that of the colonizers.38 A great ash tree of the village, a symbol of heritage for
Aït Ouyahia, survived the bombs but was felled, after independence, by the bulldozers. Post-independence, the destruction of the heritage of village life, symbolized by the bombs and bulldozers, continued, as the residents’ way of life was
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replaced by a new consumerism and a construction boom driven by expatriate
remittances from France.39 The village of nostalgia was lost, and independence
did not restore it.
This nostalgia for a lost Kabylia is tempered, however, by a narrative that
portrays Aït Ouyahia’s family’s encounter with French colonial education, from
the grandfather who forbade his children from entering the French school, to
the father who became a schoolteacher, to Aït Ouyahia’s own education as a
doctor. While Aït Ouyahia’s encounters with French racism play a part in this
story, and he is occasionally critical of others’ aping of French ways, there is no
hint of regret about his career trajectory, for that is what led to him becoming
an obstetric surgeon. Aït Ouyahia describes his youthful belief in the “oeuvre
civilisastrice” in which he took part as a French-educated doctor.40 Even in the
Orléansville chapter, Aït Ouyahia portrays his anti-colonialism as built upon
frustration with the hypocrisy of French rule, not on the rejection of its principles. He was driven to nationalism by an accumulation of insults: first racial
insults as a schoolboy (“Ils sont cons, les Kabyles”), then insubordinations by
French nurses (“I did not come here to obey an Arab”), and finally those words
that were “unworthy of a French officer” but that were nonetheless delivered:
“All thieves, these Arabs.”41
Mostafa Lacheref ’s preface suggests that a recently revived interest among
Algerian intellectuals in local histories and cultural diversity in Algeria, and
particularly in Kabyle village life, was what made Aït Ouyahia’s memoir publishable. This interest, as much as chronology, may account for the concentration of passages focusing on Kabylia near the beginning of the memoir. A more
disciplined writer or more ruthless editor might have trimmed much of the later
material from the manuscript, which would have been a loss for the historian.
Aït Ouyahia’s treatment of the 1954 earthquake seems disconnected both from
his pervasive nostalgia for the past and from those portions of his memoir that
deal with the movement for independence, and which make no mention of the
earthquake as a formative experience.
His work as a doctor provides the one unifying theme throughout the memoir. Aït Ouyahia’s true moment of heroism comes, not in his confrontation with
the French officer outside aid tent or in his work for the FLN, but in his treatment of the injured in Beni Rached. It is as a doctor, not a political actor, that
he finds his calling. Yet, as symbolized by his sudden burst of fluency in Arabic
at Beni Rached, the two are never fully separated in Aït Ouyahia’s writing. Elsewhere in Aït Ouyahia’s larger memoir, there are instances in which, as in the
Orléansville chapter, Aït Ouyahia portrayed the medical struggle against the
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inanimate causes of human suffering as akin to the political struggle against
colonial injustice.
Writing in his own voice as a much older doctor and professor of medicine,
Aït Ouyahia inveighs against his young medical students’ ignorance of both the
heroism of the Algerian combatants who gave their lives for independence and
of the French doctor who pioneered treatment for osteomalacia, the softening
of the bones, a common cause of maternal death during childbirth in colonial
Algeria. Linking natural disasters, politics, and medicine, Aït Ouyahia writes
that “History, when the cyclone quiets, when all the volcanos are extinguished,
will someday recognize him, perhaps, as a benefactor of des femmes indigènes, or
of femmes musulmanes, as they said also, indifferently, back then.”42 Aït Ouyahia
portrays national independence as a crucial turning point in the medical struggle, as he states that osteomacia has disappeared in Algeria “thanks to independence…[sic] and also to socialism” which brought “bread and milk everywhere…
[sic] schools and pupils, with rosy cheeks and shoes on their feet.”43
Aït Ouyahia then launches into a story, which he recounted to his medical
students, of his first breach (siege) delivery, in the snow, in the remote town of
Icheriden. The linkage of medical work and nationalist struggle found in the
Orléansville chapter appears in this anecdote as well. Aït Ouyahia, in a telling
pun, labels this story “the siege of Icheriden,” recalling a French colonial military
victory of 1857 in which a Kabyle village was destroyed during the French conquest of the area. After describing his obstetric accomplishments at Icheriden,
Aït Ouyahia explains that he resisted the temptation to lecture his students on
the nineteenth-century political-military events there. Instead, he tells them the
story of Hassiba Benbouali, an eighteen-year-old ALN fighter who died for the
Algerian cause. This is not a non-sequitur: both the obstetric and political heroics seem to be included in Aït Ouyahia’s lament that “Algeria forbids history! My
country forbidden its history, forbidden its heros!”44 Here, the revolution itself is
the object of nostalgia, accompanied by nostalgia for the medical achievements
of his own youth. Aït Ouyahia looks back from the point of view of a disappointing present in which Algerian society has seemingly turned its back on both
the heritage of the village and the potential of the revolution. In support of this
theme, Aït Ouyahia’s narrative of the earthquake serves as a vehicle to demonstrate both the political clarity and the medical heroism that he associated with
the years of his early adulthood. The revolutionary struggle against injustice and
the medical struggle against suffering seem to be of a kind—even if Aït Ouyahia
acknowledges that his own actions were more distinguished on the latter front
than on the former.45
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Troubles in Childhood Paradise
Habib Tengour of Algeria and Jacques Bensimon of Morocco have both produced writings that combine themes of rupture and nostalgia. Their personal narratives of the earthquakes and other dramas of the era of decolonization address the ambiguous and complex relationships among events. Both
are accomplished creative professionals: Tengour is a writer, while Bensimon,
a Moroccan-born, Berber, Jewish writer and filmmaker, became chair of the
National Film Board of Canada. Like Khaïr-Eddine, Tengour and Bensimon
self-consciously confront the question of the relationship between memory and
the events of the past.
Jacques Bensimon’s 2012 account of life in pre-earthquake Agadir, Agadir,
un paradis dérobé (Agadir, a Stolen Paradise), like Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, and
like the accounts of the Fréjus disaster written by Gaston Bonheur and Régina
Wallet (discussed in Chapter 3), exists on the boundary—always blurred—of
fiction and memoir. Bensimon, unlike Bonheur and Wallet, does not claim an
absolute veracity for his work; nor does Bensimon purport to simply present his
memories, without questioning their accuracy. Bensimon presents his work in
the form of a narrative memoir but states explicitly that he has taken license to
fictionalize elements of the story, “placing real people in romanticized situations,
introducing invented personages into real contexts,” and he asks the survivors
of Agadir to forgive him for such embellishments. Bensimon writes that his approach, inspired by his career as a filmmaker, is “to perpetrate here a ‘true novel’
or a ‘romanticized reality.’”46 This disclaimer, at the end of the book’s introduction, deliberately invites the reader to question the truthfulness of Bensimon’s
account of his life in Agadir before the earthquake.
Bensimon’s Agadir presents itself, beginning with its title, as a nostalgic text.
The narrative is framed by its introduction describing Bensimon’s return to Agadir in 2010 for a reunion with childhood friends on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the earthquake and by a conclusion discussing the author’s diagnosis with terminal colon cancer after his return to Canada. The nostalgia is
clear in his opening chapters, in which Bensimon states:
This earthquake destroyed a city that is unique in the world, the city where
I lived, and I wish today to bear witness to this epoch that now survives
only in my heart and in my spirit. I want to inscribe this happiness that
the stones, the streets, the faces no longer embody. I want to fix this life, in
order to preserve the memory of this place.47
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Bensimon’s nostalgia is also implicit in his book’s closing sentence, expressing
his final wish, to be buried in Agadir. In between, Bensimon provides fond
descriptions of his family, his rascally friends, and the emergence of a pubescent sexual awareness. Yet this nostalgia exists in tension with other elements
within the text.
Bensimon’s family was not in Agadir in 1960, having emigrated during the
upheaval of decolonization. Yet his opening chapters present the loss of the city
where he grew up as a loss created not by decolonization or emigration but by the
earthquake, which he learned of from a Radio Canada news broadcast: “With
this earthquake, my life seemed to stop on February 29th, 1960 . . . a part of me is
as if annihilated.”48 While for the survivors who remained in Agadir after 1960,
life continued, and the city was reconstructed, for Bensimon the émigré, Agadir
no longer existed. Up until that moment, he had felt that the home of his memories was still there, even in his absence. Then, the earthquake forced him to
confront his irrevocable separation from the places of his past. Bensimon makes
no mention of the controversies about architecture and the layout and identity
of the reconstructed city, nor does he invoke the “city without a soul” discourse
discussed in Chapter 6 of the present volume. The city he wrote about ceased to
exist in 1960; the post-disaster city is not relevant to his memoir, appearing only
in his opening paragraph describing his return to Agadir in 2010, dismissed with
the sentence: “I recognized nothing.”49
There are elements in Bensimon’s text that run counter to his portrayal of
the earthquake as the definitive point of rupture. There are hints that, prior to
the earthquake, Agadir had already begun to be “stolen,” by the effects of colonialism and modernity. French education had made the boy Bensimon and his
classmates “strangers in their own country”; he could barely communicate with
his own grandmother.50 The commercial success of his petty-bourgeois parents
also produced alienation from the places and habits of Bensimon’s early childhood, most notably when his mother’s shop is moved to “a beautiful modern,
avant-gardist store” owned by the Swiss company Bata.51 Much like the critics
of reconstructed Agadir, Bensimon portrayed the building’s architecture as an
affront to the cultural traditions of the city’s “oriental” residents. For Bensimon, the alienation imposed by modernist architecture and lamented by the
post-reconstruction purveyors of the “city without a soul” discourse seems to
have arrived years before the earthquake, borne by the forces of global capitalism.
Despite these hints that not all was idyllic in Bensimon’s pre-earthquake
Agadir, the mood of nostalgic reminiscence predominates for most of the
book. Near the end, however, this mood is disrupted by two scenes of startling
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violence. The first is the brutal rape of the narrator, aged “eight or nine” by one
of his grandmother’s tenants. This scene, described in bloody, graphic detail,
is presented as traumatic for the boy not only because of the pain, violation,
and violence of the act but also because of a feeling of shame, exacerbated by an
awakened awareness of his own homosexual orientation.52 Agadir, the reader
suddenly discovers, was no “paradise” for young Bensimon, even in 1951 or 1952.
The second scene of violence takes place two or three years later, in the shadow
of a French-imposed curfew, among the tanks and bombings leading up to Moroccan independence. This scene also involved sexual molestation, but this time
connected to the French presence, now experienced as an occupation. Young
Bensimon, despite hearing explosions in the city, had broken the curfew after an
argument with his father, and after staying out all night, was watching a game of
pinball through the front window of a café. An eight-year-old Muslim girl stood
next to him, apparently doing the same, as was a legionnaire who stood behind
her. But then Bensimon noticed the girl was frozen in terror; the legionnaire had
taken out his penis and was rubbing it against the girl. Bensimon exploded in
rage, striking the legionnaire with his fists; when the drunken soldier stumbled
and fell, he kicked him with his feet, and continued until bystanders intervened.
Bensimon awoke in the hospital; it was then, abruptly, that his parents decided
to emigrate.53 Thus, in this part of Bensimon’s narrative, it was sexual violence,
and the abuses of colonialism, that robbed him of “his” Agadir. Nevertheless, the
introduction presents the moment of the earthquake as a sudden, defining moment of loss that separates Bensimon from the subject of his nostalgic longing.

Of Fish and Bullocks
While the Agadir earthquake marked an ending for Jacques Bensimon, Algerian
poet and novelist Habib Tengour has written a short memoir in which the 1954
earthquake marks the beginning of a coming of age story. Writing from the
perspective of an adult academic who works and writes in both Constantine and
Paris, Tengour establishes distance between his transnational adult perspective
and the world of his childhood with a startling opening sentence that offers an
explanation for the earthquake: “At that time, the earth was like a flat plate. It
rested on the horn of a bull calf that was standing, precariously balanced on the
tail of a fish. When the fish would move it made the earth tremble.”54
For Tengour, the earthquake was not an obvious point of rupture. It struck
when he was seven years old, causing minor damage and waking some of the
residents of his hometown of Mostaganem, 130 kilometers from Orléansville.
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Tengour’s opening phrase “at that time”55 designates a period of his Algerian
childhood that continued after the earthquake, with schoolyard games and
memories of his grandfather. His initial, mythological explanation of the earthquake is seamlessly followed by his grandmother’s invocation of God’s protection and his grandfather’s search for the family Koran, and by an understated,
realist description of broken crockery and an overturned water jug. His opening
locates his account of this period in the realm of mythology, and he describes his
childhood Algeria as a world of stories—religious stories told by his grandfather
and received with slight skepticism by the precocious boy, stories told by children
during recess, and stories told by the people of the town.56
Within this mythic context, Tengour relates local explanations of the divine
causes of the disaster, as fantastic as balancing fish and bull calves. According
to one story, God was punishing the city because people had brought wine into
a mosque; according to another, it was because a Muslim scholar (“mufti”) had
gone to a brothel with a Koran in his coat pocket. There were also tales of orgies
at religious sites. In yet another version of this story, it was said that prominent
individuals in Orléansville “moistened their couscous with wine sauce and that,
under the pretext of celebrating the Night of Error, they devoted themselves to
fornicating with women and young men.”57
It is clear that the adult Tengour, the writer, does not believe these explanations; they are stories. It is less clear whether the reader is meant to believe
that these were actual explanations circulating in Mostaganem, or whether, like
the story of the fish, these stories are the writer’s interventions or importations
from other contexts.58 Tengour, like Khaïr-Eddine, avoids equating memory
with truth.
Tengour’s account of his idyllic childhood begins with the earthquake but
is distant from the epicenter and destruction. This childhood idyll is later disrupted by the violence of decolonization, which produces a turning point within
his narrative. It emerges, later in the account, that Tengour’s father was a political prisoner of the French and was tortured, an event which apparently caused
the young Tengour to suffer from stress-induced illness, interpreted as the “evil
eye.” Yet the nationalist struggle does not define Tengour’s experience or mark
the end of his childhood innocence. Rather, the intrusion of adult perspectives
comes both through his awareness of his father’s struggle—portrayed as distant
and abstract—and his growing knowledge of individuals like the family’s Jewish
neighbors, the Senkmans, and French settlers, the Delages, whose decency and
humanity disrupts local anti-Semitic beliefs (e.g. that “Jews wake up every morning with their mouths full of worms”) and nationalist/imperialist dichotomies.59
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Tengour portrays the Algerian Revolution as a common suffering, which
brings the Muslim and Jewish families closer, as fellow victims of oppression.
“Today, you are like us,” says Mrs. Senkman to Tengour’s grandfather, relating
the Jewish experience to the colonial oppression of Muslims.60 Tengour’s father
is made a prisoner; the Senkmans’ son Albert is conscripted for service in the
French army, and the suffering of the Senkmans’ son, who after his demobilization hides in his room for years, seems to parallel Tengour’s stress-induced
ailments related to the imprisonment of his father. The penultimate paragraph
in Tengour’s account of his youth ends with his grandfather’s words, “Madame
Delage and her husband are good human beings. You must learn to open your
heart to goodness, no matter where it comes from. Your father is fighting for the
country’s independence. The French who torture him are not human beings.” 61
This story of Algerian childhood which began with the earthquake ends with
the juxtaposition of universal humanity with the inhuman violence of colonialism. The final paragraph turns to the boy’s eagerness to explore Paris, where
the family relocated in 1959,62 Unlike Khaïr-Eddine, Tengour portrays this exile
uncritically, as a liberation that marks the end of the story of his childhood.
Tengour’s memoir, “Childhood,” (in an anthology of Algerian memoirs of
childhood) presents both his early years in Mostaganem and his coming of age
in Paris in positive, even nostalgic terms. His nostalgia for his early childhood
is uncomplicated by the knowledge that these were the years of French rule in
Algeria: the pre-adolescent Tengour seems initially unaware of the French; they
are not part of his world. Moreover, this whole period of his life, “at that time”
is pushed into the realm of mythology by the account of the fish and the bull.
Between this idyllic beginning and the happy ending, Tengour’s memoir is a realistic account, focusing on his growing awareness of the meaning of colonialism
and decolonization.
How does the earthquake fit into this story? Tengour’s decision to begin the
narrative with the 1954 earthquake stands in contrast with the narrative focus
on decolonization as a coming-of-age story. Tengour’s inability to omit the seismic event, which otherwise fits ill with the themes and structure of his memoir,
demonstrates the prominence of the natural disaster in his memory of this time
of war. For many writers, a story that begins with Algeria in 1954 is assumed
to begin on the night of October 31. For Tengour, however, the earthquake of
September could not be separated from the story that he tells: the earthquake
marked the beginning of a series of violent events in the land of his childhood.
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Sites of Nostalgia
Unlike Dr. Aït Ouyahia’s nostalgic memoir, the works discussed here by Kréa,
Khaïr-Eddine, Tengour, and Bensimon (three professional creative writers and
one filmmaker, by trade) explicitly recognized that their representations of disaster and decolonization were creative acts. Implicitly, the pseudo-historians Bonheur, Croizard, and Wallet, who depicted the Fréjus disaster, also accepted this.
Local historians Lahsen Roussafi, Yazza Jafri, Abdallah Kikri, and Marie-France
Dartois of Agadir, and Jacques Torres, formerly of Orléansville, have taken a
different approach, going to great lengths to assemble documentation of the history of their pre-disaster cities, both textual and photographic. They have been
aided by their comrades in civic organizations in Agadir or in the communities
of the pieds noirs (“repatriated” Europeans of Algeria residing in France) from
Orléansville. The fruits of this collaborative research, accompanied by (often
fragmented) commentary by the authors, have been published in book form
and online.63 Maps and photographs figure prominently on these websites. Dartois’s website, mfd.agadir.free.fr, systematically reconstructs the geography of
pre-earthquake Agadir, district by district. While members of Agadir’s Forum
Izorane have aspired to the creation of a walk-through memorial park on the site
of the ruined Talborj or Kasbah, this website offers a kind of virtual substitute.
Both Agadir1960.com and Orleansville.free.fr also provide interactive forums
for the shared construction of memory.
Academic historian Claire Eldridge, in her extensive examination of the memorialization of colonial Algeria by France’s communities of pieds noirs and
of harkis (Muslim Algerians forced to flee Algeria due to their ties with the defeated French), has argued that “many pied noir associations take the view that
memory is the source of history,” placing great faith in their own ability to accurately represent the past and using documentary sources only when they accord
with a nostalgic view of the colonial era, rejecting outsiders’ attempts to present
more nuanced or contradictory views that might expose the injustices of the colonial system.64 The work of Jacques Torres and his collaborators at Orleansville.
free.fr fits this description. On the website and in a self-published book, Torres
depicts an idealized pre-revolutionary Algeria built by the French, but with the
harmonious cooperation of Muslim Algerians. Torres’s contempt for academic
criticism of the colonial project is palpable:
I am of the generation of May 1958 and I had to leave the land of my ancestors in 1962, chased by the “wind of history” declared by DeGaulle . .
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. [ellipse sic]. Since then, politically-correct [bien pensantes] heads spew
torrents of lies about the French presence in Algeria, denying the work
accomplished by our predecessors—become indigenous—in concert with
the aboriginals, the “Arabs.”65
Torres’s memorialization of colonial Algeria is framed as a response to decolonization, not geoenvironmental disaster; the 1954 earthquake is treated only
briefly, and serves mainly to convey the impression that Muslim Algerians were
well-cared for after the disaster, and perhaps overindulged.66 In keeping with
the process of selective memorialization described by Eldridge, no trace appears
of the suffering or even the complaints of the Muslim survivors in the wretched
fall and winter of 1954.
Torres’s erasure of colonial violence and oppression can be seen as stemming
from an ideological support of colonialism deployed both in order to construct
a nostalgic image of the colonial past and to defend the pieds noirs against
imputed guilt. However, the effacing of colonial violence evident in Torres’s
memorialization of French Orléansville is also found in memorializations of
pre-earthquake Agadir, and not just by French writers. Like Torres and the pieds
noirs, both Moroccan and French survivors of Agadir found themselves cut off
from the physical spaces they remembered because the built environment that
had shaped their lives had been reduced to rubble. As in the work of Torres,
the local history of Agadir compiled by Roussafi, Jafri, and Kikr is shaped by
nostalgia and avoids addressing the injustices of colonialism. Roussafi, in personal communications and public lectures, speaks about the benefits that the
French presence brought to Morocco, particularly in the form of the French
lycée. Pre-earthquake Agadir, especially the doomed Talborj, is consistently
portrayed as a site of inter-ethnic harmony; Roussafi has described life there as
“perfect cohabitation.”67 Agadir1960.com and Dartois’s website, mfd.agadir.free.
fr, are the interactive products of collaboration between French and Moroccan
Muslim survivors of the Agadir earthquake. In these spaces, the prevailing nostalgia and grief leave little room for memories of the violence of colonialism in
the city that was lost. For these survivors of the Agadir earthquake, the environmental trauma, not the trauma of decolonization, shapes an idealized memory
of the pre-disaster city.
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Mapping Loss
The attention to memories of spaces and places found in these internet-era memorializations of Orléansville and Agadir were prefigured in Ali Bouzar’s 1985
book-length memoir. Bouzar was in Oued Fodda during the 1954 earthquake
and in El Asnam (previously known as Orléansville, today, Chlef) when the 1980
earthquake struck. Bouzar had experienced the physical violence of environmental disaster even more intimately than had Aït Ouyahia or Khaïr-Eddine and
much more directly than Bensimon (safe in Montreal in 1960) or Tengour (who
experienced the 1954 earthquake from the safe distance of Mostaganem). While
Jacques Bensimon portrayed a pre-disaster past that contained intense suffering,
while nevertheless maintaining a nostalgic approach to that past, and Roussafi,
Jafri, and Kikr focused on remembering an idealized, harmonious pre-disaster
past, Bouzar’s disaster memoir Le Consentement du Malheur combined his nostalgia with an emphasis on the suffering caused by disasters themselves. Bouzar’s 1985 memoir is titled Récit: Témoinage sur la Catastrope d’El Asnam du 10
Octobre 1980 (Narrative: Testimony on the El Asnam Catastrophe of October
10, 1980), but Bouzar was also a survivor of the 1954 earthquake and of the years
of the Algerian Revolution. His memoir combines “long” views of those events
with his representation of his more recent memories of the 1980 earthquake.
Like that of Roussafi, Jafri, and Kikr, Bouzar’s narrative demonstrates that, for
some, natural disaster could eclipse the violence of decolonization.
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes described here, a predominant
early response was to call for reconstruction—the product of a pressing need for
shelter for the many, and, for a privileged few, a chance to take advantage of new
opportunities. When such reconstruction came too slowly, incriminations were
many. For Ali Bouzar, however, the proper response to the destruction of a city is
memorialization, not reconstruction: “For this city of memory, of imagination,
of childhood, no bulldozer, no engine of déblayage, even the most powerful and
effective, could destroy it, make it disappear. No new El Asnam, well-conceived,
beautiful, very beautiful, flowering white city of the future could erase it.” 68 In
contrast to Kréa, Khaïr-Eddine, or Bensimon, Bouzar does not accept that the
disaster has produced a rupture that renders the past unknowable or inscrutable
or in need of creative representation. For Bouzar, the pre-disaster city still exists,
indestructible in his memory, and he sets out to document it.
Unlike Aït Ouyahia, Tengour and Bensimon, whose treatments of the
decolonization-era earthquakes in Algeria and Morocco are framed within
the authors’ memoirs of their youth, Bouzar treats his youth in the context of
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a memoir ostensibly focusing on an earthquake. Bouzar declares his intention
to write only what he and his own family experienced themselves, organized
with a “metallic path, the cold of a stopwatch,” denoting the timing of events on
that fateful 10th of October 1980.69 Yet Bouzar warns his readers that they must
excuse his “digressions, backwards turns, evocations of certain details which existed before, which I knew before.”70 Such details are important, argues Bouzar,
because they constitute an important part of his memory of the city and because
they offer a bit of comfort to the grieving asnamis, the people of El Asnam.71 Like
Bensimon’s account of Agadir and like the later memorial websites, Bouzar’s
memoir focuses specifically on the people and spaces of the city. After the earthquake, explains Bouzar, the city is enveloped in dust that obscures, rendering
invisible buildings that have, regardless, been destroyed by the earthquake. The
act of writing restores these buildings and these memories.72 Memorialization,
for Bouzar (as for Jacques Bensimon regarding Agadir) is part of a search for
healing. Through his digressions, Bouzar’s account folds together an account
of the day of the 1980 earthquake with nostalgic memories of the Orléansville
of his youth.
Bouzar’s memoir is structured as a travel narrative, beginning with a tranquil
morning walk through the city the morning before the 1980 earthquake and
ending with his voyage, by car, out of the devastated city. Through this travel
narrative, Bouzar provides the reader with a catalog of his personal landmarks in
the city—cafés, stores, streets—reconstructing and memorializing the author’s
emotional geography, populating these spaces with memorable people both from
the day of the 1980 earthquake and from his youth, “the time of French occupation.”73 Along the way the reader is presented with descriptions and anecdotes spanning decades. The places destroyed by the 1980 earthquake are sites
of memories of colonialism, of the 1954 earthquake, and of decolonization. By
organizing his memoir geographically, Bouzar flattens chronology.74
Unlike Aït Ouyahia’s earthquake chapter or Kréa’s polemical play from the
1950s, Bouzar’s memoir shows little sign of nationalism or anti-colonialism, aside
from a single statement contrasting “national liberation” with “the atrocities of
colonial repression” among a catalog of misfortunes. These misfortunes are portrayed not as exceptional events but as integral parts of the human experience:
“like the death of a father. The things of life.”75 Bouzar displays little resentment
toward the French; writing in the 1980s, Bouzar’s ire is reserved for religious
ideologues. Contrasts between “the bipolarized society of the colonial period”
and the “apparently egalitarian post-independence community”76 seem effaced
in the stories of the eccentric characters whom Bouzar recalls from his youth:
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Tifnini, the irritable merchant; Qabech, the enormous, simple-minded porter;
Tonton Sennis, the black, French-naturalized, Muslim outcast; Bouzar’s mischievous gang of lycée friends.
Decolonization is nevertheless inscribed in Bouzar’s memory of the built environment of the city. The very names of the streets and buildings invoke the
manner in which the memory of the events of 1980 parallels memories from
the era before 1962, due to an official process of decolonizing place-names after
independence: “rue Dahnane” is “ex-rue Bugeaud”; “rue des Martyrs” is “ex-rue
Isly”; and Bouzar’s apartment building, “al Nasri,” is “ex-Le Progress.” More than
just names have changed; for each locale, Bouzar describes both what the place
was in 1980 and what it had been before independence. For example, Bouzar recounts how, the morning before the 1980 earthquake, he leaves the café that was
known “in the time of French occupation” as “La Rotonde” and walks through
the An-Nasr residential development. Bouzar informs the reader that, after the
1954 earthquake, this had been nothing more than a “stony wasteland, dusty
in summer and muddy in winter.” Without warning, the narrative shifts to the
context of the Algerian Revolution: “It was this stony wasteland that, one day, a
man crossed like lightning, and passed very quickly in front of me. Then several
seconds later, I heard an explosion, right on rue Isly, which I localized at the
café La Rotonde. . . . In a fraction of a second, I found myself, an adolescent of
15 years.” The violence of the anti-colonial struggle thus erupts into Bouzar’s
narrative of the 1980 disaster. The adolescent Bouzar is confronted by a “petit-blanc” (working-class) European man with a gun. Smoke and dust filled the
air, and “soldiers ran in all directions.” But Bouzar states that these were “already
common scenes,” and his youthful self carried on with his daily tasks. Similarly,
Bouzar the writer brings the reader back to the post-independence era, reminding the reader that this place became the site of the An-Nasr apartment complex
in 1962. Bouzar then proceeds with his narrative of October 10, 1980, leading to
his arrival, after his morning stroll, back at his family foyer, shortly before the
earthquake.77 When the earthquake strikes, Bouzar and his family survive unscathed, though covered in dust and emotionally shaken; not all of their neighbors are so lucky. In his description of the moments of the 1980 disaster, Bouzar
attributes his family’s survival to his experience of the 1954 quake, flashing back
to the events of his childhood: “By instinct, with my son held by the arms like a
sheep bleating in terror, I moved toward the center of the courtyard. By instinct,
and also because I had the reflex, unaware that twenty-six years had passed, previously, from September 9, 1954.”78 The seismic shock erases time; the events
blur together.
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Later, after the 1980 earthquake, Bouzar and his family are in their car, on
their way out of the stricken city, and they stop to check on the well-being of
family friends, and the narrative again swerves into the past. The car stops in
a “rocky, dusty place, overlooking ‘Train-Car City,’” (Cité Wagons), which, as
Bouzar explains, became a site of emergency housing after the 1954 earthquake,
where livestock cars were repurposed as temporary refugee quarters. Vacant
after 1958, the area became a hangout for Bouzar and his young friends, and
the anti-colonial struggle again erupts into the narrative: “an explosion.” French
soldiers posted nearby suspected an FLN bomb-making accident and responded
in force, setting up roadblocks and conducting a manhunt. The explosion, however, did not originate from a revolutionary bomb-maker, but from one of Bouzar’s mischievous friends, who had built a rocket (he later became, according to
Bouzar, a nuclear physicist for independent Algeria). Captured and dragged to
the police station, the boy scientist escaped imprisonment only because one of
his classmates was the son of the police commissioner: he was protected by the
privilege of attending an elite French school with elite French friends. Bouzar
and his pals also seemed buoyed by the resilience of youth (or the fog of memory): they experience the anti-colonial struggle in exciting anecdotes and the
1954 earthquake as the creator of their childhood haunts.79 But when the narrative abruptly returns to 1980, with the family driving out of the city, Bouzar’s
digression is immediately followed by a statement that seems to encompass the
violence of the past as well as the present: “I begin to be exceedingly tired of this
city in ruins, this disaster, these dead, these injured, the mad, the neurotic, these
human shadows who wander through the streets of the city, these victims.”80 In
his narrative, Bouzar leaves the ruined city behind, taking the road to Algiers.
Near the end of the memoir, the road passes through his natal village of Oued
Fodda, twenty kilometers outside of the city, where the ten-year-old Bouzar had
experienced the 1954 earthquake. Here, Bouzar recounts his experience of that
trauma: the family escaped harm but their home was so severely damaged it had
to be razed, and the family agonized for two days, fearing that Bouzar’s father
had died in Orléansville where he had been working.81 The memoir then ends
with Bouzar’s successful arrival in Algiers. Yet Bouzar’s desire to escape to safety
in 1980 stands in contrast to the author’s later nostalgia for the city of the past:
through his writing, he attempts to rebuild the city that bulldozers cannot erase.
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Unspeakable
Bouzar’s memoir joins together his memories of the earthquakes of 1954 and
1980 and of decolonization. These experiences, in his account, are inseparable,
coexisting in the places of his memory. Bouzar apologizes for the digressive and
nostalgic elements of his narrative, but makes clear that his real purpose is not
the orderly representation of the chronology of the 1980 earthquake but rather
the therapeutic recollection of the past: “to soothe the wounded heart of the
Asnami survivors (sinistrés).”82 Bouzar sees the act of writing as presumptuous
because the events he seeks to describe are beyond comprehension: “Unimaginable. What happened, in little more than half a minute, surpasses the limits of the imagination, defies human understanding and meaning, and returns
man to his first humanity, made of fragility, of temporality.”83 Bouzar points out
that that the disaster produced not only the thousands of dead and injured but
also “thousands more mad, neurotic, anguished, the mentally mutilated, and
hundreds of thousands more, finally, who can no longer live like others do, like
before.”84 Bouzar is one of the lucky ones: “Praise be to God! The drama that I
just lived struck a blow to my imagination, shook my heart, but passed over my
reason and my mind. It destroyed neither my reason nor my soul.”85 Bouzar says
that writing his “testimony” is an act of betrayal (“parjure”) against the shame
(pudeur) that envelops trauma in Algerian society, as well as an indiscretion in
the face of the silence of the dead.86 Nevertheless, having recovered his powers
of language, Ali Bouzar sought to put down in words what others could not.
Bouzar states that he offers his account of the disaster as an act of altruism, like
those who donated blood in the aftermath to aid the injured, and as act of consolation, like the prayers that Muslims around the world offered for the fallen.87
The Algerian poet Moufdi Zakaria, in a poem introducing Roussafi, Jafri,
and Kikr’s locally published history of the Agadir earthquake, echoes Bouzar in
describing the experience of some survivors of disasters, who find the horror and
loss unspeakable, and who find the memories of the disaster, and of life before it,
too painful to be expressed:
There are many victims of the Agadir earthquake who do not want
to remember
the seismic disaster, and hate all mention of it, and it causes them sadness
and pain, and reminds them of its cruel effects, and also reminds them of
those who are
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lost, loved ones and friends. They are, in fact, living in the disaster
continuously88
Bouzar describes a similar phenomenon among survivors, who are silenced
either by “the empire of terror and anguish, or . . . because shame, elemental,
almost natural within our traditions, wants us to silence the suffering of the
moment, the injury of the soul, the despair of being.”89 Bouzar recounts that
there was a moment when he, too, was overwhelmed by the horror of the disaster
and became speechless: “I am like an animal. . . . I imagine nothing, I no longer
envision anything.”90 This experience of wordlessness and unspeakability seems
to be a common response to disasters and has been identified in psychiatric and
psychoanalytic contexts as a symptom of psychological trauma.
However, as Michelle Belaev argues, “the ‘unspeakability’ of trauma . . . can
be understood less as an epistemological conundrum or neurobiological fact, but
more as an outcome of cultural values and ideologies.”91 Bouzar’s allusion to the
silencing effect of disaster suggests that he would agree with Belaev: the shame
that silences is only “almost” natural—it is the product of traditions. Such traditions need not be assumed to be of ancient origin. Paulina Grzeda has argued
that responses to painful events are also conditioned by “well-established conventions,” including the conventions of writing about trauma.92 Emilie Morin
has pointed out that the concept of “unspeakability” has also been “ubiquitous
in accounts of the Algerian War of Independence,” reflecting not only the horrors of torture, but also the silencing of voices by French censorship during what
the press could only refer to as the “events” in Algeria, and the independent Algerian state’s own silence about the divisions among Algerians during the war.93
This suggests that, in the context of decolonization-era disasters in the Maghreb,
invocations of unspeakability might be seen as responses conditioned by the
experiences and cultures of decolonization as well as by the effects of disasters
themselves.

Conclusion
For Moroccan, Algerian, and French writers, memories of the disasters that
destroyed Orléansville, Fréjus, and Agadir have prompted not just traumatic
silence but also a flowering of expression grappling with events and constructing memories of the places and people who were lost. The memoirs of survivors
and the imaginations of creative writers reveal the enduring interconnections
between the environmental and political events that began during the years
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of decolonization. These written works also often exhibit an appreciation of
the disaster as actor; the inanimate becomes not just context but the author of
human lives and deaths. These disasters, occurring during a sudden disruption
of the West’s political and military mastery of the planet, reveal the weakness of
the putative divide between the environmental and the social. They also reveal
how the events of decolonization and environmental disaster, however sudden
in onset, endure over time, not only in their observable, objective “effects” but,
as Zakaria points out, in the ongoing experiences of those who grappled with
the meaning of these events.
The events discussed in this volume—decolonization and environmental
disaster—were linked by synchronicity. In the memories of survivors, however,
the environmental catastrophes of 1954, 1959, 1960, and 1980 were also linked
to decolonization through categories of suffering and violence, and through the
geography of memory. It would be a mistake, however, to view these as mere
coincidences that were later joined. To tell the story of decolonization without
including these environmental catastrophes would involve assuming that political events were autarkic in shaping Franco-Maghrebi experiences in these years;
to tell the story of environmental disaster without reference to political change
would be to impose a division of events that is alien to the documentary record.
The memoirs and literary representations discussed here suggest that those who
lived the violence of decolonization and environmental disaster did not conceptualize or experience this violence in discrete categories. For these writers,
narratives of decolonization could not be neatly separated from the other disasters their communities experienced, and environmental disaster could not be
separated from the transformations brought about by national independence.
Yet the mutual imbrication of these events does not appear suddenly, decades
later, in works of literature and memory. The archival record discussed in earlier
chapters reveals that decolonization and environmental disaster were tightly interrelated through webs of causation and meaning, in both the “short” and the
“long” consequences and experiences of these events.
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Conclusion
Humanity and Environment

T

he history of disasters is both defined and obscured by the persistent tendency to privilege the results of deliberate human action in
history.1 If Agadir or Orléansville had been leveled by a bomb, their destruction would be as widely recounted as the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
But even human-induced events are often neglected if they cannot be ascribed
directly to human intentions.2 From this intention-centered perspective, our
understanding of the history of Fréjus seems to hang upon the validity, or lack
thereof, of the Schmidt-Eenboom hypothesis, and the history of the Moroccan
oil poisoning upon the culpability of the US military. We tend to think that
hundreds dead due to an attack matter in a way that hundreds dead due an unintended event do not. If the Front de Libération Nationale blew up the Malpasset
Dam, if we judge the mass paralysis in Morocco to be the fault of American imperialism, then these events attract our attention in a way that “mere” accidents
do not. A great chasm in historical perception separates the intended from the
unintended, the human from the inanimate. I would argue, however, that this
imagined chasm limits our understanding of history.
As Timothy Mitchell writes, “We have entered the twenty-first century still
divided by a way of thinking inherited from the nineteenth.”3 The tendency to
forget or ignore the suffering provoked by non-intentionally-induced rapid-onset
catastrophes is predicated on this way of thinking, which separates the human
and the social from the nonhuman. For millennia, humans from a wide variety
of cultural traditions tended to anthropomorphize the non-human forces that
shape our lives (and voilà, the sun became Apollo, and Indra made the rain).
The Western Enlightenment’s rejection of such explanations was accompanied
by the partitioning of the physical world from the world of human agents. The
former was assigned to science and engineering; the latter to history and politics.
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The notion of “environment” (etymologically, that which surrounds or encircles) is predicated on its opposition to the human agent at the center. Despite the
idea of motion imbedded in the root verb, virer, the environment is traditionally depicted as relatively stable, changing only slowly (but for human intervention).4 Thus twentieth-century scientists imagined the comforting stability of
an eco-system in the dizzying activity of nature. The human actor, by contrast,
moves impetuously within this “natural” environment, sometimes disrupting
it. But this kinetically based distinction between agent and environment fails in
the case of rapid-onset disasters, including both earthquakes and anthropogenic
accidents in which human creations unleashed massive and unintended effects.
Philosopher Jane Bennett asks, “How can humans become more attentive
to the public activities, affects, and effects of non-humans? What dangers do
we risk if we continue to overlook the force of things?”5 Disaster survivors were
often keenly aware of the “force of things” in human history, as decolonization
and disaster merged into a single perceived event: sudden motions of the inanimate physical world (rocks, water) intermingling with the actions of humans.
Of course, tectonic plates, bursting dams, and paralyzing chemicals do not
possess intentionality. However, as neuroscience, biochemistry and philosophy undermine the illusion of human intentionality, this point seems less and
less relevant, and what remains of the agent-environment distinction depends
largely on the distinction between motion (the agent acts) and context (the environment mostly just sits there, surrounding). Gregory Clancey has recognized
that rapid-onset disasters appear to possess the unpredictability, arbitrariness,
and suddenness of human actors—and also are humanlike in their tendency to
thwart modern imperial efforts to know-in-order-to-control.6 This is not to say
that slow-moving events like climate change, erosion or desertification do not
have agent-like characteristics: they have effects in history, and the environment
never really just sits there, surrounding. The inanimate world acts constantly: it
is “vital, energetic lively, quivering, vibratory, evanescent, and effluescent.”7 My
point here is that this agentishness of the physical environment —what Bennett has called “thing-power”8—is more visible in large-scale, rapid-onset events,
making “rapid-onset disasters” a useful category.
My goal in this book has not been to avoid anthropocentrism, for that would
be to write an environmental history of these events that makes human history irrelevant and thus reifies the separation of the non-intentional from the
historiography of the social and political. Instead, this volume has aimed to
explore the role of the inanimate-in-motion in human history. Obviously, the
scope of this book is delimited both spatially and temporally by human processes
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and anthropogenic places: the era of decolonization; the French empire since
1954; localities defined by patterns of human habitation. The focus throughout has been on the human experiences and human actions that followed the
unintended movements of rock, water and cresyl phosphates. I have sought to
investigate the history of a neglected category of event, unintended disasters,
and a neglected category of human suffering, the suffering of disaster victims.
This book is, in other words, a humanistic project: there are no disasters for the
inanimate, and rocks do not suffer. The emphasis here has been on how humans,
as the social animals that we are, interpret the movements of the inanimate in
the contexts of sociopolitical experiences—in this case, in the contexts of empire
and decolonization. Yet this book also strives to recognize that humans are not
the masters of their own fate, and that the nonhuman world shapes the human
experience. Human history is, in Mitchell’s words, “an alloy that must emerge
from a process of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and non-human, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is
always somewhat overrun by the unintended.”9
It is easy enough to recognize, with Rousseau, that there is no “disaster” separate from the human context it affects. As Mitchell notes, however, it is more
difficult to acknowledge that there is no human actor who is separate from the
environment.10 In examining the history of disasters, one might ask: which
is agent, and which is environment? Do the humans act, and environmental
events constrain these choices? Or does the disaster strike, and have an impact
on the human environment in which it acts? Using the rich variety of available
sources, the historian might tell a story in which the humans (their empires,
their revolutions, their hierarchies) are the environment, and the central agent is
the earthquake, flood, or poisonous compound which acts impulsively (though
not omnipotently, its effects being channeled by the human environment). Or
one might tell a story of human agents, occasionally jostled and challenged by
unexpected events in the physical, non-human environment, but exerting power
over each other and over the environment. Both of these possible narratives are
based on a dichotomy between the human and the environmental which is
highly problematic but difficult to avoid. Some historical sources, however, provide a glimpse of what it is like to experience the world without this dichotomy.
The “experts” who appear in this book tended to imagine themselves as free
and rational agents acting upon a knowable and pliable, if occasionally recalcitrant, physical environment, an approach which was consistent with the colonial desire to master both the environment and the colonized subject. Engineers, seismologists, and urban planners were confident in their ability to
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respond effectively and to prepare for future environmental events by building
a brave new world in a ruined landscape. They arrived on the scene in the wake
of the disaster, when the motion of the inanimate had ceased or diminished.
Among the experts discussed here, only the epidemiologists engaged with the
inanimate as it still moved with the speed of agency, playing real-time defense
against a still-advancing chemical toxin. The focus of this book, however, has
been non-experts, for all of those living in disaster-stricken areas experienced the
inanimate in motion. The poison in Morocco moved at a modest pace and was
initially unknown to its victims until after the fact, but floodwaters and seismic
waves moved with lightning speed through the human and human-built environment, felling buildings and bodies. This experience led to works of memory
and representation—by Henri Kréa, Christian Hughes, Ali Bouzar, Mohamed
Khaïr-Eddine, and others—that mark no great divide between the human and
the environmental, and in particular no great divide between the environmental
disaster and the other great transformation at hand, decolonization.
This book has demonstrated that the integration of environmental disasters
and narratives of decolonization found in memoirs and later representations is
also visible in the archival record produced in the 1950s and early 1960s. This
early documentary evidence reveals that, from the moment disaster struck, the
inanimate-in-motion shaped the human process of decolonization through
multiple avenues of causality, as reactions to these disasters impacted reactions
to decolonization. At the same time, humans interpreted the meaning of these
environmental events in terms of the political and social events of decolonization. Chemical toxins impaired a superpower’s pursuit of its Cold War objectives
while enabling the opposition party in a newly independent state to mount new
critiques of the national government. Floodwaters permitted the local reassertion of boundaries between colonizer and colonized in the provincial metropole,
in contravention of new state policies. Tectonic movements revealed and exacerbated the inequities of colonialism, undermined the crumbling legitimacy of
colonial rule, and inflamed the resentment of the colonized. Seismic waves also
created opportunities for diplomacy and the extension of new forms of foreign
influence, and destroyed precolonial urban architecture and ways of life. This
destruction catalyzed the expansion of domestic state power and created new
lines of cultural contestation in the post-colony after independence. In both the
immediate and long aftermaths of these events, survivors, witnesses and opportunists produced representations of disasters that merged the environmental
with the social and political.
Decolonization was not, therefore, a purely human story.
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(Orléansville-Esnam 1948–1966),” thesis (Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne Institut de Géographie, 1967), 82–89. Regarding the use of “abandoned” land, industries,
and housing, see also Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the
Present, trans. by Michael Brett, 9th ed. (London: Hurst, 1990), 133; James McDougall,
A History of Algeria (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 249. On the role of the war of
independence, compare Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830–2000: A Short History, trans. Jane
Marie Todd (Cornell University Press, 2001), 113; James McDougall, “The Impossible
Republic: The Reconquest of Algeria and the Decolonization of France, 1945–1962,”
Journal of Modern History (2011): 124.
7. Xavier Malverti, “Méditerranée, soleil, et modernité,” in Architectures françaises
d’outre-mer, ed. Maurice Culot and Jean-Marie Thivea, 29–64, (Liège: Mardaga,
1992), 39–41.
8. Aleth Picard, “Orléansville: La reconstruction après 1954” in Architectures
françaises d’outre-mer, ed. Maurice Culot and Jean-Marie Thivea, 65–75 (Liège: Mardaga, 1992), 70–75.
9. Malverti, “Méditerranée, soleil, et modernité,” 46, 51, 55.
10. National Research Council (U.S.), El-Asnam, Algeria Earthquake October 10,
1980: A Reconnaissance and Engineering Report, ed. Arline Leeds (Washington, D.C.:
National Technical Information Service, 1983), section 4, 29.
11. Malverti, “Méditerranée, Soleil, Et Modernité,”55.
12. Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 65.
13. Georges Hardy, “L’âme marocaine d’après la littérature française,” Éditions du
bulletin de l’enseignement public du Maroc 73 (Paris: Émile Larose, 1926); Georges Hardy
and Louis Brunot, “L’enfant marocain: Essai d’ethnographie scolaire,” Éditions du bulletin de l’enseignement public du Maroc 63 (Paris: Émile Larose, 1925).
14. Theodore Dalrymple, “The Architect as Totalitarian: Le Corbusier’s Baleful

Notes

251

Influence,” City-Journal, (Autumn 2009), https://www.city-journal.org/html/architect
-totalitarian-13246.html.
15. Jean Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” Bulletin économique et social du
Maroc 32, no. 118–119 (1973): 35, 48.
16. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 48.
17. Douglas Martin, quoted in David Seaman, “‘A Jumping Joyous Urban Jumble’:
Jane Jacobs’s Death and Life of Great American Cities as a Phenomenology of Urban
Place,” Journal of Space Syntax 3 (2012): 139.
18. Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5.
19. Thierry Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” in Architectures françaises d’outremer, ed. Maurice Culot and Jean-Marie Thivead (146–166), (Liège: Mardaga, 1992):
154–156.
20. Abderrahman Sbenter, “Eléments d’articulation urbaine, ville d’Agadir,” (fin
d’études thesis, École nationale d’architecture, Rabat, 1990), 58; My Ahmed Achehaifi,
“L’urbanisme moderne à l’épreuve: Cas d’Agadir,” (fin d’études thesis, École nationale d’architecture, Rabat, 1994), 161. See also Samira Saoudi, “Le passé, le présent, et
peut-être le futur du lotissement dans la ville d’Agadir,” (fin d’études thesis, École nationale d’architecture, Rabat, 1991), 66.
21. Achehaifi, “L’Urbanisme moderne à l’épreuve: Cas d’Agadir,” 131.
22. Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,”154.
23. Thierry Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” 165.
24. Mohamed Charef, “Agadir, une ville orpheline de son passé: Mesure le présent,
stimuler le futur,” in La ville d’Agadir: Reconstruction et politique urbaine (Agadir:
Royaume du Maroc, Université Ibn Zohr, 1997), 173. Even Péré, not generally critical of
the new city, believed that the high vacancy rates in the newly constructed urban center
were due to the fact that the European-style architecture was alien to the Moroccan
population. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 87.
25. Saïd Mouline, “Éditorial,” in Urbanités en recomposition, dialogues sur la ville: textes de références, commémorations du discours royal adressée aux architectes à Marrakech
ed. Saïd Mouline (Rabat: Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme,
de l’Habitat et de l’Environnement, 2000), 10.
26. Bell and de-Shalit, The Spirit of Cities, 13.
27. “The Long Shadow of Lyautey: Long-term Effects of French Colonialism on
Contemporary Morocco,” panel organized by Moshe Gershovich, Middle East Studies
Association annual meeting, 2012.
28. Mohamed Ben Attou, “Agadir gestion urbaine, stratégies d’acteurs et rôle de la
société civile: Urbanisme opérationnel ou urbanisme de fait?” Geomaghreb 1, (2003), http://
www.geo-maghreb.com/images/Downloads/Geomaghreb1/BEN%20ATTOU%20M
.pdf, 79.
29. Mohamed Bajalat, Libération (March 12, 2011), interview, www.libe.ma and
https://terriermichel.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/mohamed-bajalat-president-du-forum

252

Notes

-izorane-pour-nous-agadir-ofella-est-un-cimetiere-nous-ne-pouvons-donc-plus-accepter
-quil-soit-profane/.
30. Mohammed Ben Attou, introduction to Le grand Agadir: Memoire et defis du
futur, ed. Ben Attou and Hassan Benhalima (Agadir: Université Ibn Zohr, 2004), 11.
31. Ahmed Bouskous, “Où étiez-vous le 29 février 1960?,” interview by Abdallah
Aourik, Agadir O’flla, February 2008, 11.
32. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 89.
33. “Nouvel an amazigh: Agadir, capitale du Souss berbère fête Id-Ennayer,” January
9, 2017, https://www.lereporter.ma/nouvel-an-amazigh-agadir-capitale-du-souss-berbere-fete-id-ennayer/. See Tariq Kabbage, “Où étiez-vous le 29 février 1960?,” interview
by Abdallah Aourik, Agadir O’flla, February 2008, 13.
34. Tariq Kabbage, “Où étiez-vous le 29 février 1960?,” interview by Abdallah Aourik,
Agadir O’flla, February 2008, 12.
35. Lahsen Roussafi, Izza Jafri, and Abdallah Kikr, Mémoires d’Agadir au XXe Siècle,
vol. 1, 1901–1945, trans. Ali Ahlallay (Rabat: Imprimerie RabatNet, 2013), 11; Richard
Smith, Ahmad Al-Mansur: Islamic Visionary (New York: Longman, 2006), 1–42.
36. Janet Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 79–80; Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,”44; Roussafi et al.,
Mémoires d’Agadir vol. 1, 1901–1945, 12–17. According to Abu Lughod, while the development of the port at Mogador also contributed to the decline of Rabat in the late 1700s,
the 1755 Lisbon/Meknes earthquake may also have played a significant role: a tidal wave
seems to have exacerbated tidal and/or sandbar inconveniences of the Bou Regreg harbor. Abu Lughod notes that there is some uncertainty about both the environmental
and political events.
37. Péré, 43–44; Marie-France Dartois, Agadir et le sud marocain (Paris: Éditions de
Courcelles, 2008), 476.
38. Roussafi et al., Mémoires d’Agadir, vol. 1, 1901–1945, 20–28; Kenneth Brown,
Ahmed Lakhsassi, and Ibn Ighil, “Every Man’s Disaster, the Earthquake of Agadir: A
Berber (Tashelhit) Poem,” Maghreb Review 5, no. 5–6 (1980): 126. As Brown and Lakhsassi put it, “In 1911, Agadir entered international history.”
39. Rabinow, French Modern, 112.
40. Rabinow, French Modern, 116.
41. As Rabinow has argued, Lyautey’s approach to urban planning was influenced by
“a slow but sustained move toward separating cultures [that] had already begun in other
parts of North Africa,” particularly Tunisia. Rabinow, French Modern, 298. Lyautey was
also influenced by the work of thinkers on the French left, whose ideas of technocratic
elitism and social paternalism crossed political divides to form a new hegemony. Urbanism, argues Rabinow, was no longer about arranging space but creating social relations.
See also Rabinow, 261–262.
42. Quoted in Gwendolyn Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy, 1900–1930,” Journal of Modern History
59 (1987): 302.

Notes

253

43. Abu-Lughod, Rabat, 142,145.
44. Both Dethier and Rabinow have offered important critiques of Abu-Lughod’s
description of the cordon sanitaire as an effective barrier to intra-urban migration and
cultural mixing. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 11; Rabinow, French Modern, 300–301.
45. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 45; Dartois, Agadir et le Sud marocain, 527.
46. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 7.
47. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 45.
48. Péré, 45; Dartois, Agadir et le Sud marocain, 539–541; Roussafi et al, Mémoires
d’Agadir, vol. 1, 1901–1945, 73–80. On Rabat and Casablanca: Abu-Lughod, Rabat, 201;
Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 11; Rabinow, French Modern, 300–301.
49. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 48.
50. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 48–49, 57.
51. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 50.
52. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 7.
53. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 27–34; Rabinow, French Modern, 3. In
Rabinow’s words, “Ecochard’s blithe attitude toward historical and ethnographic realities was not untypical of high modernism in architecture. History was imaginary;
nineteenth-century European imperialism had ceased to exist. . . . Following high modernist principles, Ecochard held that human needs were universal.”
54. Rabinow, French Modern, 4.
55. Daniel Williford, “Seismic Politics: Risk and Reconstruction After the 1960
Earthquake in Agadir, Morocco,” Technology and Culture 58 (2017): 990–1002; J.
Despeyroux, “The Agadir Earthquake of February 29th 1960: Behavior of Modern
Buildings during the Earthquake,” Proceedings of the World Conference on Earthquake
Engineering (1960): 522; Committee of Structural Steel Producers, The Agadir, Morocco
Earthquake February 29, 1960 (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1962),
38. Williford has shown that these conclusions were conditioned by a circular set of
assumptions: the exact epicenter could not be located solely based on the output of distant seismographs and therefore depended on engineering analyses of damage—which
depended, in turn, on engineers’ beliefs about the vulnerability of different types of
construction.
56. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 52.
57. Péré, “Agadir, ville nouvelle,” 48–55.
58. Williford, “Seismic Politics,” 990–1002.
59. Rabat to ICA, March 31 1960, United States National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA) RG 469, entry UD376, ICA Deputy Director, box 330,
folder “Morocco: Disasters: Earthquake.”
60. “Des problèmes qui demeure,” Al-Istiqlal, March 12, 1960.
61. Lehman, “The Reconstruction of Agadir,” trans. Language Services Section (Rabat: United States Operations Mission to Morocco, April 1960). Due to the
earthquake, Agadir became immediately connected to an international network of

254

Notes

information, individuals, and organizations interested in the study of earthquakes and
the mitigation of earthquake hazards. While the French and Moroccan press often portrayed the catastrophe in Agadir as akin to those of Fréjus and Orléansville, in the global
press Agadir was suddenly discussed in terms of a category of cities that included San
Francisco, Santiago, Messina, and Tokyo. The team of West German engineers and scientists who accompanied the German consul to Casablanca on an inspection of the site
were soon followed by engineers from the American Iron and Steel Institute. The Japanese Ministry of Reconstruction sent two seismologists in April 1960 for a one-month
mission; Japanese interest was also expressed by cosponsoring a UN resolution exhorting member countries to assist the people of Agadir, and one of the French coopérants
in Agadir, engineer Robert Ambroggi, was invited to participate in a conference in
Toyko in July 1960. Jean Daridan to Affaires Étrangères, April 7, 1960, archives of the
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Centre de la Courneuve, Maroc 1956–1968, box 9/10,
folder “Généralités 1960;” Agenda Item 21, April 6, 1960, United Nations Economic
and Social Council, 29th session, NARA RG 59, UD-07D, box 10, folder “Emergency
Aid to Agadir;” Hamer to ICA, May 25, 1960, NARA RG 469, UD376, box 330, folder
“Morocco—Disasters: Earthquake.”
62. Rabinow, French Modern, 39.
63. Nicholas Shrady, The Last Day: Wrath, Ruin, and Reason in the Great Lisbon
Earthquake of 1755 (New York: Viking, 2008), 156–160; Kevin Rozario, “What Comes
Down Must Go Up,” in American Disasters, ed. Steven Biel (New York and London:
New York University Press, 2001), 72–102.
64. Hassan II, “Message de S. M. Hassan II,” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et
d’urbanisme” 4 (1966): 2.
65. Hassan II, “Message de S. M. Hassan II,” 2.
66. Hassan II, “Message de S. M. Hassan II,” 2.
67. Rabinow, French Modern, 76, 235. See also Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au
Maroc,” 37. For a comparative example, see Charles Schencking, “The Great Kanto
Earthquake and the Culture of Catastrophe and Reconstruction in 1920s Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 34 (2008): 295–331.
68. “Agadir 1960–1965,” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme” 4
(1966): 4. See also Nadau, “La Reconstruction d’Agadir,” 148.
69. Mourad Ben Embarek, “Tourisme et urbanisme,” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme” 4 (1966): 64.
70. Ben Embarek, “Tourisme et urbanisme,” 65.
71. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 49.
72. Royaume du Maroc, Haut-Commissariat de la Reconstruction, Agadir: Information, urbanisme, aide de l’ état-1962, pamphlet, Centre de Documentation, Ministère
d’Intérieur Direction de l’Urbanisme et de l’Habitat, Rabat; David T. Hicks, “Rebuilt
Agadir.” Architectural Review 142 (1967): 295. See also Ahmed Lasky, “La renaissance d’Agadir.” Europe France Outremer 428, (1965): 51–55; Williford, “Seismic Politics,” 1004.

Notes

255

73. Williford, “Seismic Politics,” 1006. Williford also notes that attempts by residents
to play a role in shaping the future of their city through an organized “Victim’s Committee” in 1961 had little impact. Williford, “Seismic Politics,” 1010.
74. Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” 151.
75. Rabinow, French Modern, 290–291.
76. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 13; Rabinow, French Modern, 290–293;
Abu Lughod, Rabat, 168–169.
77. Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity,” 300.
78. Nadau, “La Reconstruction d’Agadir,” 150.
79. Nadau, “La Reconstruction d’Agadir,” 160. A concurring assessment is found in
“Memorandum of Conversation,” Thomas Larsen (U.S. Foreign Service) with André
Millot, Affaires Étrangères, February 14, 1961, NARA RG 59, entry 3109D, box 1.
80. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 37.
81. Nadau, “La Reconstruction d’Agadir,” 49, 150. The team of architects included
Faraoui, Castelnau, Riou, Verdugo, Zévaco, Demazières, and Azaury.
82. Jennifer Roberson, “The Changing Face of Morocco Under King Hassan II.”
Mediterranean Studies 22, (2014): 65–67; Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 49.
83. Nadau, “La Reconstruction d’Agadir,” 154.
84. Rabinow, French Modern, 3.
85. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 11.
86. Rabinow, French Modern, 3.
87. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 39.
88. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 10. As Mas noted, aspects of the
natural setting considered more desirable were made integral to the new plan, such as
the elevation of the area that became the “new Talborj,” hills in the residential areas, and
dunes and valleys in the beachfront zone designated for hotels.
89. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 10.
90. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 15. Compare to Harland Bartholomew and Associates, “Agadir Master Plan” (Rabat: 1960), 26–44.
91. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 15.
92. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 15.
93. Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” 15; Nadau, “La Reconstruction
d’Agadir,” 152.
94. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 18.
95. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 28.
96. I thank Mohamed Bajalat for pointing out the echoes of the southern Moroccan
agadir (ksar or fortress), in the new Hôtel de Ville.
97. Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” 159; Williford, “Seismic Politics,” 110.
98. Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” 154–156.
99. Regarding education, see Spencer Segalla, The Moroccan Soul: French Education,
Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912–1956 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2009), 222–235; regarding urbanism, see Rabinow, French Modern, 287. For a case

256

Notes

study in the synergy between the colonial theories of the French right and the goals of
anti-colonial nationalists outside of Morocco, see Eric Jennings, “Conservative Confluences, ‘Nativist’ Synergy: Reinscribing Vichy’s National Revolution in Indochina,
1940–1945,” French Historical Studies 27 (2004): 601–635.
100. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 37.
101. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 48.
102. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 6.
103. Dethier, “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc,” 35.
104. Abderrafih Lahbabi, “Changement social et aliénation en architecture au
Maroc,” Lamalif, (1976): 54. Lahbabi cited Gramsci’s Literatura y vida nacional as well
as Althusser’s Pour Marx.
105. Hassan II, “Texte du discours royal pronouncé devant le corps des architectes le
14/1/1986,” Al Omrane 5, (1986): 4, 8. See also Benjamin Barber, “Jihad vs McWorld,” in
Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader, ed. Patrick O’Meara et al.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 23–33.
106. Roberson, 97.
107. See Ann Wainscott, “Opposition Failure Or Regime Success? Education, the Decline of the Left and the Rise of Islamism in Post-Independence Morocco” (unpublished
paper, Florida Maghreb Workshop, Tampa: 2013).
108. Lahbabi, “Changement social et aliénation,” 52.
109. Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” 165.
110. After Hassan’s death in 1999, King Mohammed VI’s ambitious urban renewal
projects in Rabat-Salé and Tangier suggest a shift away from the Lyautey-Hassan model
promoting traditionalism and toward the model of the Persian Gulf ’s “global cities,”
particularly Doha and Dubai. Joomi Lee, “Urban Politics of the Bouregreg Project: The
Integration of Rabat-Salé and Morocco’s Monarchial State,” Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, 2011.
111. Nadau, “La reconstruction d’Agadir,” 160.
112. For the region of greater Agadir, the population rose from 39,000 to 114,000.
Brahim Kidou, “Les Changements Démographiques d’une Nouvelle Grande Ville Au
Sud Du Maroc: Le Grand Agadir,” September 28, 2009, http://www.abhatoo.net.ma/
index.php/fre/content/download/11814/195728/file/KidouBrahim.pdf. Kidou bases
these figures on official census reports.
113. Royaume du Maroc, Haut Commissariat au Plan, “Recensement Général de
la Population et de l’Habitat de 2004: Population Légale du Maroc,” 2004. In contrast, Tangiers had 2,323 foreigners out of 173,477 (1.3 percent). Mohammedia, a beach
town located between Casablanca and Rabat, housed 1,240 foreigners out of 188,619
(0.7 percent).

Notes

257

Chapter 7
1. Ibn Ighil, “The Tale of Agadir,” trans. from Tashelhit in Kenneth Brown, Ahmed
Lakhsassi, and Ibn Ighil, “Every Man’s Disaster, the Earthquake of Agadir: A Berber
(Tashelhit) Poem.” Maghreb Review 5, no. 5–6 (1980): 128.
2. Brown and Lakhsassi, “Every Man’s Disaster,” 129, 131.
3. There is a clear contrast in social backgrounds between Ibn Ighil, a rural,
Tashelhit-speaking oral poet, and the urban, middle-class, French-literate writers considered in this chapter. However, further study would be needed before one could make
generalizations about a correlation between social class or origins and the degree to
which environmental events are interpreted through a political lens.
4. E.g. Kate Marsh and Nicola Frith, eds., France’s Lost Empires: Fragmentation, Nostalgia, and La Fracture Coloniale (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).
5. William Bissell has explored issues of nostalgia among the formerly colonized in
“Engaging Colonial Nostalgia,” Cultural Anthropology 20, (2005): 215–248.
6. Henri Kréa, Le séisme: Tragédie (Paris: Pierre Jean Oswald, 1958), 81.
7. Belgacem Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières: Souvenirs et digressions d’un médecin
algérien, fils d’ instituteur d’origine indigène (Algiers: Casbah Éditions, 1999), 279.
8. James McDougall has warned against reading hegemonic strands of nationalist
narratives as teleological and monolithic rather than multiple and continually contested.
James McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12–14. On competing visions of the role of “Arabs” and
“Berbers” in the Algerian nation, see ibid. 74–86, 184–216. On French colonial discourse
and policy regarding Berbers and Arabs, see Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Ernest
Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North
Africa (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1972).
9. Jean Bernard, C’est de l’ homme qu’ il s’agit, quoted in Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et
lumières, 9.
10. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 74.
11. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 65.
12. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 285.
13. Ahmed Raqbi, “Agadir dans les écrits de Tahar Benjelloun et de Mohammed
Khaïr-Eddine,” in Le grand Agadir: Memoire et defis du futur, ed. Mohamed Ben Attou
and Hassan Benhalima, 127–131 (Agadir: Université Ibn Zohr, 2004), 130.
14. Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir (Rabat: Tarik éditions, [1967] 2010), 119.
15. E.g. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 87.
16. Hédi Abdel-Jouad, “Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine: The Poet as Iconoclast,” Research
in African Literatures 23, no. 2 (1992): 145.
17. Larbi Touaf, “The Legacy of Dissent: Mohamed Khaïr-Eddine and the ongoing
cultural diversity debate in Morocco,” Journal of North African Studies 21 (2016): 53.
18. Abdel-Jouad, “Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine: The Poet as Iconoclast,” 148.
19. Touaf, “The Legacy of Dissent: Mohamed Khaïr-Eddine,” 53.

258

Notes

20. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 25.
21. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 48–58.
22. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 11–16.
23. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 14.
24. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 35.
25. Rachida Saïgh-Bousta, “Une vie, un rêve, un homme toujours errant...,” Le
Maghreb littéraire 1, no. 1 (1997): 21. See also McDougall, History and the Culture of
Nationalism, 195.
26. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 15.
27. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 106. See also p. 98.
28. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 110.
29. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 20–30.
30. Khaïr-Eddine, Agadir, 119–123.
31. Rachida Saïgh-Bousta, “Une vie, un rêve,” 20. See also Lucy McNeece, “Le jour
de la très grande violence: Agadir ou l’écriture séismique de Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine”
in Francophonie plurielle: Actes du congrès mondial du Conseil International d’Études
Francophones tenu à Casablanca (Maroc) du 10 au 17 juillet 1993, eds. Ginette Adamson
and Jean-Marc Gouanvic (Quebec: Hurtubise, 1995), 148.
32. Anouar El Younssi, “Souffles-Anfas and the Moroccan Avant-Garde PostIndependence,” Journal of North African Studies 23 (2017): 35.
33. Ted Steinberg, “Down to Earth: Nature, Agency, and Power in History,” American Historical Review 107 (2002): 819.
34. Touaf, “The Legacy of Dissent,” 53.
35. Claire Eldridge, From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the PiedNoir and Harki Communities, 1962–2012 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2016), 11.
36. In this respect, I would argue that Khaïr-Eddine’s 1967 novel differs from Nina
Bouraoui’s 1999 Le jour du séisme (Paris: Éditions Stock), which reflects a new generation’s concerns. As Slimani Aït Saada has argued, literary representations of Algerian
earthquakes written since 1990 have tended to associate seismic disruption with the
civil unrest and atrocious civil war that afflicted Algeria in that decade, as well as with
“social malaise, an ill-being [mal-être] of the youth in search of identity markers in the
face of unrestrained globalization and the upheaval of values in a fragmented society”
(El Djamhouria Slimani Aït Saada, Histoire De Lieux: El Asnam, Miliana, Tenes [Algiers: Hibr Editions, 2013], 283). With the passage of time, connections between the
1980 earthquake, the war of independence, and earthquake of 1954 have become less
prominent—in sharp contrast to their marked presence in Ali Bouzar’s 1985 memoir. Yet
for Bouraoui, removed from the epicenters of this violence, even the more recent trauma
of the 1980 earthquake can produce a powerful evocation of more universal struggles.
The interpretation of Bouraoui’s depiction of the 1980 earthquake as a metaphorical
disruption is valid: Bouraoui uses the earthquake to express themes of violent transformation related to adolescence, gender, and sexual orientation. As Karima Yahia Ouamed

Notes

259

has argued, Bouraoui’s decision to locate the earthquake in Algiers, where Bouraoui
lived as a child, rather than in Orléansville/El Asnam, distances the narrative from the
events of the actual earthquake (“De la double origine à l’être-deux dans l’écriture de
Nina Bouraoui,” Synergies Algérie 7 [2009], 221–229). See also Trudy Agar-Mendousse,
“Fracturing the Self: Violence and Identity in Franco-Algerian Writing,” in Violent Depictions: Representing Violence Across Cultures, eds. Susanna Scarpara and Sarah McDonald (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2006), 18–31.
37. Christiane Chaulet-Achour, “Itinéraires de mémoire,” Algérie littérature/action
39 (March–April 2000), http://www.revues-plurielles.org/_uploads/pdf/4_39_2.pdf.
Chaulet-Achour quotes Dehbia Aït Mansour’s review in Liberté, April 4, 2000.
38. McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism, 8.
39. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 13–24.
40. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 64.
41. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 282–283.
42. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 289.
43. The values of the Algerian Revolution are here portrayed nostalgically, and contrasted to more recent attacks on socialism by “our grand market economists and the
goals of our ‘structural readjustors.’” Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 291.
44. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 297.
45. In contrast to the Vietnamese doctors, discussed by Michitake Aso and Annick
Guénel, whose practice of medicine came to serve the anti-imperial war effort even as the
war effort facilitated medical research, Aït Ouyahia seems to have viewed the struggle
for independence as instrumental to or even subordinate to the medical struggle against
suffering. Michitake Aso and Annick Guénel, “The Itinerary of a North Vietnamese
Surgeon: Medical Science and Politics during the Cold War,” Science, Technology and
Society 18, (2013): 291–306; Michitake Aso, “Learning to Heal the People: Socialist
Medicine and Education in Vietnam, 1945–54,”in Translating the Body: Medical Education in Southeast Asia, eds. Hans Pols, C. Michele Thompson, and John Harley Warner (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press / University of Chicago Press,
2017), 146–172.
46. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 17.
47. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 21.
48. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 21.
49. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 13.
50. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 36, 30.
51. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 59.
52. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 161–166.
53. Bensimon, Agadir, un Paradis, 198–201.
54. Habib Tengour, “Childhood,” in An Algerian Childhood: A Collection of Autobiographical Narratives [Une enfance algérienne], ed. Leïla Sebbar, trans. Marjolijn de
Jager (St. Paul: Ruminator Books, 2001), 201.
55. Tengour, “Childhood,” 201.

260

Notes

56. Slimani Aït Saada, Histoire de Lieux, 276.
57. Tengour, “Childhood,” 202.
58. It is also possible that these were responses to the 1980 earthquake anachronistically projected back to 1954; Ali Bouzar’s account of the 1980 earthquake mentions
(and dismisses) beliefs that the disaster was God’s punishment for the mixing of wine
and couscous, and although Bouzar refers to this as a “famous” slur, it is not clear from
Bouzar’s account whether it became so before or after 1980. Ali Bouzar, Le consentement
du malheur: Récit: Témoignage sur la catastrophe d’El Asnam du 10 Octobre 1980 (Algiers:
Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1985), 150.
59. Tengour, “Childhood,” 207.
60. Tengour, “Childhood,” 208.
61. Tengour, “Childhood,” 211.
62. The Tengour family’s move to France was reportedly for “political reasons.”
“Habib Tengour,” Poetry International Rotterdam, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.
poetryinternationalweb.net/pi/site/poet/item/24142/Habib-Tengour.
63. Lahsen Roussafi, Izza Jafri, and Abdallah Kikr, Mémoires d’Agadir au XXe Siècle
v.1 1901–1945, trans. by Ali Ahlallay (Rabat: Imprimerie RabatNet, 2013); Lahsen Roussafi, Yazza Jafri, and Abdallah Kikr, Dhakirat Agadir fi al qarn al ashrin [Memories of
Agadir in the Twentieth Century], 3 vols. (Agadir: Raïssa Press, 2010); Jacques Torres,
L’Orléansvillois: Un Essai Sur l’ historie du département du Chéliff (Saint Sympohrien:
Micro et Logo, 2008); Marie-France Dartois, Agadir et le Sud Marocain (Paris: Éditions
de Courcelles, 2008). The websites are “Agadir,” at mfd.agadir.free.fr; “Site d’Orléansville et sa région,” at Orleansville.free.fr; and “Agadir 1960” at agadir1960.com. It should
be noted that Marie-France Dartois’s book takes the form of an academic work of historical writing, whereas her website falls into the genre of the other books and the websites discussed in this section: a reconstruction of the past through the arrangement of
documentary evidence.
64. Eldridge, From Empire to Exile, 260.
65. Torres, L’Orléansvillois, 7.
66. Torres, L’Orléansvillois, 175.
67. Lahsen Roussafi, lecture at Dar Si Hmad, Agadir, May 14, 2015.
68. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 17.
69. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 11.
70. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 9.
71. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 17.
72. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 49.
73. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 14.
74. Aït Ouyahia uses the framework of a road trip to similar effect, in chapter titled
“Itineraire,” integrating anecdotes and reflections on local history spanning two generations as the characters travel across Algeria. Aït Ouyahia, Pierres et lumières, 171–263.
75. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 162.
76. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 20.
77. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 27–29.

Notes

261

78. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 43.
79. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 129–130. Bouzar is inconsistent with regard
to stating his age in relation to the years in which his childhood memories occurred. He
says he was ten in 1954 (139) but says he and his friends were age 10–12 when they began
playing in cité Wagons “around 1958” (128).
80. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 130.
81. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 139–140.
82. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 17.
83. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 8
84. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 8
85. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 161.
86. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 8
87. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 12.
88. Moufdi Zakaria, “Agadir Alshahida,” in Lahsen Roussafi, Izza Jafri, and Abdallah
Kikr, Dhakirat Agadir fi al qarn al ashrin [Memories of Agadir in the Twentieth Century]: v. 3, (Agadir: Raïssa Press, 2010), 4. Segalla translation.
89. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 8.
90. Bouzar, Le consentement du malheur, 120.
91. Michelle Balaev, “Trends in Literary Trauma Theory,” Mosaic: A Journal for the
Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, 4 (2008): 257.
92. Paulina Grzeda, “Trauma and Testimony: Autobiographical Writing in PostApartheid South Africa,” in Postcolonial Traumas: Memory, Narrative, Resistance,
ed. Abigail Ward, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 66. See also Abigail Ward,
Postcolonial Traumas: Memory, Narrative, Resistance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2015), 5–7.
93. Emilie Morin, “Unspeakable Tragedies: Censorship and the New Political Theatre of the Algerian War of Independence,” in Theatre and Human Rights after 1945:
Things Unspeakable, ed. Mary Luckhurst and Emilie Morin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 21–22.

Chapter Eight
1. Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002), 29–36. Mitchell, in his chapter “Can the Mosquito Speak,” extends Spivak’s question to the nonhuman agent. Gayatri Spivak, “Can
the Subaltern Speak?” in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth
Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin (New York: Routledge, 1995): 24–28. See also Brock Cutler,
“Can the North Atlantic Oscillation Speak? Climate and Empire in North Africa,” and
Mitch Aso, “The Wrong Place, the Wrong Time: Pests, Weeds, and Other Unwanted
Colonial Actors,” papers presented at the 2017 annual meeting of the French Colonial
Historical Society.
2. Kai Erikson has called into question the usefulness of intentionality as a concept

262

Notes

for understanding the atomic destruction of these cities. Kai Erikson, A New Species of
Trouble: The Human Experience of Modern Disasters (New York: Norton, 1995), 189.
3. Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 1.
4. J. Stan Rowe, “What on Earth is Environment,” originally published in The Trumpeter 6, no. 4, (1989):123–126, revised version accessed August 10, 2017, http://www
.ecospherics.net/pages/RoWhatEarth.html.
5. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 111.
6. Clancey, Earthquake Nation, 5.
7. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 112.
8. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 2. For discussions of agency, “actants,” deodands, and
“agentic” powers, see Bennett, 9, 35. I have here introduced the term “agentishness” to
better convey the necessarily imprecise nature of such concepts.
9. Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 42–43.
10. Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 299. See also Bennett’s discussion of Bruno Latour.
Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 115.

Bibliography

Bibliogr aphy

Archives and Repositories
ANFP. Archives Nationales de France, Pierrefitte.
ANOM. Centre d’Archives d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence.
Archives Départementales du Var, Draguignan.
Archives Municipales de Fréjus.
Archives Nationales du Royaume du Maroc, Rabat.
Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaine, Université Ibn Zohr, Agadir.
Bibliothèque de l’Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh, Rabat.
Bibliothèque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc, Rabat.
Centre de Documentation, École Nationale de l’Architecture, Rabat.
Centre de Documentation, Ministère d’Intérieur Direction de l’Urbanisme et de l’Habitat, Rabat.
Centre Multimedia de la Direction de l’Urbanisme, Rabat.
Fondation du Roi Abdul-Aziz Al Saoud pour les Études Islamiques et les Sciences Humaines, Casablanca.
MAEN. Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Nantes.
MAEC. Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneuve.
NARA. United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park and
Washington, D.C.
Naval History and Heritage Command Archives. Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Service de la Gestion des Archives et de la Documentation du Ministère de l’Habitat, de
l’Urbanisme et de l’Aménagement de l’Espace, Rabat.

Published Works
“Agadir 1960–1965.” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme 4 (1966): 4.
Abdel-Jouad, Hédi. “Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine: The Poet as Iconoclast.” Research in
African Literatures 23, no. 2 (1992): 145–150.

263

264

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, Janet. Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco. Princeton University Press,
1980.
Accampo, Elinor and Jeffrey H. Jackson. “Introduction to Special Issue on ‘Disaster in
French History.’” French Historical Studies 36 (2013): 166–174.
Achehaifi, My Ahmed. “L’urbanisme moderne à l’épreuve: Cas d’Agadir.” Fin d’études
diplôme thesis. École Nationale d’Architecture, Rabat, 1994.
Agar-Mendousse, Trudy. “Fracturing the Self: Violence and Identity in Franco-Algerian
Writing.” In Violent Depictions: Representing Violence Across Cultures, edited by
Susanna Scarparo and Sarah McDonald. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2006.
Ageron, Charles-Robert. “Une dimension de la guerre d’Algérie: Les ‘regroupements’ de
populations.” Histoire du Maghreb (2005): 561–586.
———. Les Algériens musulmans et la France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
———. Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present. Translated by Michael Brett.
9th ed. London: Hurst, 1990.
Aït Ouyahia, Belgacem. Pierres et lumières: Souvenirs et digressions d’un médecin algérien, fils d’ instituteur d’origine indigène. Algiers: Casbah Éditions, 1999.
Aït Saada, El Djamhouria Slimani. Histoire de lieux: El Asnam, Miliana, Ténès. Algiers:
Hibr Éditions, 2013.
Alaoui, Moulay Abdelhadi. Le Maroc du traité de Fes à la Libération, 1912–1956. Rabat:
Éditions la Porte, 1994.
Albertini, A., D. Gross, and William M. Zinn, eds. Triaryl-Phosphate Poisoning in
Morocco 1959: Experiences and Findings. New York: Intercontinental Medical Book
Corporation, 1968.
Almeida, Dmitri. “Cultural Retaliation: The Cultural Policies of the ‘New’ Front National,” International Journal of Cultural Policy (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/1028
6632.2017.1288228.
Amster, Ellen. Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in
Morocco, 1877–1956. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013.
Ansari, Humayun. “‘Burying the Dead’: Making Muslim Space in Britain.” Historical
Research 80, (2007): 545–566.
Aso, Michitake. “Learning to Heal the People: Socialist Medicine and Education in
Vietnam, 1945–54.” In Translating the Body: Medical Education in Southeast Asia,
edited by Hans Pols, C. Michele Thompson, and John Harley Warner, 146–172. National University of Singapore Press/University of Chicago Press, 2017.
Aso, Michitake and Annick Guénel. “The Itinerary of a North Vietnamese Surgeon:
Medical Science and Politics during the Cold War.” Science, Technology and Society
18 (2013): 291–306.
Azzou, El-Mustapha. “La présence militaire américaine au Maroc, 1945–1963.” Guerres
mondiales et conflits contemporains 210 (2003/2): 125–132.
Balandier, Georges. “La situation coloniale, approche théorique.” Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 11 (1951): 44–79.

Bibliography

265

———. “La situation coloniale: Ancien concept, nouvelle réalité.” French Politics, Culture, and Society 20, no. 2 (2002): 4–10.
Barber, “Jihad vs McWorld.” In Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A
Reader, edited by Patrick O’Meara, Howard Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain, 23–33.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.
Bargach, Jamila. “Rabat: From Capital to Global Metropolis.” In The Evolving Arab
City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development, edited by Yasser Elsheshtawy,
99–117. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
Barrett, Roby C. The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under
Eisenhower and Kennedy. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007.
Barrett, H. R., H. Fox, and L. Stanier. “Agadir: Thirty Years since the Earthquake.”
Geography Review 4, no. 3 (1991): 35–39.
Baum, Dan. “Jake Leg.” New Yorker 79, September 15, 2003.
Baziz, Orna. “L’exode des rescapés juifs d’Agadir après le séisme de 1960.” In La Bienvenue et l’adieu. Vol. 3: Migrants juifs et musulmans au maghreb (XVe–XX e siècle), 57–
65. Casablanca: Centre Jacques-Berque, 2012. http://books.openedition.org/cjb/161.
Becker, Heike. “Beyond Trauma: New Perspectives on the Politics of Memory in East
and Southern Africa.” African Studies 70 (2011): 321–335.
Bedjaoui, Mohammed. Law and the Algerian Revolution. Brussels: International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1961.
Bekkat, Amina Azza. “Préface.” In El Djamhouria Slimani Aït Saada, Histoire de lieux:
El Asnam, Miliana, Ténès, 5–7. Algiers: Hibr Éditions, 2013.
Belaev, Michelle. “Trends in Literary Trauma Theory.” Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 4 (2008): 149–166.
Bell, Daniel A. and Avner de-Shalit. The Spirit of Cities: Why the Identity of a City Matters in a Global Age. Princeton University Press, 2013.
Ben Attou, Mohamed. “Agadir gestion urbaine, stratégies d’acteurs et rôle de la société civile: Urbanisme opérationnel ou urbanisme de fait?” Geomaghreb 1 (2003):
77–93.
———. “Introduction.” In Le grand Agadir: Memoire et défis du futur, edited by
Mohamed Ben Attou and Hassan Benhalima, 11–13. Agadir: Université Ibn
Zohr, 2004.
Ben Embarek, Mourad. “Chronique africaine.” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et
d’urbanisme 4, (1966): i.
———. “Tourisme et urbanisme.” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme
4 (1966): 65.
Benhima, Mohamed Taïba. “La renaissance d’Agadir.” Bulletin économique et social du
Maroc 89 (1961): 5–21.
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke University
Press, 2009.
Bergman, Jonathan. “Disaster: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis.” History Compass 10, (2008): 934–946.

266

Bibliography

Bernard, Stéphane. The Franco-Moroccan Conflict 1943–1956. Translated by Marianna Oliver, Alexander Baden Harrison Jr., and Bernard Phillips. Yale University
Press, 1968.
Berque, Jacques. Le maghreb entre deux guerres. 3rd ed. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962.
Betts, Raymond. France and Decolonisation 1900–1960. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.
Bissell, William. “Engaging Colonial Nostalgia.” Cultural Anthropology 20 (2005): 215–248.
Blair, Leon Borden. Western Window in the Arab World. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1970.
Blake, G. H. and R. I. Lawless. The Changing Middle Eastern City. New York: Harper
and Row, 1980.
Boittin, Jennifer, Christina Firpo, and Emily Church. “Hierarchies of Race and Gender
in the French Colonial Empire.” Historical Reflections 37 (2011): 60–90.
Bonheur, Gaston, ed. À Fréjus ce soir là. Paris: Julliard, 1960.
———. “Visitez la pompeï provençale.” In À Fréjus ce soir là, edited by Gaston Bonheur,
9–33. Paris: Julliard, 1960.
Bouraoui, Nina. “Ecrire, c’est retrouver ses fantômes [Interview with Dominique Simonnet].” L’Express. May 31, 2004. http://www.lexpress.fr/culture/livre/ecrire-c-estretrouver-ses-fantomes_819681.html.
———. Le jour du séisme. Paris: Éditions Stock, 1999.
Bouzar, Ali. Le consentement du malheur: Récit: Témoignage sur la catastrophe d’El
Asnam du 10 octobre 1980. Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1985.
Branch, M. C. “Physical Aspects of City Planning.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 441, no. 4 (1951): 269–284.
Brown, C. L. From Madina to Metropolis: Heritage and Change in the Middle Eastern
City. New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1973.
Brown, Kenneth. People of Salé: Tradition and Change in a Moroccan City 1830–1930.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976.
Brown, Kenneth, Ahmed Lakhsassi, and Ibn Ighil. “Every Man’s Disaster, the
Earthquake of Agadir: A Berber (Tashelhit) Poem.” Maghreb Review 5, no. 5–6
(1980): 125–133.
Buck, Carol, Alvaro Llopis, Enrique Najera, and Milton Terris, eds. The Challenge of
Epidemiology. Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization, 1989.
Burke, Beatrice. “With the International Red Cross in Morocco.” Australian Journal of
Physiotherapy 7, no. 1 (1961): 8–13.
Burke, Edmund III. “The Image of the Moroccan State in French Ethnological Literature: A New Look at the Origins of Lyautey’s Berber Policy.” In Arabs and Berbers,
edited by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, 175–199. Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1972.
———. “The Transformation of the Middle Eastern Environment, 1500 B.C.E.–2000
C.E.” In The Environment in World History, 81–117. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
Burkhalter, Sarah. “Négociations autour du cimetière musulman en Suisse: Un exemple
de recomposition religieuse en situation d’immigration.” Archives de sciences sociales
des religions 113 (2001): 133–148.

Bibliography

267

Busson, Henri. “Le développement géographique de la colonisation agricole en Algérie.”
Annales de géographie 7, no. 31 (1898): 34–54.
Cappe, Willi. Agadir 29 février 1960: Histoire et leçons d’un catastrophe. Marseille: Presses
de G. Cholet, 1967. www.agadir1960.com.
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Charef, Mohamed. “Agadir, une ville orpheline de son passé: Mesure le présent, stimuler
le futur.” In La ville d’Agadir: Reconstruction et politique urbaine, 167–180. Agadir:
Royaume du Maroc, Université Ibn Zohr, 1997.
Chaulet-Achour, Christiane. “Itinéraires de mémoire.” Algérie littérature/action 39
(2000). http://www.Revues-Plurielles.org/_uploads/pdf/4_39_2.pdf.
Cherkaoui, T. E., F. Medina, and D. Hatzfeld. “The Agadir Earthquake of February 29,
1960.” Mongrafia: Instituto geográfico nacional 8 (1991): 133–148.
Choi, Sung-Eun. Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony
Home. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Choubert, Georges and Anne Faure-Muret. Le séisme d’Agadir, ses effets et son interprétation géologique: extrait du séisme d’Agadir. Casablanca: Service de la carte géologique,
Rabat, 1962.
Christelow, Allan. “The Muslim Judge and Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and
Senegal.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 24 (1982): 3–24.
Church, Christopher. Paradise Destroyed: Catastrophe and Citizenship in the French
Caribbean. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017.
Clancey, Gregory. Earthquake Nation: The Cultural Politics of Japanese Seismicity, 1868–
1930. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
Clancy-Smith, Julia. “Algeria as Mère-Patrie: Algerian Expatriates in Tunisia.” In
Identity, Memory, and Nostalgia, edited by Patricia Lorcin. Syracuse University
Press, 2005.
———. Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900.
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2011.
———. Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1994.
Coen, Deborah R. The Earthquake Observers: Disaster Science from Lisbon to Richter.
University of Chicago Press, 2013.
Colonna, Fanny. Instituteurs algériens 1883–1939. Travaux et recherches de science politique no. 36. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975.
Comité d’Action Marocaine. Plan de réformes marocaines. Paris: Imprimerie Labor, 1934.
Committee of Structural Steel Producers. The Agadir, Morocco Earthquake February 29,
1960. New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1962.
Connelly, Matthew. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the
Origins of the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

268

Bibliography

Cooper, Frederick and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in
a Bourgeois World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Corroy. “Dam Project with a Storage Reservoir on the Reyran River (Var).” In Final
Report of the Investigating Committee of the Malpasset Dam, Paris 1960. Translated
by D. Ben-Yakov, 55–56. Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, n.d.
[original May 11, 1949].
———. “Geological Study of a Dam Project with Reservoir on the Reyran River North
of Fréjus (Var).” In Final Report of the Investigating Committee of the Malpasset Dam,
Paris 1960. Translated by D. Ben-Yakov, 50–54. Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, n.d. [original November 15, 1946].
Croizard, Maurice. “L’avenue de la mort.” In À Fréjus ce soir là, edited by Gaston Bonheur, 131–168. Paris: Julliard, 1960.
Culot, Maurice and Jean-Marie Thiveaud, eds. Architectures françaises d’outre-mer.
Liège: Mardaga, 1992.
Cutler, Brock. “Historical (f)Actors: Environments and Histories in Modern North
Africa.” History Compass 16:e12509 (2018): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12509.
______. “‘Water Mania!’: Drought and the Rhetoric of Rule in Nineteenth-Century
Algeria.” The Journal of North African Studies 19 (2014): 317–337.
Dalrymple, Theodore. “The Architect as Totalitarian: Le Corbusier’s Baleful Influence.” City-Journal (Autumn 2009). https://www.city-journal.org/html/architect-totalitarian-13246.html.
Dartois, Marie-France. Agadir et le sud marocain. Paris: Éditions de Courcelles, 2008.
Davis, Diana. “Restoring Human Nature: French Identity and North African Environmental History.” In Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North
Africa, edited by Diana Davis and Edmund Burke III, 60–86. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011.
———. Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial
Expansion in North Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007.
Davis, Mike. Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third
World. London and New York: Verso, 2001.
Davis, Muriam Haleh. “Restaging Mise en Valeur: ‘Postwar Imperialism’ and the Plan
de Constantine.” Review of Middle East Studies 44 (2010): 176–186.
Debia, René Yves. Orléansville: Naissance et destruction d’une ville: Sa résurrection. Algiers: Éditions Baconnier, 1955.
Despeyroux, J. “The Agadir Earthquake of February 29th, 1960: Behavior of Modern
Buildings during the Earthquake.” Proceedings of the World Conference on Earthquake
Engineering (1960): 521–541.
Dethier, Jean. “60 ans d’urbanisme au Maroc.” Bulletin économique et social du Maroc
32, no. 118–119 (1973): 1–56.
Dias, Jill. “Famine and Disease in the History of Angola c. 1830–1930.” The Journal of
African History 22 (1981): 349–378.
Djemai, Abdelkader. Saison des pierres. Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1986.

Bibliography

269

Donat, Olivier. La tragédie Malpasset. Mont-de-Marsan: Imprimerie Lacoste, 1990.
Drury, A. Cooper, Richard Stuart Olson, and Douglas A. Van Belle. “The Politics of
Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995.” The Journal of
Politics 67 (2005): 454–473.
Duffaut, Pierre. “The Traps Behind the Failure of Malpasset Arch Dam, France, in
1959.” Journal of Rock Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering 5 (2013): 335–341.
Dynes, Russell. “The Dialogue between Rousseau and Voltaire on the Lisbon Earthquake: The Emergence of a Social Science View.” University of Delaware Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper no. 293 (1999). http://udspace.udel.edu/
handle/19716/435.
Edwards, M. Kathryn. Contesting Indochina: French Remembrance between Decolonization and Cold War. University of California Press, 2016.
Effros, Bonnie. Incidental Archaeologists: French Officers and the Rediscovery of Roman
North Africa. Cornell University Press, 2018.
Eickelman, Dale F. “Is there an Islamic City? The Making of a Quarter in a Moroccan
Town.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, no. 3 (1974): 274–294.
Eldridge, Claire. From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-Noir and
Harki Communities, 1962–2012. Manchester University Press, 2016.
Elyazghi, Mohamed. “Dialogues sur la ville: La genèse.” In Urbanités en recomposition:
dialogues sur la ville, Textes et références: Commémorations du discours royal adressé
aux architectes à Marrakech, 12–22. Rabat: Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de l’Environnement, 2013.
El Younssi, Anouar. “Souffles-Anfas and the Moroccan Avant-Garde Post-Independence.”
Journal of North African Studies 23 (2017): 34–52.
Entelis, John. Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
Erikson, Kai. A New Species of Trouble: The Human Experience of Modern Disasters.
New York: Norton, 1995.
Evans, Martin. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War. Oxford University Press, 2012.
Evison, F. F. “Lessons from Agadir.” New Zealand Engineering 18, no. 10 (1963): 369–371.
Fanon, Franzt. A Dying Colonialism. Translated by Haakon Chevalier. New York:
Grove Press, 1967.
Faraj, Abdelmalek. “Historical Background to the Mass Poisoning in Morocco 1959.” In
Triaryl-Phosphate Poisoning in Morocco 1959: Experiences and Findings, edited by A.
Albertini, D. Gross, and William M. Zinn, 5–15. New York: Intercontinental Medical
Book Corporation, 1968.
____. “Social and Vocational Aspects.” In Triaryl-Phosphate Poisoning in Morocco 1959:
Experiences and Findings, edited by A. Albertini, D. Gross, and William M. Zinn,
156–159. New York: Intercontinental Medical Book Corporation, 1968.
Favier, René and Anne-Marie Granet-Abisset. “Society and Natural Risks in France,
1500–2000: Changing Historical Perspectives.” In Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, edited by Christof
Mauch and Christian Pfister, 103–136. Lanham: Lexington, 2009.

270

Bibliography

Fletcher, Yaël. “The Politics of Solidarity: Radical French and Algerian Journalists and
the 1954 Orléansville Earthquake.” In Algeria and France, 1800–2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, edited by Patricia Lorcin, 84–98. Syracuse University Press, 2006.
Flood, Christopher and Hugo Frey. “Questions of Decolonization and Post-Colonialism
in the Ideology of the French Extreme Right.” Journal of European Studies 28
(1988): 69–89.
Fontaine, Darcie. Decolonizing Christianity: Religion and the End of Empire in France
and Algeria. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Fordham, Lt. Cmdr. J. H. “Agadir.” Postgraduate Medical Journal 36, no. 421 (November
1960): 652–657.
Foucou, Marcel. Malpasset: Une tragédie déjà entrée dans l’ histoire: Naissance, vie, mort
d’un barrage. Fréjus: self-published, 1978.
Gaillard, Jean-Christophe, Ilan Kelman, and Ma Florina Orillos. “US-Philippines Military Relations after the Mt. Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disaster Diplomacy Perspective.” European Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2009): 301–330.
Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Roger. L’oeuvre française en matière d’enseignement au Maroc.
Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928.
Gellner, Ernest and Charles Micaud, eds. Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in
North Africa. Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1972.
Godfrey, C. M. “An Epidemic of Triorthocresylphosphate Poisoning.” Canadian Medical Association Journal 85 (September 16, 1961): 689–691.
Goebel, Michael. “‘The Capital of the Men without a Country’: Migrants and Anticolonialism in Interwar Paris.” American Historical Review 121 (2016): 1444–1467.
Gold, John R. “Creating the Charter of Athens: CIAM and the Functional City, 1933–
43.” The Town Planning Review 69 (1998): 225–247.
Gross, D., S. Robertson and William M. Zinn, ‘Organisation and Contributions.’ In
Triaryl-Phosphate Poisoning in Morocco 1959: Experiences and Findings, edited by A.
Albertini, D. Gross and William M. Zinn, 160–173. New York: Intercontinental
Medical Book Corporation, 1968.
Grzeda, Paulina. “Trauma and Testimony: Autobiographical Writing in Post-Apartheid
South Africa.” In Postcolonial Traumas: Memory, Narrative, Resistance, edited by Abigail Ward, 65–82. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Guerin, Adam. “‘Not a Drop for the Settlers’: Reimagining Popular Protest and
Anti-Colonial Nationalism in the Moroccan Protectorate.” The Journal of North
African Studies 20, (2015): 225–246.
Halstead, John P. Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism,
1912–1944. Harvard University Press, 1969.
Hardy, Georges. L’ âme marocaine d’après la littérature française. Éditions du bulletin de
l’enseignement public du Maroc 73. Paris: Émile Larose, 1926.
———. Une conquête morale: l’enseignement en A.O.F. Paris: Librairie Armand
Colin, 1917.

Bibliography

271

Hardy, Georges and Louis Brunot. L’enfant marocain: Essai d’ethnographie scolaire.
Éditions du Bulletin de l’enseignement public du Maroc 63. Paris: Émile Larose,
1925.
Hassan II, King. “Message de S.M. Hassan II.” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et
d’urbanisme 4 (1966): 2.
———. “Texte du discours royal pronouncé devant le corps des architectes le 14/1/1986.”
Al omrane 5 (1986): 3–15.
Haut-Commissariat au Plan. Recensement général de la population et de l’ habitat de
2004: Population légale du Maroc. Rabat: Royaume du Maroc, 2004.
Heggoy, Alf Andrew. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria. Bloomington and
London: Indiana University Press, 1972.
Hicks, David T. “Rebuilt Agadir.” Architectural Review 142 (1967): 292–300.
Horowitz, Andy. “The Complete Story of the Galveston Horror: Trauma, History, and
the Great Storm of 1900.” In Environmental Disaster in the Gulf South, edited by
Cindy Ermus, 62–79. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2018.
Hoisington, William. The Casablanca Connection: French Colonial Policy, 1936–1943.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
———. “The Selling of Agadir: French Business Promotion in the 1930s.” International
Journal of African Historical Studies 18 (1985): 315–324.
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. New York: Viking Press, 1978.
House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Hughes, Christian. “Souvenir d’un jour tragique.” In Barrage de Malpasset: De sa conception à sa rupture, edited by Vito Valenti and Alfred Bertini, 109–110. Le Pradet:
Éditions du Lau/ Societé d’histoire de Fréjus et de sa région, 2003.
Ifowodo, Ogaga. History, Trauma, and Healing in Postcolonial Narratives: Reconstructing Identities. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Jennings, Eric. “Conservative Confluences, ‘Nativist’ Synergy: Reinscribing Vichy’s
National Revolution in Indochina, 1940–1945.” French Historical Studies 27, no. 3
(2004): 601–635.
Johnson, Jennifer. The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Health Care, Humanitarianism.
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
Jones, Randolph. “Otto Passman and Foreign Aid: The Early Years.” Louisiana History:
The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 26, no. 1 (1985): 53–62.
Julien, Charles-André. Le Maroc face aux impérialismes 1415–1956. Paris: Éditions
J. A., 1978.
Kelman, Ilan. Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters Affect Peace and Conflict. Abingdon
and New York: Routledge, 2011.
Khaïr-Eddine, Mohammed. Agadir. Rabat: Tarik Éditions, [1967] 2010.
Khalfa, Boualem, Henri Alleg, and Abdelhamid Benzine. La grande aventure d’Alger
Républicain. Paris: Éditions Messidor, 1987.

272

Bibliography

Kidou, Brahim. “Les changements démographiques d’une nouvelle grande ville au sud
du Maroc: Le Grand Agadir.” (September 28, 2009). http://www.abhatoo.net.ma/
index.php/fre/content/download/11814/195728/file/KidouBrahim.pdfMarrakech.
Kréa, Henri. Séisme: Tragédie. Paris: Pierre Jean Oswald, 1958.
Krieger, Nancy. “Epidemiology and the Web of Causation: Has Anyone seen the Spider?” Social Science and Medicine 39, no. 7 (1994): 887–903.
LaCapra, Dominick. History and Memory after Auschwitz. Cornell University
Press, 1998.
____. “Trauma, Absence, Loss.” Critical Inquiry 25 (1999): 696–727.
Lagumina, Salvatore. The Great Earthquake: America Comes to Messina’s Rescue.
Youngstown, NY: Teneo Press, 2008.
Lahbabi, Abderrafih. “Changement social et aliénation en architecture au Maroc.” Lamalif 77, (1976): 50–54.
Landauer. “Outline of Master Plan for the Reconstruction of Agadir.” In The Reconstruction of Agadir, Translation no. 3118(60), 1–6. Rabat: United States of America
Operations Mission to Morocco, 1960.
Laroui, Abdallah. L’ histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthèse. Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 1995.
Laskier, Michael. North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: The Jews of Morocco,
Tunisia, and Algeria. 2nd ed. New York University Press, 1997.
Lasky, Ahmed. “La renaissance d’Agadir.” Europe france outremer 428 (1965): 51–55.
Le Toullec, Roger. Agadir 1960: Mémoire d’un séisme. Nantes: Éditions Marines,
2002.
Lee, Joomi. “Urban Politics of the Bouregreg Project: The Integration of Rabat-Salé and
Morocco’s Monarchial State.” Conference Paper, Middle East Studies Association
Annual Meeting, 2011.
Lehman. The Reconstruction of Agadir. Translated by Language Service Section. Rabat:
United States Operations Mission to Morocco, April 1960.
Lorcin, Patricia. Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria. New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995.
———. “Women, Gender and Nation in Colonial Novels of Interwar Algeria.” Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques (2002): 163–184.
Luckhurst, Roger. The Trauma Question. London and New York: Taylor and
Francis, 2008.
Lyons, Amelia H. The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the
French Welfare State during Decolonization. Stanford University Press, 2013.
———. “The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Immigrants in France and
the Politics of Adaptation during Decolonization.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32
(2006): 489–516.
Malverti, Xavier. “Méditerranée, soleil, et modernité.” In Architectures françaises
d’outre-Mer, edited by Maurice Culot and Jean-Marie Thivea, 29–64. Liège:
Mardaga, 1992.

Bibliography

273

Mann, Gregory. “Locating Colonial Histories: Between France and West Africa.” The
American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (2005): 409–434.
Marsh, Kate and Nicola Frith, eds. France’s Lost Empires: Fragmentation, Nostalgia, and
La Fracture Coloniale. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.
Mas, Pierre. “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement.” A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme 4 (1966): 6.
McDougall, James. History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
———. A History of Algeria. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
———. “The Impossible Republic: The Reconquest of Algeria and the Decolonization
of France, 1945–1962.” Journal of Modern History (2011): 772–811.
———. “Martyrdom and Destiny: The Inscription and Imagination of Algerian History.” In Memory and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa, edited by Ussama
Makdisi and Paul Silverstein, 50–72. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
———. “Savage Wars: Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s.” Third World Quarterly 26, (2005): 117–131.
McNeece, Lucy. “Le jour de la très grande violence: Agadir ou l’écriture séismique de
Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine.” In Francophonie plurielle: Actes du congrès mondial du
conseil international d’ études francophones tenu à Casablanca (Maroc) du 10 au 17
juillet 1993, edited by Ginette Adamson and Jean-Marc Gouanvic, 147–158. Quebec:
Hurtubise, 1995.
Menant, Georges. “La vielle femme et le barrage.” In À Fréjus ce soir là, edited by Gaston
Bonheur, 35–79. Paris: Julliard, 1960.
Millecam, Jean-Pierre. “Apocalypses.” In An Algerian Childhood: A Collection of Autobiographical Narratives [Une enfance algérienne]. Translated by Marjolijn de Jager,
edited by Leïla Sebbar, 161–174. St. Paul: Ruminator Books, 2001.
Ministère de l’Agriculture. Final Report of the Investigating Committee of the Malpasset Dam, Paris 1960 [Commission d’enquête du barrage de Malpasset, rapport definitif ]. Translated by D. Ben-Yakov. Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, n.d.
Ministère du Développement Durable. “Rupture d’un barrage: Le 2 décembre Malpasset
[Var], France.” Analyse, recherche et information sur les accidents 29490 (April 2009).
Minkin, Shana. Imperial Bodies: Empire and Death in Alexandria, Egypt. Stanford University Press, 2019.
Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Mitchell, William A. “Reconstruction After Disaster: The Gediz Earthquake of 1970.”
Geographical Review 66, no. 3 (1976): 296–313.
Molotch, Harvey and Marilyn Lester. “Accidental News: The Great Oil Spill as Local
Occurrence and National Event.” American Journal of Sociology 81 (1975): 235–260.
Morin, Emilie. “Unspeakable Tragedies: Censorship and the New Political Theatre of
the Algerian War of Independence.” In Theatre and Human Rights After 1945: Things

274

Bibliography

Unspeakable, edited by Mary Luckhurst and Emilie Morin, 21–38. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Mouline, Saïd, ed. Urbanités en recomposition, dialogues sur la ville: Textes de références,
commémorations du discours royal adressée aux architectes à Marrakech. Rabat:
Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de l’Environnement, 2000.
Mulcahy, Matthew. Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Carribean, 1624–1783.
Johns Hopkins, 2006.
Nadau, Thierry. “La reconstruction d’Agadir.” In Architectures françaises d’outre-mer,
edited by Maurice Culot and Jean-Marie Thivea, 146–166. Liège: Mardaga, 1992.
National Research Council. El-Asnam, Algeria Earthquake October 10, 1980: A Reconnaissance and Engineering Report, edited by Arline Leeds. Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, 1983.
Nunez, Juliette. “La gestion publique des espaces confessionnels des cimetières de la
ville de Paris: L’exemple du culte musulman (1857–1957).” Le mouvement social 4
(2011): 13–32.
Osgood, Kenneth. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and
Abroad. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
Ouahmed, Karima Yahia. “De la double origine à l’être-deux dans l’écriture de Nina
Bouraoui.” Synergies Algérie 7 (2009): 221–229.
Ouardi, Brahim. “Écriture, théâtre et engagement dans le théâtre d’Henri Kréa et
Noureddine Aba.” Doctoral dissertation, Université de Oran, 2009.
———. “Mythe, théâtre et oralité dans Le séisme d’Henri Kréa.” Synergies Algèrie 3
(2008). http://gerflint.fr/Base/Algerie3/ouardi.pdf.
Pauty, Edmond. “Rapport sur la défense des villes et la restauration des monuments
historiques.” Hespéris: Archives berbères et bulletin de l’ institut des hautes-études marocaines 2, no. 4 (1922): 449–462.
Paye, Lucien. “Introduction et évolution de l’enseignement moderne au Maroc.” Thesis,
Université de Paris Sorbonne, 1957.
Pelling, Mark and Kathleen Dill. “Disaster Politics: Tipping Points for Change in
the Adaptation of Sociopolitical Regimes.” Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 1
(2010): 21–37.
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